On the night of January 30th-31st, 1916, two battalions of the 6th
Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brigadier-General Ketchen), supported by
artillery, machine-guns, and trench mortars, succeeded in an important
attack against the unsuspecting enemy on their brigade front. The
objects of this operation were the same as those of the 7th Battalion's
offensive in November, to obtain prisoners and information, to cause
casualties, apprehension, and material damage. This enterprise
exceeded that of our 2nd Brigade in that it pierced the German line at
two widely separated points.
In their conception and plans of attack the General Officer Commanding
the 6th Brigade and his Staff gave the same careful attention to
details as had their comrades of the 2nd Brigade two months before.
The 28th (North-West) Battalion's objective was a point on the northern
side, and that of the 29th (Vancouver) Battalion a point on the
southern face of the Spanbroekmolen salient. Here, a little to the
south-east of Kemmel and about the centre of the Canadian line, the
German line runs sharply in to a western thrust over some 1,900 yards,
and the attacks were like the jaws of pincers gripping the base of the
protuberance at that distance from each other. The two objectives were
about eleven hundred yards apart. The wire in front of these selected
points was cut solely by hand, as one of the chief features of this
attack was to dispense with the customary artillery preparation and so
take the enemy by complete surprise.
The operation, as has been stated, consisted of two widely separated
and individual attacks, delivered simultaneously, both maintained in
the hostile trenches for the same number of minutes and simultaneously
withdrawn. Scout-Sergeant Turner and Corporal Conlin, of the 28th
Battalion, worked in the enemy's wire from 10 p.m. to 1.45 in the
morning, and stayed there until joined by the attacking party, with
whom they entered the German trench at about twenty minutes to three.
The enemy's entanglements had been strongly reinforced during the
previous day, under cover of a heavy fog; but Turner and Conlin stuck
to their difficult and dangerous task and completed it without an error.
The raiders of both battalions advanced from their positions of
readiness in "No Man's Land" at half-past two sharp. The 28th
Battalion party, thirty strong, commanded by Capts. D. E. MacIntyre and
K. C. Taylor, lost a few minutes in negotiating the trunk of a fallen
tree, and were still strung out in the German wire when sounds of
exploding grenades and an increased flaring of star-shells told them
that their comrades of the 29th were already in violent touch with the
enemy. There was no time to lose. Lives hang on fractions of seconds
in such work as this. The two captains and the two tireless
wire-cutters were still in the lead. Together they crawled up the
sloping face of the big German parapet, and each threw a grenade into
the crowded trench. Four explosions followed. Sentries shouted and
fired their rifles. Capt. MacIntyre accounted for one of the sentries
with the second shot of his automatic. Then the four leaders jumped
down into the 10-foot-deep trench, into the midst of confusion and rage
and fear. The other raiders followed them with a rush.
Here were thirty Canadians with blackened faces[2] and armed with
sudden death in a trench full of Germans. Many of the Germans were
"standing to," many had but then scrambled from their dug-outs, their
blankets still about them, and their feet still unbooted. Make the
picture for yourself, with the help of these extracts from Capt.
Macintyre's report:--
"The trench seemed full of men running both ways.... Almost at once
Corporal Conlin fell at my feet shot through the head. Behind Conlin
was a Hun. I shot him through the stomach. The noise was frightful,
and I could not tell where it was coming from. The flares made it
nearly as light as day. I was knocked down by something once, but
don't know what it was.
"After six minutes I blew the horn, and all the men heard it and the
squads retired to the point of entry. Capt. Taylor held the right and
Sergeant Cameron the left. I asked them if all their squads were out,
and they said 'Yes.' Then I told them to 'beat it,' and we all jumped."
The casualties suffered by this party were two men killed and two
officers and eight men wounded. Capt. Taylor, though wounded in the
leg while in the very act of invading the trench, did terrible
execution. It is claimed for him that he killed fourteen of the enemy,
shooting some and bayoneting others. He was wounded in eight places,
but returned to our lines unaided when the affair was over.
The majority of our casualties were caused by a machine-gun which
enfiladed the invaded trench. This gun was fortunately put out of
action by a bomb from our trench-mortars just before the retirement
commenced. The 28th Battalion party brought out no prisoners, but
inflicted thirty-nine casualties by actual count.
While the North-Westerners were thus engaged at Peckham, the raiders of
the 29th Battalion were as busily employed in their chosen place of
trench at Spanbroekmolen. The officers in charge of the Vancouver
Battalion's assault were Lieuts. G. I. Gwynn, N. E. O'Brien, and L. A.
Wilmot. Lieut. Wilmot and his men cut the wire, then acted as guides
to the others, and accompanied them into the trench. The leading men
of the right and left parties went over the parapet together, using the
loophole of a machine-gun emplacement as a step. Sergeant Dungan
bayoneted the first two sentries encountered by the left party. Lieut.
O'Brien entered a dug-out and captured one of its inmates. A
machine-gun opened fire on the raiders, but the gunner was promptly
shot by Lieuts. Wilmot and O'Brien and the gun and the dug-out of the
crew were bombed. Other dug-outs were also bombed. The right party,
on the other flank of the central machine-gun emplacement, did equally
fine execution. The work of Lieut. Gwynn was conspicuous.
Things had gone very well with the raiders thus far, when Lieut. Wilmot
was wounded by a grenade. In spite of his injury he kept his head
clear and a grip on the situation. Seeing that a number of prisoners
had been taken and that the alarm of the enemy had become general, he
ordered a retirement, and then signalled to our artillery to open fire.
The return to our lines was accomplished without accident.
The 29th Battalion killed at least twenty of the enemy, did
considerable damage to dug-outs and machine-guns, and brought back
three prisoners. Lieut. Wilmot, Sergeant Kirkland, and two men were
wounded.
These two successful raids illustrate not inaptly the various phases
through which advance patrol work has gone. The first stage, as soon
as trench warfare set in, was the casual encounters of hostile parties
in the dark. The second was the organised trench raid by night, in
which the Canadians led the way. The last stage was reached in
midsummer, before the Canadians fought on the Somme, when the 19th
Ontario Battalion made a most successful daylight rush into the enemy
trenches, led by Lieuts. B. O. Hooper and S. S. Burnham. They disposed
of forty or fifty of the enemy, and after remaining in the enemy's
lines for five minutes returned with very valuable information as to
the enemy's dispositions. And these, as I have said, are instances,
chosen almost at a venture, to show in what manner and under what
conditions we go raiding in "No Man's Land."
[1] Lieut. John Galt was taken prisoner, but died of his wounds very
soon afterwards. He was buried by the enemy, and the words "Here lies
a British Officer" inscribed on his tomb.
[2] The one thing most likely to be seen by the flare-lights sent up by
the enemy is the face of an opponent. Those advancing in "No Man's
Land," therefore, blacken their faces to avoid being seen.
CHAPTER IV
FORMATION OF THE THIRD DIVISION
Coming events cast no shadows before--General Seely's command
redistributed--The Seventh Brigade in the trenches--Heavy bombardment
at Messines--Fortified positions of the Huns battered--Good work of the
Artillery--Three privates distinguish themselves--Death of a daring
explorer in "No Man's Land"--Visit of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales and
the Colonial Secretary--Canadians co-operate with British--A terrific
bombardment--The Huns establish themselves in British
trenches--Canadian guns aid the British--"Tobin's Tigers"--The Tenth
Battalion in a serious encounter--A fierce medley in the dark--An
unfortunate day--Two Generals wounded--A survey of the strategic
position---The force of massed artillery--A new era--Mr. Lloyd George's
work--Iron lips produce conclusive arguments--A successful
ruse--Ingenious device of Captain Costigan--A swollen river aids the
Canadians--A hero indeed--An exchange of front--The value of salients
questioned--The problem of transferring a sector--The Battle of St.
Eloi a joint affair--Description of the ground--The process of exchange
described--Adequate reasons for changes--A critical moment--Second
Canadian Division supports the British--Six huge craters created by
exploding mines--Activity of Northumberlands and Royal
Fusiliers--Timely assistance of Canadians acknowledged--The "Canadians'
Trench"--The enemy cleared out of debatable land--Good fighting of the
enemy at St. Eloi--Trenches filled with the dead of both
combatants--The Sixth Canadian Brigade to the relief.
[Sidenote: _Dec., 1915._]
The main event of the New Year was the formation of the 3rd Division.
Authority to create this force had been received in the last week of
December, and at the same time the 7th and 8th Brigades had come into
being. The 7th Brigade, which was commanded by Brigadier-General
MacDonell (who handed over the command of Lord Strathcona's Horse,
R.C., to Lieut.-Col. C. M. Nelles, C.M.G.) consisted of the Princess
Patricia's Light Infantry (Lieut.-Col. C. H. Buller), the Royal
Canadian Regiment (Lieut.-Col. C. H. Hill, D.S.O.), the 42nd Royal
Highlanders of Canada (Lieut.-Col. G. S. Cantlie), and the 49th
(Edmonton) Canadian Battalion (Lieut.-Col. W. A. Griesbach), all of
which had been acting for some time as corps troops. The 8th Brigade
was made up of the six Canadian Mounted Rifle regiments, which had up
till now been part of Seely's force. They were made into four
battalions of infantry, known as the 1st (Lieut.-Col. A. E. Shaw), 2nd
(Lieut.-Col. C. L. Bott), 4th (Lieut.-Col. S. F. Smith), and 5th
(Lieut.-Col. G. H. Baker) Canadian Mounted Rifles, and placed under the
command of Brigadier-General Williams. Early in January the 3rd
Division was constituted out of these two brigades, and Major-General
Mercer was appointed to the command. Coming events cast no shadows
before, and there was no fore-knowledge of the ill-luck which was to
attend one of the distinguished officers, and the death in action which
awaited the other. All seemed fair for the prospects of the 3rd
Division, which was within a few months to pass through the most
terrible ordeal that the Canadians had yet sustained. The creation of
this new force scattered Brigadier-General Seely's command.[1] The
Canadian Mounted Rifles, as we have seen, were incorporated in the 3rd
Division, while the Cavalry Brigade was removed altogether from the
Corps Command. The 2nd King Edward's Horse was dispatched on January
14th to General Headquarters, and the remaining units, the Royal
Canadian Dragoons, Strathcona's Horse, and the Royal Canadian Horse
Artillery, were attached on January 26th to the 1st Indian Cavalry
Division at Friville.[2]
General Seely commanded a Brigade holding the front trench line since
May of 1915, and it was unfortunate that the fact of his commanding a
Cavalry Brigade compelled him to abandon the advanced command on the
redistribution of the cavalry units. In the opinion of the Higher
Command and of all Canadian officers who came in contact with him, he
exhibited conspicuous intelligence, coolness, and courage in a degree
which qualified him for high command and a distinguished military
career.
