1799-1800.
Difficulties of a new Government--State of Europe--Bonaparte's wish
for peace--M. de Talleyrand Minister for Foreign Affairs--
Negotiations with England and Austria--Their failure--Bonaparte's
views on the East--His sacrifices to policy--General Bonaparte
denounced to the First Consul--Kleber's letter to the Directory--
Accounts of the Egyptian expedition published in the Moniteur--
Proclamation to the army of the East--Favour and disgrace of certain
individuals accounted for.
When a new Government rises on the ruins of one that has been overthrown,
its best chance of conciliating the favour of the nation, if that nation
be at war, is to hold out the prospect of peace; for peace is always dear
to a people. Bonaparte was well aware of this; and if in his heart he
wished otherwise, he knew how important it was to seem to desire peace.
Accordingly, immediately after his installation at the Luxembourg he
notified to all the foreign powers his accession to the Consulate, and,
for the same purpose, addressed letters to all the diplomatic agents of
the French Government abroad.
The day after he got rid of his first two colleagues, Sieyes and Roger
Ducos, he prepared to open negotiations with the Cabinet of London. At
that time we were at war with almost the whole of Europe. We had also
lost Italy. The Emperor of Germany was ruled by his Ministers, who in
their turn were governed by England. It was no easy matter to manage
equally the organization of the Consular Government and the no less
important affairs abroad; and it was very important to the interests
of the First Consul to intimate to foreign powers, while at the same time
he assured himself against the return of the Bourbons, that the system
which he proposed to adopt was a system of order and regeneration, unlike
either the demagogic violence of the Convention or the imbecile artifice
of the Directory. In fulfilment of this object Bonaparte directed M. de
Talleyrand, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, to make the first
friendly overtures to the English Cabinet: A correspondence ensued, which
was published at the time, and which showed at once the conciliatory
policy of Bonaparte and the arrogant policy of England.
The exchange of notes which took place was attended by no immediate
result. However, the First Consul had partly attained his object: if the
British Government would not enter into negotiations for peace, there was
at least reason to presume that subsequent overtures of the Consular
Government might be listened to. The correspondence had at all events
afforded Bonaparte the opportunity of declaring his principles, and above
all, it had enabled him to ascertain that the return of the Bourbons to
France (mentioned in the official reply of Lord Grenville) would not be a
sine qua non condition for the restoration of peace between the two
powers.
Since M. de Talleyrand had been Minister for Foreign Affairs the business
of that department had proceeded with great activity. It was an
important advantage to Bonaparte to find a nobleman of the old regime
among the republicans. The choice of M. de Talleyrand was in some sort
an act of courtesy to the foreign Courts. It was a delicate attention to
the diplomacy of Europe to introduce to its members, for the purpose of
treating with them, a man whose rank was at least equal to their own, and
who was universally distinguished for a polished elegance of manner
combined with solid good qualities and real talents.
It was not only with England that Bonaparte and his Minister endeavoured
to open negotiations; the Consular Cabinet also offered peace to the
House of Austria; but not at the same time. The object of this offer was
to sow discord between the two powers. Speaking to me one day of his
earnest wish to obtain peace Bonaparte said, "You see, Bourrienne, I have
two great enemies to cope with. I will conclude peace with the one I
find most easy to deal with. That will enable me immediately to assail
the other. I frankly confess that I should like best to be at peace with
England. Nothing would then be more easy than to crush Austria. She has
no money except what she gets through England."
For a long time all negotiations proved abortive. None of the European
powers would acknowledge the new Government, of which Bonaparte was the
head; and the battle of Marengo was required before the peace of Amiens
could be obtained.
Though the affairs of the new Government afforded abundant occupation to
Bonaparte, he yet found leisure to direct attention to the East--to that
land of despotism whence, judging from his subsequent conduct, it might
be presumed he derived his first principles of government. On becoming
the head of the State he wished to turn Egypt, which he had conquered as
a general, to the advantage of his policy as Consul. If Bonaparte
triumphed over a feeling of dislike in consigning the command of the army
to Kleber, it was because he knew Kleber to be more capable than any
other of executing the plans he had formed; and Bonaparte was not the man
to sacrifice the interests of policy to personal resentment. It is
certainly true that he then put into practice that charming phrase of
Moliere's--"I pardon you, but you shall pay me for this!"
With respect to all whom he had left in Egypt Bonaparte stood in a very
singular situation. On becoming Chief of the Government he was not only
the depositary of all communications made to the Directory; but letters
sent to one address were delivered to another, and the First Consul
received the complaints made against the General who had so abruptly
quitted Egypt. In almost all the letters that were delivered to us he
was the object of serious accusation. According to some he had not
avowed his departure until the very day of his embarkation; and he had
deceived everybody by means of false and dissembling proclamations.
