Nietzsche the Sociologist
For Nietzsche, as we are beginning to see, a fitting title is hard to
find. Unless we coin new names for things that have not yet been given
names, Nietzsche remains without a title among his fellow thinkers.
He has been called the "arch-anarchist," which he is not; he has been
called the "preacher of brutality," which he is not; he has been called
the "egoist," which he is not. But all these titles were conferred
upon him by people whose interest it was to reduce him in the public's
esteem. If he must be named, however, and we suppose he must, the best
title would obviously be that which would distinguish him most exactly
from his colleagues. Now, how does Nietzsche stand out from the ranks
of almost all other philosophers? By the fact that he was throughout
his life an "Advocate of Higher Man." Whereas other philosophers and
scholars had always thought they had some divine message to impart in
the cause of the "greatest number"; Nietzsche--the typical miner and
underminer--believed that his mission was to stand for a neglected
minority, for higher men, for the gold in the mass of quartz.
No title therefore could be more fair, and at the same time more
essentially descriptive, than the "Advocate of Higher Man," and in
giving this title to Nietzsche, we immediately outline him against that
assembly of his colleagues who were "Advocates of the Greatest Number."
It is of the first importance to humanity that its higher individuals
should be allowed to attain their full development, for only by means
of its heroes can the human race be led forward step by step to higher
and ever higher levels. In view of the fact that Nietzsche realised
this, some of his principles, when given general application, may
very naturally appear to be both iniquitous and subversive, and those
who read him with the idea that he is preaching a gospel for all are
perfectly justified if they turn away in horror from his works. The
mistake they make, however, is to suppose that he, like most other
philosophers with whom they are familiar, is an advocate of the
greatest number.
Let us take a single instance. In _The Honey Sacrifice_[1] the phrase
"Become what thou art," occurs. Now it is obvious that however
legitimate this command may be when applied to the highest and best, it
becomes dangerous and seditious when applied to each individual of the
mass of mankind. And this explains the number of errors that are rife
concerning Nietzsche's gospel. Whenever Nietzsche spoke esoterically,
his enemies declared that he was pronouncing maxims for the greatest
number; whenever he spoke for the greatest number, as he does again
and again in his allusions to the mediocre, he was accused of speaking
esoterically. How would any other philosophy have fared under such
misrepresentation and calumny?
Nietzsche could not believe in equality; for within him justice said
"men are not equal!" Those to whom it gives pleasure to think that men
are equal, he conjures not to confound pleasure with truth, and, like
Professor Huxley, he finds himself obliged to recognise "the natural
inequality of men."
But, far from deploring this fact, he would fain have accentuated
and intensified it. This inequality, to Nietzsche, is a condition to
be exploited and to be made use of by the legislator. The higher men
of a society in which gradations of rank are recognised as a natural
and desirable condition constitute the class in which the hopes of a
real elevation of humanity may be placed. The Divine Manu, Laotse,
Confucius, Muhammad, Jesus Christ--all these men, who in their sublime
arrogance actually converted man into a mirror in which they saw
themselves and their doctrines reflected, and who in thus converting
man into a mirror really made him feel happy in the function of
reflecting alone:--these leaders are the types Nietzsche refers to when
he speaks of higher men.
Ruling, like all other functions which require the great to justify
them, has fallen into disrepute, thanks to the incompetent amateurs
that have tried their hand at the game. As in the Fine Arts, so in
leading and ruling; it is the dilettantes that have broken our faith
in human performances. The really great ruler reaches his zenith in
dominating an epoch, a party, a nation or the world, to the best
advantage of each of these; but it does not follow that the motive
power propelling him should necessarily be the conscious pursuit of
the best advantage of those he rules,--this is merely a fortuitous
circumstance curiously associated with greatness in ruling,--generally
speaking, however, his only conscious motive is the gratification of
his inordinate will to power.