[Sidenote: _Jan 7th, 1916._]
By the end of the first week in January the 7th Brigade was able to
begin its share of trench duties, and took over from the 1st Brigade of
the 1st Division. Their first turn of duty as a Brigade was a long
one, lasting for full three weeks. The month was, on the whole, a
quiet one until the trench raid of January 30th/31st, described in the
previous chapter. The weather turned from wet to fine and cold, and
the most persistent reminders of winter were the occasional fogs, which
settled down like white blankets on the flats and enabled parties to
move about with impunity in the day-time.
The artillery bombardment on both sides formed the main feature of the
month. Although the corps was not able to keep up the great
superiority over the Germans in the number of shells fired in November
and December, very heavy bombardment of the trenches in front of
Messines took place. The enemy, perhaps in reply, shelled the front
trenches somewhat severely. On the whole, however, their bombardments
were characterised by the usual features--a wide dispersement of shells
over a large area, Dranoutre being heavily bombarded during the early
part of the month. This kind of attack is annoying rather than
serious. The policy of the Canadian gunners was very different. It
was to concentrate on objects of real importance. Organised
bombardments of sections of the enemy's front were carried out by the
artillery, and the combination of the heavy batteries and field guns
was most effective. German mounds and fortified positions near the
front lines were battered in, and all machine-gun emplacements were
carefully registered in case of sudden emergencies. It is the custom
of the enemy to occupy farm buildings as redoubts, and two direct hits
were obtained by the gunners at La Douve Farm on January 7th. Germans
were seen scattering as the result of these shots, and were instantly
pursued by shrapnel. It is necessary to lay some stress on the work of
the artillery, which is liable to suffer neglect; only the infantry can
know the relief of hearing the guns roaring over their heads.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 16th and 17th, 1916._]
Throughout the month of January considerable liveliness in patrol work
was kept up, and if encounters between parties were infrequent, this
fact was due to Teutonic caution. Some encounters, however, did take
place, and there was fighting on the 16th and 17th on the front of the
3rd Infantry Brigade.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 22nd and 23rd, 1916._]
On the night of the 22nd and 23rd the 8th Battalion (Winnipeg Rifles)
made a careful reconnaissance of their front--a task in which Privates
Bole, Gunn, and Matkin, scouts of the regiment, particularly
distinguished themselves in a short, severe encounter with the enemy.
Here again the lack of automatic pistols and sufficient ammunition
proved a handicap in the struggle.
The incidents in which good work was done are almost too numerous to
mention, but a particular interest attaches to the death of Lieut.
Owen, of the 7th British Columbia Regiment, well known as a daring
explorer in "No Man's Land." Lieut. Owen and three of his men
encountered some fifteen Germans in the sudden and nerve-breaking way
which characterises a patrol battle. A fierce fight with revolvers and
bombs ensued, and four Germans at least were seen to fall; then the
bombs ran out, and a retreat became imperative. The officer ordered
the men to retire, saying, "I am coming right after you," and remained,
covering the retreat by revolver fire. He never returned, and when his
party went back to seek him they found him lying in the wet ground with
a bullet through his head.
The end of the month, which passed in comparative quiet until the
assault of the night of the 30th, described in the previous chapter,
was chiefly marked by the arrival of two distinguished visitors.
[Sidenote: _Jan. 28th, 1916._]
On January 28th H.R.H. the Prince of Wales spent a day with the
Canadian Corps, surveying the whole field from the eminences behind the
lines and passing down a portion of the front trenches. He met and
conversed with the various Brigadiers and a few of the Regimental
Commanders. On the 30th, Mr. Bonar Law, Secretary of State for the
Colonies, whose interest in the corps is well known, arrived, and
addressed the 31st (Alberta) Battalion.
[Illustration: Map--Ypres-Armentières area]
[Sidenote: _Feb., 1916._]
In February began that period of close co-operation with the V British
Corps which was destined to last for nearly seven weeks owing to the
persistent fighting at the Bluff and about the Mound of St. Eloi. So
long is the range of modern artillery that the guns of neighbouring
corps and divisions can be of the greatest assistance to the actual
combatants by firing slantwise into the enemy positions around the
field of action, while an infantry demonstration may hold up his
reserves. [Sidenote: _Feb. 13th, 1916._] About three o'clock in the
afternoon of February 13th a terrific bombardment was directed against
the British trenches north of the Bluff, a high artificial mound
covered with trees immediately north of the Ypres-Comines Canal; a
series of mines was exploded in the neighbourhood of Hill 60 and in the
direction of Hooge and of Sanctuary Wood. As the dusk fell several
assaults were delivered along the line defended subsequently by the
Canadians on the day of June 2nd. The majority of these assaults were
repelled, but the Germans broke through the Bluff north of the canal,
and succeeded in establishing themselves in the British front trenches,
where they stayed until they were expelled on March 2nd. This action
was the beginning of many woes to both combatants. The moment the
trouble started the V (British) Corps called up the Canadians and asked
for the help of their guns. This was readily accorded, and throughout
the evening of the 13th and the day of the 14th a combined
Anglo-Canadian shoot was directed with success on the German positions
in front of the Bluff. [Sidenote: _Feb. 16th, 1916._] Further relief
to the British was afforded by an extension of our line on the night of
February 16th, 700 yards to the north, as to set free the
Northumberland Fusiliers. This task was given to the 6th Brigade, and
brought it into the trenches which flanked the line on the right of the
St. Eloi position, and from which the final relief of the
Northumberlands was made in the battle of the first week of April. The
29th (Vancouver, "Tobin's Tigers"), supported by the 28th (North-West),
took over this additional task.
Patrol fighting went on steadily all this time. Early in the month of
February a particularly exciting action was fought between a large
party of the 10th (Western Canada) Battalion and an equally numerous
party of Germans. It had been decided to creep up, cut the German
barbed wire, and bomb their front-line trenches. Lieut. Kent and
Sergeant Milne, of the 10th, with two privates, succeeded in cutting
the wire, and were joined by a column of fifty men. While waiting
immediately in front of the German trench for the best opportunity of
bombing the enemy positions, a patrol of thirty or forty Germans
stumbled across them from the flank. A fierce medley in the dark
followed, the Germans attacking with bombs and revolvers, and our men
with grenades, bayonets, and knobkerries.[3] The enemy machine-guns
took the alarm and fired blindly into the scrimmage. Eventually the
German patrol was dispersed with heavy casualties, and the 10th
returned with five prisoners.
[Sidenote: _Feb. 23rd, 1916._]
The 17th was an unfortunate day for the Canadian Corps.
Brigadier-Generals MacDonell and Leckie were both hit by stray bullets
and seriously wounded during their tour of the trenches.[4] On the
23rd, the 9th Brigade of the 3rd Division was formed. It consisted of
the 43rd Canadian Battalion, under Lieut.-Col. R. McD. Thomson; 52nd,
under Lieut.-Col. A. W. Hay; 58th, under Lieut.-Col. H. A. Genet; and
60th, under Lieut.-Col. F. A. de L. Gascoigne, and was placed under the
command of Brigadier-General F. W. Hill, D.S.O. The 3rd Division had
now its three brigades; and with a sharp brush between the 42nd (Royal
Highlanders of Canada) Battalion and some over-adventurous Germans, the
month came to a close.
The Canadian Corps was now approaching the second crisis in the history
of its various divisions; this was to lead them through three months of
continuous fighting steadily northwards across the blood-stained fields
of St. Eloi and Hooge until they almost reached the scene of the Second
Battle of Ypres. To grasp the inner meaning of these movements and the
consequences to which they led, it is essential to take a wider survey
of the strategic position which the Allied Commanders had to face on
the Western front. Two great bodies of the German reserves were known
to be in existence, the first opposite Verdun, the second in the region
of the northern British line. Whether this last concentration was a
defensive measure against a possible British advance, or portended a
third German assault on the Ypres salient, could not in the month of
March be known for certain. One fact at least was clear. The
persistent and violent offensive against Verdun which marked that month
made it incumbent on the British armies to come to the assistance of
the French. This was done in two ways. A fourth army was assembled
out of the growing hosts in France, and the Arras sector of the line
given into its charge--a step which released a French army for the
heroic contest before Verdun--while a series of attacks was delivered
from the original British line, any of which might have been the
beginning of an assault on a larger scale. The actions of the Bluff,
of the Mound of St. Eloi, and of Vimy, were designed to show the enemy
that in the northern line we were "ware and waking," and to pin the
enemy reserves to the ground. Nor, it may be added, were the Germans
slow to take up the challenge.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 2nd, 1916._]
Indeed, the whole series of actions with which the remainder of this
volume is concerned began with the German assault on February 12th on
the Bluff, when the troops of the V British Corps, who held the line on
the left of the Canadians, were driven from the position on the Bluff
and the front-line trenches to the north. Preparations had been made
for the recapture of the lost positions, and the advance took place on
March 2nd. The Divisional Artillery of the 1st and 2nd Canadian
Divisions[5] co-operated that day with the gunners of the V British
Corps in a terrific bombardment of the ground to be taken. As a result
of this fire a large section of the German front-line trenches and
communication trenches north of the canal was reduced to ruins, and the
successful assault of the British on the morning of March 2nd met with
little resistance. The lost ground was regained and consolidated.
This action was one of the first to demonstrate the increased blasting
force of massed artillery, which became the standard weapon of offence
on either side during the battles of the next five months. The
continued piling up of munitions and guns during the preceding twelve
months had begun to modify profoundly the tactics of the Western front,
and it would be alike an error and an injustice to judge the
performance of the infantry in the spring of 1916 by the standards of
the previous year. The old British idea of a solid and immovable front
line held almost entirely by the fire of a rifleman to a yard of
trench, was beginning to give way in the stress of circumstances and
the example of the French.
A line more lightly held by the aid of machine-guns and wire
entanglements, and a greater disposition to yield or gain ground, were
the signs of a new era. But chiefly the enemy's guns were our
teachers, for their iron lips pronounced very conclusive arguments.
However, if the main work of the Canadians in the attack on the Bluff
lay with the Canadian gunners, the infantry were by no means idle.
They assisted the V Corps by a demonstration on their front, and by
massing three battalions of the 4th Infantry Brigade behind their left
flank to come to the aid of the British in the event of a
counter-attack. All arms contributed to the frontal demonstration. In
the early morning of March 2nd smoke-bombs were loosed from the
trenches as though in prelude to an attack, and a great blare of
musketry and machine-gun fire roared up and down the line. The Germans
sprang to arms and hurried supports up their communication trenches
into their lightly-held front line. It was for this that our field
guns had been waiting, and with continued bursts of fire they ranged
the denser masses opposite as they came crowding into the trenches.
