The victory of Austerlitz is considered by many competent judges as the
most splendid triumph ever gained by Napoleon; and the “sun of
Austerlitz,” is a watchword with the French soldiery to the present day.
The scene of this great battle is in the vicinity of the small seignoral
town of Austerlitz, situated on the Littawa, in Moravia.
Napoleon, with that military tact which he had received from nature, and
which he had so greatly improved by experience, had adopted, among other
positions which he might have taken about Brunn, one which could not
fail to insure to him the most important results, under the supposition
that he should be attacked—a supposition which had become a certainty.
The mountains of Moravia, which connect the mountains of Bohemia with
those of Hungary, subside successively towards the Danube, so completely
that near that river Moravia presents but one wide plain. In the
environs of Brunn, the capital of the province, they are not of greater
altitude than high hills, and are covered with dark firs. Their waters,
retained for want of drains, form numerous ponds, and throw themselves
by various streams into the Morawa, or March, and by the Morawa and the
Danube.
All these characters are found together in the position between Brunn
and Austerlitz, which Napoleon has rendered forever celebrated. The high
road of Moravia, running from Vienna to Brunn, rises in a direct line to
the northward, then, in passing from Brunn to Olmutz, descends abruptly
to the right, that is to the east, thus forming a right angle with its
first direction. In the angle is situated the position in question. It
commences on the left towards the Olmutz road, with heights studded with
firs; it then runs to the right in an oblique direction towards the
Vienna road, and after subsiding gradually, terminates in ponds full of
deep water in winter. Along this position, and in front of it, runs a
rivulet, which has no name known in geography, but which, in part of its
course, is called Goldbach by the people of the country. It runs through
the little villages of Girzikowitz, Puntowitz, Kobelnitz, Sokolnitz, and
Telnitz, and, sometimes forming marshes, sometimes confined in channels,
terminates in the ponds above mentioned, which are called the ponds of
Satschau and Menitz.
Concentrated with all his forces on this ground, defended on the one
hand upon the wooded hills of Moravia, and particularly upon a rounded
knoll to which the soldiers of Egypt gave the name of the Centon,
defended on the other, upon the ponds of Satschau and Menitz—thus
covering by his left the Olmutz road, by his right the Vienna
road—Napoleon was in a condition to accept with advantage a decisive
battle. He meant not, however, to confine his operations to
self-defence, for he was accustomed to reckon upon greater results; he
had divined, as though he had read them, the plans framed at great
length by General Weirother. The Austro-Russians, having no chance of
wresting from him the _point d’appui_ which he found for his left in the
high wooded hills, would be tempted to turn his right, which was not
close to the ponds, and to take the Vienna road from him. There was
sufficient inducement for this step; for Napoleon, if he lost that road,
would have no other resource but to retire into Bohemia. The rest of his
forces, hazarded towards Vienna, would be obliged to ascend separately
the valley of the Danube. The French army, thus divided, would find
itself doomed to a retreat, eccentric, perilous, nay, even disastrous,
if it should fall in with the Prussians by the way.
Napoleon was perfectly aware that such must be the plan of the enemy.
Accordingly, after concentrating his army towards his left and the
heights, he left towards his right, that is towards Sokolnitz, Telnitz,
and the ponds, a space almost unguarded. He thus invited the Russians to
persevere in their plans. But it was not precisely there that he
prepared the mortal stroke for them. The ground facing him presented a
feature from which he hoped to derive a decisive result.
Beyond the stream that ran in front of the position, the ground spread
at first, opposite to the left, into a slightly undulated plain, through
which passed the Olmutz road; then, opposite to the centre, it rose
successively, and at last formed facing the right a plateau, called the
plateau of Pratzen, after the name of a village situated half-way up, in
the hollow of a ravine. This plateau terminated on the right in rapid
declivities towards the ponds, and at the back in a gentle slope towards
Austerlitz, the chateau of which appeared at some distance.
There were to be seen considerable forces; there a multitude of fires
blazed at night, and a great movement of men and horses was observable
by day. On these appearances, Napoleon had no longer any doubt of the
designs of the Austro-Russians. They intended evidently to descend from
the position which they occupied, and, crossing the Goldbach rivulet,
between the ponds and the French right, to cut them off from the Vienna
road. But, for this reason, it was resolved to take the offensive in
turn, to cross the rivulet at the villages of Girzikowitz and Puntowitz,
to ascend to the plateau of Pratzen while the Russians were leaving it,
and to take possession of it. In case of success, the enemy’s army would
be cut in two; one part would be thrown to the left into the plain
crossed by the Olmutz road; the other to the right into the ponds.
Thenceforward the battle could not fail to be disastrous for the
Austro-Russians. But, for this effect, it was requisite that they should
not blunder by halves. The prudent, nay even timid attitude of Napoleon,
exciting their silly confidence, would induce them to commit the entire
blunder.
