_Q._ Could I have pursued the enemy on the morning of the 24th, without
separating the rest of the squadron from the _Windsor Castle_ and
prizes, and from the frigates which had them in tow?
_A._ Certainly not, without separating from the prizes; and not under a
press of sail, without separating from the _Windsor Castle_.
_Q._ Did I not always place myself between the enemy and the _Windsor
Castle_ and crippled ships, while in tow?
_A._ It appeared to me to be the intention of Sir Robert Calder to keep
company with them, from the time of the action, till they separated by
signal.
_Q._ You understood that for their protection?
_A._ Certainly.
_Q._ Was not the British squadron always placed by me between the enemy
and the port of Ferrol, as long as the enemy remained in sight?
_A._ We certainly were between them; but whether the position was taken
for that purpose or not, I cannot say.
Captain Philip Charles Durham, of the _Defiance_; Captain Henry Inman,
of the _Triumph_, who were also both in the action, were the other two
principal witnesses; their testimony did not add much to the weight of
the prosecution. After their evidence was given, the court adjourned to
Thursday, the 26th of December, 1805, when Sir Robert Calder delivered
in his defence, and requested that it might be read by a friend (Mr.
Gaselee),[22] and the court intimating their consent, the same was read.
It opened thus:—
“MR. PRESIDENT, AND GENTLEMEN OF THE COURT,—I appear before you in a
singular, I may almost say an unprecedented, situation. Having served my
king and country, not only without reproach, but, I may add, with some
degree of reputation, for upwards of forty-six years, during which I
have been more than once honoured with marks of approbation from my
sovereign; having for the last ten months been employed on a most severe
and critical service, without once being in port; and having in the
course of it, with a very inferior fleet, forced a superior one of the
enemy, who had the advantage of wind and situation, into action, and
obtained a decisive victory over them, I felt myself impelled to solicit
the present inquiry, for the purpose of vindicating my honour and my
character from a variety of injurious and unfounded aspersions which
have been cast upon me, in consequence of the not having renewed the
engagement during the two days that the enemy afterwards remained in
sight. The consciousness of my having done my duty, would, however, have
induced me to treat these aspersions with contempt, had they not become
so general that I was apprehensive that silence on my part would be
construed into an acknowledgment of their truth, and an admission of my
own misconduct; I found myself, therefore, under the necessity of
applying to the Lords of the Admiralty, to order an inquiry into my
conduct, that I might be enabled to state publicly the reasons which
actuated it throughout, and to refute the illiberal and unfounded
assertions which had been made against me. To this they have been
pleased to assent; and although, in a subsequent letter of the 10th of
November to that which accompanies the order for your assembling, I
requested that the court might be empowered ‘to inquire into the whole
of my conduct, even prior to my falling in with the enemy, while in
their presence, and subsequent thereto,’ they have thought it right to
confine it to _the 23rd of July, and my subsequent conduct and
proceedings_, until I finally lost sight of the enemy’s ships, and to
direct me to be tried for not having done my utmost to renew the
engagement, and to take and destroy every ship of the enemy, which the
charge asserts it was my duty to engage. I consider this, therefore, as
a declaration by their lordships, that this is the only part of my
conduct upon which any particle of doubt can by possibility attach, or
of which any explanation can be requisite. At the same time, however, I
cannot but lament that the inquiry is so limited; as it prevents my
giving evidence of the circumstances of the action, which I have no
doubt I should have proved to have been such as to add to the reputation
of the British navy.
“As to defending myself against this charge, I trust I shall be able to
satisfy the court and the public, that the not renewing the engagement,
if it was practicable to have done it, was not only justifiable, but the
most proper and prudent course, under all the circumstances, to be
adopted; and that the attempting to force a renewal of the action, might
not only have endangered the safety of my own fleet, but eventually that
of the country itself; I shall request the indulgence of the court, to
be permitted to enter fully into all the circumstances, and to lay
before them the particular situation in which I was placed, the orders I
had from time to time received, and the reasons which induced me not to
attempt a renewal of the action; confident that when I have done so, all
the prejudices that have been hitherto entertained, will be dissipated,
and that by your judgment I shall be restored to the good opinion of my
country,—that country for which I have bled, and for which I have
conquered.
