Mail Carrying Railways Underpaid
A Statement by the Committee on Railway Mail Pay representing 214,275
miles of Railway in the United States, operated by 268 companies,
containing facts and figures which prove that Railway Mail Pay does
not equal the operating expenses that it makes necessary, leaving
nothing for return upon the value of the property.
THE COMMITTEE ON RAILWAY MAIL PAY
J. KRUTTSCHNITT, Chairman
Director of Maintenance and Operation, Union and Southern Pacific
Systems
RALPH PETERS, Vice-Chairman
President, Long Island Railroad
CHARLES A. WICKERSHAM
President and General Manager, Western Railway of Alabama
W. W. BALDWIN
Vice-President, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
W. W. ATTERBURY
Vice-President, Pennsylvania Railroad
GEORGE T. NICHOLSON
Vice-President, Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
E. J. PEARSON
First Vice-President, Missouri Pacific Railway
E. G. BUCKLAND
Vice-President, New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
C. F. DALY
Vice-President, New York Central Lines
W. A. WORTHINGTON
Assistant Director of Maintenance and Operation, Union and Southern
Pacific Systems
W. F. ALLEN, Secretary
H. T. NEWCOMB, Statistician
* * * * *
Mail Carrying Railways Underpaid
A STATEMENT
By the
Committee on Railway Mail Pay
representing
214,275 miles of Railway in the United States, operated by 268
companies,
containing facts and figures which prove that
RAILWAY MAIL PAY
does not equal the operating expenses that it makes necessary, leaving
nothing for return upon the value of the property.
October, 1912.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
Page
I. Scope of this Pamphlet 3
II. Railway Mail Pay Is About to be Forced Still Further Below
the Level of Just Compensation, Unless Payments are Promptly
Readjusted, on Account of the Additional Volume of Mail that
will Result from the Inauguration, on January 1, 1913, of the
Parcels Post 3
III. The Postmaster-General's Erroneous Assertion that the
Railways were Overpaid "About $9,000,000.00" in the Year 1909,
Rests Primarily Upon His Adopting an Unprecedented Theory
which Allows Nothing for a Return Upon the Capital Invested in
Railway Property 4
IV. The Mail Service Supplied by the Railways Costs Them More in
Operating Expenses and Taxes than They Are Paid For It, and
Leaves Nothing for Return on the Property 6
V. The Postmaster-General's Apportionment of Space Between the
Mail Service and the Other Services Rendered on Passenger
Trains Did Not Allow to the Mails the Space which They
Actually Require and Use and this Had the Result of Unduly
Reducing His Estimates of the Cost to the Railways of the Mail
Service 9
VI. The Postmaster-General Ignored Data which He Had Obtained
Showing Expenditures on Account of the Mails Largely in Excess
of the Direct Expenses for that Service which He Reported 11
VII. The Month of November Is Not a Fair Average Month in Any
Railway Year or One that Is Typical of a Year's Business and
Its Use as the Sole Basis of the Postmaster-General's
Calculations was So Unfavorable to the Railways as to Deprive
the Results of Any Value Even If in All Other Respects His
Methods were Beyond Criticism 13
VIII. A Commission of Senators and Members of Congress which,
Between 1898 and 1901, Most Fully and Carefully Investigated
the Subject, Ascertained and Declared that Railway Mail Pay
was Not Then Excessive; Since Then there Have Been Many and
Extensive Reductions in Pay Accompanied by Substantial
Increases in the Cost and Value of the Services Rendered by
the Railways 14
IX. The Administration of the Post Office Department Has Not, in
the Last Twelve Years, Effected any Reduction in the Annual
Total of Its Expenses for Other Purposes than Railway
Transportation or in the Proportion of Its Revenues Required
for Such Other Expenses, but the Whole Saving Which Has Nearly
Eliminated the Annual Deficit of the Department Is Represented
by the Reduced Payments, Per Unit of Service, to the Railways 17
X. The Continuous Refusal of the Post Office Department to Order
Reweighings of the Mails Except After the Maximum Interval of
Four Years which the Law Allows, the Demands for Station and
Terminal Services that Are Rendered Without Any or Without
Adequate Compensation and the Unjust Discrimination Against
Compartment Cars Used as Railway Post Offices Are All Abuses,
Seriously Injurious to the Railways, Which Have Grown Up Under
the Present System of Payment and Ought at Once to Be Remedied 18
XI. The Postmaster-General's Proposed Plan of Payment Based Upon
Operating Cost and Taxes, to Be Ascertained by the Post Office
Department, Plus Six Per Cent. Is Seriously Wrong in Principle
and Would Encourage and Perpetuate Injustice 20
_Appendices._
A. Extracts from the Postal Laws and Regulations 23
B. Classification of Operating Expenses 27
C. Receipts from Passenger and Freight Traffic by Months 28
D. How Railway Wages Have Increased 29
E. How Railway Taxes Have Increased 30
F. Letter dated September 11, 1912, from Hon. Jonathan Bourne,
Jr., Chairman, Senate Committee on Post Offices and Post Roads 31
G. Reply made thereto by the Committee on Railway Mail Pay 32
I. SCOPE OF THIS PAMPHLET.
The Committee on Railway Mail Pay, representing railways whose lines
include ninety-two per cent. of the aggregate length of all railway
mail routes in the United States, believes that the payments to the
railways for the services and facilities furnished by them to the Post
Office Department are, and for a long time have been, unjustly low.
This pamphlet contains a concise statement of the facts which prove
that this belief is warranted and, incidentally, a refutation of the
estimates made by the Postmaster-General, and reported to the Congress
(House Document No. 105, Sixty-second Congress, first session), which
led him to conclude that the basis of payment could now properly be
changed so as to accomplish a present reduction of about twenty per
cent. It will be shown that although the insufficient data and the
erroneous methods employed by the Postmaster-General resulted in his
making estimates of cost to the railways that are far below the real
cost, his own figures and calculations, when properly analyzed and
supplemented, demonstrate that the mail service has not been fairly
remunerative to the railways.
Before proceeding to this demonstration it should, however, be noted
that--
II. RAILWAY MAIL PAY IS ABOUT TO BE FORCED STILL FURTHER BELOW THE
LEVEL OF JUST COMPENSATION, UNLESS PAYMENTS ARE PROMPTLY READJUSTED,
ON ACCOUNT OF THE ADDITIONAL VOLUME OF MAIL THAT WILL RESULT FROM THE
INAUGURATION, ON JANUARY 1, 1913, OF THE PARCELS POST.