The innocent fallacy of democracy lies in supposing that by a mere
search, by a mere rummaging and fumbling among a motley populace, one
man or several men can be found, who are able to take the place of the
rare and ideal ruler. As if the mere fact of searching and rummaging
were not in itself a confession of failure,--a confession that this
man does not exist! For if he existed he would have asserted himself!
he would have needed no democratic exploration party to unearth him.
"There is no sorer misfortune in all human destiny, than when the
powerful of the earth are not at the same time the first men. Then
everything becometh false and warped and monstrous."[2]
"For, my brethren, the best shall rule: the best will rule! And where
the teaching is different, there--the best _is lacking_."[3]
Here we observe that Nietzsche advocated an aristocratic arrangement
of society. A firm believer in tradition, law, and order, and, in
spite of his opponents' accusations, an undaunted enemy of Anarchy and
_laisser-aller_, he saw in Socialism and Democracy nothing more than
two slave organisations for the raising of every individual to his
highest power, individuality made as general as possible; or, in other
words, Socialism and Democracy meant to Nietzsche the annihilation of
all higher aims and hopes. It meant valuing all the weeds and noble
plants alike, and with such a valuation, the noble plants, being in
the minority, must necessarily suffer and ultimately die out. Where
everybody is somebody, nobody is anybody. Socialism, _i.e._ organised
Individualism, seemed to Nietzsche merely the reflection in politics
of the Christian principle that all men are alike before God. Grant
immortality to every Tom, Dick, and Harry, and, in the end, every Tom,
Dick, or Harry will believe in equal rights before he can even hope
to reach Heaven, but to deny the privileges of rare men implies the
proscription from life of all high trees with broad brandies,--those
broad brandies that protect the herd from the rain, but which also keep
the sun from the envious and ambitious shrub,--and thus it would mean
that the world would gradually assume the appearance of those vast
Scotch moors of gorse and heather, where liberalism and mediocrity are
rampant, but where all loftiness is dead.
Nietzsche was a profound believer in the value of tradition, in the
value of general discipline lasting over long periods. He knew that all
that is great and lasting and intensely moving has been the result of
the law of castes or of the laws governing the individual members of a
caste throughout many generations.[4] This building up of the rare man, of
the great man (of the cultivated type in a Darwinian sense) as every
scientist is aware, is utterly frustrated by any thing in the way of
injudicious and careless cross-breeding (see Darwin on the degeneration
of the cultivated types of animals through the action of promiscuous
breeding), by democratic _mésalliances_ of all kinds, and by the laisser
aller which is one of the worst evils of that kind of freedom which
tends to prevail when the slaves of a community have succeeded in
asserting and expressing their insignificant and miserable little
individualities.
Believing all this, Nietzsche could not help but advocate the rearing
of a select and aristocratic caste, and in none of his exhortations is
he more sincere than when he appeals to higher men to sow the seeds of
a nobility for the future.
"O my brethren, I consecrate you to be, and show unto you the way unto
a now nobility. Ye shall become procreators and breeders and sowers of
the future.
"Verily, ye shall not become a nobility one might buy, like shopkeepers
with shopkeepers' gold. For all that hath its fixed price is of little
worth.
"Not whence ye come be your honour in future, but whither ye go!" Your
will, and your foot that longeth to get beyond yourselves,--be that
your new honour!"
"Your children's land ye shall love (be this your new nobility), the
land undiscovered in the remotest sea! For it I bid you set sail and
seek!"[5]
"Every elevation of the type man," says Nietzsche, "has hitherto been
the work of an aristocratic society--and so will it always be--a
society believing in a long scale of gradations of rank and differences
of worth among human beings, and requiring slavery in some form or
other. Without the _pathos of distance_, such as grows out of the
incarnated differences of classes, out of the constant outlooking and
downlooking of the ruling caste on subordinates and instruments, and
out of their equally constant practice of obeying and commanding, of
keeping down and keeping at a distance that other more mysterious
pathos could never have arisen, the longing for an ever new widening
distance within the soul itself, the formation of ever higher, rarer,
further, more extended, more comprehensive states, in short, just the
elevation of the type 'man,' the continued 'self-surmounting of man,'
to use a moral formula in a super-moral sense."[6]
I cannot attempt to give a full account of the society Nietzsche would
fain have seen established on earth. It will be found exhaustively
described in Aph. 57 of the _Antichrist_: while in the book of _Manu_ (Max
Müller's "Sacred Books of the East," No. 25), similar sociological
prescriptions are to be found, correlated with all the imposing
machinery of divine revelation, supernatural authority, and religious
earnestness.
