Method of counter-attack--Successful efforts of the French--The

question of time--Attacks which failed--Precipitancy of main

counter-attack--Enemy reinforced--The assaulting forces--Inadequate

system of railways--Failure of well-laid plans--Value of armoured

cables--A stroke of misfortune--Uncertainty as to the enemy's

positions--A test of endurance--Defective communications--Artillery

unable to support infantry--An American officer gives a lead--The death

of Major Stuart--Observatory Ridge--Enemy well supplied with

machine-guns--The fatal trench--Heavy casualties--Gallant attempt of

the 15th Battalion--The 14th Battalion digs itself in under heavy

fire--The fateful gap bridged--Lieut. Beaton and Sergt. Topham--The

Higher Command misinformed--Misfortunes of the 52nd and 60th

Battalions--The Princess Pats cheer their comrades--Gallant officers of

the 49th--Main object of the counter-attack fails--The road to Ypres

blocked to the enemy--The 3rd Division wins its spurs--A prospect of

defeat turned into an achievement of victory.

The doctrine of the counter-attack is one of the most simple in theory,

and yet it appears to be one of the most difficult to apply effectively

in practice. The idea is to take advantage of that confusion which

must always beset an enemy in a victorious advance, and to strike him

violently with the impact of new and well-organised troops from the

second or support line of the defenders. The French have reduced this

method to a fine art by punishing the Germans severely in their advance

on a lightly held trench, allowing them to occupy it, and then turning

them out at the point of the bayonet by a strong counter-attack from

troops ready in the support line trenches just behind. It may also be

used in the last resort to rally broken troops returning on their own

line and threatening confusion to all concerned, or to repel an enemy

adverse to bayonet fighting, rather than allow him to get into one's

own trench.

All these methods of counter-attacking are largely questions of timing,

like the blow delivered by a skilled boxer. You cannot hit too soon,

but if you hit too late you fail. The time limit for the launching of

this assault in the later stages of modern warfare is practically

decided by the interval which it takes an enemy to get into some kind

of cover and bring up his machine-guns. After that the confusion in

the ranks of the opponents has vanished, the machine-guns are waiting,

and artillery preparation is ineffective, as the gunners have not yet

had time to locate and register the enemy positions with sufficient

accuracy to make sure of putting those machine-guns out of action.

This chapter is the record of a counter-attack which failed, but it is

only fair to the brigades which undertook the assault to point out that

it took place eighteen hours after the Germans had made their first

rush and many hours after they had fortified their new positions.

During these eighteen hours it had been impossible to locate with any

exactitude the new lines taken up by the Germans, so that while our

artillery peppered the whole ridge very effectively, they could not

concentrate on and wipe out trenches of the existence and position of

which they were unaware.

It has been pointed out in the last chapter that the real

counter-attack of the afternoon, or evening, of June 2nd could not be

delivered because there were not at hand troops in sufficient force to

attempt the task. Gunnery had gone too fast in its development for

infantry tactics. The rim of the saucer, which could have been held

against all odds eighteen months before, had been carried by the new

artillery, and yet it was in effect the last and only defence of the

Ypres salient. It is not possible to-day to defend on a single line of

defence, and yet the Canadian Corps had been compelled by the logic of

events and the policy of its predecessors to do so. Indeed, since Lord

Ernest Hamilton wrote of the Mount Sorrel position as "the natural

line," the whole science of defence had undergone a drastic change

owing to the increased sweeping power of heavy artillery. A position

must have "lungs," as Verdun proved--first lines which can be lost

without overwhelming consequences. In the northern section of the

Ypres salient there were at least three defensible sets of trenches

with good sweeping ranges of fire, one behind the other, but here in

the south-east the configuration of the ground did not permit of a dual

or triple system. Lose one position of defence and you lose all. This

fact no doubt accounts for the anxiety of the Corps and for the haste

with which the main counter-attack was launched.

The original decision to attack was taken before 4 p.m. on June 2nd,

and the Divisional Commanders of the 1st and 3rd Divisions were aware

of it shortly afterwards, although the actual operation orders were not

issued until 9.45 p.m. that day.

[Sidenote: _June 2nd, 9.45 P.M._]

The real difficulty was to get the troops up in time for an attack at

dawn. In the ordinary course of events the natural troops to undertake

such a task are the support and reserve battalions of the brigades

which have lost the position, if a prompt decision is to be reached

before the enemy can build himself in. But so serious had been the

fighting of the morning that of these the 49th Battalion (Edmonton

Regiment), Colonel Griesbach, alone had not yet been drawn into the

fighting in the front line. The 5th Canadian Mounted Rifles, the 2nd

Canadian Mounted Rifles, and the 42nd Battalion (Royal Highlanders),

under Lieut.-Col. Cantlie, were already used up. Furthermore, it was

known that at 9 o'clock on the night of the 2nd the Germans had been

heavily reinforced, and a rough guess might have put their numbers at

anything between four and five thousand. A strong assailing force was

therefore necessary. The 3rd Brigade of the 1st Division, which was in

corps reserve, and two battalions of the 9th Brigade of the 3rd

Division, 52nd Battalion, New Ontario Regiment, under Lieut.-Colonel

Hay, and the 60th Battalion (Victoria Rifles), under Lieut.-Colonel

Gascoigne, were therefore sent up. Two battalions of the 2nd Brigade

of the 1st Division, 5th Battalion (Western Cavalry), under

Lieut.-Colonel Dyer, and the 8th Battalion (Winnipeg Rifles), under

Major Humble, were already in the trenches on the right of the line,

and had, with the exception of the 5th Battalion, been only slightly

engaged. The 7th (British Columbia) Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel

Odlum, and the 10th (Western Canada) Battalion, under Lieut.-Colonel

Rattray, were in support and reserve.

The new troops then at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding

in charge of the attack were the 7th and 10th Battalions (2nd Brigade),

General Lipsett, the 13th, 14th, 15th and 16th Battalions (3rd

Brigade), General Tuxford, the 49th of the 7th Brigade, and the 52nd

and 60th of the 9th Brigade, making a total of nine battalions. The

58th and 43rd Battalions of the 9th Brigade were not made use of in the

fighting at the time. All these were placed under the command of

General Hoare-Nairne, of the 3rd Division. That officer, in the

conference which preceded the formation of the plan, had put forward

the view that, rather than make a frontal assault across the open, it

would be better to start from what I have called the Apex of the

defence (the projecting angle between Zouave Wood and Maple Copse) and

bomb a way up the various communication trenches towards Hill 62 into

the heart of the enemy's country and then spread right and left along

our own original line. It was agreed, however, that such an advance

through an intricate tangle of trenches involved first-hand knowledge

of the ground on the part of the troops engaged; otherwise the result

would be confusion worse confounded. None of the fresh troops

available had this knowledge, and it was therefore decided somewhat

reluctantly to risk the frontal assault. [Sidenote: _June 3rd, 2

A.M._] The attack was originally to be at dawn and to be delivered on a

wide frontage--both precautions to obviate the deadly effect of the

machine-guns. On the right, Colonel Rattray, with the 7th in advance

and the 10th close in support, was to carry the south aspect of

Observatory Ridge, and finally Mount Sorrel. Brigadier-General

Lipsett, the Commander of the 2nd Brigade, was to see that this attack

conformed with the movements of the centre battalions under General

Tuxford of the 3rd Brigade. These two were old comrades, and well

accustomed to work together; they decided to set up common Brigade

Headquarters. The centre was the 3rd Brigade--the 15th Battalion (48th

Highlanders) under Lieut.-Colonel Bent advancing on the left of the

7th, with the 16th Battalion (Canadian Scottish) under Lieut.-Colonel

Leckie in support and the 14th Battalion (Royal Montreal Regiment),

under Major McCombe to the left again, with the 13th Battalion (Royal

Highlanders) under Lieut.-Colonel Buchanan close behind it. The right

of the 3rd Brigade was Square Wood and the left Maple Copse, with

Observatory Ridge Road as the point of junction between its two

battalions. The objective of the 3rd Brigade was Hill 62. Farther

north still, and not in immediate contact, the 49th Battalion of the

7th Brigade was to attack through the southern section of Sanctuary

Wood and the 52nd Battalion of the 9th Brigade to the north again,

while the 60th Battalion acted as support. Their aim was the position

between Hill 62 and the Royal Canadian Regiment, still in place at

Hooge. Such in brief was the plan. It was to prove, unfortunately, as

fallible in execution as sweeping measures hurriedly conceived under

the stress of war are apt to be.

There were two main difficulties: to get the troops up in time and to

co-ordinate the artillery and the infantry so as to get the preparation

and the assault to move as if by clockwork. But time was the great

enemy. The original attack, as has been stated, was timed for 2 a.m.

on June 3rd. The 3rd Brigade was back in Corps Reserve, and found the

roads blocked with ambulances, transport, and ammunition.[1] [Sidenote:

_June 3rd, 4.15 A.M._] It struggled vigorously, but could not get into

position until 4.15 a.m. on June 3rd, and the 2nd Brigade, which was

already on the spot, could not attack without it. This upset the whole

of the arrangements with the artillery, and these had to be rectified

under conditions which were far from satisfactory for accurate Staff

work. The telephone lines were constantly broken, and the heroic

runners were frequently killed.[2] The armoured cables[3] were the

main stand-by. On the left the 49th were ready at 2.10 a.m., but

without their left-hand battalion (the 52nd) or their support (the

60th). As a result of these delays, the attack was delivered in broad

daylight, in a succession of waves, against hidden machine-guns, so

that the enemy's fire was concentrated on each section in turn. The

signal was to have been six green rockets fired by the 3rd Division

Staff as soon as all the troops were ready. But this was, of course, a

night and not a day warning, and by a crowning stroke of misfortune

many of the rockets fired in daylight were faulty, and fourteen had to

be discharged before the requisite number was reached.

[Sidenote: _June 3rd, dawn._]

The day dawned dull and stormy, with dashes of driving rain which

drenched the troops, many of whom had been marching all night. And

though the day broke, the signal to attack still tarried hour after

hour. The 7th and 10th Battalions on the right had been in position

since before 2 a.m., and in waiting on the others had lost the precious

hours of darkness. The same fate had befallen the 49th on the left,

which waited interminably for the battalions of the 9th Brigade which

never came. The 49th Battalion was given permission to charge at 2

a.m., but their Commander preferred to wait for the 52nd and 60th

rather than risk ruining the whole affair by an isolated effort. The

14th and 15th were ready by 4.15 a.m. As the chilled soldiers of the

7th, 14th, and 15th peered out in the full grey light they saw in front

of them some hundred yards of open ground, and behind a tangled,

irregular piece of woodland, sloping up to a low crest. Somewhere in

this thicket lay the enemy's trenches, but the precise spot was largely

a matter of guesswork, not of certainty.