Congress has provided for a vast and incalculable extension of mail
traffic by creating a "Parcels Post," to be inaugurated on January 1,
1913, which, by opening the mails to many articles not previously
accepted at the post-offices and by materially reducing the rates on
mailed merchandise, is expected enormously to increase the volume of
the shipments which it covers. The Government seems to have assumed
that, under existing contracts, which were made before the meaning of
the word "mail" was thus extended, the railways can be compelled,
until these contracts expire, to carry this great additional volume of
mail traffic WITHOUT ANY COMPENSATION WHATEVER. If the former practice
of the Post Office Department is followed, no new contracts will be
made until after the next quadrennial weighings in each of the four
weighing sections, so that the position of the Government amounts to
an assertion that the whole added volume of the Parcels Post mails
will have to be carried without any compensation by the railways of
New England for four years and six months (these railways are in the
first weighing section but the weighing for the adjustment to be made
on July 1, 1913, has begun and will be completed before the Parcels
Post is inaugurated), by those of the second weighing section for
three years and six months, by those of the third weighing section for
two years and six months, by those of the fourth weighing section for
one year and six months, and by those of the first weighing section,
not located in New England, for six months. No presentation of the
injustice of the mail pay received in former years suggests even the
approximate extent of the losses which the railways will thus incur in
the next four and one-half years, unless readjustments are promptly
made on account of the Parcels Post.
III. THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL'S ERRONEOUS ASSERTION THAT THE RAILWAYS
WERE OVERPAID "ABOUT $9,000,000.00" IN THE YEAR 1909, RESTS PRIMARILY
UPON HIS ADOPTING AN UNPRECEDENTED THEORY WHICH ALLOWS NOTHING FOR A
RETURN UPON THE CAPITAL INVESTED IN RAILWAY PROPERTY.
The Postmaster-General assumed that the railways would be properly
compensated if they received a sum equal to the operating expenses and
taxes attributable to the carriage of the mails plus six per cent. of
the sum of those expenses and taxes. The calculation by which he
obtained the sum which he assumed would have been proper compensation
for the single month covered by his investigation was as follows:
His estimate of operating expenses and taxes on
account of mail service (Document No. 105, p.
280) for one month $2,676,503.75
Six per cent. of above 160,590.22
--------------
Total, assumed to represent just
compensation for one month $2,837,093.97
The railways having been paid, for the month selected, $770,679.16 in
excess of the sum resulting from the above calculation, the
Postmaster-General assumed that this excess over expenses and taxes
plus six per cent. constituted excessive profit for that month. He
multiplied this assumed excess by twelve to get his estimate of annual
excess and stated the result, in round figures, as "about $9,000,000."
The mere statement of this method discloses the fact that it makes no
allowance for any return upon the fair value of the railway property
employed in the service of the public. This omission is, of itself,
sufficient wholly to destroy the Postmaster-General's conclusion.
Everyone recognizes that a railway is entitled to at least a
reasonable return upon the value of its property devoted to the public
service. The Postmaster-General ignored this universally accepted
principle and adopted a theory which, if applied to the general
business of the companies, would render substantially every mile of
railway in the United States immediately and hopelessly bankrupt. The
recently published report of the Interstate Commerce Commission on the
railway statistics of the year that ended with June 30, 1910, contains
data by which this statement is easily demonstrated, as follows:
Operating expenses of all United States
railways, for the year $1,822,630,433
Taxes of all United States railways, for the year 103,795,701
--------------
Total $1,926,426,134
Six per cent. of above total 115,585,568
--------------
Total gross receipts permitted by
Postmaster-General's plan $2,042,011,702
But if this plan had been in force, the railways would have had, for
interest on mortgage bonds, a reasonable surplus as a margin of
safety, dividends on stocks, unprofitable but necessary permanent
improvements,[A] rents of leased properties, etc., etc., only the six
per cent. or $115,585,568. This figure may be compared with the
following, among others:
Interest obligations (on funded debt only) of
all United States railways, for the same year $370,092,222
Rentals of leased properties, all United States
railways, for the same year $133,881,409
[Footnote A: The necessity for providing, out of income, for
some kinds of improvements is commonly admitted. The public
constantly demands greater comfort and convenience which can
be supplied only by improvements in property and equipment
that bring in no additional income. A present example in the
mail service, itself, is the great expense which the railways
are now undergoing in substituting steel mail cars for those
formerly in use. The old cars, which thus become a total loss
were fully up to the most advanced standards of construction
when built and they could continue for a long time to serve
the purposes of the service except for the public demand for
stronger cars.]
Plainly, the Postmaster-General's proposal is equivalent to an
assertion that the railways would make a fair profit if they were
enabled to collect the sum of $115,585,568 in addition to their
operating expenses and taxes, but the figures given by the Interstate
Commerce Commission show that this would be less than one-third of
the sum necessary to meet interest charges which must be paid in order
to prevent foreclosures of mortgages and, if bond interest could be
ignored, is much less than the rentals that must be paid if the
existing systems are not to be broken up. And, of course, it would
allow nothing whatever for legitimate demands upon income for
dividends, permanent improvements or surplus.
It is unnecessary to dwell upon the consequences of such a theory of
"compensation" to railroad credit and to the public interest in
efficient transportation service, to say nothing of the consequences
to owners of railroad stock and bonds. Such a theory is not a theory
of compensation--it is a theory of oppression and of destruction.
The fact that the Postmaster-General has found it necessary to justify
his attack upon the present basis of railway mail pay by a theory so
unprecedented and so unwarranted in principle and in law, raises a
strong presumption against all his opinions and conclusions upon this
subject.
IV. THE MAIL SERVICE SUPPLIED BY THE RAILWAYS COSTS THEM MORE IN
OPERATING EXPENSES AND TAXES THAN THEY ARE PAID FOR IT, AND LEAVES
NOTHING FOR RETURN ON THE PROPERTY.
It cannot be too strongly emphasized that the railway mail pay at
present is insufficient to pay even its proper share of operating cost
and taxes and does not produce any return upon the property. This will
be demonstrated by any fair inquiry, as will now be shown. Reports
submitted to the Postmaster-General by railways operating 2,411 mail
routes, with a total length of 178,710 miles, showed that their gross
receipts, per car-foot mile[B], from services rendered on passenger
trains during November, 1909, were as follows:
From mail 3.23 mills
From other services 4.35 mills
[Footnote B: A car-foot mile is a unit equal to moving one
foot in car length (regardless of width or height) one mile.
