PARIS--THE FRENCH ARMY AND IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT.
IT is certainly a mistake to suppose, that the military power of France
was first created by Napoleon, or that military habits were actually
forced on the people, with the view of aiding his ambitious projects.
The French have a restless, aspiring, enterprising spirit, not
accompanied, as in England, by a feeling of individual importance, and a
desire of individual independence, but modified by habits of submission
to arbitrary power, and fitted, by the influence of despotic government,
for the subordination of military discipline. Add to this, the
encouragement which was held out by the rapid promotion of soldiers
during the wars of the revolution, when the highest military offices
were not only open to the attainment, but were generally appropriated to
the claims of men who rose from the ranks; and the general
dissemination, at that period, of an unbounded desire for violence and
rapine: And it will probably be allowed, that the spirit of the French
nation, at the time when he came to the head of it, was truly and almost
exclusively military. He was himself a great soldier; he rose to the
supreme government of a great military people, and he availed himself of
their habits and principles to gratify his ambition, and extend his
fame; but he ought not to be charged with having created the spirit,
which in fact created him; a spirit so powerful, and so extensively
diffused, that in comparison with it, even his efforts might be said to
be "dashing with his oar to hasten the cataract;" to be "waving with his
fan to give speed to the wind." The favourite saying of Napoleon, "Every
Frenchman is a soldier, and as such, at the disposal of the Emperor,"
expresses a principle which was not merely enforced by arbitrary power,
but engrafted on the character and habits of the French people.
The French are certainly admirably fitted for becoming soldiers: they
have a restless activity, which surmounts difficulties, a buoyancy and
elasticity of disposition, which rises superior to hardships, and
calamities, and privations, not with patient fortitude, but with ease
and cheerfulness. A Frenchman does not regard war, merely as the serious
struggle in which his patriotism and valour are to be tried; he loves it
for its own sake, for the interest and agitation it gives to his mind;
it is his "game,--his gain,--his glory,--his delight." Other nations of
Europe have become military, in consequence of threats or injuries, of
the dread of hostile invasion, of the presence of foreign armies, or the
galling influence of foreign power; but if the origin of the French
military spirit may be traced to similar sources, it must at least be
allowed, that the effect has been out of all proportion to the cause.
It is probable, however, that the effervescence of military ideas and
feelings, which arose out of the revolution, would have gradually
subsided, had it not been for the fostering influence of the imperial
government. The turbulent and irregular energies of a great people let
loose from former bonds, received a fixed direction, and were devoted to
views of military ascendancy and national aggrandizement under Napoleon.
The continued gratification of the French vanity, by the fame of
victories and the conquest of nations, completed the effect on the
manner and habits of the people, which the events of the revolution had
begun. Napoleon well knew, that in flattering this ruling propensity, he
took the whole French nation on their weak side, and he had some reason
for saying, that their thirst for martial glory and political influence
ought to be a sufficient apology to them for all the wars into which he
plunged them.
It is impossible to spend even a few days in France without seeing
strong indications of the prevailing love of military occupations, and
admiration of military merit. The common peasants in the fields shew, by
their conversation, that they are deeply interested in the glory of the
French arms, and competent to discuss the manner in which they are
conducted. In the parts of the country which had been the seat of war,
we found them always able to give a good general description of the
military events that had taken place; and when due allowance was made
for their invariable exaggeration of the number of the allied troops,
and concealment of that of the French, these accounts, as far as we
could judge by comparing them with the official details, and with the
information of officers who had borne a part in the campaign, were
tolerably correct. The fluency with which they talked of military
operations, of occupying positions, cutting off retreats, defiling over
bridges, debouching from woods, advancing and retreating, marching and
bivouacking, shewed the habitual current of their thoughts; and they
were always more willing to enter on the details of such operations,
than to enumerate their own losses, or dwell on their individual
sufferings.
A similar eagerness to enter into conversation on military subjects, was
observable in almost all Frenchmen of the lower orders, with whom we had
any dealings. Our landlord at Paris, a quiet sickly man, who had no
connection with the army, and who had little to say for himself on most
subjects, displayed a marvellous fluency on military tactics; and seemed
to think that no time was lost which was employed in haranguing to us on
the glory and honour of the French army, and impressing on our minds its
superiority to the allies.
Indeed, the whole French nation certainly take a pride in the deeds of
their brethren in arms, which absorbs almost all other feelings; and
which is the more singular, as it does not appear to us to be connected
with strong or general affection or gratitude for any particular
individual. It was not the fame of any one General but the general
honour of the French arms, about which they seemed anxious. We never met
with a Frenchman, of any rank, or of any political persuasion, who
considered the French army as fairly overcome in the campaign of 1814;
and the shifts and contrivances by which they explained all the events
of the campaign, without having recourse to that supposition, were
wonderfully ingenious. The best informed Frenchmen whom we met in Paris,
even those who did not join in the popular cry of treason and corruption
against Marmont, regarded the terms granted by Alexander to their city,
as a measure of policy rather than of magnanimity. They uniformly
maintained, that the possession of the heights of Belleville and
Montmartre did not secure the command of Paris: that if Marmont had
chosen, he might have defended the town after he had lost these
positions; and that, if the Russians had attempted to take the town by
force, they might have succeeded, but would have lost half their army.
