Jena was one of Napoleon’s most decisive fields. There, in the conflict
of a day, Prussia, who had dared to defy a power which had brought
Austria and Russia to the dust, was completely annihilated. There the
descendants of the great Frederick reaped the bitter consequences of his
weak presumption. At Jena, the valley of the Saale begins to widen. The
right bank is low, damp and covered with meadows. The left bank presents
steep heights, whose peaked tops overlook the town of Jena, and are
ascended by narrow, winding ravines, overhung with wood. On the left of
Jena, a gorge more open, less abrupt, called the Muhlthal, has become
the passage through which the high road from Jena to Weimar has been
carried. This road first keeps along the bottom of the Muhlthal, then
rises in form of a spiral staircase, and opens upon the plateaux in
rear. It would have required a fierce assault to force this pass.
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[Illustration: NAPOLEON AT JENA. Page 186.]
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The principal of the heights that overlook the town of Jena is called
Landgrafenberg, and, since the memorable events of which it has been the
theatre, it has received from the inhabitants the name of Napoleonsberg.
It is the highest in these parts. Napoleon and Lannes, surveying from
that height the surrounding country, with their backs turned to Jena,
beheld on their right the Saale running in a deep, winding, wooded
gorge, to Naumburg, which is six or seven leagues from Jena. Before them
they saw undulated plateaux, extending to a distance, and subsiding by a
gentle slope to the little valley of the Ilm, at the extremity of which
is situated the town of Weimar. They perceived on their left the high
road from Jena to Weimar, rising by a series of slopes from the gorge of
the Muhlthal to these plateaux, and running in a straight line to
Weimar. These slopes, somewhat resembling a sort of snail’s shell, have
thence received in German the appellation of the _Schneeke_ (snail.)
It was in September, 1806, that Napoleon, having set all his divisions
in motion, left Paris and put himself at the head of his grand army. The
Prussians were superior in numbers, well disciplined, and full of
spirit. They numbered between one hundred and thirty thousand and one
hundred and forty thousand men. The cavalry especially, bore a high
reputation, which, however, as we shall see, it could not sustain. The
French Emperor had an army of one hundred and seventy thousand men in
the field, with a power of concentrating one hundred thousand of them
within a few hours.
On learning that the Prussian army was changing its position and
advancing from Erfurt upon Weimar, with a view to approach the banks of
the Saale, Napoleon manœuvred to meet the changes of the enemy.
They might be coming thither with one of the two following intentions:
either to occupy the bridge over the Saale at Naumburg, over which
passes the great central road of Germany, in order to retire upon the
Elbe, while covering Leipzig and Dresden; or to approach the course of
the Saale, for the purpose of defending its banks against the French. To
meet this double contingency, Napoleon took a first precaution, which
was to dispatch Marshal Davoust immediately to Naumburg, with orders to
bar the passage of the bridge there with the twenty-six thousand men of
the third corps. He sent Murat, with the cavalry, along the banks of the
Saale, to watch its course, and to push reconnoisances as far as
Leipzig. He directed Marshal Bernadette upon Naumburg, with instructions
to support Marshal Davoust in case of need. He sent Marshals Lannes and
Augereau to Jena itself. His object was to make himself master
immediately of the two principal passages of the Saale, those at
Naumburg and Jena, either to stop the Prussian army there, if it should
design to cross and to retire to the Elbe, or to go and seek it on the
heights bordering that river, if it purposed to remain there on the
defensive. As for himself, he continued with Marshals Ney and Soult,
within reach of Naumburg and Jena, ready to march for either point
according to circumstances.
On the morning of the 13th, he learned by more circumstantial accounts
that the enemy was definitively approaching the Saale, with the yet
uncertain resolution of fighting a defensive battle on its banks, or of
crossing and pushing on to the Elbe. It was in the direction from Weimar
to Jena that the largest assemblage appeared. Without losing a moment,
Napoleon mounted his horse to proceed to Jena. He gave himself his
instructions to Marshals Soult and Ney, and enjoined them to be at Jena
in the evening, or at latest in the night. He directed Murat to bring
his cavalry towards Jena, and Marshal Bernadotte to take at Dornburg an
intermediate position between Jena and Naumburg. He set out immediately,
sending officers to stop all troops on march to Gera, and to make them
turn back for Jena.