Thus to move a car sixty feet long one mile results in sixty
car-foot miles; to move the same car three miles results in
180 car-foot miles, etc.]
Thus it appears that the space on passenger trains required for the
mails is proportionately less than three-quarters as productive as
that devoted to passengers, express, milk, excess baggage, etc., etc.
As it is the general belief of railway managers, whose conclusion in
this respect has rarely if ever been challenged, that the passenger
train services, as a whole, do not produce revenues sufficient to meet
their fair proportion of the operating costs and the necessary return
upon investment, and therefore are not reasonably compensatory, it is
evident that the mail service, the pay for which is more than
twenty-five per cent. below the average for the other services
rendered on the same trains, must bring in much less than reasonable
compensation. Certainly railroad revenues as a whole could not be
reduced twenty-five per cent. without destroying all return upon the
property. If so, it must be true that there can be no compensation in
a rate of mail pay that is twenty-five per cent. less than the rate of
pay for passenger traffic which, as above shown, is relatively
unprofitable.
No merely statistical comparison can, however, reveal the whole story
for the railways are required to furnish many incidental facilities
and to perform many additional services for the Post Office
Department, which render the mail service exceptionally arduous and
costly. These extra services include calling for and delivering mails
at a large proportion of the post offices located at railway towns;
supplying rooms, with light, heat and water, in railway stations for
the use of the mail clerks; placing cars, duly lighted and heated, on
station tracks for advance distribution, often many hours before the
departure of trains; carrying officers and agents of the Post Office
Department as passengers but without compensation to the extent of
more than 50,000,000 passenger miles annually (this being, of course,
in addition to the railway mail clerks on duty), etc., etc. Extracts
from the "Postal Laws and Regulations" defining and demanding these
services are given in Appendix A. No one can examine this appendix and
not be convinced that the mail service is the most exacting among all
those rendered by American railways.
The fairness of railway mail pay can also be tested by apportioning
operating expenses between passenger and freight traffic, and then
making a secondary apportionment of the passenger expenses between
mail and other kinds of traffic carried on passenger trains. This
method involves charging directly to each kind of traffic all expenses
pertaining exclusively thereto, and the apportionment, on some fair
basis, of those expenses which are common to more than one kind of
traffic.
In accordance with the request of the Postmaster-General, the railways
estimated the cost of conducting the mail service in the manner just
explained and reported the results to the Postmaster-General. After
first charging to each service the expenses wholly due to it they
apportioned the common expenses between the passenger and freight
services, following (with inconsequential exceptions) the method most
generally employed for that purpose, namely the apportionment of these
expenses in the proportions of the revenue train mileage of each
service. Having estimated, in this way, the operating expenses
attributable to passenger trains, the railways assigned to the mails
the portion of this aggregate indicated by the proportion of the total
passenger train space required for the mails. Using this method, 186
railways, operating 2,370 mail routes, with a total length of 176,716
miles, ascertained and reported that for November, 1909, the operating
expenses (not including taxes), for conducting the mail service were
$4,009,184. The Postmaster-General states (Document No. 105, page
281), that all the railways represented in the foregoing, and enough
others to increase the mileage represented to 194,978 miles, were paid
for the same month only $3,607,773.13. It thus appears that the pay
was far below the operating expenses, without making any allowance for
taxes or for a return upon the fair value of the property employed.
While different methods are in use for ascertaining the cost of
passenger train service and the results produced by such methods may
show considerable variation, yet the mail pay is so far below
reasonable compensation, from the standpoint of the cost of the
service and a return upon the value of the property, that no method
can be reasonably urged which would not demonstrate the
non-compensatory character of the present mail pay. This is
illustrated by the method which the Postmaster-General himself
employed, as the character of that method is such that it necessarily
produces the very lowest estimate of cost for the passenger train
service.
The Postmaster-General, by his method of
apportionment arrived at a cost of $2,676,503.75
But this must be increased (as will be shown
below, on account of his erroneous
apportionment of car space (page 10), by 800,802.00
And also on account of his refusal to assign
expenses directly incurred in the mail
service (page 12) 401,126.00[C]
Total, according to the Postmaster-General's
method of apportioning costs between
passenger and freight traffic $3,878,431.75
[Footnote C: There may be some duplication in this item, but
to eliminate it would require an elaborate computation which,
in view of the broad margin of expenses over receipts, is
wholly superfluous. Whatever duplication exists must be small
in comparison with this margin.]
Thus even the Postmaster-General's method of apportioning costs
between freight and passenger traffic produces an operating cost in
excess of the total pay received by the railways, leaving nothing
whatever for return upon the fair value of the property or necessary
but non-income producing improvements.
There is no allowance, in any of these estimates of cost, for the
large volume of free transportation supplied to officers and agents of
the Post Office Department, when not in charge of mail, although this
amounts to over 50,000,000 passenger miles annually and, at the low
average rate of two cents per mile, would cost the Post Office
Department more than $1,000,000 per year.
Moreover, as will presently be shown (pages 13-14) all the figures
here discussed are for the month of November, a month which, because
of the abnormally low ratio of passenger traffic to freight traffic,
substantially understates the cost of the passenger train services,
when figures derived from it are applied to an entire year.
It thus becomes evident that any inquiry which takes into
consideration the necessary elements of the situation will demonstrate
that railway mail pay is too low. It is only by ignoring essential
elements of the service and of expense and the fundamental element of
a return on the value of the property that any argument to the
contrary can be constructed.
Thus the mail traffic does not pay its operating cost. That traffic is
a substantial percentage of the total public service performed by the
railroads. It should contribute a substantial proportion to the taxes
which the railroads have to pay and to the return on railroad property
which its owners are entitled to receive. Clearly no fair method can
be devised which will fail to show that the existing mail pay is far
below a fairly compensatory basis. Certainly this condition ought not
to be intensified by adding the injustice of still further reductions.
On the contrary, the unjust reductions of recent years should be
corrected for the future, and the railroads should be relieved from
the strikingly unjust methods by which they are at present deprived of
anything approaching fair compensation.
V. THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL'S APPORTIONMENT OF SPACE BETWEEN THE MAIL
SERVICE AND THE OTHER SERVICES RENDERED ON PASSENGER TRAINS DID NOT
ALLOW TO THE MAILS THE SPACE WHICH THEY ACTUALLY REQUIRE AND USE AND
THIS HAD THE RESULT OF UNDULY REDUCING HIS ESTIMATES OF THE COST TO
THE RAILWAYS OF THE MAIL SERVICE.
Detailed reference will now be made to the methods and controlling
effect of the Postmaster-General's apportionment of passenger train
space between the mails and the other services rendered on passenger
trains. Such an apportionment was a necessary step in the calculations
reported in Document No. 105. Having obtained certain estimates of the
cost of the passenger train services, considered together, by methods,
producing the lowest results, the next step shown in Document No. 105
was to apportion a part of this cost to the mail service. The accepted
method for such an apportionment is to distribute the total cost in
proportion to the train space required by each of the respective
services. The Postmaster-General obtained from the railways statements
which he might have used in applying this method and these statements
showed that 9.32 per cent. of the total space in passenger trains was
required by the mails, but, instead of using the data showing this
fact, he substituted figures of his own which reduced the space
credited to the mail service to 7.16 per cent. of the total. The total
of passenger train costs which the Postmaster-General estimated should
be apportioned among passengers, express and mail, on the basis of
space occupied, was $37,074,172.[D] He therefore assigned to the mail
service 7.16 per cent. of the last-named sum or $2,654,510.69. If,
however, he had used the proportion of space, 9.32 per cent.,
resulting from the reports he had obtained from the railways, the
amount apportioned as cost of the mail service for the month would
have been $800,802 greater. Multiplying this by twelve gives an
increase in the estimated annual cost of over $9,600,000.
[Footnote D: This is the sum which was apportioned by the
Postmaster General on the basis of train space occupied. He
estimated $40,121,294.83 (Document No. 105, page 280) as the
total operating expenses and taxes of the passenger train
services for the month. Of this total $21,993.06 was charged
directly to the mails and $3,025,129.77 directly to the other
passenger train services, leaving the sum stated in the text
to be apportioned on the space basis.]
Thus the Postmaster-General arrived at his declaration that the
railways were getting an excess profit of $9,000,000 by means of two
fundamental errors, omitting for the present reference to any other
errors. He understated the annual mail expenses and taxes of the
railways by at least $9,600,000, and he ignored entirely the necessary
return on the value of railroad property.
This examination of his methods shows that the determination of space
was of primary and controlling importance and that the changes in
space allotment have destroyed the value of his deductions. These
changes were due to his refusal to assign to the mail service the
working space and temporarily unoccupied space on trains, which were
necessary to the mail service and to his actually assigning much of
this space to the passenger service rendered on the same trains.
It is scarcely necessary to note that all kinds of traffic require
"working space" in addition to the space actually occupied by the
traffic itself, and that this is especially true of the mail traffic,
or that where there is a preponderating movement of a certain traffic
in one direction there must be some empty space on account of that
traffic, sometimes called "dead" space, in trains moving in the
direction of lighter traffic. Thus passenger cars must have aisles,
vestibules and platforms, and postal cars must have a great deal of
space in which to sort the mails while, for mail carried in baggage
cars, there must be space in which to reach the pouches and to receive
and deliver them through the doors. A through train must also have the
full capacity required for the maximum traffic of any kind likely to
seek accommodation on any part of its journey, although during much of
each trip the actual traffic may be considerably below this limit. The
Postmaster-General, however, refused to credit the mail service with
much of the space thus required by the Department although his figures
for the other passenger train services allowed fully for all such
space required by them. In fact in many cases such space, actually
required by the mails and so reported by the railways, was taken from
the total mail space and, without reason, assigned to the passenger
service. These modifications of the data correctly reported, not
susceptible of justification upon any sound transportation principle,
were carried so far that the tabulations of the Post Office
Department, which are stated for railway mail routes having a total
length of 194,977.55 miles[E] show only 926,164,459 "car-foot miles"
made in the mail service, although certain railways, included therein,
and having railway mail routes aggregating only 178,709.96 miles, had
correctly reported mail space equivalent to 1,153,110,245 "car-foot
miles." Thus, although the Department's figures cover 8.3 per cent.
more mileage, its reductions of space resulted in assigning to this
greater mileage about one-quarter (24.5 per cent.) less mail space. At
the same time the Department actually increased the space assigned to
the other passenger train services, its figures showing 12,014,065,506
car-foot miles in these services for 194,977.55 miles of mail routes
which must be compared with 11,222,478,739 car-foot miles reported by
the railways for 178,709.96 mail-route miles.
[Footnote E: Document No. 105, p. 53.]
This treatment of the controlling figures as to space, supplementing
the other errors of method and omissions of fact, which have been or
will be cited, was amply sufficient to turn a real loss into an
apparent profit.
VI. THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL IGNORED DATA WHICH HE HAD OBTAINED SHOWING
EXPENDITURES ON ACCOUNT OF THE MAILS LARGELY IN EXCESS OF THE DIRECT
EXPENSES FOR THAT SERVICE WHICH HE REPORTED.
As a part of the investigation reported in Document No. 105 the
Postmaster-General obtained from the railways statements showing the
amounts expended by them for the station and terminal services
required by his Department and the amount of free transportation
furnished on his requisition for officers and agents of the postal
service when not in charge of mail. These data were not used (Document
No. 105, p. 6) and, as no adequate allowance was made in any other way
for these expenses, the omission unjustly reduced the estimates
of the cost to the railways of their postal services. The
Postmaster-General's explanation of this omission implies that it was
partially offset by the assignment as cost of mail service of its
proportion, on the space basis, of all the station and terminal
expenses of the passenger train services but these special mail
expenses are disproportionately heavy and the amount so assigned was
far too low. The expenses for station and terminal services especially
incurred for the mails, during November, 1909, and reported to the
Postmaster-General, for ninety-two per cent. of the mileage covered by
Document No. 105 aggregated $401,136.00, as follows:
Amount of wages paid to messengers and porters
employed exclusively in handling mails $79,980.84
Portion properly chargeable to mail service, pro-rated
on basis of actual time employed, of wages
paid to station employees a part of whose time
is employed in handling mails 198,927.01
Amount expended for maintenance of horses and
wagons and for ferriage, etc., in connection with
mail service 5,640.98
Rental value, plus average monthly cost of light
and heat, of room or rooms set apart for the exclusive
use of the mail service 37,258.93
Rental value of tracks occupied daily for advance
distribution of the mail 47,029.12
Average monthly cost of light and heat for postal
cars placed daily for advance distribution of mail 18,400.57
Interest at the legal rate upon the value of cranes,
catchers and trucks required for mail service 3,895.36
------------
Total $401,126.00[F]
[Footnote F: This total includes $9,993.19 reported by four
companies which gave totals for these items, but did not
report the items separately.]