The time of waiting for the charge is one of tense anxiety. As the

company commanders consult their watches and note the passage of the

minutes, the men string themselves up for a final effort. The next few

seconds will carry them over the parapet through the shell fire and

machine-gun fire into the enemy trenches if they are fortunate, but in

any case to a fate which no man can predict. Here the moments of

nervous strain were prolonged hour after hour until endurance must have

become an agony. But the spirit of the counter-attacking battalions on

the right never faltered, and when the time came at last they advanced

to the assault in the face of a devastating fire with their customary

resolution and gallantry.

The artillery preparation was from the first, in the opinion of

competent witnesses, not adequate for the task of clearing the way for

the infantry. The assault, as we know, had been ordered for 2 a.m. on

June 3rd. The time had to be altered owing to the delay in the arrival

of the infantry in some parts of the field. [Sidenote: _June 3rd, 7.00

A.M._] The new assault was timed for 7 a.m., June 3rd, but in one case

it was postponed for another hour owing to the constant breakdown of

all telephone communication between the Higher Command, the Battalion

Commander, and the gunners. These last had indeed a hard task in any

event. The trenches in front of them had been dug by the Germans since

the assault, and were neither ranged by observers nor photographed by

our aircraft. The heavy rain and brooding mists had robbed the guns of

the vision which is essential to accuracy. They fired blindly into the

positions which the enemy might be supposed to occupy, and could not

give the infantry the unfailing support which it expects and almost

invariably receives.

At last it came! The green rockets were fired at 7.10 a.m. of June

3rd, and those battalions which were ready went over the parapet.

Major Stewart, an officer of the Canadian Forces, formerly in the

regular U.S.A. Army, was wounded in giving the 7th a lead over the

parapet at 7.37 a.m., as they were clearly puzzled as to whether the

signal had been given or not. His orderly stopped behind to bandage

his wound, and both were killed in an instant by a shell. The 7th

Battalion, closely supported by the 10th, attacked on the extreme right

of the position with the view of clearing the south edge of Observatory

Ridge, and so getting through to Mount Sorrel. It was impossible to go

straight for the objective while the Ridge remained in German hands.

The task was a very difficult one, and it is not surprising that they

failed. They were exposed to an enfilade fire from the position on

Hill 60 held by the enemy,[4] who as the 7th Battalion dashed out from

the trench, could see our troops with perfect distinctness. The enemy

were plentifully supplied with machine-guns, and had even wired their

front in the eighteen hours in which they had enjoyed undisturbed

possession. They had a particularly new strong trench just behind

Armagh Wood, which held up the whole centre of the assault, for it had

been in no way impaired by the artillery preparation. Lieut. Elliott

and Lieut. Carstairs, each with a company of the 7th, attacked on the

right, and Captain Holmes with two companies of the same Battalion and

one of the 10th under Captain Fisher on the left. Captain Holmes found

it impossible to get on, and finally dug himself in about forty yards

in front of the enemy; Captain Fisher, pressing up to his assistance,

was shot through the head and killed. Meanwhile a party on the extreme

left found a hole in the enemy's line, and, turning the fatal trench,

broke right through. But the Germans had reconstructed the battered

Fortified Post, once held by the C.M.R.'s at this place, and manned it

with machine-guns, which simply swept the bold adventurers out of

existence. Few returned. On the right, Lieut. Elliott fought his way

forward and turned the south end of the German position, reaching the

original trench line just south of Mount Sorrel. Here, however, he was

caught in the right rear by the German machine-guns on Hill 60. His

party suffered heavy casualties and he was wounded. They were not able

to hold their ground. Lieut. Carstairs' company fared no better. The

attack on the right had broken down, and to press it was mere suicide

on a large scale. There was no alternative but for the 2nd Brigade to

get back and turn on the guns.

[Sidenote: _June 3rd, 8.35 A.M._]

Next, to the north, came the 15th Battalion, who attacked at 8.35 a.m.

They were already astride the end of the Ridge, but the ground in front

of them had absolutely no cover, and after pushing to just beyond

Rudkin House they were compelled to stop and dig themselves in under a

withering fire.

The 14th Battalion (Royal Montreal Regiment) was to continue the attack

on the north, its right connecting with the 15th Battalion on

Observatory Ridge. The connection was duly made earlier in the night,

and the Battalion was in position to attack at 4.15 a.m. in the morning

of June 3rd. It is of the essence of an attack made on a broad

frontage that it prevents the concentration of enemy fire at any one

point in the line, and it is therefore essential that the various

assaults should be simultaneous. This, unfortunately, was not the case

with the 14th Battalion. Although the regiment had been ready for some

hours and had been notified that the artillery preparation would begin

at 6.15 a.m. and last till about 7 o'clock, a subsequent message was

received to the effect that the bombardment would not begin until 7.45

a.m., and therefore terminate at 8.15. [Sidenote: _June 3rd, 8.17

A.M._] The battalion in consequence advanced to the attack at 8.17 in

broad daylight against machine-guns, an hour after the first assault

had taken place. In spite of these adverse circumstances, the 14th

Battalion went forward without flinching and ultimately linked itself

up with the 15th at Rudkin House on the right and with Maple Copse on

its left. Here the regiment dug itself in under the fire of the enemy,

and so with the 15th bridged the fatal gap between Square Wood and

Maple Copse. The casualties in the 14th were 387.[5] Two notable

feats of arms were performed on both flanks of the 14th Battalion.

Lieut. Beaton and his platoon pushed right up to the German lines on

the right of the regiment and maintained himself there until midnight

of the 3rd-4th. On the left Sergeant Topham and fourteen men broke

clean through the enemy and reached a point not far from our own

original front line. They were, of course, completely unsupported, and

soon found themselves practically surrounded by the enemy. Of Sergeant

Topham's party of fifteen, two succeeded in making a safe return.

These stories, however, of isolated bodies getting through the first

German line and penetrating to our trenches reached the Higher Command

and conveyed to them a totally erroneous view of the actual situation.

In consequence, although the right and centre attack had stuck fast

after an advance of 200 or 300 yards, the left was urged forward later

in the day under the impression that the whole enemy position was being

carried.[6]

The position on the extreme left, where the 49th and 60th[7] were to

attack through Sanctuary Wood, was a peculiar one. The 49th Battalion

was in position by 2.10 a.m., the regiment having moved steadily to its

objective under heavy fire, merely panting for the fray. It had not

yet been engaged in any great general action, and was anxious to give

its proofs--which, indeed, it did most nobly. Unfortunately, the 52nd

and 60th Battalions failed to arrive in time for the assault, which

took place at 7 a.m. on June 3rd. [Sidenote: _June 3rd, 7.00 A.M._]

They were caught in heavy barrages in the only communication trench

which led them to their points of assembly, and all the senior officers

who understood the plan were either killed or wounded. The two

regiments became mixed up in the mile-long trench. The 60th, however,

eventually reached the position originally allotted to them as

supporting battalion in the support trenches, and these lines they

maintained all day of the 3rd under heavy fire, relieving the

P.P.C.L.I. that night. Colonel Griesbach, who was in charge of the

whole assault, and had therefore handed over the command of his

regiment to Major Weaver (Major Weaver was hit in the barrage and

handed over his command to Major Hobbins), twice walked back across the

open through a sleet of steel to consult by telephone with his

Brigadier and to try to find someone in command of the 52nd or 60th.

In the latter effort he failed, and these regiments took no part in the

assault. Colonel Griesbach succeeded, however, in getting on the

telephone with General Macdonell, to whom he explained the situation.

The General speaks very highly of the clear grasp of affairs which

Colonel Griesbach displayed.

By now, however, the morning had come, and there were no assembly

trenches to shelter large bodies of men for the assault through

Sanctuary Wood. The 49th were sheltering in what cover they could find

in the Apex, and the support line in Sanctuary Wood. The 52nd and 60th

were far behind, and it became a question whether to assault with the

49th alone or to abandon the attack altogether. Colonel Griesbach

decided that it would be dangerous to let down the battalions on his

right, even though the main plan on the left had gone awry, and at 7

o'clock the 49th climbed the parapet and attacked across the open.

[Sidenote: _June 3rd, 7 A.M._] As they passed through and to the right

of the Princess Patricia's attenuated companies, these stood up and

cheered a new battalion going out to win its battle honours. The

Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, in fact, seem to have

contemplated the action which ensued over ground on which they had just

fought in the spirit of an elder brother watching a younger one snowing

his mettle.

The attack of the 49th was well planned and carried out in a very

gallant manner, the officers leading their men, revolver in hand, to

within point-blank range of the enemy. In this manner Captain

McNaughton and Lieut. F. W. Scott fell at the high tide of the assault.

Five officers were killed and eight wounded. But the effort was an

isolated one, and was persisted in far too long under the erroneous

impression that the 2nd and 3rd Brigades had recaptured the old front

line and were urgently in need of support on their left to make the

whole position good.

[Sidenote: _June 3rd, afternoon_]

The 49th, at any rate, succeeded in making a very considerable advance

and in establishing blocks in Sanctuary Wood and in rendering the apex

of the new front line comparatively safe from assault. Finally, on

advice from the officers of the Princess Patricia's they desisted from

any further attempt to advance to the old front line, and rested

content with the security of the new line which their own gallantry and

persistence had achieved.

[Sidenote: _June 3rd, 6 P.M._]

By 6 p.m. of the evening of June 3rd it was known that the

counter-attack had failed in its main object. The strange stories

about capturing the original trenches had withered away, by their lack

of proof and by their intrinsic absurdity. The enemy neither fainted

nor failed, but remained roughly where he stood at the beginning of the

day, though he had been thrust back here and there. None the less, the

failure had achieved certain important objects. It had made good the

line which now ran continuously from the Menin Road to Hill 60 in a

shape which, though irregular, was firm. The deadly danger of the

afternoon of June 2nd no longer existed. The fatal gap had been

closed. The spirit of the Canadians had risen in the face of adversity

and proved to the Württembergers that as long as the Corps stood in the

entrance there was no easy road to what remained of the famous city of

Ypres. The 1st Division had saved the town from entrance by the north

a year before; the Corps had protected it from the tramp of German

infantry advancing from the south. That heap of stone and rubble, with

its one projecting pinnacle, still remained inviolate and inviolable.