In the evening of the preceding day, Marshal Davoust had entered
Naumburg, occupied the bridge of the Saale, and taken considerable
magazines, with a fine bridge equipage. Marshal Bernadotte had joined
him. Murat had sent his light cavalry as far as Leipzig, and surprised
the gates of that great commercial city. Lannes had proceeded towards
Jena, a small university town, seated on the very banks of the Saale,
and had driven back pell-mell the enemy’s troops left beyond the river,
as well as the baggage, which encumbered the road. He had taken
possession of Jena, and immediately pushed his advanced posts upon the
heights which command it. From these heights he had perceived the army
of the Prince of Hohenlohe, which, after recrossing the Saale, encamped
between Jena and Weimar, and he had reason to suspect that a great
assemblage was collecting in that place.
Napoleon had arrived at Jena on the afternoon of the 13th of October.
Marshal Lannes, who had outstripped him, was waiting for him with
impatience, like that of a war-horse, snuffing the battle. Both mounted
their horses to reconnoitre the localities. We have described the ground
upon which the battle was fought. The Prussians were posted on the
heights which overlook the town of Jena. The French were coming up on
the low ground on the opposite side of the river. The chief difficulty
was to reach the Prussians. There was but one method that appeared
practicable. The bold tirailleurs of Lannes, entering the ravines which
are met with on going out of Jena, had succeeded in ascending the
principal eminence, and all at once perceived the Prussian army encamped
on the plateaux of the left bank. Followed presently by some detachments
of Suchet’s division, they had made room for themselves by driving in
General Tauenzien’s advanced posts. Thus by force of daring, the heights
which commanded the left bank of the Saale were gained; but by a route
which was scarcely practicable to artillery. Thither, Lannes conducted
the emperor, amidst an incessant fire of tirailleurs which rendered
reconnoisance extremely dangerous.
Napoleon, having before him a mass of troops, the force of which could
scarcely be estimated, supposed that the Prussian army had chosen this
ground for a field of battle, and immediately made his dispositions, so
as to debouch with his army on the Landgrafenberg, before the enemy
should hasten up, _en masse_, to hurl him into the precipices of the
Saale. He was obliged to make the best use of his time, and to take
advantage of the space gained by the tirailleurs to establish himself on
the height. He had, it is true, no more of it than the summit, for, only
a few paces off, there was the corps of General Tauenzien, separated
from the French only by a slight ridge of ground. This corps was
stationed near two villages, one on the right, that of Closewitz,
surrounded by a small wood, the other on the left, that of Cospoda,
likewise surrounded by a wood of some extent. Napoleon purposed to leave
the Prussians quiet in this position till the next day, and meanwhile to
lead part of his army up the Landgrafenberg. The space which it occupied
was capable of containing the corps of Lannes and the guard. He ordered
them to be led up immediately through the steep ravines which serve to
ascend from Jena to the Landgrafenberg. On the left, he placed Gazan’s
division. On the right, Suchet’s division; in the centre, and a little
in rear, the foot-guard. He made the latter encamp in a square of four
thousand men, and in the centre of this square he established his own
bivouac.
But it was not enough to bring infantry upon the Landgrafenberg—it was
necessary to mount artillery too upon it. Napoleon, riding about in all
directions, discovered a passage less steep than the others, and by
which the artillery might be dragged up with great exertion. Unluckily,
the way was too narrow. Napoleon sent forthwith for a detachment of the
engineers, and had it widened by cutting the rock; he himself, in his
impatience, directed the works, torch in hand. He did not retire till
the night was far advanced, when he had seen the first pieces of cannon
rolled up. It required twelve horses to drag each gun-carriage to the
top of the Landgrafenberg. Napoleon purposed to attack General Tauenzien
at day-break, and, by pushing him briskly, to conquer the space
necessary for deploying his army. Fearful, however, of debouching by a
single outlet, wishing also to divide the attention of the enemy, he
directed Augereau towards the left, to enter the gorge of the Muhlthal,
to march one of his two divisions upon the Weimar road, and to gain with
the other the back of the Landgrafenberg, in order to fall upon the rear
of General Tauenzien. On the right, he ordered Marshal Soult, whose
corps, breaking up from Gera, was to arrive in the night, to ascend the
other ravines, which, running from Lobstedt and Dornburg, debouch upon
Closewitz, likewise for the purpose of falling upon the rear of General
Tauenzien. With this double diversion, on the right and on the left,
Napoleon had no doubt of forcing the Prussians in their position, and
gaining for himself the space needed by his army for deploying. Marshals
Ney and Murat were to ascend the Landgrafenberg by the route Lannes and
the guard had followed.
