[The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as Sun Tzŭ does
not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he has already told us
(V §§ 6-11) that such deflections from the ordinary course are
practically innumerable, we have little option but to follow Wang Hsi,
who says that "Nine" stands for an indefinitely large number. "All it
means is that in warfare we ought to vary our tactics to the utmost
degree…. I do not know what Ts’ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out
to be, but it has been suggested that they are connected with the Nine
Situations" - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The
only other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost—a
supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends some
weight.]
1. Sun Tzŭ said: In war, the general receives his commands from the
sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces.
[Repeated from VII. § 1, where it is certainly more in place. It may
have been interpolated here merely in order to supply a beginning to
the chapter.]
2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high
roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in
dangerously isolated positions.
[The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as given in the
beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. § 43. q.v.). Chang Yu
defines this situation as being situated across the frontier, in
hostile territory. Li Ch’uan says it is "country in which there are no
springs or wells, flocks or herds, vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin,
"one of gorges, chasms and precipices, without a road by which to
advance."]
In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In a desperate
position, you must fight.
3. There are roads which must not be followed,
["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li Ch’uan,
"where an ambush is to be feared."]
armies which must be not attacked,
[More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must not be
attacked." Ch’en Hao says: "When you see your way to obtain a rival
advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real defeat, refrain from
attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men’s strength."]
towns which must not be besieged,
[Cf. III. § 4 Ts’ao Kung gives an interesting illustration from his own
experience. When invading the territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the
city of Hua-pi, which lay directly in his path, and pressed on into the
heart of the country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the
subsequent capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities.
Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, cannot be
held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." Hsun Ying, when
urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is small and
well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will be no great feat
of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself a laughing-stock." In
the seventeenth century, sieges still formed a large proportion of war.
It was Turenne who directed attention to the importance of marches,
countermarches and manœuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste
men in taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a
province." [1] ]
positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign which
must not be obeyed.
[This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence for
authority, and Wei Liao Tzŭ (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to exclaim:
"Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is antagonistic to virtue, a
military commander is the negation of civil order!" The unpalatable
fact remains, however, that even Imperial wishes must be subordinated
to military necessity.]
4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany
variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops.
5. The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted
with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn
his knowledge to practical account.
[Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means not only
securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural advantages in
every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of ground is
characterized by certain natural features, and also gives scope for a
certain variability of plan. How it is possible to turn these natural
features to account unless topographical knowledge is supplemented by
versatility of mind?"]
6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war of varying
his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five Advantages, will
fail to make the best use of his men.
[Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and generally
advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain road is short, it
must be followed; if an army is isolated, it must be attacked; if a
town is in a parlous condition, it must be besieged; if a position can
be stormed, it must be attempted; and if consistent with military
operations, the ruler’s commands must be obeyed." But there are
circumstances which sometimes forbid a general to use these advantages.
For instance, "a certain road may be the shortest way for him, but if
he knows that it abounds in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has
laid an ambush on it, he will not follow that road. A hostile force may
be open to attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely
to fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so on.]
7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of advantage and of
disadvantage will be blended together.
["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous one," says
Ts’ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always present to your
mind."]
8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, we may
succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our schemes.
[Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the enemy, we must
not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the possibility of the
enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this enter as a factor into
our calculations."]
9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we are always
ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate ourselves from
misfortune.
[Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a dangerous position,
I must consider not only the enemy’s ability to injure me, but also my
own ability to gain an advantage over the enemy. If in my counsels
these two considerations are properly blended, I shall succeed in
liberating myself…. For instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and
only think of effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will
incite my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to
encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the
advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy’s toils." See the
story of Ts’ao Ts’ao, VII. § 35, note.]
10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;
[Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, some of
which would only occur to the Oriental mind:—"Entice away the enemy’s
best and wisest men, so that he may be left without counselors.
Introduce traitors into his country, that the government policy may be
rendered futile. Foment intrigue and deceit, and thus sow dissension
between the ruler and his ministers. By means of every artful
contrivance, cause deterioration amongst his men and waste of his
treasure. Corrupt his morals by insidious gifts leading him into
excess. Disturb and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely
women." Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of
Sun Tzŭ here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer
injury, and he will submit of his own accord."]
and make trouble for them,
[Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that trouble
should be made for the enemy affecting their "possessions," or, as we
might say, "assets," which he considers to be "a large army, a rich
exchequer, harmony amongst the soldiers, punctual fulfillment of
commands." These give us a whip-hand over the enemy.]
and keep them constantly engaged;
[Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent them from
having any rest."]
hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given point.
[Meng Shih’s note contains an excellent example of the idiomatic use
of: "cause them to forget _pien_ (the reasons for acting otherwise than
on their first impulse), and hasten in our direction."]
11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the
enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the
chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made
our position unassailable.
12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a general: (1)
Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
["Bravery without forethought," as Ts’ao Kung analyzes it, which causes
a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad bull. Such an
opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered with brute force, but
may be lured into an ambush and slain." Cf. Wu Tzŭ, chap. IV. ad init.:
"In estimating the character of a general, men are wont to pay
exclusive attention to his courage, forgetting that courage is only one
out of many qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave
man is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, without
any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." Ssu-ma Fa,
too, makes the incisive remark: "Simply going to one’s death does not
bring about victory."]
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
[Ts’ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as "cowardice" as
being of the man "whom timidity prevents from advancing to seize an
advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick to flee at the sight of
danger." Meng Shih gives the closer paraphrase "he who is bent on
returning alive," this is, the man who will never take a risk. But, as
Sun Tzŭ knew, nothing is to be achieved in war unless you are willing
to take risks. T’ai Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will
subsequently bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu
pursued the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle
with him at the island of Ch’eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered only a
few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. But Huan
Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him should be be
overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of his war-junk, so
that he might escape, if necessary, at a moment’s notice. The natural
result was that the fighting spirit of his soldiers was utterly
quenched, and when the loyalists made an attack from windward with
fireships, all striving with the utmost ardor to be first in the fray,
Huan Hsuan’s forces were routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled
for two days and nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat
similar story of Chao Ying-ch’i, a general of the Chin State who during
a battle with the army of Ch’u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in readiness
for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be the first to get
across.]
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
[Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by Huang Mei,
Teng Ch’iang and others shut himself up behind his walls and refused to
fight. Teng Ch’iang said: "Our adversary is of a choleric temper and
easily provoked; let us make constant sallies and break down his walls,
then he will grow angry and come out. Once we can bring his force to
battle, it is doomed to be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao
Hsiang came out to fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy’s
pretended flight, and finally attacked and slain.]
(4) a delicacy of honour which is sensitive to shame;
This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honour is really a defect
in a general. What Sun Tzŭ condemns is rather an exaggerated
sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned man who is stung
by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-ch’en truly observes, though
somewhat paradoxically: "The seeker after glory should be careless of
public opinion."]
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry and
trouble.
[Here again, Sun Tzŭ does not mean that the general is to be careless
of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to emphasize is the danger
of sacrificing any important military advantage to the immediate
comfort of his men. This is a shortsighted policy, because in the long
run the troops will suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the
prolongation of the war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken
feeling of pity will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered
city, or to reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his
military instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated
efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so many
strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And in the end,
relief came through the very man who started out with the distinct
resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of the whole to
sentiment in favour of a part. An old soldier of one of our generals who
failed most conspicuously in this war, tried once, I remember, to
defend him to me on the ground that he was always "so good to his men."
By this plea, had he but known it, he was only condemning him out of
Sun Tzŭ’s mouth.]
13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous to the
conduct of war.
14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the cause will
surely be found among these five dangerous faults. Let them be a
subject of meditation.
[1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.