Briefly, Nietzsche says this:--
It is ridiculous to pretend to treat every one without regard to those
natural distinctions which are manifested by superior intellectuality,
or exceptional muscular strength, or mediocrity of spiritual and
bodily powers, or inferiority of both. He tells us that it is not the
legislator, but nature herself, who establishes these broad classes,
and to ignore them when forming a society would be just as foolish as
to ignore the order of rank among materials and structural principles
when building a monument. Though the base of a pyramid does not require
to be of the very finest marble, we know it must be both broad and
massive. Nietzsche declares that no society has any solidarity which
is not founded upon a broad basis of mediocrity. Though the stones
get fewer in the layers as we ascend to the top of the pyramid, we
know that their gradation is necessary if the highest point is to be
readied. Nietzsche believes in the long scale of gradations of rank
with the ascending line leading always to the highest--even if he be
only a single individual. Though the very uppermost point consists of a
single stone, it is around that single stone that the weather will rage
most furiously and the sun shine most gorgeously. That single stone
will be the first to cleave the heavy shower, and the first, for, to
meet the lightning. Nietzsche says: "Life always becomes harder towards
the _summit_,--the cold increases, responsibility increases."[7]
"Saepius ventis agitatur ingens
pinus, et celsae graviore casu
decidunt turres, feriuntque summos
fulgura montes."[8]--HORACE, _Carm_. II. X.
Thus he would have the intellectually superior, those who can bear
responsibility and endure hardships, at the head. Beneath them are
the warriors, the physically strong, who are "the guardians of right,
the keepers of order and security, the king above all as the highest
formula of warrior, judge, and keeper of the law. The second in rank
are the executive of the most intellectual." And below this caste are
the mediocre. "Handicraft, trade, agriculture, _science_, the greater
part of art, in a word, the whole _compass_ of business activity,
is exclusively compatible with an average amount of ability and
pretension." At the very base of the social edifice, Nietzsche sees
the class of man who thrives best when he is well looked after and
closely observed,--the man who is happy to serve, not because he must,
but because he is what he is,--the man uncorrupted by political and
religious lies concerning equality, liberty, and fraternity,--who is
half conscious of the abyss which separates him from his superiors, and
who is happiest when performing those acts which are not beyond his
limitations.
He forestalls this sketch of his ideal society by enunciating the moral
code wherewith he would transvalue our present values, and I shall now
give this code without a single remark or comment, feeling quite sure
that the reader who has understood Nietzsche so far will not require
any assistance in seeing that it is the necessary and logical outcome
of the rest of his teaching.
* * * * *
"What is good? All that increases the feeling of power, will to power,
power itself in man.
"What is bad?--All that proceeds from weakness.
"What is happiness?--The feeling that power _increases_, that resistance
is overcome.