The day of the 13th had closed; profound darkness enveloped the field of
battle. Napoleon had placed his tent in the centre of the square formed
by his guard, and had suffered only a few fires to be lighted; but all
those of the Prussian army were kindled. The fires of the Prince of
Hohenlohe were to be seen over the whole extent of the plateaux, and at
the horizon on the right, topped by the old castle of Eckartsberg, those
of the army of the Duke of Brunswick, which had all at once become
visible for Napoleon. He conceived that, so far from retiring, the whole
of the Prussian forces had come to take part in the battle. He sent
immediately fresh orders to Marshals Davoust and Bernadotte. He enjoined
Marshal Davoust to guard strictly the bridge of Naumburg, even to cross
it, if possible, and to fall upon the rear of the Prussians, while they
were engaged in front. He ordered Marshal Bernadotte, placed
immediately, to concur in the projected movement, either by joining
Marshal Davoust, if he was near the latter, or by throwing himself
directly on the flank of the Prussians, if he had already taken at
Dornburg a position nearer to Jena. Lastly, he desired Murat to arrive
as speedily as possible with his cavalry.
While Napoleon was making these dispositions, the Prince of Hohenlohe
was in complete ignorance of the lot which awaited him. Still persuaded
that the bulk of the French army, instead of halting before Jena, was
hurrying to Leipzig and Dresden, he supposed that he should at most have
to deal with the corps of Marshals Lannes and Augereau, which, having
passed the Saale, would, he imagined, make their appearance between Jena
and Weimar, as if they had descended from the heights of the forest of
Thuringia. Under this idea, not thinking of making front towards Jena,
he had on that side opposed only the corps of General Tauenzien, and
ranged his army along the road from Jena to Weimar. His left, composed
of Saxons, guarded the summit of the Schnecke; his right extended to
Weimar, and connected itself with General Ruchel’s corps. However, a
fire of tirailleurs, which was heard on the Landgrafenberg, having
excited a sort of alarm, and General Tauenzien applying for succor, the
Prince of Hohenlohe ordered the Saxon brigade of Cerini, the Prussian
brigade of Sanitz, and several squadrons of cavalry, to get under arms,
and dispatched these forces to the Landgrafenberg, to dislodge from it
the French, whom he conceived to be scarcely established on that point.
At the moment when he was about to execute this resolution, Colonel de
Massenbach brought him from the Duke of Brunswick a reiterated order not
to involve himself in any serious action, to guard well the passages of
the Saale, and particularly that of Dornburg, which excited uneasiness
because some light troops had been perceived there. The Prince of
Hohenlohe, who had become one of the most obedient of lieutenants when
he ought not to have been so, desisted at once, in compliance with these
injunctions from the head-quarters. It was singular, nevertheless, that
in obeying the order not to fight, he should abandon the _debouche_ by
which, on the morrow, a disastrous battle was to be forced upon him. Be
this as it may, relinquishing the idea of retaking the Landgrafenberg,
he contented himself with sending the Saxon brigade of Cerini to General
Tauenzien, and with placing at Nerkwitz, facing Dornburg, the Prussian
brigade of Schemmelpfennig, lastly several detachments of cavalry and
artillery, under the command of General Holzendorf. He sent some light
horse to Dornburg itself, to learn what was passing there. The Prince of
Hohenlohe confined himself to these dispositions: he returned to his
head-quarters at Capellendorf.