The line was not a good one, but it was a line still.

Finally, the regiments of the 3rd Division had proved themselves in

action on the big scale, and so had entered into the fellowship of arms

of the Canadian Corps. It has not been necessary to dwell at any

length on the 1st Division, which, from brigadiers down to privates,

behaved with the skill and courage of experienced veterans.

But if this chapter is one of failure it is not devoid of consolation.

The 3rd Division in its first great fight had won its battle honours.

Deprived at the very outset of the encounter of the services of its

General and one of his brigadiers, assailed by the fiercest bombardment

British troops had yet encountered, with a first line swept out of

existence and a second line full of rending gaps, it yet held on and

changed the fortunes of the third battle of Ypres until the prospect of

an overwhelming defeat was turned into the achievement of a final

victory.

[1] It is impossible to pass over the check thus experienced by the 3rd

Brigade without commenting on the reason for much misfortune to the

British Armies during the two years of war on the Western front--the

inadequate system of light railways. I have witnessed on many

occasions blocks on the roads in Flanders caused by ambulance and

transport wagons going down and infantry and ammunition wagons coming

up, whereby hours were lost, very often at critical moments. Many of

these checks might have been avoided altogether if a system of light

railways had been constructed behind the trenches as soon as it became

apparent that trench warfare had rendered the contending armies

immobile for a long period of time. Since Sir Douglas Haig took

command there has been a great improvement in this direction, but it is

difficult to make up for lost time. I could not help thinking of the

contrast between this delay and the rapidity and skill with which Sir

William Mackenzie drove his railway across the Canadian prairies, not

unlike the plains and plateaus of Flanders. The military leaders,

indeed, with their technical staff training, lagged far behind in a

task which would have been accomplished rapidly by experts like Sir

Herbert Holt. Possibly, however, they had not the requisite authority

from the Government to employ civilians in engineering tasks and in

transportation problems. It must be added, however, that there were

two principal difficulties which it took time to overcome: the shortage

of shipping to carry over the material, and the dual, and sometimes

triple, control of the railways by the British, French, and Belgian

authorities.

[2] Among them Private H. Johnston, of the 2nd Battalion, is entitled

to special mention for his absolute indifference to danger when

carrying important despatches.

[3] The armoured cable is an underground telephone system, protected by

armour from damage and destruction by shell fire. It is recorded in

the diaries of the Canadian Divisions that the system of steel cables

on this front was hit by shells fifty-seven times during the fighting

in June without communication being broken.

[4] Positions on Hill 60 were held by the enemy and ourselves.

[5] The 14th was commanded by Major McCombe (formerly Captain in the

3rd Victoria Rifles, Montreal) during the temporary absence of

Lieut.-Colonel Clarke. Major McCombe, who had already been once

wounded in action, showed great gallantry and ability in the attack.

[6] During the fighting of this and the following night Sergeant

Brayton, of the 14th, exhibited conspicuous courage in the work of

carrying the wounded lying in the open.

[7] The 52nd Battalion had been detailed for attack with the 49th

Battalion, but in the night march was overtaken by the 60th. In

consequence, their _rôles_ were reversed.

CHAPTER X

A LULL IN THE STORM. THE FIGHT FOR HOOGE

Relief of the front-line Battalions--Heavy losses of the Seventh

Brigade--Good work of the Third Pioneer Battalion--Sudden advance of

the enemy--The Knoll of Hooge--The Menin Road--Description of the

scene--The 28th relieves the Royal Canadians--Heavy bombardment by the

enemy--The importance of the Knoll of Hooge--The enemy springs four

mines under the first-line trenches--A company of the 28th perishes--A

terrific explosion--Fierce fighting of the 6th June--Effective work of

Captain Styles--The enemy in dangerous proximity to our support

line--Former tragedies in Zouave Wood--Serious casualties of the 6th

Brigade--The effective loss of the village of Hooge--Preparations for

retaliation.

After the storm which had blown for thirty hours since the morning of

June 2nd, a kind of lull settled down on the field. The artillery

bombardments on both sides showed that the fighting was by no means

finished, but the infantry remained on the ground where the assault of

June 3rd had left them. It was now necessary to relieve the decimated

front-line battalions.

The 6th Brigade was in reserve of the 2nd Division, and it was decided

to bring it up to the Hooge section on the left, but this move was not

finally completed until the night of the 5th-6th, when the Royal

Canadian Regiment was relieved by the 28th (North-West) Battalion.

[Sidenote: _June 4th, 8.30 A.M._] At 8.30 a.m. on the 4th the

battalions of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades in the firing line were relieved

by the 1st Brigade; the 1st Battalion (Ontario Regiment) under

Lieut.-Colonel Hodson took the place of the 7th and 10th from the old

line to Square Wood; and the 2nd Battalion (Eastern Ontario) was

substituted for the 15th and 14th in the new trench from Square Wood to

Maple Copse. On the following day the 43rd, 52nd, 58th, and 60th

Battalions, 9th Brigade, relieved the Princess Patricia's Canadian

Light Infantry and the 49th Battalion in the centre of the position at

12.45 p.m., and these regiments were able to go back for a

well-deserved rest.

[Sidenote: _June 5th_]

The casualties of the 7th Brigade had indeed been severe, totalling in

all 45 officers and 1,051 men, and making up with those sustained by

the 8th Brigade considerably more than 3,000, apart from the losses

incurred by the 60th and 52nd Battalions of the 9th Brigade. The

effect of the action can be seen by giving the rifle strength of the

Brigade as it came out of the fighting. This was as follows:--Royal

Canadian Regiment, 500; the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light

Infantry, 210; 42nd Battalion, 460; 49th Battalion, 450; or 1,620 to a

Brigade, which, if it had been at the full strength of 900 rifles to a

battalion, would have numbered 3,600, or nearly three to one of the

actual survivors. They had left their trenches, however, sensibly

improved, chiefly owing to the efforts of the 3rd Pioneer Battalion,

commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Holmes, which all through the action

continued to make good the new front line and to dig trenches in

support of it. This work was indeed essential, as it must be

remembered that the larger part of the new position had never been

intended for defence at all.

[Illustration: Map--BATTLE OF HOOGE 5th TO 6th JUNE 1916]

In the meantime, it became clear that the situation could not be left

as it was. Officers' patrols had been out on the night of the 4th-5th

and had located the enemy's position fairly accurately. [Sidenote:

_Night, 4th-5th._] But while the Higher Command was planning the

counterstroke, the enemy moved suddenly against the only part of the

front line which remained in our possession.

The knoll of Hooge, if it hardly formed part of Mount Sorrel Ridge

system, was yet an eminence of great importance, for from it one could

look straight down to the walls of Ypres. It had in consequence

changed hands over and over again, until the chateau, stables, and tiny

village were nothing but a rubble heap of bricks stained with the best

blood of Great Britain and Canada. Its last adventure had been in the

summer of 1915, when it was lost on July 31st and retaken by the 6th

Division on August 8th. Since then, however, the advance trenches had

been pushed forward until they were right at the east end of the

village and looked down on Lake Bellewaarde. On the left the ground

falls swiftly, too, to Bellewaarde Beek, on the other side of which was

the 60th British Brigade. The line here was exposed and open to the

Germans on the higher ground, and was only held by a series of bombing

posts.

On the night of the 5th-6th the 28th Battalion came up to relieve the

Royal Canadian Regiment. The direct way up to Hooge is the Menin Road,

straight from the historic gate. But you will not take that way unless

you are anxious for death, for it is ranged to the last millimetre.

The battalion will turn outside the gate, which has seen so many armies

and generations pass, and skirt the edge of the calm and stagnant moat.

Then it will turn through the long grass and water meadows such as

fringe the Thames, and finally into the communication trenches. After

this descent it is a question of a long struggle up the communication

trenches, of clawing one's way through abandoned telephone wires which

conspire in the effort to strangle, and of climbing and leaping

shell-holes where the German guns have struck the trench with accuracy.

Finally comes the Menin Road again. The great causeway runs straight

with the rectitude of a Roman road. But there is added to it modern

engineering, which has raised it twenty feet above the ground on each

side. The road is lined with poplars, now mostly decapitated and

scarred. Now and again, as the relieving battalion advances, a high,

shrill noise will be heard overhead, followed by the flash and

detonation of shells among the shattered trees. The 28th Battalion,

used to these manifestations, plodded steadily up to the relief of the

Royal Canadian Regiment on the night of June 5th.

[Sidenote: _Night of June 5th._]

There are three lines of trenches of great importance in the Hooge

position. The front-line trenches are now pushed forward to the

extreme limit of the village beyond the crater the British blew up in

August, 1915--for these look down into the valley of the Germans,

though they are, in their turn, somewhat commanded by the enemy's

heights at Bellewaarde Farm. These trenches connect with the British

on the left of this rise beyond Bellewaarde Beek, and on the right

stretch as far as the gap which leads down to Zouave Wood.

Some two hundred yards behind lies a support line, a good trench

leading down to the Beek. Its field of fire is limited by the slope of

the ground upwards towards the front-line trenches. North-east it

commands a good field of fire, and proved, in consequence, useful to

the 28th Battalion when the front line had been abandoned. Behind the

support line the machine-guns were concentrated for the defence, and

behind that again was another set of trenches.

The disposition of the 6th Brigade was as follows:--One and a half

companies of the 28th in the front line and in bombing posts. The

remaining two platoons and the machine-gun sections were in the support

line. The machine-gun sections consisted of three Colt guns left by

the 7th Brigade,[1] two Lewis guns of the Royal Canadian Regiment, one

Colt gun of the 6th Brigade Machine-Gun Company, and in addition a

Stokes gun. The other two companies of the 28th were in support

trenches by the Menin Road. The 31st Battalion was in reserve along

with a company of the 60th Battalion of the 9th Brigade, which it was

found impossible to relieve at the last moment on the night of the

5th-6th. The 29th and 27th were in Brigade reserve. Shortly after

midnight the 6th Brigade was in position. The shelling during the

night was very heavy, and the relief was, in consequence, accomplished

under some difficulties, but as these bursts of fury died away time

after time there was no particular reason to suspect an attack of the

German infantry. At 7 a.m. on the 6th an unprecedented bombardment

began once more, and lasted until the very moment of the assault at

Hooge seven hours later.