"Not contentedness, but more power; not peace at any price, but
warfare; not virtue, but capacity (virtue in the Renaissance style,
virtù free from any moralic acid)."[9]
* * * * *
I cannot well close this chapter on Nietzsche's sociological views
without touching upon two of the most important elements in modern
society, and his treatment of them. I refer to "altruism" and to
"pity." I am more particularly anxious to express myself clearly on
these two points, inasmuch as I know how many erroneous opinions
are current in regard to Nietzsche's attitude towards them. In all
gregarious communities, as is well known, altruism and pity have become
very potent life-preserving factors, and it would be hard to find
in Europe to-day, a city, a town, or a village, in which these two
qualities are not considered the most creditable of virtues. Now apart
from the fact that this excessive praise of compassion and selflessness
is a sign of slave values being in the ascendant, we must bear in
mind two things: (1) that under our present system of society, in
which cruelties are perpetrated far more brutal than any that could be
found in antiquity, a sort of maudlin sentimentality has arisen among
the oppressing classes, whereby they attempt to counterbalance their
deeds of oppression with lavish acts of charity. This sentimentality
is a sign that their conscience is no longer clean for the act of
oppressing; because in their heart of hearts they feel themselves
unworthy of being at the top: (2) that wherever two or three human
beings collect together, a certain modicum of altruism and compassion
is a prerequisite of their social unity.
Dismissing observation one as the mere expression of a regrettable
fact which scarcely requires substantiation, and which is responsible
for more than three-quarters of the anomalies that characterise
modern Western civilisation; and passing over the suggestion that the
excessive praise of compassion and selflessness denotes an ascendency
of slave values (for we have dealt with this question in Chapter III.),
let us turn to the more abstract proposition enunciated in observation
two and try to grasp Nietzsche's treatment of it.
In the first place, let us understand that there are two kinds of pity
and selflessness, just as there are two kinds of generosity. There
is the pity, the selflessness and the generosity which is preached
and praised as a virtue by him who urgently requires them because he
is ill-constituted, needy, and hungry; and there is the pity, the
selflessness and the generosity which suggests itself to the man
overflowing with health, trust in the future, and confidence in his
own powers. To such a man, pity, selflessness, and generosity are a
means of discharging a certain plenitude of power, and in his case
giving and bestowing are natural functions. In the first instance, the
three virtues are preached from a utilitarian standpoint which tends to
increase an undesirable type; in the second, they are the sign of the
existence of a desirable type.
Let us hear Nietzsche--
"A man who says: 'I like that, I take it for my own, and mean to guard
it and protect it from everyone'; and the man who can conduct a case,
carry out a resolution, remain true to an opinion, keep hold of a
woman, punish and overthrow insolence; a man who has his indignation
and his sword, and to whom the weak, the suffering, the oppressed, and
even the animals willingly submit and naturally belong; in short, a man
who is a master by nature--when such a man has sympathy, well! that
sympathy has value! But of what account is the sympathy of those who
suffer! or of those even who preach sympathy!"
Wherever we find anything akin to "pity," even in nature: the suckling
of the young, the maintenance of dependants (the lion's attitude
towards the jackal), the protection of the helpless young (as in many
fish and mammals), it is always the superabundance of the giver and his
Will to Power which creates the pitiful act.
But the pity which most of us understand as a virtue in Europe to-day,
is merely a sort of sickly sensitiveness and irritability towards pain,
an effeminate absence of control in the presence of suffering, which
has nothing whatever to do with our powers of alleviating the misery
we contemplate, and which is only compatible either with excessive
sentimentality or with weak and overstrained nerves. In that case all
it does is to add to the misery of this world, and to elevate to a
virtue that which is perhaps one of the saddest signs of the times. It
is then indiscriminate, rash, and short-sighted, and gives rise to more
evil than it tries to dispel.
"Ah, where in the world have there been greater follies than with the
pitiful? And what in the world hath caused more suffering than the
follies of the pitiful?
"Woe unto all loving ones who have not an elevation which is above
their pity!"[10]
The legislator or the leader (and it is to him, remember, that
Nietzsche appeals), is often obliged to leave dozens to die by the
wayside, and has to do so with a clean conscience. If the march he
is organising requires certain sacrifices, he must be ready to make
them; the slavish pity, then, which would sacrifice the greater to
the less, must have been overcome by him in his own heart., and he
must have learnt that hardness which is wider in its sympathies, more
presbyopic in its love, and less immediate in its effect. But he alone
can feel like this who has something to give to those he leads, _i.e._
his protection and guidance, his promise of a better land.