All the foregoing data were reported to the Postmaster-General in
response to his request but he made no use of these items, an omission
manifestly to the serious disadvantage of the railways and having the
effect of unduly reducing his estimates of the cost of the mail
service.
Similarly, the Postmaster-General omitted to use the data he had
obtained from the railways showing the volume of free passenger
transportation, already referred to, supplied to the officers and
agents of the Post Office Department and his estimates contain no
recognition of the cost of this service although its extent should be
a matter of record in the Department as it is furnished only on its
requisition. The space in passenger coaches occupied by these
representatives of the Post Office Department, traveling free, was not
assigned to the mail service but was treated as passenger space.
VII. THE MONTH OF NOVEMBER IS NOT A FAIR AVERAGE MONTH IN ANY RAILWAY
YEAR OR ONE THAT IS TYPICAL OF A YEAR'S BUSINESS AND ITS USE AS THE
SOLE BASIS OF THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL'S CALCULATIONS WAS SO UNFAVORABLE
TO THE RAILWAYS AS TO DEPRIVE THE RESULTS OF ANY VALUE EVEN IF IN ALL
OTHER RESPECTS HIS METHODS WERE BEYOND CRITICISM.
All the Postmaster-General's calculations, reported in Document No.
105, and by him relied upon therein, and elsewhere, to substantiate
his attack upon existing railway mail pay, depend solely upon data for
the single month of November, in the year 1909. It is obvious,
therefore, that the validity of his conclusions, if all the rest of
his processes were accurate and his deductions otherwise sound, would
depend upon whether November is sufficiently typical of the railway
year to be safely used as the sole basis for conclusions applicable to
a whole year. The truth is, however, that November is not a typical or
average month and that all of its deviations from the averages
of the year are such as greatly to favor the result which the
Postmaster-General was seeking.
It may well be doubted whether the railway year contains any month
that can properly be regarded as typical of the whole period but if it
does, the month of November, with four Sundays, two holidays and only
twenty-four working days, is certainly not such a month. The
Interstate Commerce Commission publishes the monthly aggregates of
railway receipts and these official data conclusively prove that
November, 1909, was the one month for which the data were most
strongly favorable to finding, by the Postmaster-General's method, an
abnormally low apparent cost for the passenger train services and,
consequently, for the mail service.
It is a month in which substantially Winter conditions prevail in a
large part of the country and, on this account, one during which much
of the ordinary work of maintenance of way and structures must be
suspended. Such work occasions a large fraction of the yearly expenses
of all railways and these expenses pertain in a relatively large
proportion to the passenger services because the higher speed of
passenger trains results in greater relative wear and tear upon
road-bed and structures than that caused by the slower trains of the
freight service and the requirements of safety to passengers carried
at high speed impose more costly standards of maintenance than would
otherwise be necessary. Consequently a month in which these
maintenance expenses are necessarily below the yearly average cannot
typify the full annual cost of the passenger train services. Figures
showing the facts are contained in Appendix B.
It is, of course, understood that the respective expenses of the
passenger and freight services must move upward and downward with the
fluctuations in the volume of each sort of traffic. No month can
furnish a reliable basis for estimating the proportion of the total
expenses that is caused by the passenger service unless during that
month the volume of passenger traffic bears a normal relation to the
volume of freight traffic. But in November, 1909, as will appear from
official figures for each month in the year contained in Appendix C,
passenger traffic, as measured by receipts therefrom, was much below
the average month of the year while freight traffic was far above the
average. The November receipts from passengers amounted to only 21.5
per cent. of total receipts, the lowest relation shown for any month
in the year. Of course, under these conditions passenger expenses were
curtailed and freight expenses relatively enhanced. Certainly the use
of data resulting from these abnormal relations could not possibly
produce results fairly typical of a normal period, that is of a whole
year. The results so obtained must have diminished the apparent cost
of the passenger train services below the true cost, by just as much
as the figures for November were below the average figures of the
year.
These considerations fully establish the truth that, if every other
feature of Document No. 105 were absolutely beyond criticism, the fact
that it rests wholly upon estimates based upon data for the single
month of November would render its conclusions illusory, misleading
and seriously prejudicial to the railways.
VIII. A COMMISSION OF SENATORS AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHICH, BETWEEN
1898 AND 1901, MOST FULLY AND CAREFULLY INVESTIGATED THE SUBJECT,
ASCERTAINED AND DECLARED THAT RAILWAY MAIL PAY WAS NOT THEN EXCESSIVE;
SINCE THEN THERE HAVE BEEN MANY AND EXTENSIVE REDUCTIONS IN PAY
ACCOMPANIED BY SUBSTANTIAL INCREASES IN THE COST AND VALUE OF THE
SERVICES RENDERED BY THE RAILWAYS.
The Congressional Joint Commission to Investigate the Postal Service,
which reported on January 14, 1901, is authority for the fact that, at
that time, railway mail pay was not excessive. Senator William B.
Allison, of Iowa; Senator Edward S. Wolcott, of Colorado; Senator
Thomas S. Martin, of Virginia; Representative Eugene F. Loud, of
California; Representative W. H. Moody, of Massachusetts, and
Representative T. C. Catchings, of Mississippi, six of the eight
members of the Commission, then united in the following:
"Upon a careful consideration of all the evidence and the
statements and arguments submitted, and in view of all the
services rendered by the railways, we are of the opinion
that 'the prices now paid to the railroad companies for the
transportation of the mails' are not excessive, and
recommend that no reduction thereof be made at this time."
Fifty-second Congress, Second Session, Senate Document No.
89, pp. 19, 22, 25, 29.