[Sidenote: _June 6th, 7 A.M._]

One vital fact was entirely unknown to the Royal Canadian Regiment and

the 7th Brigade. The Germans in planning their attack on Mount Sorrel

and Hill 62 had not in the least forgotten the importance of the knoll

at Hooge. It was necessary to capture it if the new line was to be

made complete and the Ypres salient finally broken. Their right wing

had, as has been recorded, lapped round in the direction of the village

and had been driven back by the sturdy fire of its defenders. But long

before this they had made their plans and had driven four mines right

under the front-line trenches. When the hour of attack at 2 p.m. came

the mines were sprung simultaneously. [Sidenote: _June 6th, 2 P.M._]

The aeroplane photographs after the event show them actually

overlapping in the craters they threw up. The explosion was horrible,

and one entire company of the 28th perished in it almost to the last

man. Many of the remaining company of the 28th were involved in the

catastrophe; the bombing posts were abandoned and the survivors

concentrated in the support trenches. Yet so tremendous was the noise

of the artillery preparation that the garrisons in the Fortified Posts

behind were quite unaware that any mines had been exploded until the

survivors began to arrive, although they were but a little distance

from the scene of this tremendous detonation.

[Sidenote: _June 6th, afternoon._]

After this the day of the 6th witnessed some very fierce fighting. The

Germans had already taken the whole Canadian front line from the gap to

Mount Sorrel on the morning of June 2nd, and were determined to carry

the remainder at Hooge on the 6th. Soon after the mines had exploded

they came forward in the usual formation with packs on their shoulders

like men expecting no resistance. So far as the front line was

concerned they were right; otherwise they made an error. They occupied

the remains of the trenches in Hooge and assaulted the 60th British

Brigade opposite Bellewaarde Farm, but were repulsed with considerable

loss by the resolute infantry of the British Brigade which had neither

been mined at all nor bombarded to any considerable extent. The enemy

then came straight down the line of the Menin Road both on the right-

and the left-hand sides. By this time, however, the resistance, in

spite of the continuous bombardment. had been organised by Captain

Styles, of the 28th, who was fortunate in having at his disposal in the

support line such an exceptionally strong force of machine-guns.

The battle was back on the old line always occupied when Hooge is lost,

and was defended with the greatest obstinacy by the Canadian infantry

and gunners. On the left-hand side of the causeway the enemy got as

far down the hill as Bellewaarde Beek, but any further advance was

swept out of existence by the machine-guns in the support line. On our

right side of the Menin Road the attack appeared more dangerous. The

enemy succeeded in jumping from shell hole to shell hole, and attained

dangerous proximity to our support line. But here again the 28th drove

them back by rifle and machine-gun fire.[2]

[Sidenote: _June 6th, 3.30 P.M._]

By 3.30 p.m. on June 6th the attack on the support line had been

repulsed for the moment by Captain Styles and the machine-guns, but it

persisted on the right-hand side of the road all the afternoon. At

about 4 o'clock the enemy determined to attack the support trenches now

held by the 31st. Their avenue of approach was obvious. It was

through the gap and down by the Zouave Wood. This is an old field of

battle, fought over until every yard of earth is covered with the

relics of the slain. Here in October of 1914 seven hundred of the

Prussian Guard broke clean through the British front line, and paused

as though bewildered when they found they had attained their object.

They were immediately caught in reverse by the fire of the 7th

Division, still holding the slope of the ridge to the right and left,

and charged from the support trenches by the 52nd (Oxfordshire Light

Infantry), who killed them to a man. For many months afterwards their

piled bodies still cumbered the ground. The Germans, undismayed by

this precedent, attacked down Zouave Wood at 4 o'clock and renewed

their attempts during the course of the evening. The support trenches

are good ones, the field of fire excellent, the wood itself devoid of

all substantial cover, and the enemy gained nothing by the attempt

except a heavy list of casualties. Hooge had gone, but the support

line still remained.[3] The main attacks were delivered in two waves

at five yards' interval and fifty yards' distance. But although all

the main attacks were repelled, the Germans succeeded in establishing

small posts down our old communication trenches in the Zouave Wood area.

Early on the night of the 6th-7th the bombardment, which had been

applied to the whole area for nearly seventeen hours, died away. None

the less, the casualties of the 6th Brigade were serious--20 officers

and 580 men.

[Sidenote: _June 6-7th, night._]

The whole line, then, had gone, and Ypres remained open to its

assailants. This is the first reflection on the loss of the village of

Hooge. But all the time that attack was going on, and some time before

it, the powers that be had been brooding darkly over methods of

retaliation and reconquest. It was time to teach the enemy that two

could play at the game of the new artillery preparation, and ground

lost by that method could as speedily be regained. In the next chapter

we shall see how these plans evolved themselves and what the result of

the trial was. As it is, on the night of the 6th, the Germans were

sitting on the rim of the saucer imagining that in the third battle of

Ypres they had at last conquered the salient.

[1] Under Lieut. Ziegler. When Lieut. Ziegler was wounded

Lance-Corporal James took over the command. The assistance of these

guns was invaluable in repelling the attacks.

[2] The advance of the enemy down the communication trench north of the

Menin Road was checked by Lieut. Gilmour, of the 28th, who put up a

block just beyond the support trench nearest to the front and drove

them back with bombs.

[3] Capt. W. E. Manhard, of the 8th Field Company R.E., showed great

gallantry and devotion to duty in making the new front line secure.

His splendid example was an inspiration to all ranks working under him.

CHAPTER XI

THE FINAL VICTORY

Canadians take the initiative--The Anglo-French offensive--Good

fellowship between the Imperial and Canadian Army--British Brigade

supports the Canadians--The Württembergers and the Canadians--General

Burstall commands formidable assembly of heavy guns--Aeroplane

photographs--Battalions massed in strength--Divisional

Commanders--Artillery pounds the German position--The enemy

demoralised--The advance to the assault--Intense artillery

preparation--A struggle between weapons of attack and methods of

defence--Unforeseen developments of trench warfare--The significance of

the Battle of the Marne--The use of gas a failure--Terrific force of

great guns--Mr. Lloyd George and the industrial development of

England--The 3rd Toronto Battalion advances--The centre attack--A

daring scheme to baffle the enemy--The front line moves forward

unnoticed--German listening post captured--The forward rush--The

bayonets clear the trenches--Captain Bell-Irving's daring exploit--The

16th and the 3rd Battalions recapture the heights--The 13th Battalion

to the charge--Machine-gun fight and bombing encounters--Hill 62 in

Canadian hands--Real gain of the day--Counter-attacks dispersed--The

enemy dazed by the suddenness and the success of the onset--Splendid

arrangement and precision of the attack in face of difficulties--Ypres

salient reconquered with bayonet in semi-darkness--A devastated

territory--The natural green blotted out--Earth churned up into masses

of mud--The sight after the battle--Where captains and soldiers

lie--Those we shall remember--Defeat turned into victory.

It is difficult to penetrate the mind of the German Headquarters Staff.

The enemy had, by a profuse expenditure of ammunition and a great

concentration of heavy guns, conquered the last defensive position

which guarded Ypres on the south-east. The Canadians lay below them in

hastily constructed trenches on the flat, where every move was visible

to the keen observers on the heights above. One would imagine that the

next step would be to turn the guns on again to destroy far weaker

positions, to break the salient finally, and to compel the retirement

of two army corps to posts far back in the rear. Yet after June 6th

the Germans made no move and allowed the initiative to pass into

Canadian hands. The best explanation of this singular line of conduct

has been suggested by the Army Commander, who held that the sole object

of the attack was to compel the British to move troops from other parts

of the line.

The idea of the Anglo-French offensive in the summer of 1916 had long

been a nightmare to the great Headquarters Staff. They dreamt of the

continual piling up of men and munitions from beyond the narrow seas at

some pre-arranged point; they believed that a vigorous offensive at one

or two places would disturb their opponents and confuse the threatened

move. According to this theory, Verdun and the third battle of Ypres

were defensive-offensive operations. Neither action prevented the

offensive at the Somme. However that may be, the Germans remained

impassive after their first two strokes, while the Canadian Corps

devoted itself in quietness and confidence to the preparation of the

real attack. They borrowed liberally both in men and guns from the

army corps on their right and left, but no general reserve of the

British Army was shifted to imperil the great offensive on the Somme.

There has been nothing pleasanter in the course of the campaign than

the feeling of good comradeship, common among soldiers, which subsisted

between the Imperial Service and the Canadian Corps. The Canadian

Corps had borne the brunt of the fighting on the Ypres salient, and, as

far as they were concerned, to ask was to have. A British brigade was

moved into the St. Eloi district, so as to set the 2nd Division free

for retaliation. A reserve cavalry division of the British Army was

moved up at once to occupy the third line in order that the Canadian

generals might have no doubt as to their freedom of action in moving to

the final assault against the captured positions. The Higher Command

now had the reserves necessary to make them secure in an advance, and

they certainly needed such security. In the fighting which ensued

between June 2nd and 14th every Brigade of the Canadian Corps was fully

engaged, and many of them suffered severe casualties. None the less,

they endured until the end and the Canadians regained the lost ground.

Their attitude is best summed up by the remark of a senior Staff

Officer, who, basing prejudice on military knowledge, declared "that

this was a personal matter between the Württembergers and the Canadians

and that the Canadians were going to win." Troops animated by this

spirit are not likely to fail.

But the work of the real counter-attack had to be done behind the

lines. The failure of the first effort had been due to lack of

artillery preparation on unknown trenches. None the less, the heavy

guns were on the march. Some were asked for from neighbouring Army

Corps, others were freely offered as a voluntary contribution to the

gallantry of the Canadian infantry. The new reinforcements were

stupendous.

General Burstall, of the Canadian Corps, thus commanded one of the

greatest assemblages of guns ever concentrated on the British front. I

have described already the effect of the enemy's bombardment on the

Canadian front. The Germans were now about to get a little of their

own medicine back. The guns were divided into groups, the trenches

accurately ranged, and each battery was given its definite and proper

objective.