Napoleon, stirring before daylight, gave his last instructions to his
lieutenants, and orders for his soldiers to get under arms. The night
was cold, the country covered to a distance with a thick fog, like that
which for some hours enveloped the field of Austerlitz. Escorted by men
carrying torches, Napoleon went along the front of the troops, talking
to the officers and soldiers. He explained the position of the two
armies, demonstrated to them that the Prussians were as deeply
compromised as the Austrians in the preceding year; that, if vanquished
in that engagement, they would be cut off from the Elbe and the Oder,
separated from the Russians, and forced to abandon to the French the
whole Prussian monarchy; that, in such a situation, the French corps
which should suffer itself to be beaten would frustrate the grandest
designs, and disgrace itself for ever. He exhorted them to keep on their
guard against the Prussian cavalry, and to receive it in square with
their usual firmness. His words everywhere drew forth shouts of
“Forward! _vive l’Empereur!_” Though the fog was thick, yet through its
veil the enemy’s advanced posts perceived the glare of the torches,
heard the acclamations of the French, and went to give the alarm to
General Tauenzien. At that moment, the corps of Lannes set itself in
motion, on a signal from Napoleon. Suchet’s division, formed into three
brigades, advanced first. Claparede’s brigade, composed of the 17th
light infantry, and a battalion of _elite_, marched at the head,
deployed in a single line. On the wings of this line, and to preserve it
from attacks of cavalry, the 34th and 40th regiments, forming the second
brigade, were disposed in close column, Vedel’s brigade, deployed,
closed this sort of square. On the left of Suchet’s division, but a
little in rear, came Gazan’s division, ranged in two lines and preceded
by its artillery. Thus they advanced, groping their way through the fog.
Suchet’s division directed its course towards the village of Closewitz,
which was on the right, Gazan’s division towards the village of Cospoda,
which was on the left. The Saxon battalions of Frederick Augustus and
Rechten, and the Prussian battalion of Zweifel, perceiving through the
fog a mass in motion, fired all together. The 17th light infantry
sustained that fire, and immediately returned it. This fire of musketry
was kept up for a few minutes, the parties seeing the flash and hearing
the report, but not discerning one another. The French, on approaching,
at length discovered the little wood which surrounded the village of
Closewitz. General Claparede briskly threw himself into it, and, after a
fight hand to hand, had soon carried it, as well as the village of
Closewitz itself. Having deprived General Tauenzien’s line of this
support, the French continued their march amidst the balls that issued
from that thick fog. Gazan’s division, on its part, took the village of
Cospoda, and established itself there. Between these two villages, but a
little farther off, was a small hamlet, that of Lutzenrode, occupied by
Erichsen’s fusiliers. Gazan’s division carried that also, and was then
able to deploy more at its ease.
At this moment the two divisions of Lannes were assailed by fresh
discharges of artillery and musketry. These were from the Saxon
grenadiers of the Cerini brigade, who, after taking up the advanced
posts of General Tauenzien, continued to move forward, firing battalion
volleys with as much precision as if they had been at a review. The 17th
light infantry, which formed the head of Suchet’s division, having
exhausted its cartridges, was sent to the rear. The 34th took its place,
kept up the fire for some time, then encountered the Saxon grenadiers
with the bayonet, and broke them. The route having soon extended to the
whole corps of General Tauenzien. Gazan’s and Suchet’s divisions picked
up about twenty pieces of cannon and many fugitives. From the
Landgrafenberg, the undulated plateaux, on which the French had just
deployed, gradually subsided to the little valley of the Ilm. Hence they
marched rapidly upon sloping ground, to the heels of a fleeing enemy. In
this quick movement they encountered two battalions of Cerini, and also
Pelet’s fusiliers, which had been left in the environs of Closewitz.
These troops were flung back for the rest of the day towards General
Holzendorf, commissioned on the preceding day to guard the _debouche_ of
Dornburg.