"Myself I would sacrifice to my design, and my neighbour as well--such
is the language of creators.
"All creators, however, are hard."[11]
Now turning to the question of egoism _cru et vert_, which, according to
some, is the very basis and core of Nietzscheism, what are the points
which strike us most in Nietzsche's standpoint? To begin with, in this
question, as in all others, his honesty is paramount, and we become
conscious of it the moment we read his first line on the subject.
Where Nietzsche discusses matters of which others are wont to speak
with heaving breasts, florid language, and tearful voices, he takes
particular pains to be clear, concise, calculating and cold--hence
perhaps the hatred he has provoked in those who depend for their effect
upon the impression of benevolence which their watery eyes, their
cracked, good-natured voices, and their high-falutin' words make upon a
multitude.
Nietzsche puts his linger on the very centre of the question of egoism,
he simply says: "Not every one has the right to be an egoist. Whereas
in some egoism would be a virtue, in others it may be an insufferable
vice which should be stamped out at all costs."
In whom then is egoism a vice?
Obviously in him who is physiologically botched, below mediocrity in
spirit and body, mean, despicable, and even ugly.
Egoism in such a man means concentrating certain interests, and not
always the least valuable, upon the promotion and enhancement of
an undesirable element in society. The egoism of him who is below
mediocrity is a form of tyranny which leads to nothing, save, perhaps,
a Heaven where the _haute volée_ will consist of the whole scum and dross
of humanity. Such egoism leads humanity downwards: it practically says:
"I, the bungled and the botched, I the poor in spirit and body, I the
mean, despicable and ugly, want my kind to be all-important, paramount
and on the top--I the least desirable wish to prevail." But this
egoism would mean humanity's ruin, it would mean humanity's suicide and
annihilation: it would certainly mean humanity's degradation. When such
egoism says: "I will have all," the only decent retort is deafness.
When such egoism says: "I have as much right to live and flourish as
the well-constituted, the superior in spirit and body, the beautiful
and the happy," wisdom replies with a shrill of its shoulders. And when
such egoism preaches altruism--then! Then woe to all those who are
tempted to practise one virtue more! Woe to humanity! Woe to the whole
world!
There is, on the other hand, a form of egoism, which is both virtuous
and noble. It is the egoism of him whose multiplication would make the
world better, more desirable, happier, healthier, superior in spirit
and body. Egoism in such a case is a moral duty; wherever, _in such a
case_, giving, bestowing--altruism in fact--is not compatible with
survival, then egoism becomes the highest principle of all, and it is
in such circumstances that altruism may become a vice.
Now let us hear Nietzsche's own words:--
"Selfishness," he says, "has as much value as the physiological value
of him who possesses it: it may be very valuable or it may be vile
and contemptible. Each individual may be looked at with respect to
whether he represents an ascending or a descending line of life. When
that is determined, we have a canon for determining the value of his
selfishness. If he represent the ascent in the line of life, his value
is in fact very great--and on account of the collective life which
in him makes a further step, the concern about his maintenance, about
providing his optimum of conditions, may even be extreme... If
he represent descending development, decay, chronic degeneration, or
sickening, he has little worth, and the greatest fairness would have
him _take away_ as little as possible from the well-constituted. He is
then no more than their parasite."[12]
This is all clear enough; but it is quite conceivable that a
misunderstanding of it might lead to the most perverted notions of what
Nietzsche actually stood for, and when I hear people inveighing against
the so-called egoism of his teaching, and declaring it poisonous on
that account, I often wonder whether they have really made any attempt
at all to comprehend the above passage, and whether there is not
perhaps something wrong with language itself, that a thought which to
some seems expressed so clearly and unmistakably, should still prove
confusing and incomprehensible to others.