Others canvassed his conduct while in Egypt: the army which had triumphed
under his command he had abandoned when reduced to two-thirds of its
original force and a prey to all the horrors of sickness and want: It
must be confessed that these complaints and accusations were but too well
founded, and one can never cease wondering at the chain of fortunate
circumstances which so rapidly raised Bonaparte to the Consular seat.
In the natural order of things, and in fulfilment of the design which he
himself had formed, he should have disembarked at Toulon, where the
quarantine laws would no doubt have been observed; instead of which, the
fear of the English and the uncertainty of the pilots caused him to go to
Frejus, where the quarantine laws were violated by the very persons most
interested in respecting them. Let us suppose that Bonaparte had been
forced to perform quarantine at Toulon. What would have ensued? The
charges against him would have fallen into the hands of the Directory,
and he would probably have been suspended, and put upon his trial.
Among the letters which fell into Bonaparte's hands, by reason of the
abrupt change of government, was an official despatch (of the 4th
Vendemiaire, year VIII.) from General Kleber at Cairo to the Executive
Directory, in which that general spoke in very stringent terms of the
sudden departure of Bonaparte and of the state in which the army in Egypt
had been left. General Kleber further accused him of having evaded, by
his flight, the difficulties which he thus transferred to his successor's
shoulders, and also of leaving the army "without a sou in the chest,"
with pay in arrear, and very little supply of munitions or clothing.
The other letters from Egypt were not less accusatory than Kleber's; and
it cannot be doubted that charges of so precise a nature, brought by the
general who had now become commander-in-chief against his predecessor,
would have had great weight, especially backed as they were by similar
complaints from other quarters. A trial would have been inevitable; and
then, no 18th Brumaire, no Consulate, no Empire, no conquest of
Europe--but also, it may be added, no St. Helena. None of these, events
would have ensued had not the English squadron, when it appeared off
Corsica, obliged the Huiron to scud about at hazard, and to touch at the
first land she could reach.
The Egyptian expedition filled too important a place in the life of
Bonaparte for him to neglect frequently reviving in the public mind the
recollection of his conquests in the East. It was not to be forgotten
that the head of the Republic was the first of her generals. While
Moreau received the command of the armies of the Rhine, while Massena, as
a reward for the victory of Zurich, was made Commander-in-Chief in Italy,
and while Brune was at the head of the army of Batavia, Bonaparte, whose
soul was in the camps, consoled himself for his temporary inactivity by a
retrospective glance on his past triumphs. He was unwilling that Fame
should for a moment cease to blazon his name. Accordingly, as soon as he
was established at the head of the Government, he caused accounts of his
Egyptian expedition to be from time to time published in the Moniteur.
He frequently expressed his satisfaction that the accusatory
correspondence, and, above all, Kleber's letter, had fallen into his own
hands.' Such was Bonaparte's perfect self-command that immediately after
perusing that letter he dictated to me the following proclamation,
addressed to the army of the East:
SOLDIERS!--The Consuls of the French Republic frequently direct
their attention to the army of the East.
France acknowledges all the influence of your conquests on the
restoration of her trade and the civilisation of the world.
The eyes of all Europe are upon you, and in thought I am often with
you.
In whatever situation the chances of war may place you, prove
yourselves still the soldiers of Rivoli and Aboukir--you will be
invincible.
Place in Kleber the boundless confidence which you reposed in me.
He deserves it.
Soldiers, think of the day when you will return victorious to the
sacred territory of France. That will be a glorious day for the
whole nation.
Nothing can more forcibly show the character of Bonaparte than the above
allusion to Kleber, after he had seen the way in which Kleber spoke of
him to the Directory. Could it ever have been imagined that the
correspondence of the army, to whom he addressed this proclamation,
teemed with accusations against him? Though the majority of these
accusations were strictly just, yet it is but fair to state that the
letters from Egypt contained some calumnies. In answer to the
well-founded portion of the charges Bonaparte said little; but he seemed
to feel deeply the falsehoods that were stated against him, one of which
was, that he had carried away millions from Egypt. I cannot conceive
what could have given rise to this false and impudent assertion. So far
from having touched the army chest, Bonaparte had not even received all
his own pay. Before he constituted himself the Government the
Government was his debtor.
Though he knew well all that was to be expected from the Egyptian
expedition, yet those who lauded that affair were regarded with a
favourable eye by Bonaparte. The correspondence which had fallen into
his hands was to him of the highest importance in enabling him to
ascertain the opinions which particular individuals entertained of him.
It was the source of favours and disgraces which those who were not in
the secret could not account for. It serves to explain why many men of
mediocrity were elevated to the highest dignities and honours, while
other men of real merit fell into disgrace or were utterly neglected.