Agreeably to these ideas, Napoleon made his dispositions. Expecting for
two days past to be attacked, he had ordered Bernadotte to quit Iglau on
the frontier of Bohemia, to leave there the Bavarian division which he
had brought with him, and to hasten by forced marches to Brunn. He had
ordered Marshal Davoust to march Friant’s and if possible Gudin’s
division towards the abbey of Gross Raigern, situated on the road from
Vienna to Brunn, opposite to the ponds. In consequence of these orders,
Bernadotte marched, and had arrived on the 1st of December. General
Friant, being alone apprised in time, because General Gudin was at a
greater distance towards Presburg, had set out immediately, and
travelled in forty-eight hours the thirty-six leagues which separate
Vienna from Gross Raigern. The soldiers sometimes dropped on the road,
exhausted with fatigue; but at the least sound, imagining that they
heard the cannon, they rose with ardor to hasten to the assistance of
their comrades, engaged, they said, in a bloody battle. On the night of
the 1st of December, which was extremely cold, they bivouacked at Gross
Raigern, a league and a half from the field of battle. Never did troops
on foot perform so astonishing a march; for it is a march of eighteen
leagues a day for two successive days.
On the 1st of December, Napoleon, reinforced by Bernadotte’s corps and
Friant’s division, could number sixty-five or seventy thousand men,
present under arms, against ninety thousand men, Russians and Austrians,
likewise present under arms.
At his left he placed Lannes, in whose corps Caffarelli’s division
supplied the place of Gazan’s. Lannes, with the two divisions of Suchet
and Caffarelli, was to occupy the Olmutz road, and to fight in the
undulated plain outspread on either side of that road. Napoleon gave
him, moreover, Murat’s cavalry, comprising the cuirassiers of Generals
d’Hautpoul and Nansouty, the dragoons of General Walther and Beaumont,
and the chasseurs of Generals Milhaud and Kellermann. The level surface
of the ground led him to expect a prodigious engagement of cavalry on
this spot. On the knoll of the Centon, which commands this part of the
ground, and is topped by a chapel called the chapel of Bosenitz, he
placed the 17th light artillery, commanded by General Claparede, with
eighteen pieces of cannon, and made him take an oath to defend this
position to the death.
At the centre, behind the Goldbach rivulet, he ranged Vandamme’s and St.
Hilaire’s divisions, which belong to the corps of Marshal Soult. He
destined them to cross that stream at the villages of Girzikowitz and
Puntowitz, and to gain possession of the plateau of Pratzen, when the
proper moment should arrive. A little further behind the marsh of
Kobelnitz and the chateau of Kobelnitz, he placed Marshal Soult’s third
division, that of General Legrand. He reinforced it with two battalions
of tirailleurs, known by the names of chasseurs of the Po and Corsican
chasseurs, and by a detachment of light cavalry, under General Margaron.
This division was to have only the third of the line and the Corsican
chasseurs at Telnitz, the nearest point to the ponds, and to which
Napoleon was desirous of drawing the Russians. Far in rear, at the
distance of a league and a half, was posted Friant’s division at Gross
Raigern.
Having ten divisions of infantry, Napoleon, therefore, presented but six
of them in line. Behind Marshals Lannes and Soult, he kept in reserve
Oudinot’s grenadiers, separated on this occasion from Lannes’s corps,
the corps of Bernadotte, composed of Drouet’s and Rivaud’s divisions,
and, lastly, the imperial guard. He thus kept at hand a mass of
twenty-five thousand men, to move to any point where they might be
needed, and particularly to the heights of Pratzen, in order to take
those heights at any cost, if the Russians should not have cleared them
sufficiently.
Such were the skilful dispositions of the Emperor, and having completed
what may be called the foundation of victory, he issued a confident
proclamation to his soldiers, as follows:
“Soldiers—The Russian army appears before you to avenge the Austrian
army of Ulm. They are the same battalions that you beat at Hollabrunn,
and that you have since been constantly pursuing to this spot.
“The positions which we occupy are formidable; and while they are
marching to turn my right, they will present their flank to me.
“Soldiers, I shall myself direct your battalions. I shall keep out of
the fire, if, with your usual bravery, you throw disorder and confusion
into the enemy’s ranks. But, if the victory should be for a moment
uncertain, you will see your Emperor the foremost to expose himself to
danger. For victory must not hang doubtful on this day, most
particularly, when the honor of the French infantry, which so deeply
concerns the honor of the whole nation, is at stake.
“Let not the ranks be thinned upon pretence of carrying away the
wounded, and let every one be thoroughly impressed with this thought,
that it behoves us to conquer these hirelings of England, who are
animated with such bitter hatred against our nation.
“This victory will put an end to the campaign, and we shall then be able
to return to our winter-quarters, where we shall be joined by the new
armies which are forming in France, and then the peace which I shall
make will be worthy of my people, of you, and of myself.