The retaliation of the German artillery was singularly ineffective,
probably because their attention was now wholly occupied with the line
further north. This operation produced one striking incident of
ingenuity in warfare. At one point in the corps position the stream of
the Douve, flowing rapidly with the winter rains, ran through our
trenches and disappeared into the German line. This fact suggested to
Capt. Costigan, D.S.O., of the 10th Battalion, a new method of alarming
the Hun.
This enterprising officer suggested that a raft loaded with high
explosive might be floated down the current and exploded in the enemy's
lines.
The stream was, however, narrow, and, as anyone who has thrown sticks
into a river will remember, the tendency of a floating object is to get
stuck on some obstacle or corner on the way down. Capt. Costigan
therefore proposed to accompany the raft himself until it was within
certain reach of the objective. He and Corporal Witney came out of the
trenches and carried the raft to the river. After floating down some
distance, he found the stream continually obstructed by low overhanging
boughs, and to avoid any chance of failure he continued to pilot his
dangerous convoy to within thirty yards of where the German barbed
wire, stretched across the channel, barred any further progress. Here
he waited in the water until the light of a flare gave the signal for
the general demonstration. The fuse was then lit and the load shot
fair at the enemy's obstruction from a distance of thirty yards. The
explosion was a very fine one, and so perturbed the gentle soul of the
enemy that he fired off several concealed machine-guns, the existence
of which the 10th Battalion had long suspected but the location of
which they had never known. Writing in cold blood, it is easy to
represent such a feat of arms as ordinary, but when one considers what
the action really entailed, the exploit was heroic even as we count
heroism to-day. It was something which an ordinary man could not have
done and could not reasonably have been expected to do. The long
stumble in the dark with sudden death in one's hands, the plunge into
the icy stream, the physical struggle with the sweeping boughs and
jutting bends, the swift drift down towards the enemy, and the calm
waiting in the cold, dark water for the given signal, serve to show
that the most romantic deeds of the hero of fiction can be matched and
mastered in the battlefields of to-day.
That the whole demonstration was a success is witnessed by the
following telegram from the V Corps:--
"SINCERE THANKS FOR YOUR MOST VALUABLE CO-OPERATION. SHOULD ENEMY
RENEW COUNTER-ATTACK TO-MORROW AT DAWN OR LATER, HOPE YOU WILL
AGAIN HELP US."
[Sidenote: _Mar., 1916._]
Early in March orders were issued by the 2nd Army Commander for the
exchange of fronts between the V and the Canadian Corps. The sector
held by the V Corps runs from the Ypres-Roulers Railway just north of
Hooge down south as far as St. Eloi. It constituted the southern half
of the Ypres salient, and was by common consent about the worst portion
of the whole British line. In the autumn of 1914 during the first
battle of Ypres, it had been heroically defended by the Guards Brigade,
the Household Cavalry, and the 7th Division, seldom mustering more than
5,000 men at any given time, against the successive attacks of two
German Army Corps and of the Prussian Guard lasting for a month.
The V Corps had now held it for little short of a year, and had during
that period incurred heavy losses. Nor is this to be wondered at when
one considers the number of general and minor actions which had taken
place in the area since the great attack on Hill 60 in April, 1915.
The trenches round Hooge had continually changed hands. Fierce
divisional actions had been fought there on June 16th, July 30th, and
August 8th, 1915; while later in the autumn an unsuccessful British
assault had been launched against the Bellewarde Lake line. Of minor
actions there had been no end, while the great bulge of the salient
rendered every trench in it liable to that most deadly of dangers, a
direct lateral fire from heavy guns placed to the south or to the
north. Salients are valuable as examples of the British soldier's
willingness to die rather than to live. They make a great many widows
and orphans and splendid material for patriotic speeches. For the
rest, their utility may be questioned--and has been.
[Sidenote: _Mar., 1916._]
The transfer of a sector from one Army Corps to another is one of those
operations which the layman thinks of as done by a single sweeping
stroke of the Commander-in-Chief's pen. In reality, it is a slow and
intricate process--nothing less than the gradual interchange of all the
population of two countrysides and all the means of feeding and
clothing them--a wave of immigration and emigration affecting more than
120,000 people, and this has to be carried out with the minimum of
disturbance, since the inhabitants of the two areas must be ready to
man the trenches and fight a battle at any stage in the process of
change.
The Staffs are in the position of two householders who are exchanging
residences and moving their families under the immediate threat of a
burglary at either or both houses. If it is done on too large a scale,
there will be confusion, but, on the other hand, every day that the
move is protracted, there will be mixed Staffs and units in the same
battle line and sector--a state of affairs not conducive to the
efficient management of a sudden crisis. Far behind the front line
trenches the ramifications of the services extend; for though a brigade
may be holding a frontage of a couple of thousand yards, its section
runs back through miles of land crowded with reserves, with light and
heavy artillery, with transport services, hospitals and depots, and all
the paraphernalia of modern war. The trench line is like a tooth, the
depth of the roots of which is only discovered when one tries to pull
it out. To the Staffs, at any rate, the period of movement is one of
strain and anxiety, and the total changes were not completed under a
period of three weeks, during which time both corps were engaged in
heavy and continuous fighting.
The battle of St. Eloi was indeed a joint or rather a successive affair
carried on by units of two Corps, the Canadians and the V (British).
[Sidenote: _Mar. 17th-April 8th, 1916._]
The moves began as early as March 17th, when the heavy divisional
artillery, supporting the 3rd Canadian Division, were taken north, and
were completed by the night of April 8th. The Corps Command of the two
sections was not handed over till April 4th. A glance at the map will
show the problem which confronted the Corps Commanders. The V Corps
held exactly the southern curve of the Ypres salient from almost due
east of the town.
The left of its 24th Division rested on Bellewarde Beek, and its line
continued along the rise through Sanctuary Wood to a high point
south-east of the extremity of Zillebeke Lake, known as Mount Sorrel.
We shall have occasion later to study this ground with more
particularity, for the force which holds it holds Ypres in the hollow
of its hand. Here the salient headed back violently, running almost
due east and west, took a southerly turn again, crossed the railway to
Comines, passed Hill 60 of glorious and tragic memory, and struck the
Ypres-Comines Canal by the Bluff. This was the sector of the 50th
British Division--south again was the 3rd British Division holding what
was destined to be the field of St. Eloi from the canal to Bois
Quarante.
At the village of St. Eloi there was another of these violent turns of
the line which leave the opposing forces facing each other due north
and south. The total length of this corps sector was about six miles,
but the curves of the trenches and the ground would make the actual
number of yards to be held considerably greater. It was, roughly,
broken up into three sections of two miles each belonging to a single
division. With Bois Quarante the salient of Ypres came to an end. The
Canadian Corps line to the south reaching to Ploegsteert has already
been described. It was devoid in the main of salients and had become
increasingly peaceful since the fierce fighting in the streets of
Comines and Wytschaete in the autumn of 1914.
It was held, when the 3rd Canadian Division was formed finally in the
middle of February, by three divisions on a frontage of six brigades.
The 3rd Division had no line of its own, but sent its brigades up
indifferently to relieve those of the other two divisions. It was
therefore selected as the first of the infantry formations for
transference to the new Canadian front.
A moment's consideration will make it clear that to exchange two bodies
of men in the front line would mean an open gap in the defence during
the period of the full relief. As in the game of "Fox and Geese,"
though the metaphor is perhaps not very complimentary to the enemy or
ourselves, a single hole in the ranks lets the fox through. The change
can therefore only be made in two ways. It can be begun by moving the
reserve troops of the two corps into each other's positions and pushing
them up into the front line in succession until the process is
complete, or by a swifter and more direct method of marching the
reserve division of one corps to relieve a front line division of the
other, this division in turn becoming a temporary reserve for its
neighbouring corps. In accordance with the former plan, the 3rd
Canadian Division was taken up in the third week of March and took over
from the 24th Division in the Hooge-Zillebeke sector, while the 24th
Division came back to the rest area of the Canadian Corps, whence they
in turn displaced a front line Canadian Division. The process once set
on foot by the initial move becomes more or less automatic. But it is
necessarily slow. It would be in the last degree inadvisable and
dangerous to substitute larger bodies of troops in a single night and
place each on ground with which it is thoroughly unfamiliar. Even the
ordinary visits of officers to their new trenches a day or so in
advance would be no protection against confusion in the dark on ground
unknown to a whole brigade or division--and this lesson was written in
letters of blood in the first week of April over the stricken field of
St. Eloi. The 3rd Division move was therefore made by degrees. It
began on March 18th with two battalions of the 8th Brigade to the V
Corps camp behind the lines, while two British battalions took their
place in Canadian reserve. The next day the exchange of the remainder
of the Brigade was effected, while in the course of the night the two
original Canadian battalions took over their share of the British
trenches. On the day of the 20th the entire 7th Canadian Brigade
marched from its own reserve area into that of the V Corps near
Poperinghe, and went into the firing line the following night. The 9th
Brigade followed them on the 23rd, and became the supporting brigade of
the whole division. The relief of the north section of the line was
now complete, and the divisions changed on the night of the 21st. In
the meantime as each British unit was pulled out it came swiftly and
surely into the place of the Canadians. The change can be put most
simply in a mathematical form. If _A_ represents the British in the
trenches, _B_ the British in reserve, _C_ the Canadians in the
trenches, and _D_ the Canadians in reserve--_B_ and _D_ change places.
That is the first move. On the following day or night approximately
_D_ relieves _A_, and _B_ relieves _C_ in the trenches. That is the
second move. There remains only the substitution between the two units
_C_ and _A_ and the full relief has been accomplished, and each party
stands complete within its new area. The process in a corps will be
slow, since the unit of exchange will be only two battalions out of
thirty-six, or at most of a brigade.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 23rd-25th, 1916._]
Thus the 24th British Division as soon as the 3rd Canadians had got
into place, began to relieve the 1st Canadian Division. On the night
of the 23rd two of their battalions took the lines of the two
battalions of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Brigade in the trenches, and
the change was finished by the night of the 25th. Next came the turn
of the 1st Canadian Brigade, which was out by March 28th-29th.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 28th-29th, 1916._]
On that night the 50th British Division began to move to the rear as
the leading columns of the 1st Canadian Division came up to take its
place. The process was continued until the 2nd Canadian Division in
its turn stood in the trenches of the 3rd British Division. The length
of time and the order of the moves are best indicated by the days in
which the various high commands took over their new responsibilities.