Since the Commission reported, the volume of the American mails, the
revenue of the American postal service and its demands upon the
railways for services and facilities have greatly increased. The costs
of supplying railway transportation have also greatly increased. The
necessary cost of railway property per unit of service has increased,
and in consequence the amount required as a reasonable return thereon,
on account of higher wages and prices, the higher standards of service
demanded and the higher value of the real estate required for extended
and necessary terminal plants. Operating expenses have grown by reason
of repeated advances in rates of wages paid to employees of every
grade and increased prices of materials and supplies. Taxes have
increased with the rapidly augmenting exactions of State and local
governments and the imposition of an entirely new Federal corporation
tax.[G] Yet during this period of rapidly advancing railway expenses,
and in spite of the fact that at its commencement the railway mail pay
was not excessive, the rates of payment for railway mail services have
been subjected to repeated and drastic decreases accomplished both by
legislative action and by administrative orders. These reductions have
so much more than offset the rather doubtful advantages which the
railways might be assumed to have obtained from the increased volume
of mail traffic that in 1912 they find their mail service more
unprofitable than ever before. The following table shows the facts:
Average railway mail
Fiscal Total railway pay per $100.00 of
Year mail pay postal receipts.
1901 $38,158,969 $34.18
1904 43,971,848 30.62
1907 49,758,071 27.10
1910 49,405,311 22.04
1911 50,583,123 21.26
[Footnote G: Data indicating some of the increases in wages
and taxes are given in Appendices D and E.]
The foregoing shows that the Post Office Department expended for
railway transportation, in 1901, $34.18 in order to earn $100.00 in
gross and that by 1911 this expenditure had been reduced 37.8 per
cent. to $21.26.
This notable reduction was the consequence (first) of the operation of
the law fixing mail pay under which the average payment per unit of
service decreases as the volume of mail increases; (second) of the
Acts of Congress of March 2, 1907, and May 12, 1910, and (third) of
administrative changes effected by the Post Office Department which,
without decreasing the services required of the railways or enabling
those services to be rendered at any lower cost, greatly reduced the
payment therefor. Chief among these administrative changes was the
Postmaster-General's order known as the "Divisor" order (No. 412 of
June 7, 1907, superseding Order No. 165 of March 2, 1907) radically
lowering the basis for calculating the annual payments for
transportation. No official estimate of the reduction in the aggregate
annual payment produced by the operation of the law fixing the scheme
of payment has been made but from time to time the Department has
published estimates of the reductions otherwise effected. None of
these estimates is now up to date, and to make them comparable with
the present volume of mail substantial increases would be necessary,
but they are given below as representing an amount substantially less
than the lowest possible statement of the total present annual
reduction.
Cause of reduction Amount of annual reduction.
Natural operation of the law No estimate.
Acts of March 2, 1907, and May 12, 1910 $2,723,658.90
Withdrawal of pay for special facilities 167,005.00
Postmaster-General's divisor order 4,941,940.34
Other administrative changes 699,544.51
--------------
Total (with no allowance for the first item
above) $8,532,148.75
No one will contend for a moment that there has been any net reduction
in the cost of supplying railway mail services and facilities since
1901, the year in which the report of the Joint Commission to
Investigate the Postal Service was made. In fact, all changes in
railway operating costs, except those due to increased efficiency of
organization and management, which can have little if any effect in
connection with mail traffic, have been in the opposite direction.
During the years characterized by these reductions the railways have
been called upon continually to improve the character of their postal
service and the Post Office Department will not deny that the railways
are now rendering better, more frequent, and more expeditious postal
service than in 1901, or any intermediate year, and are doing so at
greatly increased cost to themselves.
In view of these thoroughly substantiated facts the drastic reductions
of recent years afford unanswerable proof that railway mail pay is now
too low.
IX. THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT, IN THE
LAST TWELVE YEARS, EFFECTED ANY REDUCTION IN THE ANNUAL TOTAL OF ITS
EXPENSES FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN RAILWAY TRANSPORTATION OR IN THE
PROPORTION OF ITS REVENUES REQUIRED FOR SUCH OTHER EXPENSES, BUT THE
WHOLE SAVING WHICH HAS NEARLY ELIMINATED THE ANNUAL DEFICIT OF THE
DEPARTMENT IS REPRESENTED BY THE REDUCED PAYMENTS, PER UNIT OF
SERVICE, TO THE RAILWAYS.
That the recent savings of the postal service have been wholly at the
expense of the railways is shown by the following:
1901. 1911.
Postal gross receipts $111,631,193 $237,879,823
Postal expenses, all purposes;
Total $115,554,921 $238,507,669
Per cent. of gross receipts 103.5 100.3
Railway mail pay;
Total $38,158,969 $50,583,123
Per cent. of gross receipts 34.2 21.3
Postal expenses other than
railway mail pay;
Total $77,395,952 $187,924,546
Per cent. of gross receipts 69.3 79.0
This table shows that in the ten years from 1901 to 1911 the Post
Office Department reduced its operating ratio between its total
expenses and its gross receipts from 103.5 per cent. to 100.3 per
cent., being a reduction of 3.2 points; but it also shows that this
improvement was due solely to the fact that the ratio of railway mail
pay expenses to gross receipts was reduced from 34.2 per cent. to 21.3
per cent., a reduction of 12.9 points, while the ratio of all other
expenses to gross receipts increased from 69.3 per cent. to 79 per
cent., an increase of 9.7 points. Thus the improvement of 3.2 points
in the ratio for all expenses was due entirely to the greatly reduced
ratio of railway mail pay, the heavy reduction in that respect
exceeding by 3.2 points the very substantial increase in the ratio of
all other expenses.
During the ten years from 1901 to 1911 the Department took up an
enormous increase in business at a greatly decreased cost for railway
transportation and at a largely increased cost for other purposes. It
cost the Department, for purposes other than railway transportation,
nearly nine-tenths of $126,248,630 to add that amount to its gross
receipts (although for these other purposes it had previously spent
less than seven-tenths of its gross receipts) while it required less
than one-tenth of the same sum to pay for the added railway
transportation that the new business required (although at the
beginning of the period railway transportation had cost more than
one-third of the gross receipts). This startling comparison fully
warrants the conclusion that the power of Congress and the Department
has been exercised to force upon the railways, by reducing the
payments for their services, the burden not only of the effort to
eliminate the annual postal deficit but of considerable increases in
other forms of postal expenditure. No reference to rural free delivery
will serve to explain away the conclusion suggested by this comparison
especially since only a fraction of the cost of that service
represents really an additional net outlay. This service has permitted
a reduction of one-third in the number of post offices and has been in
many cases substituted for star route service and the savings thus
permitted ought to be credited to it before determining its cost.
