II

Statements like these are very apt to be misconstrued or misinterpreted

unless one is very careful to define one's position; and, after what I

have said, I should do myself an injustice if I did not make certain

that my position is clear. I believe in experimentation in education. I

believe in experimental schools. But I should wish these schools to be

interpreted as experiments and not as models, and I should wish that the

failure of an experiment be accepted with good, scientific grace, and

not with the unscientific attitude of making excuses. The trouble with

an experimental school is that, in the eyes of the great mass of

teachers, it becomes a model school, and the principles that it

represents are applied _ad libitum_ by thousands of teachers who assume

that they have heard the last word in educational theory.

No one is more favorably disposed toward the rights of children than I

am, and yet I am thoroughly convinced that soft-heartedness accompanied

by soft-headedness is weakening the mental and moral fiber of hundreds

of thousands of boys and girls throughout this country. No one admires

more than I admire the sagacity and far-sightedness of Judge Lindsey,

and yet when Judge Lindsey's methods are proposed as models for school

government, I cannot lose sight, as so many people seem to lose sight,

of the contingent factor; namely, that Judge Lindsey's leniency is based

upon authority, and that if Judge Lindsey or anybody else attempted to

be lenient when he had no power to be otherwise than lenient, his

"bluff" would be called in short order. If you will give to teachers and

principals the same power that you give to the police judge, you may

well expect them to be lenient. The great trouble in the school is

simply this: that just in the proportion that leniency is demanded,

authority is taken away from the teacher.

And I should perhaps say a qualifying word with regard to my attitude

toward educational theory. I have every feeling of affection for the

science of psychology. I have every faith in the value of psychological

principles in the interpretation of educational phenomena. But I also

recognize that the science of psychology is a very young science, and

that its data are not yet so well organized that it is safe to draw from

them anything more than tentative hypotheses which must meet their final

test in the crucible of practice. Some day, if we work hard enough,

psychology will become a predictive science, just as mathematics and

physics and chemistry and, to a certain extent, biology, are predictive

sciences to-day. Meantime psychology is of inestimable value in giving

us a point of view, in clarifying our ideas, and in rationalizing the

truths that empirical practice discovers. A very few psychological

principles are strongly enough established even now to form the basis of

prediction. Among the most important of these are the laws of habit

building, some laws of memory, and the larger principles of attention.

Successful educational practice is and must be in accord with these

indisputable tenets. But the bane of education to-day is in the

pseudo-science, the "half-baked" psychology, that is lauded from the

house-tops by untrained enthusiasts, turned from the presses by

irresponsible publishing houses, and foisted upon the hungry teaching

public through the ever-present medium of the reading circle, the

teachers' institute, the summer school, and I am very sorry to admit

(for I think that I represent both institutions in a way) sometimes by

the normal schools and universities.

Most of the doctrines that are turning our practice topsy-turvy have

absolutely no support from competent psychologists. The doctrine of

spontaneity and its attendant _laissez-faire_ dogma of school government

is thoroughly inconsistent with good psychology. The radical extreme to

which some educators would push the doctrine of interest when they

maintain that the child should never be asked to do anything for which

he fails to find a need in his own life,--this doctrine can find no

support in good psychology. The doctrine that the preadolescent child

should understand thoroughly every process that he is expected to reduce

to habit before that process is made automatic is utterly at variance

with long-established principles which were well understood by the

Greeks and the Hebrews twenty-five hundred years ago, and to which

Mother Nature herself gives the lie in the instincts of imitation and

repetition. It is conceivable that these radical doctrines were

justified as means of reform, especially in secondary and higher

education, but, even granting this, their function is fulfilled when the

reform that they exploited has been accomplished. That time has come

and, as palpable untruths, they should either be modified to meet the

facts, or be relegated to oblivion.

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