This action had not lasted two hours. It was nine o’clock, and Napoleon
had thus early realized the first part of his plan, which consisted in
gaining the space necessary for deploying his army. At the same moment
his instructions were executed at all points with remarkable
punctuality. Towards the left, Marshal Augereau, having sent off
Heudelet’s division, and likewise his artillery and cavalry, to the
extremity of the Muhlthal, on the high road from Weimar, was climbing
with Desjardin’s divisions, the back of the Landgrafenberg, and coming
to form on the plateaux to the left of Gazan’s division. Marshal Soult,
only one of whose divisions, that of General St. Hilaire, had arrived,
was ascending from Lobstedt, in the rear of Closewitz, facing the
positions of Nerkwitz and Alten-Krone, occupied by the relics of
Tauenzien’s corps and by the detachment of General Holzendorf. Marshal
Ney, impatient to share in the battle, had detached from his corps a
battalion of voltigeurs, a battalion of grenadiers, the 25th light
infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and had gone on before with this
body of _elite_. He entered Jena at the very hour when the first act of
the engagement was over. Lastly, Murat, returning at a gallop, with the
dragoons and cuirassiers, from reconnoisances executed on the Lower
Saale, was mounting in breathless haste towards Jena. Napoleon resolved,
therefore, to halt for a few moments on the conquered ground, to afford
his troops time to get into line.
Meanwhile, the fugitives belonging to General Tauenzien’s force had
given the alarm to the whole camp of the Prussians. At the sound of the
cannon, the Prince of Hohenlohe had hastened to the Weimar road, where
the Prussian infantry was encamped, not yet believing the action to be
general, and complaining that the troops were harassed by being obliged
needlessly to get under arms. Being soon undeceived, he took his
measures for giving battle. Knowing that the French had passed the Saale
at Saalfeld, he had expected to see them make their appearance between
Jena and Weimar, and had drawn up his army along the road running from
one to the other of these towns. As this conjuncture was not realized,
he was obliged to change his dispositions, and he did it with promptness
and resolution. He sent the bulk of the Prussian infantry, under the
command of General Grawert, to occupy the positions abandoned by General
Tauenzien. Towards the Schnecke, which was to form his right, he left
the Niesemuchel division, composed of the two Saxon brigades of
Burgsdorf and Nehroff, of the Prussian Boguslawski battalion, and of a
numerous artillery, with orders to defend to the last extremity the
winding slopes by which the Weimar road rises to the plateaux. To aid
them, he gave them the Cerini brigade, rallied and reinforced by four
Saxon battalions. In rear of his centre, he placed a reserve of five
battalions under General Dyherrn, to support General Grawert. He had the
wrecks of Tauenzien’s corps rallied at some distance from the field of
battle, and supplied with ammunition. As for his left, he directed
General Holzendorf to push forward, if he could, and to fall upon the
right of the French, while he would himself endeavor to stop them in
front. He sent General Ruchel information of what was passing, and
begged him to hasten his march. Lastly, he hurried off himself with the
Prussian cavalry and the artillery horses, to meet the French, for the
purpose of keeping them in check and covering the formation of General
Grawert’s infantry.
It was about ten o’clock, and the action of the morning, interrupted for
an hour, was about to begin again with greater violence, while, on the
right, Marshal Soult, debouching from Lobstedt, was climbing the heights
with St. Hilaire’s division; while in the centre Marshal Lannes, with
Suchet’s and Gazan’s divisions, was deploying on the plateaux won in the
morning; and while, on the left, Marshal Augereau, ascending from the
bottom of the Muhlthal, had reached the village of Iserstedt, Marshal
Ney, in his ardour for fighting, had advanced with his three thousand
men of the _elite_, concealed by the fog, and had placed himself between
Lannes and Augereau, facing the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, which
occupied the centre of the field of battle. He arrived at the very
moment when the Prince of Hohenlohe was hastening up at the head of the
Prussian cavalry. Finding himself all at once facing the enemy, he
engaged before the Emperor had given orders for renewing the action. The
horse artillery of the Prince of Hohenlohe having already placed itself
in battery, Ney pushed the 10th chasseurs upon this artillery. This
regiment, taking advantage of a clump of trees to form, dashed forward
on the gallop, ascended by its right upon the flank of the Russian
artillery, cut down the gunners, and took seven pieces of cannon, under
the fire of the whole line of the enemy. But a mass of Prussian
cuirassiers rushed upon it, and he was obliged to retire with
precipitation. Ney then dispatched the 3d hussars. This regiment,
manœuvring as the 10th chasseurs had done, took advantage of the
clump of trees to form, ascended upon the flank of the cuirassiers, then
fell upon them suddenly, threw them into disorder, and forced them to
retire. Two regiments of light cavalry, however, were not enough to make
head against thirty squadrons of dragoons and cuirassiers. The chasseurs
and hussars were soon obliged to seek shelter behind the infantry.