The 3rd Canadian Division took over from the 24th British Division, as
has already been mentioned, on March 21st. The 24th British Division
from the 1st Canadian Division on March 30th, giving ten days for the
double change. The 1st Canadian Divisional Staff assumed
responsibility for the area of the 50th Division on the night of April
3rd, four days later. The 50th relieved the 2nd Canadian Division on
the same night, while the 2nd Canadian Division did not relieve the 3rd
British till the fatal night of April 4th-5th. Reading the map from
north to south, we find the 9th and 7th Brigades holding the front of
the 3rd Canadian Division; the 3rd and 1st Brigades in the same order
as that of the 1st Division, while the 6th Brigade covered the whole
frontage of the 2nd Division opposite St. Eloi. The Corps Commanders
changed their functions on April 4th, and by the 7th-8th the V Corps
were safely ensconced in the Canadian area.
But in describing this move in its completeness we have run ahead of
history. While the columns of weary men were tramping through the dust
of the day, the delicious cool of the evening, and the chilliness of
the night march, and the great batteries were being slowly removed from
position to position, an event had occurred which added greatly to the
difficulty. If the transfer of a corps can be done in peace so much
the better for all concerned. In this case a fierce conflict was
raging on the front of the 3rd British Division before the 2nd Canadian
Division had taken over from them. After the fighting at the Bluff in
February and March, it had been determined that the V Corps should
assault the enemy's position at St. Eloi, and this attack had no doubt
originally been intended to be the business of the corps concerned.
[Sidenote: _Mar. 27th, 1916._] For other reasons, which it is not
necessary to relate here, the Canadians were brought up half-way
through the intended action, which began on March 27th. The strategic
reasons for a move on the British front in answer to Verdun have been
indicated; the tactical reasons for a change in the _personnel_ of the
line were strong.
None the less, the obvious disadvantage of changing the higher command
in the middle of an action would have been overwhelming but for one
single reason. The mineshaft and the mines, the explosion of which
would hurl the charge, were by the end of March ready for use. Every
hour's delay meant a risk of their discovery and a counter-explosion by
the enemy, when the labours of weeks would have been lost for ever. In
these difficult and conflicting circumstances it was decided by the
higher authorities to send the 3rd British Division to the attack
opposite St. Eloi, and to bring the Canadian 2nd Division up to their
support and relief as soon as the first stage of the fighting was over.
On the night of March 27th the mines were exploded, with cataclysmic
effect, and six huge craters full of dead or wounded Germans took the
place of the enemy's front trenches. The Northumberlands and the Royal
Fusiliers of a British Division were over the parapet in a moment and
dashed on the shattered enemy position. A heavy barrage of artillery
fire was kept up by the various divisional artillery brigades to
prevent the counter-attack; in this the Canadians took their share, as
the Commander of the V Corps telegraphed in the following message:--
"The handling of the trench mortars reflected the greatest credit
on the officers and men concerned."
In the meantime, the 4th Canadian Brigade had been giving most valuable
assistance in linking up the right of the attacking regiments with the
old line. They had driven a communication trench during the four days
of doubtful fighting through from the trenches on the right of the St.
Eloi position to the new line--and it was christened forthwith "The
Canadian Trench." Further demonstrations were made by our infantry up
and down their front and were duly and generously acknowledged as
before by our brothers-in-arms of the V Corps. "Thank you very much
for all the most valuable help you are giving. Your assistance has
contributed very largely to the success which we have achieved." But
the attack of the Northumberlands, though it had attained its immediate
objective, had not been uniformly successful. It had begun to
encounter all those difficulties which were to confront the 6th
Canadian Brigade. The centre attack went right through the crumbled
_débris_ of the craters, and a position was established some two
hundred yards south of them and four hundred yards in advance of the
old British line. The 3rd Division fought throughout with the greatest
gallantry and resolution. On the right, the efforts of the 4th
Canadian Brigade succeeded finally in establishing touch, but the left
remained in the air, and Crater 5, the easternmost of the big craters,
was still in the enemy's hands. [Sidenote: _April 2nd, 1916._]
Finally, after four days' fighting, it was necessary to make what was
practically a renewed assault on April 2nd and clear the enemy out of
the debatable area. This was done with the utmost gallantry by the 3rd
British Division and a new line well beyond the craters finally
established. But this last effort absolutely exhausted the energy of
the troops concerned. They had fought like heroes, but there are
limits to human endurance, and it was imperative to bring up the
Canadians to their support. A considerable number of German prisoners
passed through the lines of the Canadian troops in support, and the
reports speak of them as fine upstanding men in the main, but too young
from our military point of view. The Divisional Command was able to
extract from them much valuable information as to the distribution of
the German regiments. There can be no doubt that the enemy infantry
fought well at St. Eloi, and with a nerve and initiative that they have
seldom displayed. They may have been new troops, but they were not old
men driven on by their officers to certain death in massed formation,
and they were all the more formidable for that.
It was now necessary to move the 2nd Division into action. The 6th
Brigade led, and the 27th and 31st Battalions were its spearhead, with
the 28th and 29th in support and reserve. The Northumberlands had been
in the new line for about forty-eight hours, but they had been unable
to place it in a good condition for defence. Their trenches were the
remains of German second or third line defences choked with the dead
and wounded of both combatants; their communications were only to left
and right; firing trenches or platforms there were practically none;
the earth was a sodden pulp and the skies full of falling shells; the
schemes for the reconstruction of the lines put forward by their
divisional command, wise as they were, had not been carried out owing
to extreme weariness and the want of material; the position of the
enemy was unknown, and doubt and darkness enveloped the whole
situation. It was under this cloud of danger and uncertainty that the
6th Canadian Brigade advanced to the relief.
[1] This had consisted of the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, Lord
Strathcona's Horse, 2nd King Edward's Horse, Royal Canadian Dragoons,
and 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th Canadian Mounted Rifles. The Fort
Garry Horse did not come out until February 24th, 1916. Brig.-General
Seely had commanded his Brigade with marked ability, and its dispersal
was much regretted by the troops.
[2] The 3rd Divisional Train, under Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Lougheed, and
the Machine-Gun Companies accompanied the Division to France in
January, 1916. The Divisional Signal Company was formed from units in
the field in December, 1915, and placed under the command of Major T.
E. Powers. The Supply Column was also formed in the field. The 9th
and 10th Field Ambulances, under Lieut.-Colonels C. A. Peters and A. W.
Tanner respectively, went to France on April 3rd, 1916 and the 8th
Field Ambulance, under Lieut.-Colonel S. W. Hewetson, followed a month
later. The 3rd Divisional Engineers, with Lieut.-Colonel T. V.
Anderson in command, arrived at the Front early in April.
[3] These were made locally in the trenches, and consisted of about two
feet of hedge-stick, covered at the top with nails bound round with
wire.
[4] General Leckie was assisted back to safety by Major E. McCuaig, of
the 13th Battalion. This officer, while temporarily in command of the
Battalion, subsequently repulsed a very severe German attack on the
line north of St. Eloi on April 19th, 1915. The 13th were very heavily
bombarded, and lost 10 officers and 225 men, but held their ground.
[5] The remaining three Brigades of the 2nd Division--the 5th
(Lieut.-Colonel G. A. Carruthers), the 6th (Lieut.-Colonel W. B. M.
King), and the 7th (Lieut.-Colonel J. S. Stewart) Canadian Field
Artillery--had crossed to France in January. The 4th Brigade C.F.A.
had been out since September, 1915.
CHAPTER V
ST. ELOI
Canadians in a serious engagement--The old German line--The new British
line--The effect of the eruption--Trenches little better than
drains--The Second Division in "No Man's Land"--The situation described
by General Turner--A gap in our line--The call for additional
guns--Welcome relief--The importance of rear exits--Evacuation of the
wounded--Our weak spot discovered--Prompt and intelligent action by
General Turner--Steadfast endurance--The bravery of Privates Smith and
Bowden--Conspicuous gallantry of Captain Meredith--Miscalculation--The
enemy dashes through the zone of our artillery--Desperate situation of
the Canadians--Communication by telephone intermittent--Confusion in
the trenches--Under bombardment for sixty hours--The enemy's artillery
preparation begins--Pandemonium inevitable--Clogged rifles and
machine-guns--A brave struggle for existence--A moment of doubt--The
enemy gains the craters--An unfortunate mistake--Unorganised
retirement--Precipitate action--A case for help--Dilemma of the Higher
Command--Trench mortars put out of action--Full story of the retirement
cut short by death--A hand-to-hand encounter--Failure less welcome than
success--Reasons for retirement only appreciated by those experienced
in trench warfare--The Fates unpropitious--The error of the
craters--Success denied though well deserved.
[Sidenote: _April 3rd, 1916._]
On the night of April 3rd began the most serious engagement in which
Canadian troops had been involved since the Second Battle of Ypres.
The 2nd Division was ordered to occupy the ground won by the 3rd
British Division in the two successive actions on March 27th and April
2nd. To understand the protracted battle which ensued it is necessary
to have a clear grasp of the ground over which it was fought. The
opposing lines opposite St. Eloi ran almost due east and west, instead
of the north and south frontage which marked the usual direction of
Allied and German trenches. The old German line had been a salient
north pushed out towards St. Eloi and receding from it right and left.
The new line captured by the 3rd British Division was a salient thrust
due south into the German position and receding again slightly on its
right and abruptly on its left, to meet the old British line. In other
words, the old British line had been the arc of a bow turned north and
the new line became the arc of a bow pushed south. The distance
between these bows never exceeded 500 yards, and both of them were less
than 1,000 yards in length from end to end, with a direct frontage of
600 yards. In the middle, running as the string of both concave bows
and separated by 200 or 250 yards from either old or new line, was the
original German line blown to atoms in most places and represented
throughout the centre part of its length by a series of four huge
minecraters. These crowned the mound of St. Eloi, a rise in the ground
which dominated the surrounding country.
To hold the craters and the mound was to look down into your enemies'
trenches. The explosion of the great mine had leapt to heaven in a
colossal shower of yellow smoke and _débris_; it could be seen from
miles away and shook the earth like the sudden outburst of a volcano.
The effects of the eruption on a narrow space of 600 yards were
tremendous. Trenches on both sides collapsed like packs of cards under
the shock; old landmarks were blotted out, and right in the centre of
the arc of the bow stretched a line of huge tumbled _débris_. In front
lay the new trenches captured by the 3rd British Division on April 2nd.
Behind lay the remains of the old line, while the crater stood as an
almost impassable bar between troops holding the one and troops holding
the other. To get to the new front trench, you had to enter it from
the left or the right, and a line to which supports cannot be brought
up from the rear is always in grave danger. So much for the general
position; its particular features have yet to be considered.