On the other side of the line, one must conceive the Germans toiling

mightily, with the assiduity of coral insects, to make good what they

seem to have imagined was to be their permanent home. Their industry

was certainly marvellous. When the weather grew clear again and the

aeroplane photographs could be taken, they showed no fewer than eight

communication trenches driven up from the old German line to the new

one, and an entire and excellent support line, dug just west of our own

original front trench, now battered almost out of recognition, while

the assault revealed deep dug-outs innumerable. So, from June 4th to

June 12th the powers of offence and defence got ready, one for the

other.

[Illustration: Map--POSITION 9th-l2th JUNE BEFORE SUCCESSFUL ATTACK]

But while the heavy guns were being brought into position, it was

necessary to reorganise the infantry and to mass the Corps for a strong

and concerted attack. An immediate assault had been put out of the

question by the failure of June 3rd. [Sidenote: _June 4th-12th._] The

enemy's trenches had to be located accurately before the fire of the

guns could be directed upon them. For some days after the 3rd the

weather remained unfavourable, and in the heavy rains and mists it was

impossible for our aircraft to obtain good photographs, or for the

ranging shots of our guns to be observed adequately. This delay gave

us an opportunity for the reorganisation of the infantry, preparatory

to a general assault, and it is, after all, by the infantry that the

final issue will be decided. The Canadian battalions were therefore

massed in great strength for the night of the 12th-13th.

The 9th British Brigade took over the St. Eloi sector, and thus

released the 2nd Division, which was enabled to take over the ground on

the northern sector, while the 1st Division prepared for the attack,

and recuperated its forces in rest billets. [Sidenote: _June 8-9th._]

When the reliefs had been accomplished the position on June 8th was as

follows: 6th Brigade of the 2nd Division at Hooge, and 9th Brigade of

the 3rd Division from Zouave Wood to Maple Copse; 5th Brigade of the

2nd Division in line of Maple Copse to Hill 60; 4th Brigade of 2nd

Division from Hill 60 to Ypres-Commes Canal; 9th British Brigade in the

St. Eloi sector.

[Illustration: Map--POSITION BEFORE & AFTER ATTACK ON NIGHT 12th-13th

JUNE 1916]

The accompanying sketch will make the position of June 9th quite clear.

The 2nd Division were to hold the line while the attacking brigades

were reorganised. The 1st Division was given the post of honour; but

its formation was entirely altered for the purpose of the battle. It

was necessary to secure two elements: knowledge of the ground and a

sufficient number of battalions which had not been too severely

punished in the action of June 3rd. Further, it was essential to

secure the conjoint services of the two Brigadiers, General Tuxford and

General Lipsett, who were familiar with the locality and accustomed to

work together. With these objects in view the 1st Division was

redistributed in the following manner:--

General Lipsett took command of the 1st, 3rd, 7th and 8th Battalions

for the right attack. General Tuxford took command of the 2nd, 4th,

13th and 16th Battalions for the left attack, while General Hughes

remained as Divisional Reserve with the 5th, 10th, 14th and 15th

Battalions to push the matter through should any disaster overtake the

leading regiments. [Sidenote: _June 12th._] The map will show the

disposition of our forces and the great mass of infantry assembled for

the purpose of retaking the lost position.

[Sidenote: _June 11-12th, night._]

The 2nd Division was relieved by the 1st Division on the night of the

11th-12th preceding the attack at dawn of the 12th-13th. The artillery

in the meantime had not been idle. Apart from pounding the German

position in a regular and methodical spirit, it had indulged in the

last few days in bursts of intensive fire, which seemed to herald an

infantry assault which did not take place. By this time the Germans

were first of all demoralised by being kept on perpetual tenterhooks,

and finally lulled into a false security. So much was this the case

that our final attack, though preceded by three-quarters of an hour's

intense preparation, caught them in the middle of a relief.[1]

The frontage of the attack was one of three battalions, the 3rd, 16th

and 13th, from right to left. Strong reserves were behind, and on both

flanks demonstrations would be made, the 7th loosing smoke bombs from

Hill 60 and confusing the enemy with a bombing attack, while the 58th

made a severe bombing attack up the well-fought-over communication

trenches by the Apex on the left of the 1st Division, and were to link

up finally with the captured position. [Sidenote: _June 12th, 8.30

P.M._] In the evening of June 12th, at 8.30, a tremendous bombardment

was directed on the German trenches before the last light failed; at

12.45 a.m. of June 13th the tempest of the guns would be let loose once

more, and at 1.30 the guns would lift and the battalions advance to the

assault in successive lines, each supporting regiment occupying

trenches in front of them as soon as they were vacated by their

predecessors. The Staff preparations had been complete and were

crowned with success. In this, as in previous operations of the 1st

Division told in this volume, Major-General Currie exhibited the skill

and resolution which he had shown in so marked a degree at the second

battle of Ypres. He achieved, however, so great a reputation at that

action that it would seem almost superfluous to mention that the

conduct of affairs in his hands was efficient and successful. He was

greatly assisted in his operations by Lieut.-Colonel Kearsley, the

Chief Staff Officer of the Division. Brigadier-General Harington, of

the Corps Staff, did much to perfect the plan of operations. He left

the Canadians, much to their regret, shortly after the action to take

up a superior command. He stayed long enough, however, to see an

action which had begun as a reverse turned into a striking triumph.

But the main credit must be given to General Byng, who well sustained

his previous military reputation in laying down the outline of the plan

which brought success, and in supervising its preparation.

It had been agreed that, in the event of a check taking place anywhere,

flares should be sent up to indicate the position stormed by the

assailants, and for this purpose the objectives were divided into four

successive lines. It would, perhaps, be unwise to give further details

of these arrangements, and one may be content to remark that they

worked admirably. Finally, when the 3rd Battalion arrived at Mount

Sorrel on the right, the 16th at Hill 62 in the centre, and the 13th to

the old lines to the north of this, a red flare from each section would

be the signal that the whole position was taken.

[Sidenote: _June 12-13th, night._]

The weather throughout the attack was of the vilest description, the

rain coming down in torrents; but it was not, as subsequent events will

show, altogether unfavourable to the successful prosecution of the

adventure. The new wire which had been placed along the front by the

2nd Division was removed early in the night of the 12th, for to do so

before would have been to evoke suspicion; and planks were placed

across the trenches to allow the supports to cross them quickly.

[Sidenote: _June 13th, 12.45 A.M._]

Then at 12.45 the guns began. For three-quarters of an hour the air

was full of the preparation. An enormous force of heavy artillery had

been assembled, against which no ordinary parapet or traverse would

stand for an instant. The 18-pounders reached an astonishing total,

with several Belgian field guns in addition. It is true that the whole

of this artillery would not be turned on the actual field of battle.

Some of it was to be employed for purposes subsidiary to the action.

None the less, a great battery of guns of all calibres pointed their

muzzles towards the Germans on Hill 62 and Mount Sorrel. The enemy's

positions on Mount Sorrel and Hill 62 were to be shelled upon a

frontage of 1,500 and to a depth of 1,000 yards, while it was the

ambition of the artillery to break to pieces, day in and day out, some

10,000 yards of German trenches, so that when the moment for the

assault arrived the infantry could go forward, in General Burstall's

words, with slung rifles. This ambition they very nearly fulfilled, as

the light casualty lists of the 1st Division show. The infantry would

be the first to acknowledge the immense debt they owed to the artillery

behind them.

War, while it is in one sense a contest between two opponents, is also

a struggle between the weapons of offence and the methods of defence.

A strange kind of attack suddenly grows formidable, and after winning

one or two resounding victories is countered by the cunning brains

which organise an appropriate form of resistance. On the other hand,

man raises what appears to be an impregnable bar to the forward

progress of armies; instantly, far away, perhaps in laboratories beyond

the seas, human intelligence is contriving to break the bar and to

prove that it is impossible for any one force to say to another, "So

far shalt thou go and no farther." In this interplay of forces the

functions of the infantry, cavalry and artillery are constantly

changing. Now one has, for a short period, a greater superiority and

importance, and then the circle swings round and

"The spoke which is to-day on top

To-morrow's on the ground."

In all these calculations, each side is fallible until it has gained by

experience.

It is a general and very fallacious view that the Germans foresaw all

these developments of war and prepared for them, while the Allies were

caught napping. Nothing could be more untrue. The Germans were better

prepared for all possible eventualities than anyone else, but no

soldier in any army foresaw the actual course which modern warfare

would take. As a matter of fact, the development of trench warfare and

the reign of the machine-gun was so fatal a blow to German prospects

that it is improbable that they would have declared war at all if they

had thought it anything more than a bare possibility. To them it was a

matter of life and death to keep the armies on the move--life if they

could crush the French and British armies in the field and then turn

back on Russia; death if they were condemned to a static defence while

the invincible resources of the Allies in men and money accumulated

slowly on either front. History decided at the Marne in favour of the

latter alternative.

From the date of the Aisne the infantry in defence gained a decided

superiority over the artillery in attack and kept it for many months

after the race to Calais had locked the lines in Western Europe. The

enemy possessed indeed a great superiority in heavy guns, but it was

not sufficient to blow out of its position a resolute corps or army.

The deadlock was complete. The gunners could not destroy the trenches

and the machine-gun emplacements sufficiently to allow the infantry to

advance, and time was on our side. It was in the attempt to break

through this impasse that gas was first used at Ypres; but after that

terrible experience the defence produced the gas helmet, and the new

weapon broke in the German's hands.

Then began the race between the contending armies to produce guns and

shells of such size and in such quantities as would blast a whole area

with death, bury the machine-guns and the garrisons, destroy the

superiority of the infantry in defence, and give the game once more

into the hands of the offensive. In this race we were slow starters.

The generals took time to realise the necessities of the new situation,

and it was not until the cyclonic energy of Mr. Lloyd George was

harnessed to the work of the Munitions Department that the vast

industrial resources of Great Britain were really brought into play.

It was a work which required not only the energy of genius, but the

tact of a consummate man of affairs conversant with all the details of

civilian life. But presently the machine began to work and to gather

momentum in its course. Every private concern adapted to the task was

taken over and pressed into the work. The factories smoked on every

hillside and the furnaces flared in every city. The vast metal tubes

of the guns took shape, and a tremendous volume of shells began to flow

in ever-increasing numbers across the Channel. By the summer the work

was well in hand and the guns were ready to overpower the defence of

the German defenders and clear the way for the 1st Division. On that

June night Mr. Lloyd George was fighting on Canada's side.