Speaking once more to higher men, then, Nietzsche tells them, with
some reason on his side, that altruism may be their greatest danger,
that altruism may be even their greatest temptation, that there are
times when they must avoid it as they would avoid a plague. In periods
of gestation, when plans and dreams of plans for the elevation of
themselves and their fellows are taking shape in their minds, altruism
may lure them sideways, it may make them diverge from their path, and
it may make mankind one great thought the poorer. In this sense, and
in this sense alone, does our author deprecate the altruistic virtues;
but, again, I venture to remind readers that it is the simplest thing
on earth to awaken suspicion against him by declaring, as some have
declared, that his deprecation of altruism applies to all.
No greater nonsense could be talked about Nietzsche than to say that he
preached universal egoism. Universal egoism as opposed to select egoism
is behind all the noisiest movements to-day--it is behind Socialism,
Democracy, Anarchy, and Nihilism--but it is not behind Nietzscheism,
and nobody who reads him with care could ever think so.
With these observations in mind, we can read the following passages
from _Thus Spake Zarathustra_ without either surprise or indignation;
indeed we may even learn a new valuation from them which will alter our
whole outlook on life, though no such sudden revulsion of feeling need
necessarily follow a study of Nietzsche's doctrine. Only when we have
given his thoughts time to become linked up and co-ordinated in our
minds are we likely to find that our view of the world has become in
the least decree transformed.
* * * * * *
"Do I advise you to love your neighbour? leather do I advise you to
flee from your neighbour and to love the most remote.
"Higher than love to your neighbour is love unto the most remote future
man.
"It is the more remote (your children and your children's children) who
pay for your love unto your neighbour.[13]
"Your children's land ye shall love (be this love your new nobility!),
the land undiscovered in the remotest sea! For it I bid your sails seek
and seek!
"In your children ye shall make amends for being the children of your
fathers: all the past shall ye thus redeem! This new table do I place
over you!"[14]
[1] Z., chap. lxi.
[2] Z., p. 299.
[3] Z., pp. 256, 257.
[4] G. E., Aph. 188.
[5] Z., pp. 247, 248.
[6] G. E., p. 223.
[7] Antichrist, Aph. 57.
[8] "The big pine is more often shaken by the winds: the higher a
tower, the heavier is the fall thereof, and it is the tops of the
mountains that the lightning strikes."
[9] _Antichrist_, Aph. 2.
[10] Z., pp. 104, 105.
[11] Z., p. 105.
[12] _The Twilight of the Idols_, Par. 10, Aph. 33.
[13] Z., pp. 69, 70.
[14] Z., p. 248.
* * * * *
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
When we have done rubbing our eyes and ears at the dazzling and
startling novelty of all we have seen and heard, let us ask ourselves
calmly and dispassionately what sort of man this is who has led us thus
far into regions which, from their very unfamiliarity and exoticness,
may have seemed to us both unpleasant and forbidding.
This is no time for apologetics, or for pleading extenuating
circumstances. Even if Nietzsche's doctrines have been presented in a
form too undiluted to be inviting, it would scarcely mend matters, now,
to beg pardon fur them; and I have no intention of doing anything of
the sort. But these questions may be put without any fear of assuming
a penitential attitude, and I do not hesitate to put them: Was the
promise of Nietzsche's life fulfilled? Did the task he started out
with, "the elevation of the type man," receive his best strength, his
best endeavours, his sincerest application? However fundamentally
we may disagree with his conclusions, were they reached by means of
an upright attempt at grappling with the problems? To all of those
questions there is but one answer, and that answer clears Nietzsche of
all the slander and calumny to which he has been submitted for the last
thirty years.
However often we may think he has erred, it is nonsense any longer to
speak of him as an anarchist, an advocate of brutality, a supporter of
immorality in its worst modern sense, and a guardian saint of savage
passions. If I have led any readers to suspect that he was all this, I
can only entreat them to turn as soon as possible to the original works
themselves, and there they will find that it was I who was wrong.