We have learned from a study of the French reports at Verdun what can
be effected by concentrated artillery fire on a selected area. The
frontage at St. Eloi was that of 600 to 1,000 yards, and against it was
directed for over three weeks a colossal concentration of German fire,
answered shell for shell by our own artillery. Under the combined
efforts of the artillery of both sides and the result of the mine
explosions, the whole face of the country was altered. The "high hills
were laid low and the valleys were exalted" until an officer of the 3rd
British Division who had stayed behind to assist the newcomers, twice
confessed himself utterly unable to recognise the ground destroyed by
man as bearing any resemblance to the ground he had known designed by
Nature.
In this change will be found the explanation of much that followed.
But there was to be added another cause, the inclemency of the weather.
In this battered soil was nothing but mud. Every shellhole was a pond,
every step might lead one up to the waist in the sticky element, and
earthworks fell in from the flood as much as from the shell-fire of the
enemy. It is then under a doubtful star that we must conceive of the
whole action being fought. The trenches in the first firing line were
little better than scattered drains--behind was the crater
barrier--underfoot were the mud and the water, and above the unceasing
whine of the shells. The air was heavy with a damp mist, even by day,
and by night all objects were magnified and uncertain till a shell-hole
appeared a crater, an advance of fifty yards like one of 500 yards, and
an hour grew into years! The battle was fought in "No Man's Land"--a
_débris_ of shattered trees, sudden pool-holes, and upraised earth,
"where no man comes, nor hath come since the making of the world."
[Illustration: Map--St. Eloi area]
Into this area the 2nd Division came on the night of 3rd April. The
6th Brigade, under Brigadier-General Ketchen, took over the immediate
front, while the 5th and 4th Brigades were in reserve. The post of
honour was given to the 27th (Winnipeg) Battalion, commanded by
Lieut.-Col. Snider, on the right of the line and to the 31st. (Alberta)
Battalion, under Lieut.-Col. Bell, on the left. The 29th (Vancouver)
Battalion, under Lieut.-Col. Tobin, was in support of the 27th, while
the 28th (North-West) under Lieut.-Col. Embury, occupied a position
behind the craters and in the centre, with its left supporting the
31st. It is on the first two regiments that attention must be
concentrated for the moment, for they had to occupy the southern thrust
of the line and to file into their new positions from the old line on
either flank.
A glance at the map will show the position, while Gen. Turner has given
a lucid description of the state of the various defences three hours
after the men were in. From the right of the old British line, the
Canadian communication trench, built by the 4th Canadian Brigade--as
elsewhere mentioned--broke straight out to the left and ran east with a
touch of south, until it met the original German firing trench at a
point known as Sackville Centre, of which we shall hear more in the
future. The General described it as 250 yards in length, "a wet,
shallow communication trench." This was held by a company of the 27th,
under Lieut. Wilson. Continuing to our left the line crossed the first
of the two roads (that to Wytschaete) which run from north to south and
meet in St. Eloi; here the front, after going south-east for about
fifty yards, swung round due east until it reached Bathurst Butts, near
the second road; it then bent sharply north, so as to complete the
salient by striking the old German firing trench again at Campbelltown
Corner.[1] This bit was about 540 yards in length, and consisted of a
deep _untraversed_ firing trench, with a few firing platforms _facing
north_: that is, the wrong way.[2] Apparently the 3rd British Division
had been unable to turn it about after they took it by storm. The last
two hundred yards were--adds the General--badly battered. The frontage
was fairly evenly divided between two companies of the 27th. The
left-hand company thus secured the most shaky point in the frontage--a
200 yards which proved a miniature gap of Alsace to the Germans. From
Campbelltown Corner to the original British line the circuit was
completed by one company of the 31st. Here the old British line
continued due east to the canal and was occupied by two more companies
of the 31st, with a third in support.
Machine-guns were also posted at intervals along the line. It was
found necessary, owing to the extent to which these were being
constantly put out of action, to call for additional guns. These were
supplied by the 5th Brigade, the 22nd, 24th, 25th, and 26th each
sending up a Lewis gun and team; but they were not available till the
night of the 5th just before the German attack, when they were posted
by Lieut. McLorg, of the 28th.
The relief, in the language of the official reports, was successfully
concluded during the night of the 3rd and 4th. How much doubt, how
much discomfort, how much danger a single sentence can cover! As the
Canadians slipped and struggled along the wretched drains, or clambered
over the places where shell-fire had destroyed them, they found
everywhere the men of the 61st British Brigade, 3rd British Division in
a state of considerable exhaustion. They had been fighting what was
practically a continuous general action for five days under terrific
shell-fire. The last push, which had driven the Germans 200 or 250
yards south of the craters, left the British in such casual shelter as
they could obtain, encumbered with the dead on both sides and with
their own wounded, whom they were unable to evacuate. A firing trench
with no direct way in or out from the rear exposes its occupants to
every horror and hardship and danger. The supply of food, water, and
ammunition, is intermittent and uncertain, while the knowledge that
supports may take hours to come up in case of attack is added to the
mental torture and physical staleness induced by a persistent
bombardment by heavy guns. But the presence of wounded men in a
crowded trench passes the limit of horror. The dreadful nature of the
injuries inflicted by high explosive, the irrepressible cries and moans
of pain; the impossibility of bringing relief to the sufferers form a
combination of sight, sound and sensation which if protracted for many
hours absolutely unnerves the unwounded survivors and forms the
nightmare of their sleep for years.
[Sidenote: _April 3rd and 4th, 1916._]
Even with fair weather and solid defences a night relief has its
trials; under the conditions of the night of April 3rd, its success was
an achievement. As the 27th (Winnipeg) and the 31st (Alberta)
succeeded to this bed of thorns, in the pitch dark of night, they
discovered that the officers of the 61st (British) Brigade, through no
fault of theirs, but owing to the lie of the ground and the conditions
of the assault, could tell them practically nothing of the whereabouts
of the enemy. They looked out into a noisy darkness which covered the
Unknown. Such a state of affairs is by no means uncommon in trench
warfare. Furthermore, while the line throughout could nowhere be held
continuously, that portion of it between Bathurst Butts near the second
road, and Campbelltown Corner could only be held by small bombing posts
linked together by visiting patrols. By daylight it was altogether
untenable for any body of men in sufficient number to resist a resolute
attack. There was thus a gap sparsely and insecurely occupied by
patrols of the 27th between the left of that regiment and the right of
the 31st Battalion. This was the joint in the harness, and against it
the Germans directed a continuous shower of heavy explosives.
It was obvious to the Higher Command that if the position was to be
made secure or even tenable, a drastic scheme of consolidation must be
set on foot. General Turner grasped the situation firmly and clearly;
and after consulting General Haldane (3rd British Division) put forward
the following plan. He proposed to repair the front line, to dig
communication trenches through the intervals between the craters, so as
to link old and new lines together, to make good the damage done to the
old line, and finally to dig another trench about halfway between the
firing line and the craters where supports could be kept handy. Dummy
trenches were also to be made in the lips of the crater and both lines
wired. The work was carried out by small parties, one N.C.O. and a few
men of the 28th, centre support battalion, and most of them were
overwhelmed by the German onrush on the morning of April 6th.
This plan would have saved the situation had time or opportunity been
given to carry it out, but the Fates ruled otherwise.
The first thing to do was to evacuate the British wounded, and this
gruesome task was accomplished during the morning to the accompaniment
of heavy shelling, which began at ten o'clock and lasted at intervals
nearly all day. Lieut. McCaw and his company, holding the bad part of
the line, endured, without shifting an inch, a terrible bombardment
which destroyed the greater part of their position from under their
very feet. Out of the 90 men present (for 40 had been sent back as
there was no cover for them), 67 were killed or wounded--a notable
example of endurance. The trenches were blown out of existence and men
lay down in the open under what cover they could find. As one wounded
man was seen to fall, Private Smith dashed out to render first aid
under the shower of high explosives; he was himself struck down at
once. Private Bowden went in his turn to the two men, dressed their
wounds, and remained with them until they both died, with no cover
against the rain of shell except a shovel over his head.
Wading in many places waist-deep in the mud, Capt. Meredith, of the
27th, who behaved with conspicuous coolness and gallantry in the action
which ensued, found that the day's bombardment had practically wiped
out the position he was to occupy. There was a little cover on the
right, just east of the second road; but to the left, in the Gap
itself, it was impossible to do more than put out isolated groups of
sentries and bombers, to crouch in shell holes, or behind improvised
shelters, and trust that one would not be observed. A single fact
speaks volumes; although Capt. Meredith had only 110 men for his
company, it was found impossible to get cover by daylight for more than
a few isolated posts, and the remainder of the men had to be sent back
in the early morning of April 5th, to come up again on their weary
journey as soon as it was dark. There was, in a word, no longer a line
for over 250 yards of the front. Some 40 men were trying to hold the
position of a strong company of 200.
[Sidenote: _Night, April 5th and 6th, 1916._]
On the following night, that of the 5th and 6th, it was decided to
relieve the two sorely-beset companies of the 27th. Capt. Gwynn, of
the 29th Battalion, was to take over from Capt. Meredith the left of
the line, and Lieut. O'Brien, of the same regiment, was to relieve the
company of the 27th on the right. It was during the concluding stages
of this relief that the German attack took place. The blasting fire of
our artillery had been well maintained on the German second and third
line trenches, and it was supposed that this barrage[3] had proved
effective in preventing any considerable force of the enemy reaching
through to their own front line. This did not prove to be the case.
The German 214th Battalion, with some units of the 216th,
had--according to the accounts of prisoners--succeeded in passing
through the barrage into the front line, from which they launched their
assault.
On the night of the 5th, the Germans had dashed through the zone of our
artillery fire in a succession of small parties in extended order, and
had thus, by choosing their occasions, escaped with comparatively small
casualties, and massed in strength within striking distance of our
front. It may be said that throughout the action the Germans showed a
far greater aptitude for fighting in small parties than is usual with
them, and that they nowhere attempted the mass formation attack which
has generally been a prelude to their defeat.
But while the Germans are forming up for the assault at dawn, we must
return to the fortunes of the Canadians. The working parties are out
for the second night in succession, and a strong second line trench
with barbed wire entanglements has been constructed in front and south
of the craters. Behind and north of the craters a third supporting
line is being dug, while the reliefs of the 29th are struggling up
through the delays of mud and barrage to reach the battered 27th.