Marshal Ney then sent forward the battalion of grenadiers and the
battalion of voltigeurs which he had brought, formed two squares, then
placing himself in one of them, opposed the charges of the Prussian
cavalry. He allowed the enemy’s cuirassiers to approach within twenty
paces of his bayonets, and terrified them by the aspect of a motionless
infantry which had reserved its fire. At his signal, a discharge within
point-blank range strewed the ground with dead and wounded. Though
several times assailed, these two squares remained unbroken.
Napoleon, on the top of the Landgrafenberg, had been highly astonished
to hear the firing recommence without his order. He learned with still
more astonishment that Marshal Ney, whom he had supposed to be in the
rear, was engaged with the Prussians. He hastened up greatly displeased,
and on approaching Vierzehn-Heiligen, perceived from the height Marshal
Ney defending himself, in the middle of two weak squares, against the
whole of the Prussian cavalry. This heroic demonstration was enough to
dispel all displeasure. Napoleon sent General Bertrand with two
regiments of light cavalry, all that he had at hand, in the absence of
Murat, to assist in extricating Ney, and ordered Lannes to advance with
his infantry. During the time that elapsed before relief arrived, the
intrepid Ney was not disconcerted. While, with four regiments of horse,
he renewed his charges of cavalry, he moved the 25th infantry to his
left, in order to station himself on the wood of Iserstedt, which
Augereau, on his part, was striving to reach; he made the battalion of
grenadiers advance as far as the little wood which had protected his
chasseurs, and dispatched the battalion of voltigeurs to gain possession
of the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen. But, at the same instant, Lannes,
coming to his assistance, threw the 21st regiment of light infantry into
the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, and, putting himself at the head of
the 100th, 103d, 34th, 64th, and 88th of the line, debouched in the face
of the Prussian infantry of General Grawert. The latter deployed before
the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, with a regularity of movement due to
long exercises. It drew up in order of battle, and opened a regular and
terrible fire of small arms. Ney’s three little detachments suffered
severely; but Lannes, ascending on the right of General Grawert’s
infantry, endeavored to turn it in spite of repeated charges of the
Prince of Hohenlohe’s cavalry, which came to attack him in his march.
The Prince of Hohenlohe bravely supported his troops amidst the danger.
The regiment of Sanitz was completely broken; he formed it anew under
the fire. He then purposed that the Zastrow regiment should retake the
village of Vierzehn-Heiligen at the point of the bayonet, hoping thereby
to decide the victory. Meanwhile he was informed that more hostile
columns began to appear; that General Holzendorf, engaged with superior
forces, was incapable of seconding him; that General Ruchel, however,
was on the point of joining him with his corps. He then judged it
expedient to wait for this powerful succor, and poured a shower of
shells into the village of Vierzehn-Heiligen, resolved to try the effect
of flames before he attacked it with his bayonets. He sent at the same
time officers to General Ruchel, to urge him to hasten up, and to
promise him the victory if he arrived in time; for, according to him,
the French were on the point of giving way. At that very hour fortune
was deciding otherwise. Augereau debouching at last from the wood of
Iserstedt with Desjardin’s division, disengaged Ney’s left, and began to
exchange a fire of musketry with the Saxons who were defending the
Schnecke, while General Heudelet attacked them in column on the high
road from Jena to Weimar. On the other side of the field of battle, the
corps of Marshal Soult, after driving the remains of the Cerini brigade,
as well as the Pelet fusiliers, out of the wood of Closewitz, and
flinging back Holzendorf’s detachment to a distance, opened its guns on
the flank of the Prussians. Napoleon, seeing the progress of his two
wings, and learning the arrival of the troops which had been left in
rear, was no longer afraid to bring into action all the forces present
on the ground, the guard included, and gave orders for advancing. An
irresistible impulse was communicated to the whole line. The Prussians
were driven back, broken, and hurled down the sloping ground which
descends from Landgrafenberg to the valley of the Ilm. The regiments of
Hohenlohe and the Hahn grenadiers, of Grawert’s division, were almost
entirely destroyed by the fire or by the bayonet. The Cerini brigade,
assailed with grape, fell back upon the Dyherrn reserve, which in vain
opposed its five battalions to the movement of the French. That reserve,
being soon left uncovered, found itself attacked, surrounded on all
sides, and forced to disperse. Tauenzien’s corps, rallied for a moment,
and brought back into the fire by the Prince of Hohenlohe, was hurried
away, like the others, in the general rout. The Prussian cavalry, taking
advantage of the absence of the heavy French cavalry, made charges to
cover its broken infantry; but the chasseurs and hussars kept it in
check; and though driven back several times, returned incessantly to the
charge. A terrible carnage followed this disorderly retreat. At every
step prisoners were made; artillery was taken by whole batteries.