Indeed, so confidently were these propositions maintained by all the
best informed Frenchmen, civil or military, royalist of imperialist,
whom we met, that we were at a loss whether to give credit to the
statement uniformly given us by the allied officers, that the town was
completely commanded by those heights, and might have been burnt and
destroyed, without farther risk on the part of the assailants, after
they were occupied. The English officers, with whom we had an
opportunity of conversing on this subject, seemed divided in opinion
regarding it; and we should have hesitated to which party to yield our
belief, had not the conduct of Napoleon and his officers in the campaign
of the present year, the extraordinary precautions which they took to
prevent access to the positions in question, by laying the adjacent
country under water, and fortifying the heights themselves, clearly
shewn the importance, in a military point of view, which is really
attached to them.
The credulity of the French, in matters connected with the operations of
their armies, often astonished us. It appeared to arise, partly from the
scarcity of information in the country; from their having no means of
confirming, correcting, or disproving the exaggerated and garbled
statements which were laid before them; and partly from their national
vanity, which disposed them to yield a very easy assent to every thing
that exalted their national character. In no other country, we should
conceive, would such extravagant and manifestly exaggerated statements
be swallowed, as the French soldiers are continually in the habit of
dispersing among their countrymen. From the style of the conversation
which we were accustomed to hear at _caffés_ and _tables d'hôte_, we
should conceive, that the French bulletins, which appeared to us such
models of gasconade, were admirably well fitted, not merely to please
the taste, but even to regulate the belief, or at least the professions
of belief, of the majority of French politicians, with regard to the
events they commemorate.
The general interest of a nation in the deeds and honours of its army,
is the best possible security for its general conduct; and it must be
admitted, that in those qualities which are chiefly valued by the French
nation, the French army was never surpassed; while it is equally
obvious, that both the army and the people have at present little regard
for some of the finest virtues which can adorn the character of
soldiers.
The grand characteristic of the French army, on which both the soldiers
and the people pride themselves, is what was long ago ably pointed out
by the author of the "Caractere des Armées Europeennes Actuelles"--the
individual intelligence and activity of the soldiers. They were taken
at that early age, when the influence of previous habit is small, and
when the character is easily moulded into any form that is wished; they
were accustomed to pride themselves on no qualities, but those which are
serviceable against their enemies, and they had before them the most
animating prospect of rewards and promotion, if their conduct was
distinguished. Under these circumstances, the native vigour, and
activity, and acuteness of their minds, took the very direction which
was likely, not merely to make them good soldiers, but to fit them for
becoming great officers; and this ultimate destination of his
experience, and ability, and valour, has a very manifest effect on the
mind of the French soldier. We hardly ever spoke to one of them, of any
rank, about any of the battles in which he had been engaged, without
observing, that he had in his head a general plan of the action, which
he always delivered to us with perfect fluency, in the technical
language of war, and with quite as much exaggeration as was necessary
for his purpose. What he wanted in correct information, he would
assuredly make up with lies, but he would seldom fail to give a general
consistent idea of the affair; and it was obvious, that the manœuvres
of the armies, and the conduct of the generals, on both sides, had
occupied as much of his consideration and reflection, as his own
individual dangers and adventures.
When we afterwards entered into conversation with some English private
soldiers, at Brussels and Antwerp, concerning the actions they had seen,
we perceived a very marked difference. They were very ready to enter
into details concerning all that they had themselves witnessed, and very
anxious to be perfectly correct in their statements; but they did not
appear ever to have troubled their heads about the general plan of the
actions. They had abundance of technical phrases concerning their own
departments of the service; but very few words relative to the
manœuvring of large bodies of men. Their rule seemed to be, to do their
own duty, and let their officers do theirs; the principle of the
division of labour seemed to prevail in military, as well as in civil
affairs, much more extensively in England than in France.
The soldiers of the French imperial guard, in particular, are remarkably
intelligent, and in general very communicative. We entered into
conversation with some of these men at La Fere, and from one of them,
who had been in the great battle at Laon, we had fully as distinct an
account of that action as we are able to collect, the next day, from
several officers who accompanied us from St Quentin to Cambray, and who
had likewise been engaged in it. When we asked him the numbers of the
two armies on that day, he replied without the least hesitation, that
the allied army was 100,000 and the French 30,000.--Another of these men
had been at Salamanca, and after we had granted his fundamental
assumption, that the English army there was 120,000 strong, and the
French 40,000, he proceeded to give us a very good account of the
battle.
These men, as well as almost all the French officers and soldiers with
whom we had opportunities at different times of conversing, gave their
opinions of the allied armies without any reserve, and with considerable
discrimination. Of the Russians and Prussians they said, "Ils savent
bien faire la guerre; ils sont de bons soldats;" but of the common
soldiers of these services in particular, they said, "Ils sont tres
forts, et durs comme l'ame du diable--mais ils sont des veritables
betes; ils n'ont point d'intelligence. La puissance de l'armée
Française," they added, with an air of true French gasconade, "est dans
l'intelligence des soldats."--Of the Austrians, they said, "Ils brillent
dans leur cavalerie, mais pour leur infanterie, elle ne vaut rien."