[Sidenote: _Night, April 5th and 6th, 1916._]
Capt. Gwynn, of the 29th, had already been informed that the left of
his line would only be occupied by machine-guns, bombing, and sentry
posts, and with some 40 men, picked out for these danger posts, he went
on ahead of the remainder of his company and found Capt. Meredith near
Bathurst Butts at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 6th. The position
was rapidly becoming desperate. One of Capt. Meredith's subalterns,
Lieut. Dunlop, had been out under a rain of shells to try to find the
original line to the left, held by the 31st, and the posts holding it.
He returned to say that he could find no vestige of either the trench
or the posts. Everything had been wiped out; and two machine-guns and
their crews perished with the exception of a single man, who crawled
back wounded hours after. A party of the 31st who had made a similar
attempt to keep connection from their right, returned with the same
news. Under the circumstances, Capt. Meredith could supply no guides
into the unoccupied chaos of shell-holes which represented his left,
and the two officers having completed their relief in the small
fraction of surviving trench, returned to the nearest telephone, at
Fredericton Fort, to get orders from the Colonel of the 29th Battalion.
It was at this point in the line alone that the telephone was working,
and that only intermittently, in spite of the heroic conduct of the
signallers in going out into the open again and again to repair the
shattered wires. Lieutenant Browne of the 22nd (French Canadians), of
the 4th Brigade, with his machine-gun party, remained behind with the
40 men of the 29th on the left of Bathurst Butts. The two officers and
the men who had been relieved reached Fredericton Fort successfully at
about 2.45 a.m., and found there several officers of the 27th, and also
Lieut. O'Brien of the 29th, who was trying to relieve Lieut. Wilson's
company of the 27th. Less fortunate than Capt. Gwynn, he had not
succeeded in finding the officer he was to replace, but none the less
he appears to have got his men somewhere near the trench he was to
occupy. This place he found full of stray units, ration-carrying
parties of the 27th, many of whom had lost their way, and having placed
his men in position, he also returned to the telephone at Fredericton
Fort in the hope of finding someone in authority.
The Canadian communication trench was by this time practically
abandoned under heavy shell-fire. For the rest, then, one must
conceive the remains of the front line as held, where there was any
cover, by isolated groups of the 29th, intermingled here and there with
men of the 27th who had not been relieved or who had missed their way,
and with a gaping space on the left. Beyond this, the line on the left
still held firm for the moment.
The 27th Battalion, the relief of which was by now more or less
complete, had suffered a terrible experience. It had been almost
continuously under heavy shell fire in hopeless trenches for about
sixty hours, during which sleep, rest, or refreshment had been
practically out of the question. Major Kitson had conducted the
defence of the first line with skill and judgment, and the Company
Commanders, Capt. Meredith, Lieut. McCaw, Lieut. Wilson, and their
subalterns had shown great courage and coolness in the face of adverse
circumstances. Lieut. R. E. N. Jones, of the same battalion, met a
gallant death in the early morning of the attack in an attempt to keep
touch with and collect the left of the regiment during the retirement.
He went out into the open under a terrific fire and was killed almost
instantly.
[Sidenote: _April 6th, 3 A.M._]
It was by now three o'clock of a misty morning; and as the officers
around the telephone dug-out discovered that the line was cut, and were
taking counsel together, the German artillery preparation began.
The shelling--heavy but intermittent--rose to a roar and the night
overhead became pandemonium, while the ground underneath shook with the
concussion or dissolved under the explosions. Officers endeavoured to
rejoin their units, but it most cases found it impossible, and every
group turned to their official or natural leader for orders. It is
easy for those whose experience of the movements of bodies of men is
confined to reviews in peace time, or to the organisation of a big
political demonstration, to consider that this state of affairs is not
to be expected of an army. Such a view simply springs from ignorance
of conditions. Not here was a broad plain, smiling in the sun, on
which battalions could be moved with uniformity; or the familiar
pavements, where every street turning is known to the marshals of the
delegations; not here the frictionless chess-board of the war game,
with its moves pondered silently long in advance. The ground on which
to move is certain death; the shattered and almost impassable trenches;
the vast distance away in time of any supports; the blindness in the
sense of direction which affects nearly every man on unknown country in
the dark; the line of craters behind and the noise of the shells
overhead: these are the elements making up the picture of the situation
which, on that April morning, the 6th Canadian Brigade had to face.
The rifles and machine-guns on which armed men are accustomed to depend
for their lives, were half-clogged and useless. The very position of
the enemy was unknown. But the native hardihood of the race asserted
itself; groups made up of every unit formed themselves for the struggle
for existence, fought where they could and retreated or died when the
choice became retirement or passive annihilation.
[Sidenote: _April 6th, 3.30 A.M._]
On this scene of incertitude and disturbance the day began to break.
It was the hour when men rub their eyes and shiver in the cool air and
stand to arms to meet that period which is most likely to bring the
attack. The light of dawn, stealthy and suspicious, was showing in the
east over a scene of ruin and desolation, and in this valley of dry
bones something began to move. To the group of watchers in the
trenches dark forms advancing could be seen through the mist. They
came straight on without hesitating up the St. Eloi-Wytschaete road,
towards Sackville Centre. It was known to our men that some Pioneers
were out in that direction wiring the front. A whisper of doubt ran
along the line. Were they the enemy or one of our working parties gone
astray? One group evidently had made up its mind, and a sputter of
fire broke out--how different in volume and intensity, alas! from the
full-throated crash of musketry from a strongly-held, well-filled
trench! It was enough, at any rate, for the Germans. They had thought
to find nothing alive in the area on which their guns had wrought such
havoc. The dark line turned half-right and swung round like a wave,
seeking an inlet through some rocky barrier. Instantly every gun and
rifle which would work was brought to bear. But the result was one to
break the hearts of men trained to regard their weapons as their
unfailing friends in the hour of need and danger. The foul mud
splashed over them in torrents by the bombardment had worked into
breech and magazine, and men threw down their choked rifles with
curses, and snatched for one left behind by some dead or wounded man.
But these, too, after a shot or two, refused to do their work! All
along the line the remaining Lewis guns jammed, groups were too
isolated to make a concerted counter-attack with the bayonet; and the
Germans passed along our front until they found the fatal gap in the
line. As they came opposite the last post on our left, Lieut. Browne,
a machine-gunner of the 22nd French Canadians, turned his Lewis gun and
what rifles the party had full on to them at short range. Some fifteen
or twenty Germans were seen to fall, and the remainder threw themselves
flat on their faces. Then the inevitable happened, and the gun went
out of action. As the fire dribbled away to the crack of a single
rifle, the enemy jumped up, swung to the left of the outpost, and
headed straight through the undefended breach for the craters 150 yards
behind.
The light had now grown brighter, and the officers at Sackville Centre
could see the Germans breaking through to Craters 2 and 3. They turned
their remaining men half-left rear, and fired with every rifle which
would work. But the damage was done. The working parties on the
second line, which was being built in front of the craters, had been
withdrawn before light, and the small groups of the 28th Battalion in
the craters themselves must have been overpowered by the 200 or 300
Germans who broke in on them. Once over the rim, the enemy were for
the moment safe, and they promptly set about digging themselves in, and
getting the machine-guns they had brought with them into position.
In all, then, some 200 or 300 Germans succeeded in occupying the two
craters on the right of our position. From this point they began to
work towards our left, and in the course of the day or the following
night became possessed of Craters 4 and 5. This movement would have
placed them in the rear of the men of the 31st Battalion at
Campbelltown Corner had that still been occupied. As a matter of fact,
however, the extreme right and south position of the 31st had been
abandoned and destroyed in the course of the preliminary bombardment.
At dawn a tremendous fire had been directed on the top line towards
Shelley Farm,[4] and the trench between Campbelltown Corner and the old
British line became untenable. To stay in it was certain and useless
death. Part of its garrison got back into the original line. Other
parties occupied the two small and ancient Craters 6 and 7, immediately
in advance of it, under the impression, arrived at without due thought,
that these were Craters 4 and 5; while one platoon cut off by the
barrage moved to their left into an old advanced trench which afforded
them some cover.
[Sidenote: _April 6th, 4:30 A.M._]
At 4.30 in the morning, or an hour after the attack on the 27th, about
200 of the enemy made a second attack and attempted to overwhelm the
party holding Craters 7 and 6; Major Doughty, of the 31st, organised
the defence with skill and resolution. He allowed the Germans to
advance within effective range, and then brought a concentric fire to
bear on them. The isolated platoon enfiladed them on the left, the men
in the craters enfiladed them on the right, while the original
occupants of the old front line just behind and to the left of the
craters mowed them down from the front. The attack recoiled in
confusion.
[Illustration: Map--St. Eloi]
Some fled, others threw themselves down into shell-holes and lay there
unobserved as long as the daylight lasted. Our line was suffering now
the fate of a taut rope cut in the centre. Each end recoiled
instinctively to its point of connection with the old British trenches.
It cannot be maintained that the retirement on the right, albeit it was
from an untenable position, was carried out in a very skilled or
organised fashion. This fact was due partly to the general nature of
the ground and the situation, which has been sufficiently dwelt on, and
partly to the number of different units on the same front. The time of
relief--and the relief of the 27th was not yet fully accomplished
though nearly so--with two sets of officers and men on the same front
moving contrary ways, is always a period of some little confusion, and
for that reason reliefs are not carried out at dawn, because it is the
likely time for an attack. In this case the circumstances made it
impossible to get the reliefs up earlier. But, apart from this, there
were small parties of Pioneers scattered about in or in front of the
line. It was not, of course, the business of these latter to await the
Germans, but to get back into their own line, but the precipitancy and
thoroughness with which they executed this movement added to the
prevailing disturbance. At any rate, on the right every party from
Bathurst Butts and the extreme right of their original line was between
two fires and in imminent danger of being surrounded. So the scattered
groups began to retire towards Sackville Centre and Fredericton Fort,
where Capts. Gwynn and Meredith were organising the defence. Their
party consisted of some subalterns of both their regiments, sixteen men
of the 27th, and five Pioneers. These officers determined to hold on
in spite of the heavy machine-gun fire from the craters in the rear,
and to give time for the more easterly parties to rally on them. They
got the telephone to work and asked for reinforcements; they tried to
establish a continuous line down the Canadian communication trench,
which had been deserted at its easterly end, and they asked for fire to
be directed on the captured craters from the guns and trench mortars.
Col. Snider, of the 27th, was the nearest Commanding Officer to them,
and he did his utmost to come to their assistance. Their last request
verged on the heroic, for their own trenches were only a hundred yards
beyond those of the enemy, and their precise position could not be
known to our gunners far to the rear. All this time men were falling
fast. The cover was poor, and to show one's head was to invite an
almost inevitable bullet. None the less, Lieut. Jackson, of the 29th,
volunteered to go out with four men of the 27th and try to locate more
precisely the positions the enemy had taken up. So murderous was the
fire that within a few minutes he and one private returned alone. The
other three had been killed almost instantly.