In this great danger, General Ruchel at length made his appearance, but
too late. He marched in two fines of infantry, having on the left the
cavalry belonging to his corps, and on the right the Saxon cavalry,
commanded by the brave General Zeschwitz, who had come of his own accord
and taken that position. He ascended at a foot-pace those plateaux,
sloping from the Landgrafenberg to the Ilm. While mounting, Prussian and
French poured down around him like a torrent, the one pursued by the
other. He was thus met by a sort of tempest, at the moment of his
appearance on the field of battle. While he was advancing, his heart
rent with grief at this disaster, the French rushed upon him with the
impetuosity of victory. The cavalry which covered his left flank was
first dispersed. That unfortunate general, an unwise but ardent friend
of his country, was the first to oppose the shock in person. A ball
entered his chest, and he was borne off dying in the arms of his
soldiers. His infantry, deprived of the cavalry which covered it, found
itself attacked in flank by the troops of Marshal Soult, and threatened
in front by those of Marshals Lannes and Ney. The battalions placed at
the left extremity of the line, seized with terror, dispersed, and
hurried along the rest of the corps in their flight. To aggravate the
disaster, the French dragoons and cuirassiers came up at a gallop, under
the conduct of Murat, impatient to take a share in the battle. They
surrounded those hapless and dispersed battalions, cut in pieces all who
attempted to resist, and pursued the others to the banks of the Ilm,
where they made a great number of prisoners.
On the field of battle were left only the two Saxon brigades of
Burgsdorf and Nehroff, which, after honorably defending the Schnecke
against Heudelet’s and Desjardin’s division of Augereau’s corps, had
been forced in their position by the address of the French tirailleurs,
and effected their retreat, formed into two squares. These squares
presented three sides of infantry and one of artillery, the latter being
the rear side. The two Saxon brigades retired, halting alternately,
firing their guns, and then resuming their march. Augereau’s artillery
followed, sending balls after them; a swarm of French tirailleurs ran
after them, harassing them with their small arms. Murat, who had just
overthrown the relics of Ruchel’s corps, fell upon the two Saxon
brigades, and ordered them to be charged to the utmost extremity by his
dragoons and cuirassiers. The dragoons attacked first without forcing an
entrance; but they returned to the charge, penetrated and broke the
square. General d’Hatpoul, with the cuirassiers, attacked the second,
broke it, and made that havoc which a victorious cavalry inflicts on a
broken infantry. Those unfortunate men had no other resource but to
surrender. The Prussian battalion of Boguslawski was forced in its turn,
and treated like the others. The brave General Zeschwitz, who had
hastened with the Saxon cavalry to the assistance of its infantry, made
vain efforts to support it, and was driven back, and forced to give way
to the general rout.
Murat rallied his squadrons, and hastened to Weimar, to collect fresh
trophies. At some distance from that town were crowded together,
pell-mell, detachments of infantry, cavalry, artillery, at the top of a
long and steep slope, formed by the high road leading down to the bottom
of the valley of the Ilm. These troops, confusedly huddled together,
were supported upon a small wood, called the wood of Webicht. All at
once, the bright helmets of the French cavalry made their appearance. A
few musket-shots were instinctively fired by this affrighted crowd. At
this signal, the mass, seized with terror, rushed down the hill, at the
foot of which Weimar is situated: foot, horse, artillerymen, all tumbled
over one another into this gulf—a new and tremendous disaster. Murat now
sent after them a part of his dragoons, who goaded on this mob with the
points of their swords, and pursued it into the streets of Weimar. With
the others he made a circuit to the other side of Weimar, and cut off
the retreat of the fugitives, who surrendered by thousands.