“Before, however, I enter into the particular statement, permit me to
make an observation or two on the specific charge, which is the
principal object of your inquiry. It does not range itself precisely
within any of the Articles of War, though it in part adopts the language
of one of them. It assumes as a principle, that it was my duty to renew
the engagement, and to endeavour to take or destroy every ship of the
enemy.
“I am ready to admit, that it is so much the duty of an officer to
engage the enemy wherever he meets with them, that it is incumbent upon
him to explain satisfactorily why he does not; but, in making that
explanation, it is not necessary for him to prove the physical
impossibility of doing so. It may be possible, and yet there may be very
many reasons why he should not. Indeed, the absurdity of a contrary
position is such, that it would be an idle waste of time to trouble the
court with many observations upon it.
“They will, however, permit me to observe, that mine is not the only
instance in which a British fleet has laid in sight of that of the enemy
without renewing the engagement.
“In proof of this assertion, if it be necessary, I need only recal to
your memory, out of many others, the example of two very great and
gallant officers, who after obtaining most brilliant victories over the
enemy, did not think themselves justified in bringing them a second time
to action, although they were in sight of them fully as long as I was.
The two meritorious officers to whom I allude are, Earl Howe, in the
action of the 1st of June, 1794, and Earl St. Vincent, in that of the
27th of February, 1797. Of the latter, I am competent to speak from my
own knowledge, having had the honour to serve under his lordship as
captain of the fleet in that engagement.
“Of the propriety of the conduct of these noble lords, in both
instances, no doubt has at any moment been entertained by any body. They
certainly exercised a sound discretion upon that occasion; but it may
not be improper for me to remark, that, although the advantages they had
acquired were certainly superior to mine; that mine was a situation in
which it was in every respect more necessary to exercise that
discretion, which, in every case, must be vested in the commander of a
squadron, to judge of the propriety or impropriety of offering battle to
a superior fleet. In the instances above-mentioned there was no other
force to contend with, no other quarter from which an attack was to be
apprehended, than the fleets which had been already engaged. In mine, it
behoved me to be particularly on my guard against the Ferrol and
Rochefort squadrons, consisting of twenty-one sail of the line, both
which, I had reason to believe, were out, and _one of which appears to
have been actually at sea_, and to which the squadron opposed to me
might easily have given notice of their situation, as will be hereafter
more fully stated.
“With these observations I shall dismiss this part of the case for the
present, and proceed to lay before the court a statement of the facts,
to which I am to request their serious attention.”
The Vice-Admiral then went into a complete detail of his conduct prior
to, at, and after the action. He thus referred to the actual battle:—
“On the 22nd of July, about noon, the combined squadrons came in sight.
Their force, consisting of _twenty sail of the line, seven frigates, and
two brigs_, a much greater force than, as I before stated, Admiral
Cornwallis supposed them to consist of. And it appears, from Lord
Gardner’s letter to me of the 6th of July, that when seen off the
Diamond Rock, at Martinique, on the 16th of May, they consisted of
sixteen sail of the line, and six frigates.
“My force consisted of _fifteen sail of the line, two frigates, the
Frisk cutter, and Nile lugger_.
“Notwithstanding this superiority, and notwithstanding they had the
advantage of the wind, I forced them to action. The general result of it
you are already acquainted with. As it is not particularly the object of
your inquiry, it is unnecessary to take up your time with observations
upon it.
“Amidst the numerous prejudices that have assailed me, I have never yet
heard the slightest insinuation to my disadvantage, either as to the
mode of the fleet being carried into, or conducted in action. The
victory certainly was ours, and most decisively so. I have only to
lament that the weather did not afford an opportunity of making it more
complete. Such was the valour and intrepidity of my second in command,
and of every officer and man of my squadron, that, but for the weather,
I am satisfied it would have been so. As it was, there are but few
instances, and those of modern date, in which _even equal_ numbers have
been so successful....”