[Sidenote: _June 13th, 1.30 A.M._]

Then, as the guns lifted, the infantry charged. On the right

Lieut.-Col. Allan led the 3rd Toronto Battalion forward, with the 1st

Battalion close in support. So dense was the brushwood in Armagh Wood

that in the first stages they went forward in the curious formation of

sections in file. Advancing with great dash, they got in advance of

the enemy's barrage before the latter could be turned on to our

trenches, and took the Germans' front line. One of our Fortified

Posts, then in the enemy's hands, turned a machine-gun and rifle fire

on them, but the fort was taken by assault and the garrison bayoneted

in the fighting. This Fortified Post represented the left of the 3rd

Battalion, and thenceforward they met with little opposition here and

in the centre, except attacks from isolated bombing posts, and their

casualties were almost entirely due to enemy shell fire. They rushed a

position somewhere in the region of their old line on Mount Sorrel, as

soon as our guns lifted to the old German line, and were the first of

the attackers to signal that the final objective had been reached at

ten minutes past two in the morning of June 13th, forty minutes from

the commencement of the action. [Sidenote: _June 13th, 2.10 A.M._] The

right-hand company, however, working up the old front line British

trenches, was somewhat delayed by an obstinate resistance, but with the

assistance of a company of the 1st Battalion it also pushed through.

The night of the attack was, as has been stated, dark and squally. The

rain blew in great gusts, drenching the waiting battalions to the skin

and filling the assembly trenches knee-deep in water. But these

conditions suggested to the mind of Colonel J. E. Leckie, of the 16th

Battalion, or centre attack, a particularly daring scheme. Two of his

subalterns, Lieuts. Adams[2] and Scroggie, had been for some days

reconnoitring and crawling about the ground in front, with the view of

guiding the Battalion during the actual assault.[3] In the course of

these investigations they had come across an old trench marked on no

map and about 100 yards in front of the Canadian first line. Such a

trench is a common feature on ground which has been much fought over.

It was suggested that if the leading lines of the Battalion crept up

during the night to this new position they would be 100 yards nearer

their objective and would probably escape the German artillery fire,

which would break out on our front line the instant our guns lifted and

the attack was seen to be imminent. Such a course had great

advantages. On the other hand, Colonel Leckie had to consider the fact

that an encounter with a patrol or a listening post of the enemy would

give away the secret of an attack the prospect of which had, so far,

been sedulously guarded from reaching the ears of the enemy. A

premature brush on the part of a company with even a small section of

the enemy would have meant flares and infantry firing along the whole

line and the plan would have stood disclosed. Colonel Leckie decided

to take the risk and the responsibility. His regiment was drawn up for

the assault on a frontage of two half-companies in four successive

lines. The first two lines were passed successfully up to the unmarked

trench without any suspicion of their intention reaching the enemy.

The margin between success and failure was, however, narrow to the last

inch. The Germans had actually put out a listening post well in front

of their line, but the advance guards of the 16th (Canadian Scottish)

passed by it in the dark. By the time the Germans discovered the

presence of the Canadians they were hemmed in in front and rear, and

remained quiescent until dawn led to their discovery and surrender. Of

course, they ought to have fired their rifles and given the alarm at

any cost to themselves.

But the manoeuvre succeeded, like many risky chances taken in war. The

enemy's shells missed the two front lines completely as the 16th

Battalion charged straight into the German positions. The two

supporting lines, on the other hand, suffered somewhat severely from

ranged shell-fire as they climbed the parapet. The first two waves of

the assault met, indeed, with little resistance owing to the unexpected

rapidity of their advance--a plan since extensively adopted in the

fighting on the Somme.

Isolated German parties of bombers or machine-gunners still put up a

fleeting resistance. In the face of these assaults the Canadian

infantry moved steadily on with the quietude of fate. The second two

waves of the 16th, on approaching the German front line, were met in

places by machine-gun fire and by a bombing resistance, in which

Captain Wood, an American Army officer whose services were very

valuable to the Canadians, was killed. The trench was soon taken and

the enemy who resisted were bayoneted. The survivors, who were taken

prisoners, appeared to be dazed and to possess neither rifles nor

equipment. About thirty yards behind this line, however, a machine-gun

was still in action and was causing many casualties in our ranks.

Captain Bell-Irving dashed out from the line, got behind the gun, shot

three of the team with his revolver, and, picking up a rifle, charged

in from the rear and killed the remaining gunners with the bayonet.

Line after line was carried in this fashion until the 16th were able to

put up the red flares, which signalled to the division that they had

recaptured the heights and stood once more on their old ground or in

its immediate vicinity. Although not so quick to arrive as the 3rd

Battalion, they were soon in touch with it, and the new line was linked

up.

Meanwhile, on the left the 13th Battalion (Royal Highlanders of

Canada), under Lieut.-Colonel Buchanan, had advanced at a given signal.

The German artillery had ranged their assembly trenches during our own

bombardment and inflicted somewhat severe losses on them before they

climbed the parapet at the correct moment. They set out in the usual

formation of four waves on a frontage of two half companies, the first

two waves under Major Perry and the last two under Major McCuaig, and,

advancing across broken ground under heavy shell fire, reached their

first objective. Here they were held up for a time by a machine-gun on

their left front; a bombing party had to be sent round its rear to

destroy it before the regiment could proceed. Finally, after some

isolated bombing encounters in the communication trenches, the 13th

broke through to the north of Hill 62 and linked up with the 16th on

their right.[4] The circle from left to right was now complete, for

the 58th (Colonel Genet), fighting their way slowly up the

communication trenches on the left of the 13th, finally established

touch with them. The main action was over shortly after 2.30 on the

morning of June 13th.

[Sidenote: _June 13th, 2.30 A.M._]

On the right the 1st Division had not, as they thought, retaken the

precise position held by the 3rd Division on June 1st, although in the

heat of the assault they were fully convinced that they had done so,

and, in fact, succeeded in doing so on the following day. The Germans

had built a new support trench somewhat to the west of the original

British line, and this was in very good condition. In the meantime, a

fortnight of rain and heavy bombardments, both from British and German

guns, had practically obliterated the old first line. In the confusion

of the final onrush in a half-light the company commanders of the

various battalions occupied at once the first sound trench which

obviously held a dominating position looking towards the east, and, in

doing this, they no doubt stopped on the right 50 yards short of their

objective. Such an error must be regarded as trivial by those who

understand the conditions of modern warfare; it is a mistake which is

bound to be made over and over again, even by the best infantry in the

world, and is a far less dangerous offence than the opposing one of

overcharging the position. Bombing posts were at once established down

the German communication trenches and all measures taken against

threatened counter-attacks. Immediately behind the assaulting waves

came the Pioneers carrying on them the materials for consolidating and

making good the captured trench the very instant it was clear of the

enemy. In this work, Major W. B. Lindsay, of the Engineers, especially

distinguished himself. The enemy, indeed, threatened a counter-attack,

but their concentrations were, however, dispersed by our gun-fire. The

enemy, in fact, had been surprised, and appeared to be dazed by the

suddenness and the success of the onset, and the various reliefs of the

assaulting battalions were carried out successfully, though under heavy

shellfire.

It may be pointed out in summarising the action that no military

movement can be realised without a consideration of its environment.

The advance of the Canadians to the final counter-assault took place in

the semi-darkness which precedes the dawn. The wildness of the

elements tended to produce confusion if it added security from

observation. There was enough light to distinguish the features and

uniform of the enemy from our own and to give the officers a general

sense of their direction. In the gloomy rainstorm, just before

daybreak, the 1st Division advanced in a long succession of four lines,

one close behind the other, on the frontage of three companies. Each

regiment maintained its correct line of attack on the objective; each

leading company was reinforced at the proper moment by the company

which was marching steadily behind. The fury of the German shell-fire

in no way discomposed the orderly advance of these disciplined

battalions. In the shadows of the shattered woods which surrounded

them it was easy to be deflected from the true course by the sudden

spurt of machine-gun fire from an undestroyed emplacement, or to be

checked by bombs thrown by isolated detachments of Germans. But the

regiments moved steadily forward in the darkness, over a ground ravaged

both by British and German artillery until no landmarks remained. Here

and there patches of barbed wire still stood out to show that a trench

had once existed behind it. The orders were to use the bayonet until

light came, for fear of firing into the other detachments. Through

this chaos of shattered trees and earth the Canadian infantry moved

steadily forward, and as the dawn broke once more on a ruined

countryside it saw the assailants unshaken in discipline and correct in

alignment--masters once more of the heights which defend the salient of

Ypres.

Captain Papineau, of the Corps Staff, on June 16th surveyed the field

of battle after the Canadian Corps had re-established itself in its old

positions. His impressions are well worth recording. Looking north

from the works which we still maintain on Hill 60, he was able to

survey most of the ground over which the ebb and flow of battle had

raged during the preceding fortnight. The first impression was one of

blight--as though a devastating plague had suddenly descended upon

these woods and fields and hills, had blotted out the natural green of

Nature, and churned up the earth into sordid masses of mud. The blaze

of sunshine and the blue sky flecked with slow-moving clouds could not

wipe out the ugliness of the prospect. Man had defaced Nature until

the charm of Nature had vanished.

Gaunt and grey and menacing, the prospect of the low hills swept out

from the feet of the observers. Below were the shattered remains of

Square Wood and Armagh Wood. Observatory Ridge, lost and recaptured,

stood in front, its coppices full of the memories of hidden

machine-guns. Behind there peeped out the higher grounds of Hills 61

and 62, to which the remains of Sanctuary Wood still climbed upwards.

On the right rose Mount Sorrel, where the grim earth and shattered

trunks still met the clear sky. Behind, in contrast, the green fields

of high grass stretching towards Ypres ringed this land of death. The

uncut crops, grown wild, had attained an unwonted luxuriance. Here and

there a bunch of scarlet poppies might have drawn their intense colour

from the gallant blood which had soaked the earth beneath. The unkempt

hedgerows, no longer tall and neat, ran back to the city behind, and

the beheaded and scarred poplars remained as mute witnesses to the

strife of man. Yet Nature was attempting to assert herself, and

through this summer's growth of verdure to cover the riot of battle.

Scattered beneath this innocent mantle of green are innumerable shell

holes, old crumbling trenches full of the memories and odours of death,

graves and graveyards marked by the crosses commemorating the

long-forgotten captains once well loved by their regiments, and of

humble privates perhaps still remembered. The torn and trampled

equipment, the empty ammunition boxes, the remains here and there of

shattered bodies, which human care and energy had been unable to bury,

all await the healing tide of Nature which will cover them in its due

time. On the roads behind lie the bodies of dead horses, with the

flies thick on their congealed sides, killed in the effort to bring up

to the assaulting battalions the necessities of war and livelihood.