That increases in postal expenditures were necessary, between 1901 and
1911, is not denied. The period was one in which steady and extensive
increases in the cost of living made necessary considerable increases
in the salaries of postal employees and in the cost of postal
supplies, precisely as the railways were impelled to increase the
salaries and wages of their employees and were obliged to pay higher
prices for their supplies. In other words, the purchasing power of the
American dollar, and of standard money everywhere, greatly decreased
and this decrease affected the Post Office Department as it has
affected every business undertaking. But the purchasing power of the
railway dollar decreased exactly as that of all other dollars and it
was unreasonable and unjust that while this change was in progress,
the losses which it entailed in the postal service of the Government
should be shifted, as it has been shown that they were, to the
railways which were, at the same time, suffering far greater losses
from the same cause.
X. THE CONTINUOUS REFUSAL OF THE POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT TO ORDER
REWEIGHINGS OF THE MAILS EXCEPT AFTER THE MAXIMUM INTERVAL OF FOUR
YEARS WHICH THE LAW ALLOWS, THE DEMANDS FOR STATION AND TERMINAL
SERVICES THAT ARE RENDERED WITHOUT ANY OR WITHOUT ADEQUATE
COMPENSATION AND THE UNJUST DISCRIMINATION AGAINST COMPARTMENT CARS
USED AS RAILWAY POST OFFICES ARE ALL ABUSES, SERIOUSLY INJURIOUS TO
THE RAILWAYS, WHICH HAVE GROWN UP UNDER THE PRESENT SYSTEM OF PAYMENT
AND OUGHT AT ONCE TO BE REMEDIED.
In addition to the inadequacies in the rates of pay provided under the
present law, which result in payments that do not leave any balance
for taxes or return upon property and indeed do not even meet
operating expenses, there are certain conditions which have grown up
in the application of the existing basis of pay that ought to be
rectified. This is especially necessary in view of the tendency,
herein shown, of the Post Office Department to apply the system so as
to reduce its expense for railway transportation, and to look to this
item as the chief or sole source of economies.
The transportation pay received for each railway route is determined,
under the practice of the Department, for a period of four years on
the basis of the average daily weight carried during a period of about
three months duration prior to the beginning of the period for which
it is fixed. Thus, by the terms of the law, the Government upholds the
principle that weight should be the basis of payment but, by an
inconsistent practice, denies that principle and creates a condition
under which it is practically certain that the weight actually carried
will differ materially from the weight paid for. Congress, surely,
never intended this result for the provision of law is, merely, that
the mail shall be weighed "not less frequently" than once in four
years and clearly implies an intention that it should be weighed
whenever a substantial change in volume has taken place. But the Post
Office Department controls, subject to the provision of law, the
frequency of the weighings, and naturally seeks those reductions in
its expenses which can be effected without loss anywhere except in
railway revenues. Consequently, it long ago ceased to order new
weighings, except when compelled to do so by the expiration of the
statutory limit. It thus happens that while the railways are paid on
the basis of a certain average daily weight they are frequently
carrying a much greater weight and with no compensation whatever for
the increase in the weight. In other instances the change is in the
opposite direction but with increasing national population and wealth
it is obvious that most of these changes must be to the injury of the
railways. However, the element of uncertainty thus introduced into
each contract is unbusinesslike and in fairness to both parties ought
to be removed. No railway would make a four years' contract to carry,
for a definite sum, the unlimited output of any manufacturing plant
and if it attempted to do so the contract would be void under the
Interstate Commerce law. The terms of the mail contracts are
substantially dictated by the Postmaster-General and by Congress and
the latter ought, in justice both to the railways and to the
Government, to require the former to make annual weighings in order
that the scheme of payment provided in the law may be fairly and
accurately applied.
Railways are required to transfer the mails between their stations and
all post offices not more than a quarter of a mile distant from the
former and, at the election of the Post Office Department, to make
similar transfers at terminals. For the former no compensation is
accorded, and for the latter the allowances are inadequate. There are
numerous instances in which these extra services require expenditures,
on the part of the railways concerned, that exceed the total
compensation of the mail routes on which they occur. The extent of
these requirements in particular cases is largely subject to the will
of the Department and this produces unreasonable uncertainties as to
what may be demanded during the life of any contract. The basis of
payment plainly does not contemplate such services, they are a
survival from the period when the mails were carried by stage-coaches,
which could readily deviate these distances from their ordinary
routes, and it is clear that the Government ought to perform these
services itself or reasonably compensate the railways therefor.
Much of the mail moved by the railways is carried in cars especially
equipped as traveling post offices in order that it may be accompanied
by postal clerks who perform, on the journey, precisely the labor
which they would otherwise perform in local post offices. Cars so used
can be but lightly loaded and are costly to supply, to equip, to
maintain and to move. Their use has greatly increased the efficiency
of the postal service and vastly expedited the handling of the mails.
In the infancy of this service Congress provided for additional
payments for the full cars so required, but when the practice of
requiring portions of cars for the same identical purpose was
inaugurated no provision for paying for them was made and this
condition never has been corrected. Even in Document No. 105, the
injustice of this situation is recognized (page 3) and the
Postmaster-General asserts that it is a purely arbitrary
discrimination and without logical basis. Obviously a reasonable
allowance for apartment cars ought to be made.
XI. THE POSTMASTER-GENERAL'S PROPOSED PLAN OF PAYMENT BASED UPON
OPERATING COST AND TAXES, TO BE ASCERTAINED BY THE POST OFFICE
DEPARTMENT, PLUS SIX PER CENT. IS SERIOUSLY WRONG IN PRINCIPLE AND
WOULD ENCOURAGE AND PERPETUATE INJUSTICE.
The foregoing discussion makes plain the error and injustice in the
Postmaster-General's proposal to pay the railways for carrying the
mail upon the basis of returning to them the operating expenses and
taxes, as ascertained by the Post Office Department, attributable to
the carriage of the mails, plus six per cent. of the sum of these
expenses and taxes.
The discussion under heading III above demonstrates that the plan
leaves out of consideration any allowance for return upon the property
and would be destructive of the universally recognized rights of the
railroad companies.