From these soldiers we could extract no more particular character of the
English troops, than "Ils se battent bien," But it is doing no more than
justice to the French officers, even such as were decidedly imperialist,
who conversed with us at Paris, and in different parts of the country,
to acknowledge that they uniformly spoke in the highest terms of the
conduct of the English troops. The expression which they very commonly
used, in speaking of the manner in which the English carried on the war
in Spain, and in France, was, "loyauté." "Les Russes, et les Prussiens,"
they said, "sont des grands et beauxhommes, mais ils n'ont pas le cœur
ou la loyauté des Anglais. Les Anglais sont la nation du monde qui font
la guerre avec le plus de loyauté," &c. This referred partly to their
valour in the field, and partly to their humane treatment of prisoners
and wounded; and partly also to their honourable conduct in France,
where they preserved the strictest discipline, and paid for every thing
they took. Of the behaviour of the English army in France, they always
spoke as excellent:--"digne de leur civilization."
A French officer who introduced himself to us one night in a box at the
opera, expressing his high respect for the English, against whom, he
said, he had the honour to fight for six years in Spain, described the
steadiness and determination of the English infantry in attacking the
heights on which the French army was posted at Salamanca, in terms of
enthusiastic admiration. Another who had been in the battle of Toulouse,
extolled the conduct of the Highland regiments in words highly
expressive of
"The stern joy which warriors feel,
In foemen worthy of their steel."
"Il y a quelques regimens des Ecossais sans culottes," said he, "dans
l'armée de Wellington, qui se battent joliment." He then described the
conduct of one regiment in particular, (probably the 42d or 79th), who
attacked a redoubt defended with cannon, and marched up to it in perfect
order; never taking the muskets from their shoulders, till they were on
the parapet: "Si tranquillement,--sacre Dieu! c'etoit superbe."
Of the military talents of the Duke of Wellington they spoke also with
much respect, though generally with strong indications of jealousy. They
were often very ingenious in devising means of explaining his
victories, without compromising, as they called it, the honour of the
French arms. At Salamanca, they said, that in consequence of the wounds
of Marmont and other generals, their army was two hours without a
commander. At Vittoria again, it was commanded by Jourdan, and any body
could beat Jourdan. At Talavera, he committed "les plus grandes sottises
du monde; il a fait une contre-marche digne d'un bete." Some of the Duke
of Wellington's victories over Soult they stoutly denied, and others
they ascribed to great superiority of numbers, and to the large drafts
of Soult's best troops for the purpose of forming skeleton battalions,
to receive the conscripts of 1813.
The French pride themselves greatly on the _honour_ of their soldiers,
and in this quality they uniformly maintain that they are unrivalled, at
least on the continent of Europe. To this it is easy to reply, that,
according to the common notions of honour, it has been violated more
frequently and more completely by the French army than by any other. But
this is in fact eluding the observation rather than refuting it. The
truth appears to be, that the French _soldiers_ have a stronger sense of
honour than those of almost any other service; but that the _officers_,
having risen from the ranks, have brought with them to the most exalted
stations, no more refined or liberal sentiments than those by which the
private soldiers are very frequently actuated; and have, on the
contrary, acquired habits of duplicity and intrigue, from which their
brethren in inferior situations are exempt.
When we say of the French soldiers that they have a strong sense of
honour, we mean merely to express, that they will encounter dangers, and
hardships, and privations, and calamities of every kind, with wonderful
fortitude, and even cheerfulness, from no other motive than an _esprit
du corps_--a regard for the character of the French arms. Without
provocation from their enemies, without the prospect of plunder, without
the hope of victory, without the conviction of the interest of their
country in their deeds, without even the consolation of expecting care
or attention in case of wounds or sickness,--they will not hesitate to
lavish their blood, and sacrifice their lives, _for the glory of
France_. Other troops go through similar scenes of suffering and danger
with equal fortitude, when under the influence of strong passions, when
fired by revenge, or animated by the hope of plunder, or cheered by the
acclamations of victory; but with the single exception of the British
army, we doubt whether there are any to whom the mere spirit of military
honour is of itself so strong a stimulus.
We have already noticed the state of the French sick and wounded, left
in the hospitals at Wilna during the retreat from Russia; a state so
deplorable, as to have excited the strongest commiseration among their
indignant enemies. This, however, was but a single instance of the
system almost uniformly acted on, we have understood, by the French
medical staff in Russia, Germany, and Spain, of deserting their
hospitals on the approach of the enemy, so as to leave to him, if he did
not chuse to see the whole of the patients perish before his eyes, the
burden of maintaining them. The miseries which this system must have
occasioned, in the campaign of 1813 in particular, require no
illustration.
Another regulation of the French army, during the campaign of that year,
will shew the utter carelessness of its leaders, in regard to the lives
or comforts of the soldiers. When the men who were incapacitated for
service by wounds or disease, were sent back to France, they were
directed, in the first instance, to Mentz, where their uniforms, and any
money they might have about them, were regularly taken from them, and
given to the young conscripts who were passing through to join the
armies; they were then dressed in miserable old rags, which were
collected in the adjacent provinces by Jews employed for that purpose,
and in this state they were sent to _beg_ their way to their homes.