Yet of these, too, the poet has written that their cups are the calm

pools and the winding rivers, and that care never breaks their healthy

slumbers. Even over all that quiet countryside has come the continued

spray of bursting shells, week after week and month after month, and if

you look closely into every field and tree and ruined house, every yard

of that wide landscape will show its wounds. We shall remember when

the time of reckoning comes.

Even as the observers watched the field of conflict on June 16th,

sudden clouds like giant powder-puffs leapt into the sky, and the air

carried less swiftly the sound of bursting shrapnel. They looked into

Square Wood, which was a wood no longer. In it there was no speck of

green--only grey mud, slowly crusting in the sun, and bare, white,

lifeless stalks to mark what had once been trees. But against the

sky-line the new Canadian trenches ran, marked by the new outlines of

red earth, to show that we held once again the lines of Mount Sorrel.

The experience had been a hard one; the cost of life severe; the

energies of the whole Corps had been required to balance the advantage

the Württembergers had gained over us in the early days of June, and no

regiment had been exempt from a share in the trial. Yet the task was

accomplished, and defeat was turned into victory.

[1] The greatest possible assistance to the attack was given by Capt.

Godwin and the trench mortar batteries of the 1st Division. These

mortars kept up so heavy a fire on Hill 60 that the enfilade fire which

had largely stopped the night attack on June 3rd was kept down

completely. Capt. Godwin was unfortunately killed.

[2] Lieut. Adams was killed in the attack.

[3] A reconnaissance was also undertaken on the night of the 12th to

try to estimate the accuracy of our shooting in the bombardment

beginning at 8.30 p.m.

[4] The Staff Direction of General Tuxford's Brigade was admirable

throughout, and for this special credit should be given to the work of

the Brigade Major--Major Clarke--and to Captains Urquart and Clarke

Kennedy.

CHAPTER XII

"CANADA IN FLANDERS"

Conclusion--Canada will meet new necessities with fresh exertions--The

Military co-operation of all parts of the Empire to lead to closer

Political Union--Significance of the title "Canada in Flanders"--French

General's views--British Infantry have never had to protect their own

soil--Devotion of Australians and Canadians for an ideal--They felt the

Empire was in danger--Lack of foresight in England--Prevision of Mr.

Hughes, General Botha, and Sir Robert Borden--Recrimination in War-time

useless, but the feeling for closer union and more responsibility

growing overseas--Difficulty of organising this sentiment in a

constitutional form without imperilling the liberty of the

Dominions--Perils of refusing to do so--Controversy between Captain

Papineau and Mr. Bourassa--Risk of reaction after the War--"Admit us to

your Councils"--Reorganisation of Imperial resources the first

constructive task for the Statesmen of the Empire.

It is more than a year ago since, in the last chapter of the first

volume of "Canada in Flanders," these words were written:--

"After incredible hardships patiently supported, after desperate

battles stubbornly contested, the work of the Canadians is still

incomplete. But they will complete it, meeting new necessities with

fresh exertions, for it is the work of civilisation and of liberty."

These words still contain some truth in relation to the conditions of

to-day. The work is still incomplete. But in the interval which has

passed the dimensions of the task have wholly altered. In this war

success depended, as Mr. Churchill once pointed out, not upon episodes,

but upon tendencies. And in the last ten months the tendencies have

all marched with the terrible inevitableness of a Greek tragedy towards

the doom of the Central Powers.

In that development the Canadians have played their part. They will

continue to play it, "meeting new necessities with fresh exertions,"

until the happy day when peace is dictated upon the terms which the

Allies require. And then they will return to the farm, the bank, the

university, the shop, and the ranch, as the seven thousand returned who

fought in our South African quarrel. But is it possible that they

should return without having stamped upon the loose constitution of the

Empire articles at once more formal and more mutual than those with

which until this war we have on the whole been content?

It does not seem possible, and it is certainly not desirable, that this

remarkable military co-operation should be so unfruitful in

constitutional result. In this final chapter of the second volume--the

last volume in which it is likely that the present writer will be able

to undertake the responsibility of authorship--he may perhaps be

forgiven if he allows himself the intrusion of a more personal note

than has been consistent with the scope of that part of the work which

has preceded it.

"Canada in Flanders" suggests many reflections to a mind either

acquainted with the past or imaginative in relation to the future. It

speaks of achievement; and it also speaks of the agony of lingering

death; it recalls Ypres, which will perhaps be in the history of Young

Canada what Verdun is in the history of Old France; it recalls, too,

the truncated bodies of the maimed who have offered the sacrifice of

radiant youth and health upon a shrine the reality of which to them may

perhaps sometimes have seemed a little remote. "Canada in Flanders,"

if confined to the military activities of Canadians in that unlovable

country, would awake these and many other tragic and glorious memories.

The pages which precede these words are a contribution and an effort to

do justice to this branch of the subject.

But to the title "Canada in Flanders" must be conceded the relevance of

some other observations which as a Canadian I think ought to be made,

because it is plain that the Empire is still in an evolutionary stage;

because plans and policies involving great changes are being boldly

canvassed; because I myself am in favour of great changes; and,

finally, because to see the facts as they really are is a condition

precedent to fruitful development.

The first step in such a consideration is to examine shortly the

nature, the significance, and the inevitable consequences of the

Dominion's contribution to the necessities of this gigantic struggle.

The degree of heroism which has been constantly displayed by Canadians

of all ranks will be admitted by all who have read these pages. The

moral grandeur of their deeds can only receive justice from those who

keep in mind considerations which are sometimes overlooked, but which

are nevertheless of immense importance.

A very distinguished French General--a General than whom none more

distinguished has been discovered by France in this war--and very few

by any country in any war--was good enough once to discuss with me the

respective qualities of the French and British infantry. Our

conversation took place under circumstances which invited and won from

him both sympathy and candour. He spoke of the soldiers of France in

words so eloquent, so full of personal reminiscence, so charged with

emotion, so vibrant with a wholly attractive pride, that for the first

time I fully understood how deep and how pure are the wells from which

the patriotism of this immortal nation is distilled. Then he began to

speak of the British forces. Of these he made this penetrating

observation: "To the British of all nations this singular tribute must

be paid: that their infantry has never been engaged in any protracted

war without a universal admission that it was the equal of any infantry

in the world; and yet that it has never been afforded the supreme

incentive to soldiers, that of fighting on their own soil, and for

their own women and children at the moment and on the scene of their

instant peril.

"In Flanders, under Marlborough, in the Peninsula and at Waterloo,

under Wellington, your infantry have compelled the admiration of the

world. And yet, my friend, they have never responded, as we have, to

this appeal:--

"'Soldiers! facing you are the men who still occupy the sacred soil of

France: who have ravished your women: and murdered old men, your

compatriots. Soldiers, advance to avenge your country and those of

your blood and race whom a savage enemy has done to death!'"

Deeply moved by a tribute made with so much feeling, tact, and

sympathy, I ventured to ask,

"Do not these remarks of yours, General, apply with even more force to

the troops of the great self-governing Dominions who from so far have

come to sustain with their lives the fortunes of the Allies upon soil

so remote?"

His reply stated so clearly and with such insight the view on which I

desire to insist that I venture to reproduce it. "Nothing," he said,

"in the history of the world has ever been known quite like it. My

countrymen are fighting within fifty miles of Paris to push back and

chastise the vile and leprous race which has violated the chastity of

our beautiful France. But the Australians at the Dardanelles and the

Canadians at Ypres fought with supreme and absolute devotion for what

to many of them must have seemed simple abstractions, and that nation

which will support for an abstraction the horror of this war of all

wars, will ever hold the highest place in the records of human valour."

I recall this conversation because it illustrates my point.

In a sense it is true that the majority of Australian and Canadian

soldiers understand generally that they are fighting for the existence

of the Empire, and in particular for the independence of that part of

the Empire to which each respectively belongs; but the conclusion can

only be a general one, the outcome rather of intuition than of exact

knowledge. Australia is far, far remote from European quarrels.

Canada has no neighbour but the United States. The shearer from

Australia and the lumberman from Canada have come to help the Empire;

but they would, I suspect, rather fight for six months than spend six

minutes in attempting a lucid exposition of the motives which proved

decisive to each individual volunteer. And, indeed, how could

they--simple men far away from the heart of the Empire--be expected to

have grasped the nature of the German menace when the whole of a great

historic party in England was blind to it six months before the war

broke out? Was a bank clerk in Toronto, or a book-keeper in Sydney, or

a squatter in Rhodesia, to appreciate the ultimate tendency of German

policy when the Chairman of the National Union of Liberal Federations,

himself a Privy Councillor, was declaring that as a business man he

preferred the sanctions of International Law to the protection of the

British Fleet; when members of Parliament were forming each year a

powerful committee to fight the Naval Estimates; when official

invitations to suspend shipbuilding programmes gave annual indulgence

to the Teuton sense of humour; when German editors and professors in

yearly deputations exploited the simplicity of their silly hosts; and

when, finally, statesmen in high places paid periodic and public

tribute to the sincerity and humanity of German _Kultur_?

To ask these questions is to answer them. The majority of those who

stood to the Colours did so because they saw that at that moment the

Empire was in peril. The circumstance that neither they nor their

leaders were responsible for the policy which brought us, wholly

unprepared on the military side, to the most gigantic struggle in

history, seemed to them no sufficient reason for refusing to fight

while the fight lasted. But it may be pointed out that many of their

leaders had a very clear vision of the dangers in our path. They saw

the European situation from a distance, and perhaps for that reason in

truer perspective. Mr. Hughes, the Prime Minister of Australia, who

unites with profound knowledge of affairs dauntless courage and the

analytical power of a trained mind, has always believed this struggle

must come. General Botha--in many ways the most romantic figure in the

Empire to-day--adroit politician, skilful general, chivalrous soldier,

faithful friend--returned from a visit to the German Army manoeuvres

some years ago with the same apprehension branded upon his mind. Sir

Robert Borden, only four years ago, in introducing his naval proposals

in the Canadian Parliament, used these prophetic words:--

"But to-day while the clouds are heavy, and we hear the booming of the

distant thunder, and see the lightning flash above the horizon, we

cannot and we will not wait and deliberate until the impending storm

has burst upon us in fury and with disaster."