Personally I believe, as Hippolyte Taine, Dr. George Brandes and Wagner
believed, that Nietzsche's work is greater than his own or the next
generation could ever suspect. Questions such as Art, the future of
Science, and the future of Religion, which Nietzsche treats with his
customary skill, I have been unable to find room for, in this work.
But in each of these departments, I believe (and in this belief I am
by no means alone) that Nietzsche's speculations may prove of the very
highest value.
Already in Biology there are signs that Nietzsche's conclusions are
gaining ground. In Art, as I hope to able to show elsewhere, his
doctrines are likely to effect a salutary revolution: while, in the
departments of history, psychology, jurisprudence and metaphysics,
specialists will doubtless arise who will attempt to make innovations
under his leadership.
For the present, though the outlook is brighter than it was,
Nietzscheism--that is to say: free-spiritedness, intellectual bravery;
the ability to stand alone when every one else has his arm linked in
something; the courage to face unpleasant, fatal, and disconcerting
truths,--has not much hope of very general acceptance, among those to
whom it really ought to appeal. Calumny, which had a long start, has
deafened many to the cause and will continue deafening a larger number
still, until the truth is ultimately known. Yet it is to be hoped that
readers may learn to be less satisfied than they have been heretofore
with second-hand accounts of what Nietzsche stood for, and that very
shortly everybody who is interested in the matter will be able to reply
to the slanderer with facts culled from Nietzsche's life and works.
* * * * * *
"Mine enemies have grown strong," says Zarathustra, "and I have
disfigured the face of my teaching, so that my dearest friends have to
blush for the gifts I gave them."[1]
"But like a wind I shall one day blow amidst them, and take away their
breath with my spirit; thus my future willeth it.
"Verily a strong wind is Zarathustra to all low lands; and his enemies
and everything that spitteth and speweth he counselleth with such
advice: Beware of spitting against the wind."[2]
[1] Z., pp. 95, 96.
[2] Z., p. 116.
Books Useful to the Student of Nietzsche
BIOGRAPHIES:--
_Das Leben Friedrich Nietzsche's_, by Mrs. Förster-Nietzsche.
_Erinnerungen an Friedrich Nietzsche_, by Deussen.
_Nietzsche, sein Leben und sein Werk_, by Raoul Richter.
EDITIONS OF WORKS.
The complete works of Friedrich Nietzsche. Edited by Dr.
Oscar Levy. (The first complete and authorised English
Translation.) T. N. Foulis, 21 Paternoster Square.
_Friedrich Nietzsche's Werke_. Library Edition 15
vols.----Pocket Edition (very good) 10 vols.
MONOGRAPHS.
Bélart, _Nietzsche's Ethik._
------ _Nietzsche's Metaphysik._
------ _Nietzsche und Richard Wagner._
Brandes, G., _Menschen und Werke._
Common, Thos., _Nietzsche as Critic._
Fouillée, A., _Nietzsche et l'Immoralisme._
Gaultier, J., De Kant à Nietzsche.
------ _Nietzsche et la Réforme philosophique._
Kennedy, J. M., _The Quintessence of Nietzsche._
Lichtenberger, H., _La Philosophie de Nietzsche._
Mügge, _Nietzsche His Life and Works._
Sera, Leo, _On the Tracks of Life._
Tienes, _Nietzsche's Stellung zu den Grundfragen der
Ethik genetisch dargestellt_.
Tille, A., _Von Darwin bis Nietzsche._
Zeitler, J., _Nietzsche's Æsthetik._
NIETZSCHE'S WORKS: Authorised Version: edited by Dr. Oscar Levy.
_Thoughts out of Season_. 2 vols.
_The Birth of Tragedy_.
_Thus Spake Zarathustra_.
_Beyond Good and Evil_.
_The Future of our Educational Institutions_.
_Human, All too Human_. Vol. i.
_The Will to Power_. 2 vols.
_The Genealogy of Morals_.
_The Case against Wagner_.
_The Joyful Wisdom_.
_The Dawn of Day_.