Such, as we were assured by some of our countrymen, who saw many of
these men passing through Verdun, was the reward of thousands of the
"_grande nation_" who had lost their limbs or their health in vainly
endeavouring to maintain the glory and influence of their country in
foreign states. In the campaign of 1814, which was carried on during the
continuance of a frost of almost unprecedented intensity, and in so
rapid and variable a manner, and with so large bodies of troops, as to
prevent the establishment of regular hospitals or of any thing like a
regular Commissariat, the French troops, particularly the young
conscripts and national guards, suffered dreadfully; and numbers of them
who escaped the swords of their enemies, perished miserably or were
disabled for life, in consequence of hardships, and fatigues, and
privations.
All these examples were known to the French soldiers--they took place
daily before their eyes, and, in the last instance, the allies took
pains to let them know, that the only obstacle to honourable peace was
the obstinacy of their commander; yet their ardour continued unabated;
the young soldiers displayed a degree of valour in every action of both
campaigns, which drew forth the warm applause even of their enemies; and
it is not to be doubted, that the troops whom Napoleon collected at
Fontainbleau, at the end of the campaign in France, were
enthusiastically bent on carrying into effect the frantic resolution of
attacking Paris, then occupied by a triple force of the allies, from
which his officers with difficulty dissuaded him.
In like manner, there is probably no general but Napoleon, who would not
have attempted to terminate the miseries of the army during the retreat
from Moscow, by entering into negotiation with the Russians; nor is
there any army but the French which would have tamely consented to be
entirely sacrificed to the obstinacy of an individual. But to have
concluded a convention with the Russians would have been _compromising
the honour of the French arms_; and this little form of words seemed to
strike more terror to the hearts of the French soldiers, than either the
swords of the Russians, or the dreary wastes and wintry storms of
Russia, which might have been apostrophised in the words of the poet,
"Alas! even your unhallowed breath
May spare the victim fallen low,
But man will ask no truce to death,
No bounds to human woe."
"He saw, without emotion, (says Labaume), the miserable remains of an
army, lately so powerful, defile before him; yet his presence never
excited a murmur; on the contrary, it animated even the most timid, who
were always tranquil when in presence of the emperor." At the present
moment, from all the accounts that we have received, as well as from our
own observations of those French soldiers whom we have ourselves seen
after their return from Moscow, the sentiments of the survivors of that
expedition with regard to Napoleon remained unchanged; and no person who
has read any of the narratives of the campaign can ascribe their
constancy to any other cause, than that feeling of attachment to the
glory of their country, to which the French, however improperly, give
the name of military honour.
If the character of the French soldiers is deserving of high admiration
for their constancy and courage, it must be observed, on the other
hand, that there is a mixture of _selfishness_ in it, an utter disregard
of the feelings, and indifference as to the sufferings, not merely of
their enemies, or of the inhabitants of the countries which they
traverse, but even of their best friends and companions, which forbids
us to go farther in their praise. It is as unnecessary, as it would be
painful, to enter on an enumeration of the instances of wanton cruelty,
violence, and rapacity, which have sullied the fame of their most
brilliant deeds in arms. It will be long before the French name will
recover the disgrace which the remembrance of such scenes as Moscow, or
Saragossa, or Tarragona, has attached to it, in every country of Europe;
and it is impossible to have a more convincing proof of the tyrannical
and oppressive conduct of the French armies in foreign states, than the
universal enthusiasm with which Europe has risen against them,--the
indignant and determined spirit with which all ranks of every country
have united to rid themselves of an oppression, not less galling to
their individual feelings, than degrading to their national character.
But it is particularly worthy of remark, that the latest and most
authentic writers in France itself, who have given any account of the
French armies, have, noticed selfishness, and disregard of the feelings
of their own comrades, as well as of all other persons, as one of the
most prominent features of their character. We need only refer to
Labaume's book on the expedition to Russia, to Miot's work on the
Egyptian campaigns, or to Rocca's history of the war in Spain, for ample
proofs of the correctness of this observation. Whether this peculiarity
is to be ascribed chiefly to their national character, or to the nature
of the services in which they have been engaged, it is not very easy to
decide.
The dishonourable conduct of the French officers, particularly of the
superior officers, in the present year, is much more easily explained
than excused. They had risen from the ranks--they had been engaged all
their lives in active and iniquitous services--they had been accustomed
to look to success as the best criterion of merit, and to regard
attachment to their leaders and their colours, as the only duties of
soldiers;--they had never thought seriously on morality or
religion--they had been applauded by their countrymen and
fellow-soldiers, for actions in direct violation of both--and they had
been taught to consider that applause as their highest honour and
legitimate reward. Under these circumstances, it is easy to see, that
they could have little information with regard to the true interests of
France, and that they would regard the most sacred engagements as
binding only in so far as general opinion would reprobate the violation
of them; and when a strong party shewed itself, in the nation as well as
the army, ready to support them and to extol their conduct in rising
against the government, that their oaths would have no influence to
restrain them. It is to be considered, likewise, that a large proportion
of the officers had been originally republicans. They had been engaged
in long and active military service, and been elated with military
glory; in the multiplicity of their duties, and the intoxication of
their success as soldiers, they had ceased to be citizens; but during
the repose that succeeded the establishment of the Bourbons, when they
again found themselves in the midst of their countrymen, their original
political feelings and prejudices returned, embittered and exasperated
by the influence of their military habits, and the remembrance of their
military disgraces. We have ourselves conversed with several officers,
who were strongly attached to Napoleon, but whose political views were
decidedly republican; and have heard it stated, that the officers of
artillery and engineers are supposed to be particularly democratic in
their principles.