The leaders, then, of political thought in the Dominions had arrived at

sound conclusions by observation and inference from known facts. And

having formed these conclusions, they decided, when war came, to throw

their whole strength into the scale, though they were well aware of the

errors of judgment that had paralysed preparation in England. The rank

and file volunteered in hundreds of thousands, and then in more

hundreds of thousands, because they saw that recrimination as to past

responsibility was at that moment futile, and that there and then the

Empire was in mortal peril. From thousands of miles the flower of the

youth of the Empire have come and trained, and fought and died, or have

drifted back broken after the war to the Dominions whence they set out.

And the men who have done these things, uncompelled and uncompellable,

have accepted our military and diplomatic direction of the war, even

when they disagreed with it, without question and without complaint.

Nothing nobler has been uttered in the war than the answer, made in the

Australian Parliament, by the Prime Minister to a Member who gave

expression to the bitter grief with which Australia learned of the

definite abandonment of the Dardanelles adventure.

"Not upon us," said he, "have these great burdens and responsibilities

been cast. Not by one word or even one doubt will I add to the

anxieties of those from whom decisions have been required."

It is a commonplace that no such phenomenon as the great rally of the

Dominions has ever been witnessed in history. None of the Great

Empires of the world has ever conceded so much freedom to its

constituent parts or been rewarded by so much devotion. And it is well

known that the whole world--our friends and our enemies alike--have

been amazed at the spectacle of Imperial solidarity which the war has

exhibited. "For the purposes of a European war," wrote one of

Germany's many military philosophers, "the British Colonies, even if

they remain faithful, may be ignored." To-day this gallant

theorist--the nursling of Treitschke--is, one may presume, somewhat

better informed.

It may perhaps be urged that, after all, the very co-operation of which

so much has been said has become possible under the undefined,

impalpable, and sentimental Union which has hitherto prevailed

throughout the Empire; that the task of translating in the twin fields

of Defence and Diplomacy informal into formal representations of the

Dominions is very hard to reconcile with the complete domestic

independence of each unit; and that all our most valuable

constitutional doctrines have been the fruit of an evolutionary and not

of a conscious or studied process. This is true. But it ignores a

real peril to the Empire. In all things physical, mental, and moral,

great activities are followed by great reactions. And the violence of

the reaction is generally determined by the violence of the activity.

The efforts made by all parties in this War have been stupendous. It

is certain that these exertions will be followed in every belligerent

country by violent reactions. The Dominions will not escape the

influence of these currents of opinion. "The captains and the kings

depart," but there remain the memory of the dead, the presence

everywhere of the maimed, and perhaps to many of the bereaved the

anxiety of financial pressure. Canada has been and is overwhelmingly

loyal, but none the less a student of Imperial affairs should give

attention to the recent correspondence between Mr. Bourassa and Capt.

Papineau. Similar problems survive even the immense influence and

prestige of General Botha in South Africa. In Australia and New

Zealand the loyalty which is endemic in these stubborn and homogeneous

peoples is reinforced by obvious local inducements to a centripetal

policy. But even here there are forces which at a time of reaction are

certain to become both articulate and critical. In measuring the

probable extent and seriousness of such a reaction the student of

politics will not forget the lessons of the South African War. The

glamour of war is dissipated: material gains are forgotten: there

survive commercial and industrial dislocations, the stale but strident

advertisement of war scandals, and the abiding, grinding pressure of

war taxation. The khaki election in England was followed by the

_débâcle_ of 1906, and by the accession to power of a Parliament which

consisted to a greater extent than any House of Commons which had ever

existed in England of pacifists, idealists, and demagogues to whom not

only the thought of war, but even of preparation for war, was abhorrent.

But the country in which this reaction against the South African War

took place was, after all, the country whose Government, elected by

themselves, was responsible for the diplomacy which led up to that war

and for the conduct of the war when once it was declared. The danger

in the case of the self-governing Dominions is that the reaction is

certain to be supported by opponents of the War with the argument that

those who have made contributions relatively so immense were never

consulted as to the policy, and have merely been called in to support

the consequences of other men's bungling. It is sufficient to say that

such a campaign might become formidable.

There is only one remedy. It is not attempted here to work out the

details; and, indeed, their elaboration might most usefully engage the

exclusive work of the twelve ablest statesmen in the united Empire.

But without making any such attempt, it may be broadly claimed that

both in the interests of the Mother Country and of the Dominions, and

of that Empire of which they are equally the legatees, the close of the

War will mark the moment when the claim of Sir Robert Borden, "Admit us

to your councils," will become irresistible. It is important that this

claim should be recognised now. With every year that passes it will

become more important. The Dominions have played a great part in this

War and one which will never be forgotten. But they are still in their

infancy. Their adult strength has yet to be tested. There may never

be another world struggle. Should such an occasion unhappily arise, it

is at least likely to be remote in time. And the more remote it be,

the more decisive is the part which our kinsmen in the Outer Empire may

hope to play.

Do not, at least, let us fail in the attempt to keep our friends for

want of imagination.

Burke, in a splendid and memorable passage, dealing with those Colonies

which the folly of our ancestors lost, spoke to a deaf audience of the

swift development of our old American Colonies:--

"Whether I put the present numbers too high or too low is a matter of

little moment. Such is the strength with which population shoots in

that part of the world that, state the numbers as high as we will,

whilst the dispute continues, the exaggeration ends. Whilst we are

discussing any given magnitude they are grown to it. Whilst we spend

our time in deliberating on the mode of governing 2,000,000 we shall

find we have millions more to manage. Your children do not grow faster

from infancy to manhood than they spread from families to communities,

and from villages to nations."

Such will be the growth of these great communities which have given us

their lives in this War. Let us welcome, and, if it be possible, let

us increase their proven attachment. Nor let us for one moment forget,

among the great tasks with which peace will confront us, that the

reorganisation of our Imperial resources is the first constructive task

which awaits the statesmen of the Empire. If this indeed be realised,

the work will not have been done in vain which has been done by "Canada

in Flanders."

APPENDIX.

Extracts from the third supplement of the _London Gazette_ of Friday,

May 29th, 1916. In the Despatch from Sir Douglas Haig, G.C.B.,

Commander-in-Chief British Forces in France, of May 19th, the following

references are made to the Canadian troops:--

SECTION 10.

During the period under review the forces under my command have been

considerably augmented by the arrival of new formations from home, and

the transfer of others released from service in the Near East. This

increase has made possible the relief of a French Army, to which I have

already referred, at the time of the Battle of Verdun. Among the newly

arrived forces is the "Anzac" Corps. With them, the Canadians, and a

portion of the South African Overseas Force which has also arrived, the

Dominions now furnish a valuable part of the Imperial Forces in France.

SECTION 8.

The following units were specially brought to the notice of the

Commander-in-Chief for good work in carrying out or repelling local

attacks an raids:

1st Divisional Artillery,

22nd Canadian Howitzer Brigade,

5th Canadian Infantry Battalion,

7th Canadian Infantry Battalion,

29th Canadian Infantry Battalion,

49th Canadian Infantry Battalion.

SECTION 6.

St. Eloi.

6. On March 27th our troops made an attack with the object of

straightening out the line at St. Eloi, and cutting away the small

German salient which encroached on the semicircle of our line in the

Ypres salient to a depth of about 100 yards over a front of some 600

yards. The operation was begun by the firing of six very large mines;

the charge was so heavy that the explosion was felt in towns several

miles behind the lines, and large numbers of the enemy were killed.

Half a minute after the explosion our infantry attack was launched,

aiming at the German Second Line. The right attack met with little

opposition, and captured its assigned objective; but the left attack

was not so successful, and a gap was left in possession of the Germans,

through which they entered one of the craters. The following days were

spent by both sides in heavy bombardment and in unsuccessful attacks,

intended on our part to capture the remaining trenches, and on the part

of the Germans to drive us from the positions we had occupied. In the

very early morning of April 3rd we succeeded in recapturing the crater

and the trenches still held by the enemy, thereby securing the whole of

our original objective. We had, moreover, captured five officers and

195 men in the first attack on March 27th, and five officers and 80 men

in the attack on April 3rd. The work of consolidating our new

position, however, proved extremely difficult, owing to the wet soil,

heavy shelling and mine explosions; though pumps were brought up and

efforts at draining were instituted, the result achieved was

comparatively small. By dint of much heavy work the Brigade holding

these trenches succeeded in reducing the water in the trenches by two

feet by the morning of the 5th. This state of affairs could not, even

so, be regarded as satisfactory; and during the 5th the enemy's

bombardment increased in intensity, and the new trenches practically

ceased to exist. On the morning of the 6th the enemy attacked with one

battalion supported by another; he penetrated our new line, and gained

the two westernmost craters. It is difficult to follow in detail the

fighting of the next three weeks, which consisted in repeated attacks

by both sides on more or less isolated mine craters, the trench lines

having been destroyed by shell fire. Great efforts were made to

maintain communication with the garrisons of these advanced posts, and

with considerable success. But there were periods of uncertainty, and

some misconception as to the state of affairs arose. On the 11th it

was reported to me that we had recaptured all that remained of the

position won by us on March 27th and April 3rd. This report, probably

due to old craters having been mistaken for new ones, was subsequently

found to be incorrect. The new craters, being exposed to the enemy's

view and to the full weight of his artillery fire, have proved

untenable, and at the present time our troops are occupying trenches

roughly in the general line which was held by them before the 27th.

In a subsequent despatch, dated December 23rd, 1916, issued in a

Supplement to the London Gazette of December 29th, the following

references to the activities of Canadian troops during June appears:--

While my final preparations were in progress the enemy made two

unsuccessful attempts to interfere with my arrangements. The

first, directed on May 21st against our positions on the Vimy

Ridge, south and south-east of Souchez, resulted in a small enemy

gain of no strategic or tactical importance; and rather than weaken

my offensive by involving additional troops in the task of

recovering the lost ground, I decided to consolidate a position in

rear of our original line.

The second enemy attack was delivered on June 2nd on a front of

over one and a half miles from Mount Sorrel to Hooge, and succeeded

in penetrating to a maximum depth of 700 yards. As the southern

part of the lost position commanded our trenches, I judged it

necessary to recover it, and by an attack launched on June 13th,

carefully prepared and well executed, this was successfully

accomplished by the troops on the spot.

Neither of these enemy attacks succeeded in delaying the

preparations for the major operations which I had in view.

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