Furthermore, such a plan is fundamentally erroneous because it
involves paying the highest rates to the railroad that by reason of
physical disabilities or inefficient methods is most expensively
operated and the lowest rates to the railroad which, by reason of the
highest efficiency, operates at the lowest cost. A railroad's superior
operating efficiency is frequently due to exceptionally heavy capital
expenditures to obtain low grades, two, three or four main tracks, and
to improve in other respects the roadbed and tracks to the end that
trains may be hauled at the lowest expense. Such a railroad needs, and
is entitled to sufficient net earnings to enable it to pay a proper
return upon the increased value which is due to such expenditures. But
under the Postmaster-General's plan, a railroad would be penalized for
all the capital expenditures made by it for the purpose of decreasing
its operating cost, because the more it decreased its operating cost
the more it would decrease its mail pay.
The ascertainment of the cost to a railroad of conducting mail service
is necessarily very largely a matter of judgment and opinion, because
a large proportion of the total operating expenses are common to the
freight and passenger traffic and can only be approximately
apportioned. There is room for a very wide discretion in the making of
such apportionments. It would not be right or proper to entrust the
Post Office Department with the discretion of making such
apportionment, because the Post Office Department has an obvious
interest at stake, its object always being to reduce the railroad pay
to a minimum.
The last preceding statement is fully justified by the facts disclosed
by the foregoing pages, which show how consistently the Post Office
Department has relied upon reductions in railway mail pay as the ever
available source of desired curtailments of expenses and how
unsuccessfully the railways have resisted this persistent pressure.
They show that successive Postmasters-General have taken advantage of
every legal possibility, such as taking the longest time between mail
weighings which the law permits and the strained interpretation of the
statute fixing the basis of payment (page 19), in order to effect
reductions in railway mail pay. Consequently, the facts point
irresistibly to one conclusion, namely, that the Post Office
Department is a bureaucratic entity with an interest in the reduction
of the amounts paid to the railways that is incompatible with an
impartial ascertainment of what is fair compensation. This interest,
coupled with the brief tenure of the responsible officers of the
Department, must always incline the latter to support insufficient
standards of mail pay and prevent their recognizing the ultimate
necessity of paying fairly for efficient service. It would, therefore,
be clearly inexpedient and strikingly unjust to place railway mail
revenues wholly at the mercy of the Department by enacting a law which
would authorize each Postmaster-General to fix railway mail pay on the
basis of his own inquiries and opinions in a field in which so much
must be left to estimate and approximation as that of the relative or
actual cost of the different kinds of railway service.
It is conceded that every railway mail contract is between the
Government, which is the sovereign, and a citizen, and that the nature
and terms of the contract are always substantially to be dictated by
the former. But this very condition invokes the principle of primary
justice, that the sovereign shall take care to exercise its power
without oppression. To this end the determination of the terms on
which the Post Office Department may have the essential services of
the railways ought to be reserved, as at least partially in the past,
to the Congress, or, if delegated at all, they should be entrusted to
some bureau or agency of Government not directly and immediately
interested in reducing railway mail pay below a just and reasonable
compensation.
APPENDIX A.
EXTRACTS FROM THE POSTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS.
"Railroad companies, at stations where transfer clerks are employed,
will provide suitable and sufficient rooms for handling and storing
the mails, and without specific charge therefor. These rooms will be
lighted, heated, furnished, supplied with ice water, and kept in order
by the railroad company." Section 1186, second paragraph.
"The specific requirements of the service as to ... space required ...
at stations, fixtures, furniture, etc., will at all times be
determined by the Post Office Department and made known through the
General Superintendent of Railway Mail Service." Section 1186, third
paragraph.
"Railroad companies will require their employees who handle the mails
to keep a record of all pouches due to be received or dispatched by
them, and to check the pouches at the time they are received or
dispatched, except that no record need be kept of a single pouch from
a train or station to the post office or from the post office to a
train or station which, in regular course, is the only pouch in the
custody of the company's employees at that point while it is being
handled by them. This is not to be construed as relieving railroad
companies from having employees on trains keep and properly check a
record of all closed pouches handled by them, without exception."
Section 1187, first paragraph.
"In case of failure to receive any pouch due, a shortage slip should
be made out, explaining cause of failure, and forwarded in lieu of the
missing pouch. Specific instructions in regard to the use of shortage
slips will be given by the General Superintendent of Railway Mail
Service." Section 1187, second paragraph.
"Every irregularity in the receipt and dispatch of mail should be
reported by the employee to his superintendent promptly, and if a
probable loss of or damage to mail is involved, or if the cause of
failure to receive a pouch is not known, the report should be made by
wire, and the superintendent will notify the division superintendent
of Railway Mail Service without delay. A copy of the employee's report
should be attached to and become a part of the permanent pouch
record." Section 1187, third paragraph.
"Train pouch records will be kept on file at the headquarters of
division superintendents of railroad companies for at least one year
immediately following the date the mail covered by them was handled,
and shall be accessible there to post office inspectors and other
agents of the Post Office Department. Station pouch records will be
kept on file at the station to which they apply for at least one year
immediately following the date the mail covered by them was handled,
and shall be accessible there to post office inspectors and other
agents of the Post Office Department." Section 1187, fourth paragraph.
"Railroad companies will require their employees to submit pouch
records for examination to post office inspectors and other duly
accredited agents of the Post Office Department upon their request and
exhibition of credentials to such employees." Section 1187, fifth
paragraph.
"Every railroad company is required to take the mails from, and
deliver them into, all terminal post offices, whatever may be the
distance between the station and post office, except in cities where
other provision for such service is made by the Post Office
Department. In all cases where the Department has not made other
provision, the distance between terminal post office and nearest
station is computed in, and paid for, as part of the route." Section
1191, first paragraph.
"The railroad company must also take the mails from and deliver them
into all intermediate post offices and postal stations located not
more than eighty rods from the nearest railroad station at which the
company has an agent or other representative employed, and the company
shall not be relieved of such duty on account of the discontinuance of
an agency without thirty days' notice to the Department." Section
1191, second paragraph.
"At connecting points where railroad stations are not over eighty rods
apart a company having mails on its train to be forwarded by the
connecting train will be required to transfer such mails and deliver
them into the connecting train, or, if the connection is not
immediate, to deliver them to the agent of the company to be properly
dispatched by the trains of said company." Section 1192.
"At places where railroad companies are required to take the mails
from and deliver them into post offices or postal stations or to
transfer them to connecting railroads, the persons employed to perform
such service are agents of the companies and not employees of the
postal service, and need not be sworn; but such persons must be more
than sixteen years old and of suitable intelligence and character.
Postmasters will promptly report any violation of this requirement."