It is much easier to account for the conduct of the French army since
the dethronement of Napoleon, than to point out any means by which that
conduct could have been altered. It was stated to us at Paris, that the
number of military officers to be provided for by government, was
upwards of 60,000. These would certainly comprise a very large
proportion of the talents and enterprise of the French nation. The
number of them that can have been sincerely devoted to the Bourbons, or
that can have been otherwise disposed of since that time, cannot be
great; nor do we see by what means it will be possible to reconcile the
majority of this very important class of men, to a government which has
twice owed its elevation to the discomfiture and humiliation of the
French arms.
It may be easily conceived, that in an army, the officers of which have,
for the most part, risen from the ranks, the principles of strict
military subordination cannot be enforced with the same punctilious
rigour as in services where a marked distinction is constantly kept up
between officers and soldiers. There is a more gradual transition from
the highest to the lowest situations of the French army--a more
complete amalgamation of the whole mass, than is consistent with the
views of other governments in the maintenance of their standing armies.
It is true, that a change has taken place in the composition of the
French army, in this respect, under the imperial government. A number of
military schools were established and encouraged in different parts of
the country, and a great number of young men were sent to these by their
parents, under the understanding, that after being educated in them they
should become officers at once, without passing through the inferior
steps, to which they would otherwise have been devoted by the
conscription. A great number of officers, therefore, have of late years
been appointed from these schools to the army, who have never served in
the ranks; but the manners and habits which they acquire at the schools
are, we should conceive, very little superior to what they might have
learnt from the private soldiers, who would otherwise have been their
associates. A comparison of the appearance and manner of the pupils of
the Ecole Militaire, with those of the young men at the English military
colleges, would shew, as strongly as any other parallel that could be
drawn, the difference in respectability and gentlemanlike feeling
between the English and French officers.
There is so little of uniformity in dress, of regard to external
appearance, or of shew of subordination, and inferiority to their
officers, in the French soldiers, that a stranger would be apt to
consider them as deficient in discipline. The fact is, that they know
perfectly, from being continually engaged in active service, what are
the essentials of military discipline, and that they are quite careless
of all superfluous forms. Whatever regulations are necessary, in any
particular circumstances, are strictly enforced; and the men submit to
them, not from any principle of slavish subjection to their officers,
but rather from deference to their superior intelligence and
information, and from a regard to the good of the service.
The French army may, in fact, be said to have little of the feelings
which are truly military. The officers have not the strong feeling of
humanity, and the high and just sense of honour, not merely as members
of the army, but as individuals; the soldiers have not the habit of
implicit obedience and attachment to their peculiar duties; and the
whole have not the lively sense of responsibility to their country, and
dependence on their sovereign, which are probably essential to the
existence of an army which shall not be dangerous, even to the state
that maintains it. The French army submitted implicitly to Napoleon,
because he was their general; but we should doubt if they ever
considered themselves, even under his dominion, as the _servants of
France_. They appear, at present, at least, to think themselves an
independent body, who have a right to act according to their own
judgment, and are accountable to nobody for their actions. In this idea
of their own importance they were, of course, encouraged by Napoleon,
who, on his return from Elba, spoke of the injuries done by the Bourbons
to the _army and people_, and assigned the former the most honourable
place in his Champ de Mai. And it will appear by no means surprising,
that they should have acquired these sentiments, when we consider the
importance which has been attached to their exploits by their
countrymen, the encouragement to which they have been accustomed, the
preference to all other classes of men which was shewn them by the late
government, and the nature of the services in which they have been
engaged, and for which they have been rewarded; circumstances fitted to
assimilate them, in reality as well as appearance, rather to an immense
band of freebooters, having no principle but union among themselves,
and submission to their chiefs, than to an established and responsible
standing army.
This observation applies to the feelings and principles of the soldiers
taken as a body, not to their individual habits; for, excepting in the
case of the detachment of the imperial guard, quartered at Fontainbleau,
we never understood that the French soldiers in time of peace, at least
among their own countrymen, were accused of outrage or rapine.
There is considerable variety in the personal appearance of the French
soldiers. The infantry are generally little men, much inferior to the
Russians and Prussians in size and weight; but as they are almost all
young, they appear equally well fitted for bearing fatigues, and they
have an activity in their gait and demeanour, which accords well with
their general character. In travelling through the country, we could
almost always tell a French soldier from one of the allies at a
distance, by the spring of his step. They have another excellent
quality, that of being easily fed. Nothing appeared to excite more
astonishment or indignation in France, than the quantity of food
consumed by the allied troops. We found at Paris, that the Russian
convalescents, occupying the hospitals which had formerly been
appropriated to French troops, actually eat three times the rations
which the French had been allowed. Frenchmen of the middling and higher
ranks appear to have generally very keen appetites, and often surprise
Englishmen by the magnitude and variety of their meals; but the
peasantry and lower orders are accustomed to much poorer fare than the
corresponding classes, at least in the southern part of our island, and
the ordinary diet of the French soldiers is inferior to that of the
English. In garrison, they are never allowed animal food, at least when
in their own country; and the better living to which they are accustomed
in foreign countries, and on active service, is a stronger
recommendation of war to these volatile and unreflecting spirits, than
it might at first be thought.