Out of the seventy thousand Prussians who had appeared on the field of
battle, not a single corps remained entire, not one retreated in order.
Out of one hundred thousand French troops, composed of the corps of
Marshals Soult, Lannes, Augereau, Ney, Murat, and the guard, not more
than fifty thousand had fought, and they had been sufficient to
overthrow the Prussian army. The greater part of that army, seized with
a sort of vertigo, throwing away its arms, ceasing to know either its
colors or its officers, covered all the roads of Thuringin. About twelve
thousand Prussians and Saxons, killed and wounded, about four thousand
French killed and wounded also, strewed the ground from Jena to Weimar.
On the ground were seen stretched a great number—a greater number,
indeed, than usual—of Prussian officers, who had nobly paid for their
silly passions with their lives; Fifteen thousand prisoners, two hundred
pieces of cannon, were in the hands of the French, intoxicated with joy.
The shells of the Prussians had set fire to the town of Jena, and from
the plateaux where the battle was fought, columns of flame were seen
bursting from the dark bosom of night. French shells ploughed up the
city of Weimar, and threatened it with a similar fate. The shrieks of
fugitives while running through the streets, the tramp of Murat’s
cavalry, dashing through them at a gallop, slaughtering without mercy
all who were not quick enough in flinging down them arms, had filled
with horror that charming city—the noble asylum of letters.
At Weimar, as at Jena, part of the inhabitants had fled. The conquerors,
disposing like masters of their almost deserted towns, established their
magazines and their hospitals in the churches and public buildings.
Napoleon, on returning from Jena, directed his attention, according to
his custom, to the collecting of the wounded, and heard shouts of _Vive
l’Empereur!_ mingled with the moans of the dying.
But Napoleon knew not yet the full measure of his victory. In the course
of the day, he had heard the distant thundering of the cannon in the
direction of Naumberg, where he had posted Marshal Davoust. He had the
greatest confidence in the wisdom, valor, and inflexible resolution of
that great general, but he did not know of the immensely superior forces
the Marshal had to fight, to maintain his position. The facts were soon
learned. Marshal Davoust, with only twenty-six thousand men, had not
only sustained his position for many hours against the impetuous attack
of seventy thousand Prussians, commanded by the Duke of Brunswick, and
cheered by the presence of Frederick William himself, but had routed his
enemy, and thus achieved the victory of Auerstadt. Never had there been
a grander display of heroic firmness by general and soldiers. The
Prussians had lost three thousand prisoners, nine or ten thousand men,
killed or wounded, besides the Duke of Brunswick, Marshal Mollendorf and
General Schwettan mortally wounded, together with a prodigious number of
their gallant officers. Davoust had suffered a loss of seven thousand
men, killed or wounded, and half the generals of brigade and colonels
were placed _hors de combat_. The king was denied the consolation of his
army retreating in good order. Nearly every corps was broken and
disbanded, being seized with a panic. The roads were crowded with
fear-stricken fugitives.
During the terrible night, which followed the bloody day of Jena and
Auerstadt, the victors suffered not less than the vanquished. The night
was intensely cold, and they were obliged to bivouac on the ground,
having scarcely any thing to eat. Many of them wounded, more or less
severely, were stretched on the cold earth beside wounded enemies,
mingling their groans. Napoleon made every effort in his power to
relieve their sufferings, and many a poor soldier, almost fainting from
loss of blood, exerted his feeble strength to shout “_Vive l’Empereur!_”
But the Prussian army was annihilated. The road to Berlin was open, and
thither the French Emperor hastened, in following up his decisive
victory. A few small actions were fought and the French made thousands
of prisoners almost every day. Frederick William solicited an armistice,
but the Emperor refused to grant it for wise military reasons. He was
destined to enter the Prussian capital in triumph. Never did Europe
dread the name of Napoleon so notably as when that Prussian army, upon
which the last hope was founded, vanished before his resistless arms.
[Illustration]