The requests for assistance from guns and men from the Brigade could
not be very adequately met. The Higher Command were under a double
difficulty. In the first place, so heavy was the German fire on the
communication trenches that it was impossible to move supports up to
them in the daylight hours of that morning. In the second place, the
continual breakdown in the telephone service made all information as to
the precise state of affairs in the front line impossible to obtain
from minute to minute. In so far, however, as messages came through
they continued to confirm the original evidence which had given the
Brigade a radically false view of the whole situation. The view of the
Brigade was that the Germans were simply a small raiding party who had
broken through a weakly-held part of the line and seized on Crater 2,
and possibly Crater 3. There they were, surrounded on every side
except that by which they had come in, by parties of our troops in the
closest proximity to them. Capts. Gwynn and Meredith were close behind
their line on the right; and it was quite wrongly believed that Major
Daly and the 31st were cheek by jowl with them in Craters 4 and 5 on
the left; in the centre, of course, was our main force. To start a
heavy bombardment was therefore impossible, for it would have killed
more Canadians than Germans; it would have been using a steam-hammer to
crack a nut and cracking one's own finger instead. A bombing and rifle
attack was the only way to deal with such intruders. That was the
obvious argument, and it would have been correct had the premises on
which it was based borne any relation to the facts. The difficulties
with which General Ketchen was confronted can best be appreciated in
the light of the fact that he was not definitely informed till 5
o'clock on the morning of the 6th that the two Craters--2 and 3--were
lost, and that all communication with the front then ceased for two and
a half hours! As it was, under the urgent pressure of Col. Snider, of
the 27th, and Capt. Gwynn, artillery fire was finally opened on Crater
2.
The trench mortars in our original right-hand trenches, whose gunners
were near enough to see what they were doing, were out of action.
Eventually, however, some 18-pounders were turned on the enemy. Capt.
Gwynn, who observed the bombardment by Fredericton Fort, was doubtful
of its efficacy, but the testimony of prisoners taken during the
ensuing night proves that the garrison of Crater 2 lost heavily, though
not heavily enough to induce them to retire. But the main reliance was
placed on a bombing and infantry attack from the north and north-east,
and the 28th Battalion, which had not yet been in action, was ordered
to come up from its trenches behind the centre of the position and
assist in the assault.
In the meantime, the isolated parties of the 27th and the 29th were
making their way back as best they could from the east to the rallying
point in front of Crater 1. The stories of these successive
retirements will, in the main, never be told--for too often they were
cut short by death. The machine-gun teams of the 5th Brigade were also
involved in the retreat. Lieut. Browne commanded the 22nd, Sergt.
Naylor the 24th, Lieut. White the 25th, Lieut. Lockhart the 26th. Of
all these, only one gun was brought out of action--that of Sergt.
Naylor, of the 24th Battalion, who showed great presence of mind in
mitigating the confusion of the mixed units in the retreat, and saved
the majority of his team. The character of the force is well
illustrated by the private occupations of his team. The sergeant was a
storekeeper, Lance-Cpl. Rose a patternmaker, Lance-Cpl. Duley a bank
teller, Private Arundel a ledger-keeper, Private Clarke a salesman,
Private Burchell a private secretary.
The parties of the 25th and 26th were never seen again. They must
presumably have perished, and their stories with them. One tale,
however, survives--and that is the march of Lieut. Browne of the 22nd
(French Canadians) and his detachment across the front and through the
lines of the enemy. As has been already related, Lieut. Browne found
himself on our extreme left with a Lewis gun when Capt. Gwynn went back
for instructions. He fired on the Germans and saw them pass behind him
to the crater. "The enemy," he says, "marched in absolute silence
until I opened fire, and they extended and began to shout as they ran
forward. In my opinion the enemy did not think that the front line was
occupied, which would account for their advancing in close order until
struck by our fire." As the enemy swung round his left, there was no
outbreak of fire from the Lewis gun of the 25th Battalion--it had been
buried and its crew presumably killed. Every gun and rifle save one
having jammed, and the enemy being well behind the line, Lieut. Browne
took his decision. "Not being able to do any effective work and
believing the other crews to be out of action; also seeing the enemy
closing on the left towards the craters, I decided to retire to the
second line, there to unite with the garrison to make a stand." The
party, which consisted of five men of the 22nd and a few others,
accordingly started back north, following in the wake of the advancing
Germans. There was, however, no garrison in our newly-dug second line
south of the craters, for the working party had gone. Instead they
encountered the barbed wire the working parties had put in front of the
trench. The Germans, by now on the edge of the craters, fired on them
as they were struggling through. Lance-Cpl. Lambert, Private Rattè,
Private Brisebois, and a man of the 25th fell, but as they gained the
other side they came across a digging party which had lost its way, and
had not gone back with the others. Hastily gathering these men, Lieut.
Browne charged for the spot where they had been fired on. Not a man
had a rifle which would work, but they rushed in like the paladins of
romance on the armed Germans who were in the trench. These they killed
in hand-to-hand conflict with the butts of their rifles. Alter this
notable feat of arms the party got into the new second line trench and
proceeded along it towards Fredericton Fort. As they came running down
the trench, the Germans came out of the crater against them, but Lieut.
Browne's detachment managed to elude the enemy. Picking up some of the
29th, and the gun crew of the 24th on the way, Lieut. Browne succeeded
in reaching Fredericton Fort, where he found Capts. Gwynn and Meredith.
Of his original section only two remained alive. None the less, each
new group had rallied round this officer, and were "ready for a fight
at any time." Such a story of valour and discretion exceeds all that
fiction has ever imagined. [Sidenote: _April 6th, 7 A.M._] At 7 a.m.
on the morning of the 6th, all telephone communication with the
officers at Fredericton Fort ceased. The last message which came
through to Capt. Gwynn (as appeared subsequently) from the Canadian
communication trench was a simple and tragic one: "_We are retiring_."
Isolated by now on both right and left, and with the enemy in front and
rear, Capt. Gwynn still held firm until he was reasonably certain that
the last party from the abandoned line had come in. Finally, some two
hours afterwards, no orders having been received, as indeed they could
not be, he decided to retire. His men were falling fast in an
impossible position and no alternative was open to him.
Fortunately, a message asking for the support of the machine-guns in
our original trenches on the right had got through, and under cover of
their fire and the shelling of the Crater 2 by our 18-pounders, Capt.
Gwynn conducted a successful retirement to the old lines. In this
emergency the 27th and the 29th were ably led, and seconded their
officers' efforts to the last. The news of this final movement on the
right did not reach the Brigade until some time later in the day.
With this retirement the first phase of the battle comes to an end.
The new line has been indubitably lost with the exception of a few
outpost positions like the minor craters, and the remainder of the
prolonged struggle is devoted to the attempt to reoccupy by a series of
counter-attacks ground which has been abandoned, and to oust the enemy
from the craters. It will be well to defer to a later stage a full
consideration of all the circumstances which prevented a successful
issue, but something may be said with advantage on the fighting from
the night of April 3rd, when the Canadian 2nd Division took over, to
the morning of the 6th, when the German advance succeeded. It is
inevitable that the mere event should leave behind it a certain trace
of bitterness. To lose trenches, however indefensible, can never be
pleasant. Failure must differ from success whatever the real merits of
the case may be. And it is part of the tragedy of modern warfare that
the real conditions which make such a retirement unavoidable can never
be understood to the full by those who have not gone through the
experience of a general action in trench warfare. No word painting,
however vivid, can make the picture actual to minds which have
mercifully been preserved from the experience and to eyes which have
never seen a modern battlefield. The shock of squadrons, the bayonet
charge, or the exchange of point-blank volleys between opposing
battalions has become familiar to us in history-books, and the artist
can draw them to the life. It is easy to grasp the recoil of a column
down the hill-side under the furious impetus of an overwhelming
assault. But to be killed in sections by high explosives and
machine-guns in a trench which is rapidly ceasing to exist, so that the
agony is prolonged for hours, is an ordeal more difficult to grasp.
The mere reiteration of its horrors dulls the sense of the reader as
the actuality strains the nerves of the soldier. Every sentence would
have to end with the word "shell." The knowledge that to stay is
useless because no attack will be made while anyone remains alive; that
to bring up supports is impossible under the barrage, and that anyone
who came would merely share your fate; the impossibility of keeping
pace with the destruction of your only cover; the biting fire from
rear, front and flank; the impotence of gripping a useless rifle--these
things are indeed worse than the bitterness of death! The men of the
6th Brigade were right in retiring as soon as the line was broken and
had become indefensible, and when no supports could be brought up to
their assistance. But, apart from the unavoidable necessities of the
case, the 2nd Division suffered from ill-luck. In all military
operations luck is of primary importance, because even the best planned
and most carefully executed schemes are met by such unexpected changes
and conditions that they go to ruin through the Unforeseen. Every
commander must expect a reasonable share of the favours of fortune.
That share was in this action conspicuously lacking. The mistake about
the identity of the Craters 4 and 5 was the beginning of all the
trouble. Had the 31st Battalion occupied these instead of Craters 6
and 7, when they were blown out of Campbelltown Corner, they might have
checked the whole enemy advance and made the Germans in Craters 2 and 3
what they were for long believed to be by the Higher Command, an
isolated group partly surrounded by the Canadians. The initial mistake
was the precipitate action and belief of the 31st Battalion, due to the
fact that no one knew the ground as it had been transformed by mine and
shell fire. But the results of the blunder were cumulative.
The counter-attack on the night of the 6th-7th--dealt with in the next
chapter--by the 27th and 31st Battalions confirmed and exaggerated the
error by failing to get to the real craters, although the men of these
battalions were firmly convinced that they _had_ done so. They found
men holding what they thought to be Crater 5, and naturally believed
them. The result was to immobilise our artillery during the crucial
phase of the action and for days afterwards. Had we known that the
whole crater line in the centre was held by the Germans, we could
almost certainly have blown them out of it. As it was our gunners were
crippled by the fear of destroying the positions of their own infantry.
Such a mistake is no doubt "the luck of war," and in the ordinary
course of events it would soon have been rectified by the photographic
pictures taken by our aeroplanes. But here came the crowning blow of a
malignant fortune. All through the first fortnight of the action a
great gale blew. It not only hindered our actions on the surface of
the earth, but it absolutely stopped them in the air. No aeroplane
could go up in it, and the vital facts of the position were hidden from
the commanders until the morning of April 16th.
Confronted by all these adverse circumstances, the companies of the
27th, 29th and the 31st did all that mortal men could do. In the face
of heavy casualties, and holding positions under intolerable artillery
fire, they stood their ground firmly so long as defence was possible,
and retired, in rallying groups when to hold on was merely suicide they
did not command success; they deserved it.