The French cavalry are almost universally fine men, much superior to the
infantry in appearance. The horses of the _chasseurs à cheval_, and
hussars, are small, but active and hardy; and even those of the
cuirassiers have not the weight or beauty of the English heavy dragoons,
though we have understood that they bear the fatigues and privations,
incident to long campaigns, much better.
The imperial guard was composed, like the Russian guard, of picked men,
who had already served a certain length of time, and the pay being
higher than of the regiments of the line, and great pains being
uniformly taken to preserve them as much as possible, from the hardships
and dangers to which the other troops were exposed, and to reserve them
for great emergencies, it was at once an honour and a reward to belong
to them. We saw a review of the elite of the imperial guard on the 8th
of May 1814, in presence of the King of France; the regiments of
cavalry, of which a great number passed, were very weak in numbers, but
the men were uncommonly fine, and the horses strong and active. The
finest regiment of infantry of the old guard, with some pieces of
cannon, did not defile before the King, but passed out of the Cour de
Carousel by a back way, on account, as we understood, of its having
shewn strong symptoms of disgust on the entrance of the King into Paris.
That regiment, as well as all the rest of the infantry of the old guard,
then called the Grenadiers Français, whom we had ever occasion to see,
was composed of the finest men, not merely in point of strength, but of
activity and apparent intelligence. The few pieces of artillery of the
guard that we saw were in very bad condition, and their equipment
particularly mean; but this branch of the service had not then had time
to repair the losses it had sustained in the campaign.
The cavalry of the guard appeared to have been the most fashionable
service under Napoleon. There were cuirassiers, heavy and light
dragoons, chasseurs, hussars, grenadiers à cheval, and lancers of the
guard, all of whom had different and splendid uniforms, and presented an
uncommonly varied and magnificent appearance when reviewed together.
Their magnificence and variety was evidently intended to gratify the
taste of the French people for splendid shows, and to attract young men
of fortune and expensive habits.
The imperial guard had much more of the air and manner, as well as
dress, of regular soldiers, than any other part of the French army;
indeed it is impossible to conceive a more martial or imposing figure
than that of one of the old grenadiers, (commonly called the _vieux
moustaches_,) in his striking and appropriate costume, armed with his
musket and sword, the cross of the legion of honour on his breast, his
rough and weather-beaten countenance bearing the impression of the sun
of Italy and the snows of Russia, while his keen and restless eye
shows, more expressively than words, that he is still "ready, aye
ready, for the field."
We thought we could discern in the countenances of the troops of
different nations, whom we saw reviewed about this time, the traces of
the difference of national character. The general expression of the
Russians, we thought, was that of stern obstinate determination; of the
Prussians, warm enthusiastic gallantry; of the French, fierce and
indignant impetuosity. This may have been fancy, but all who have seen
the troops of these different nations, will allow a very striking
difference of expression of countenance, as well as of features.
* * *
No measure was omitted by Napoleon to secure, the services, in the army,
of all who could be of any use in it. The organization of the garde
d'honneur was intended to include as large a number as possible of the
young men, whose circumstances had enabled them to avoid the
conscription. No act of the Imperial Government seemed to have given
more general offence in France than the formation of this corps, the
number of which was stated to have amounted at one time to 10,000. They
were, in the first instance, invited to volunteer, under the assurance
that they were to be employed as a guard for Maria Louisa, and under no
circumstances to be sent across the Rhine. A maximum and minimum number
were fixed for each _arrondissement_, some number between which was to
be made up by voluntary enrolments; but when any deficiency was
discovered, as for example in Holland, where the young men were very
little disposed to voluntary service in the French army, a balloting
immediately took place, and a number greater than the maximum was
compelled to come forward. Exemption from this service was impossible;
immense sums were offered and refused. They were all mounted, armed, and
clothed at their own expense; those who did not chuse to march, were
sent off under an escort of gens-d'armes; and all were conducted to the
fortresses on the Rhine, were they were regularly drilled. Some of them
were induced to volunteer for extended service, by a promise, that after
serving one campaign, they should be made officers; and in the course of
the campaign of 1813, _all_ of them were brought up to join the army;
and these young men, taken only a few weeks before from their families,
where many of them had been accustomed to every luxury and indulgence,
were compelled to go through all the duties and fatigues of common
hussars. Some regiments of them, which were very early brought into
action, having misconducted themselves, were immediately disbanded;
their horses, arms, and uniforms, were taken from them for the use of
the other troops, and they were dismissed, to find the best of their way
to their homes. Those who remained were distributed among the different
corps of cavalry, and suffered very severely in the campaign in France.
We spoke to some of them at Paris, who said they had bivouacked, at one
period of the campaign, _on snow_, fourteen nights successively, and
described to us the action at Rheims, one of the last that was fought,
where half of their regiment were left on the field. These men
complained loudly of the treacherous conduct of Napoleon to them and
their brethren of the same corps; yet they expressed their willingness
to undergo all their sufferings again, if they could thereby transfer
the date of the peace to the other side of the Rhine.
The effect of this measure on the middling and higher ranks was not more
oppressive than that of the conscription on the lower ranks, and even on
persons in tolerably good circumstances; for we have heard of £.400
Sterling, being twice paid to rescue an individual, whom a third
conscription had at length torn from his family. The impression produced
in France, however, by either of these measures, cannot be judged of
from a comparison with the feelings so often manifested in this country,
under circumstances of less aggravated affliction. The same careless,
unthinking, constitutional cheerfulness, which is so commendable in
those Frenchmen whose sufferings are all personal, displays itself in a
darker point of view, when they are called on to sympathise with the
sufferings of their friends. It is a disposition, allied indeed to
magnanimity on the one hand, but to selfishness on the other. The
sufferings of the French on such an occasion as the loss of a near
relation, may be acute; but they are of very short duration. In Paris,
mourning is at present hardly ever worn. At the time when we were there,
although a bloody campaign had only recently been concluded, we did not
see above five or six persons in mourning, and even these were not
certainly French. We understood it to be a principle all over France,
never to wear mourning for a son; but whether this was adopted in
compliance with the wishes of Napoleon, as was stated by some, or was
general before his time, as others maintained, we were not sufficiently
informed.
* * *
It may be a question, whether the real, as well as professed motive of
the policy of Napoleon, while he directed the affairs of France, was
some ill-conceived and absurd idea of the superior happiness and
prosperity which France might enjoy, if placed indisputably at the head
of the civilized world, and especially if elevated above the rivalship
of England; but if the good of France was really his end, it is quite
certain that it engaged very little of his attention, and that he
occupied himself almost exclusively with regard to the means which he
held to be necessary to its attainment. The causes of the wars in which
he engaged were of little importance to him; but the immediate object of
all of them was the glory and aggrandizement of France; and to this
object his whole soul was devoted, and all the energies of the state
were directed.
In a general view, the imperial government may be said to have rested on
the following foundations.
In the first place, it rested on the principle which was universally
acted on, of giving active employment, and animating encouragement, to
all men of talents or enterprise--to all whose friendship might be
useful, or whose enmity might be dangerous. The conscription carried off
the flower of the youthful population; parents were encouraged to send
their children; if they shewed any superior abilities, to the military
schools, whence they were rapidly promoted in the army. The formation of
the garde d'honneur effectually prevented all danger from a numerous
class of men, whose circumstances might have enabled them to exert
themselves in opposing public measures. In the civil administration of
the country, it was the system of Napoleon, from the beginning of his
career, to give employment to all who might be dangerous, if their
services were not secured. The prefects of towns and _arrondissements_,
were generally men of intelligence and information regarding the
characters of the inhabitants; and the persons recommended by them to
the immense number of situations in the police, in the collection of
taxes, &c. were always men of activity, enterprise, and ability: Birth,
education, and moral character, were altogether disregarded, and
religious principle was rather considered a fault than a recommendation.
The consequence was, that the young, the bold, the active, the
enterprising, the independent, were either attached to the imperial
government, or at least prevented from exerting themselves in opposition
to it; while those whom family cares, or laborious occupations, or
habits of indolence, or want of energy of mind, rendered unfit for
resistance to any government, were the only people whose interest it
was to resist that of Napoleon.
In the next place, while much was done by these means to secure the
support of the most important part of the nation to the imperial
government, the most effectual precautions were taken to prevent danger
to it, from those whom either principle might lead, or injuries might
provoke to disaffection. The police was everywhere so powerful, and the
system of espionage so universally extended, that it was almost
impossible for different individuals to combine against the government.
Without including the hosts of douaniers, who were under the orders of
the collectors of taxes, the gens d'armerie, who were at the disposal of
the police, and had no other duties to perform, amounted to above 10,000
men, cavalry and infantry, all completely armed and equipped. As soon,
therefore, as any individual excited suspicion, there was no difficulty
as to his apprehension. The number of police officers was very great,
and they were all low born, clever, unprincipled men, perfectly fitted
for their situations. The extent and accuracy of the information
possessed by them was almost incredible. Indeed, we regard the system of
espionage, by which this information was procured, as the most complete
and damning proof of the general selfishness and immorality of the
French people, of which we have received any account. It was not merely
that a number of persons were employed by the police as spies; but that
no man could put any confidence even in his best friends and nearest
relations. The very essence of the system was the destruction of all
confidence between man and man; and its success was such, that no man
could venture to express any sentiments hostile to the government, even
in the retirement of his own family circle. That sacred sanctuary was
every where invaded, not by the strong hand of power, but by the secret
machinations of bribery and intrigue.