[1] The whole of this line from the Canadian communication trench to
Campbelltown Corner consisted of German communication, or second and
third line, trenches, which had been battered in turn by the guns of
both sides.
[2] A traverse is the projection of earth back into the firing trench
which divides it into sections or firing bays. Its object is to give
cover against flank fire, so that if an enemy enfilades you he cannot
sweep right down the length of the trench. A trench without traverses
is therefore very dangerous.
The firing platform is a ledge of earth from one to two feet high, on
which a man must stand in order to see or fire over a parapet. It
follows from this that until he gets up on the platform he can, in a
good trench, walk about freely, without exposing his head to the enemy.
Here, of course, the trench was a German one, and in consequence the
parapet and platform were on the north side of the trench, whereas we
wanted them on the south side. The first thing to do in capturing a
trench from the enemy is to seize the sandbags of the parapet and to
drag them across to the other side and then make a new platform below
them.
[3] A barrage is a concentration of shell fire on a particular point or
frontage so as to make it impassable to the enemy. It is also called
"curtain fire" by the French. It can be used to prevent an attack on
one's own front line, or check reinforcements coming to the enemy first
line from the second or third lines.
[4] The Farm was not named after the poet, but because of the number of
shells it received.
CHAPTER VI
ST. ELOI (_continued_)
Counter-attacks--Obstacles to victory--The ground described--The enemy
deceived--Ravage wrought by heavy guns--Impassable ground--Schemes
based upon unreliable information--Forward movement ordered--The 28th
severely shelled at Voormezeele--Confusion regarding the occupation of
the craters--Raid on Craters 2 and 3 fails--Wrong craters attacked--The
Canadian infantry in Craters 6 and 7--Enemy patrols walk straight into
Canadian trenches and are taken prisoners--The actual situation
revealed by aerial photographs--Unit follows unit to certain death--The
brave 28th--Heavy casualties--Determination of the Higher
Command--Sniper Zacharias--A gallant deserter--Imperative order to take
the German positions--Crater No. 1 captured--Unfortunate lack of
reliable information--Four Privates hold an exposed position for 70
hours--Individual acts of bravery common--Good work of the Lewis gun
team--"Get on at any cost"--Brave though fruitless attempts--A glorious
failure--Repeated counter-attacks unsuccessful--The third phase of the
Battle of St. Eloi--A parallel of Verdun--The enemy seizes a dominant
position--A deadlock--General Turner's suggestions--Reconstruction of
the old British line under General Watson--The inglorious drudgery of
digging--Perilous position of Canadians in advanced positions--Carrier
pigeons used as messengers for the first time--Value of position
problematical--Superior trenches of the enemy--Useful work of
aircraft--Historic ground--First and second great actions of Dominion
Army contrasted--Failure and success enter into the education of a
nation.
[Sidenote: _April 6th, 1916._]
With the morning of April 6th began that series of counter-attacks
against the Germans which continued at intervals during the remainder
of the action.
Here, in estimating the causes of success or failure, three factors are
of primary importance: the general lie of the land and the consequent
disposition of our troops on it; the concentrated fire of the enemy's
heavy artillery; and the state of the weather and the subsoil. None of
these factors was in our favour, and though taken singly their
hostility need not have proved fatal, taken in conjunction they formed
as grave an obstacle to victory as any general has encountered.
The knoll of St. Elbi is in itself of no great magnitude. From the
plateau which it crowns the ground drops suddenly to the south and the
German second line trenches. But though it possesses this local
advantage it is in its turn dominated both by the rise at Eikhof Farm
some 1,000 yards to the east and by gun positions well back in the
German line. This drawback was aggravated by the fact that, like most
positions, such as Hooge or Hill 60, in the Ypres salient, it could be
subjected to a converging fire from the front and either flank. The
German observers could thus look north past the knoll, and watching any
signs of the movements of our troops far behind the line, turn on them
a rain of shells from at least three points of the compass. The
Canadian Higher Command was compelled in consequence to order the
dispositions of the troops accordingly. The divisional frontage was
taken by only one brigade with two battalions in the advance positions.
The centre and support battalion had to find cover farther back, while
the reserve battalion was right back near Dickebusch nearly three miles
away. Such a dispersion cannot but be disadvantageous. But the
configuration of the ground would have been of less importance had
there been no great concentration of German guns to face. Such a
collection of heavy pieces takes days to assemble or disperse, and is
not therefore to be looked for on the side of the defence. The enemy,
_ex hypothesi_, should have been taken by surprise when the craters
were blown up and the 3rd British Division attacked, and plenty of time
given to the assailants to consolidate the new position before a great
concentration of guns could be brought to bear on them. But this did
not happen, by a simple piece of bad luck, as has been related in
Chapter IV. In February the British Division holding the Bluff to the
north of St. Eloi, just east of the Canal, and included in the
subsequent Canadian position, had some trenches there snatched from
them. They took the matter calmly; got up the heavy batteries,
including even the monstrous 15-inch guns, blew the Bluff practically
to pieces, and took back the lost ground on March 2nd. This
performance caused keen irritation to the Germans, who looked round for
the best spot on which to retaliate, and selected St. Eloi. The troops
then who carried the new line, and the Canadians, who had to hold it,
found a ready-prepared artillery concentration against them from the
moment they started. The whole area was laid waste, and the old
British line in the centre, and many of the support and communication
trenches behind it, were rendered untenable.
[Illustration: Map--St. Eloi area]
Depth then, not length, is the distinguishing feature of the section
occupied by the 2nd Canadian Division. And here the third factor comes
into play, the state of the soil. In war, distance, time, and energy
are interchangeable terms. The interval between a line and its
supports is not to be measured by the number of yards between them, but
by the time it will take to traverse and by the amount of fatigue
involved in the process. Undisturbed earth under rain forms mud, but
in a country which is not marshy it can be crossed somehow. But earth
disintegrated by high explosive and drowned in water becomes pulp. One
can wade through water, or struggle over mud, but this stuff was
neither. As men splashed from shell-hole to shell-hole--and the
surface of the earth consisted of nothing else--they sank up to the
armpits and could find no grip for their feet. One of the strongest
men in the 2nd Division has declared that after sixty yards of this
work he was incapable of going further.
To make new--or, worse still, to repair old--trenches out of this
material was impossible. Add darkness for a night attack, and the
picture is complete. Even by daylight, parties reported in the utmost
good faith that they had reached such and such a point on the map,
when, as a matter of fact, they had done nothing of the kind, for all
the old landmarks had vanished. Yet it was on this information that
schemes of attack had to be based.
[Sidenote: _Morning, April 6th, 1916._]
On the morning of the 6th, as soon as the enemy attack was known of at
Headquarters, a forward movement of the supports and reserves of the
6th Brigade began. Two companies of the 29th were already up with the
27th in the original British trenches and the new Canadian line beyond,
and a bombing party followed them into the former position. The 28th
occupied Voormezeele in the support centre line, where they were
subjected to as severe a shelling as any experienced in the forward
trenches. Two battalions, 18th (Western Ontario), commanded by
Lieut.-Col. Wigle, and 21st (Eastern Ontario), under Lieut.-Col.
Hughes, of the 4th Brigade, took their places at Dickebusch in reserve.
Two counter-attacks were then organised. The attacks were to be
simultaneous and converging. From the right of the line the bombers of
the 27th and the 29th were to head an assault against Craters 2 and 3,
which lay to the south-east of the original line. From the left-centre
of the line, the bombers of the 28th and 31st Battalions were to
re-occupy Craters 4 and 5, should these have been abandoned, moving in
a south-westerly direction. The men of these two regiments had to come
up from well behind St. Eloi on to ground with which they were utterly
unfamiliar, and from which all landmarks had been blotted out. As they
advanced through the half-ruined communications in the full light of
day, the German observers caught a glimpse of them and a tremendous
barrage of fire was turned on them. Dashing through this, they saw in
front of them the outlines of two craters and immediately assumed that
their objective was before them. No one knew at the time which craters
on our left were in German hands, and as has been noted before, the
31st under Major Doughty, when they evacuated their forward position at
the time of attack, were firmly convinced that they had seized Craters
4 and 5, whereas they had actually occupied Craters 6 and 7, and from
these repulsed the assault.
It was into these two craters that the bombers of the two battalions
broke, and found one still occupied by a party of the 31st, and the
other abandoned under a rain of shells. They reported accordingly, and
the original error was again confirmed in the minds of the Brigade. In
the meantime, the raid on Craters 2 and 3 had come to grief. It was
delivered across the open, where the only cover was shell-holes, in
face of a sweeping machine-gun fire from the German redoubts in the
craters, backed by their gunners behind their lines. To advance in the
face of this hail of death was impossible, and finally the attempt was
abandoned.
An attack organised for 1.30 a.m. on April 6th was postponed while our
artillery bombarded the craters. All through the day the German
barrage hardly lifted, but it was decided to make a new push against
Craters 4 and 5, then supposed to be Craters 2 and 3, as soon as the
dark descended. But at dusk the Germans themselves took the initiative
for a moment. [Sidenote: _6 P.M., April 6th, 1916._] When the 31st had
repulsed the attack at dawn on the 6th, they imagined that the
surviving Germans had made a final retirement. This proved not to be
the case; some 50 or 60 of them had flung themselves flat down in the
shell-holes in front of Craters 6 and 7 and the trenches on our left,
and had remained crouching there all day. As evening fell, they leapt
up suddenly and charged the 31st. A withering rifle fire swept the
enemy's groups, which faded out of existence. Some fell and some fled,
but a few dropped back again into their shell-holes, and remained there
during the night. The strain appears to have been too much for the
nerves of the survivors. Driven mad by their position and the fire of
our artillery, they leapt up again at dawn on the 7th, and with their
rifles slung danced "like Red Indians," as an eye-witness observed, in
front of the Canadian lines.
On the evening of the 6th, the 28th were coming up in successive
parties to the support of the right of that hard-tried Battalion, and
had effected a junction with Major Daly (31st) behind our own craters.
Their instructions were to pick up bombers of the 31st and to assault
and capture Craters 2 and 3. They actually advanced against Craters 4
and 5. The bombing attack was led by Lieut. V. P. Murphy (25th), who
succeeded in establishing himself nearer the hostile craters than any
previous advance had done. He was supported by Capt Styles (28th), who
exposed himself with the greatest gallantry in the continuous attempt
to keep touch with the various scattered units of the 28th and the
31st. But the mud was almost impassable, the darkness intense, the
position of the enemy uncertain, and the ground a mere mass of holes.