We were particularly informed, with respect to the establishment of the
police in Amsterdam, where the sentiments of the people being known to
be averse to French dominion, it was of course made stronger than in
less suspicious parts of the country. Within a week after the annexation
of Holland to France, the police was in full force, and the spies every
where in motion. No servant was allowed to engage himself who had not a
certificate from the police, implying his being a spy on his master. At
the _tables d'hôte_, persons were placed to encourage seditious
conversation, and those who expressed themselves strongly, were soon
after seized and committed to prison. No person could leave Amsterdam,
even to go three miles into the country, without a passport from the
police, which was granted only to whom they pleased. When a party went
out on such an excursion, they were sure to be met by some of the gens
d'armerie, who already knew their names and destination, and who fixed
the time of their return. From the decisions of the police there was no
appeal; and those who were imprisoned by them, (as so many of the
inhabitants of Amsterdam were, that it ceased to be any reproach,) had
no method of bringing on a trial, or even of ascertaining the crimes of
which they were accused. Frequently individuals were transported from
one part of the country to another, without any reason being assigned,
and set down among strangers, to make their bread as they best could,
under the inspection of the police, who instantly arrested them on their
attempting to escape. This system was probably more strictly enforced in
Holland than over the greater part of France, but its most essential
parts were every where the same, and the information, with respect to
the private characters and sentiments of individuals, was certainly
more easily obtained in France than in Holland.
Such, according to the information of the most intelligent and best
informed persons with whom we had an opportunity of conversing, were the
principal means by which the power of Napoleon was maintained, and his
authority enforced. But it must be owned that he did more than
this,--that during the greater part of his reign, he not only commanded
the obedience, but obtained the admiration and esteem of the majority of
his subjects.
In looking for the causes of this, we shall in vain attempt to discover
them in real benefits conferred on France by Napoleon. It is true, that
agriculture made some progress during his reign, but this was decidedly
owing to the transference of the landed property from nobles and
churchmen, to persons really interested in the cultivation of the soil,
which had taken place before his time, and not to the empty and
ostentatious patronage which he bestowed on it; the best proof of which
is, that the main improvement that has taken place has not been, as
already observed, in the principles or practice of agriculture, but in
the quantity of land under tillage. It is true also, that certain
manufactures have been encouraged by the exclusion of the English
goods; but this partial increase of wealth was certainly not worth the
expense of a year's war, and was heavily counterbalanced by the distress
occasioned by his tyrannical decrees in the commercial towns of France,
and of the countries which were subjected to her control.
As a single instance of this distress, we may just notice the situation
of the city of Amsterdam during the time that Holland was incorporated
with France. Out of 200,000 inhabitants of that city, more than one
half, during the whole of that time, were absolutely deprived of the
means of subsistence, and lived merely on the charity of the remainder,
who were, for the most part, unable to engage in any profitable
business, all foreign commerce being at an end, and supported themselves
therefore on the capital which they had previously acquired; and, lest
that capital should escape, two-thirds of the national debt of Holland
were struck off by a single decree of Napoleon. The population of the
town fell off about 20,000 during the time of its connection with
France; the taxes, while the two countries were incorporated, were
enormous; the income-tax, which was independent of the droits reunis, or
assessed taxes, having been stated to us at one-fifth of every man's
income. It was during the pressure of these burdens that the tremendous
system of police which we have described was enforced; and to add to the
miseries of the unfortunate inhabitants of this and the other commercial
towns of Holland, they were not allowed to manifest their sufferings.
Every man who possessed or inhabited a house was compelled to keep it in
perfect repair; so that even at the time of their liberation, these
towns bore no external mark of poverty or decay. The consequence of that
decree, however, had been, that persons possessing houses at first
lowered their rents, then asked no rents at all; happy to get them off
their hands, and throw on the tenants the burden of paying taxes for
them and keeping them in repair; and lastly, in many instances, offered
sums of money to bribe others to live in their houses, or even accept
the property of them.
The taxes of France, under Napoleon, it would have been supposed, were
alone sufficient to exasperate the people against them. They were
oppressive, not merely from their amount, but especially from the
arbitrary power which was granted to the prefects of towns and
_arrondissements_, and their agents, in collecting them. A certain sum
was directed to be levied in each district, and the apportioning of this
burden on the different inhabitants was left almost entirely to the
discretion of these officers.
It is quite obvious, therefore, as we already hinted; that the
popularity of Napoleon in France, during at least the greater part of
his reign; can be traced to no other source than the national vanity of
the French. As they are more fond of shew than of comfort in private
life, so their public affections are more easily won by gaudy
decorations than by substantial benefits. Napoleon gave them enough of
the former; they had victories abroad and _spectacles_ at home--their
capital was embellished--their country was aggrandised--their glory was
exalted; and if he had continued successful, France would still have
continued to applaud and admire him, while she had sons to swell her
armies, and daughters to drudge in her fields.
As it was not Napoleon who made the French a military and ambitious
people, so it is not his fall alone that can secure the world against
the effects of their military and ambitious spirit. It is not merely the
removal of him who has so long guided it, but the extinction of the
spirit itself that is necessary. The effect of the late events on the
active part of the population of France, cannot be accurately judged of
in the present moment of irritation and disorder; but whatever
government that country may ultimately assume, it may surely be hoped
that their experience of unsuccessful and calamitous war has been
sufficient to incline them to peace; that they will learn to measure
their national glory by a better standard than mere victory or noise;
that they will reflect on the true objects, both of political and
military institutions, and acknowledge the happiness of the people they
govern to be the supreme law of kings, and the blessings of the country
they serve to be the best reward of soldiers.