The trial of that distinguished naval commander, Sir Robert Calder,
Bart., Vice-Admiral of the White, differed from those of Byng,
Sackville, and Keppel, in this, that it was not set on foot by an angry
or partial Government, but arose entirely from the over sensitiveness of
the gallant admiral himself, who could not submit to some unfavourable
remarks which were made on his conduct for not pushing to the utmost the
victory he had gained. He had defeated, in a great naval encounter, the
combined fleets of France and Spain; but he had not completely crushed
the enemy. Unfortunately, this occurred in the very centre of Nelson’s
triumphs, when not only that hero, but the whole British people might,
to use Napoleon’s term, be called “the spoilt children of victory.”
Calder, it was admitted, had acted with courage and sagacity; but he had
not shown the peculiar—the almost supernatural daring of Nelson: hence
the general murmur. Nelson himself told him not to mind the outcry, but
to fight on. He unwisely did not follow the advice, but called for a
court-martial, and brought upon himself a sad and unforeseen result.
Before coming to the affair, a word or two of Calder’s previous career
is necessary. He was a man of good birth and ancient lineage, being the
second son of Sir James Calder, third Baronet of Muirtoune, the head of
a very old family in Morayshire. He was born at his father’s house at
Elgin, the 2nd July, 1745, and, when fourteen years of age, was a
midshipman in the Royal navy. He rose in his profession with slow but
well-earned promotion, until he was looked on as one of the bravest and
safest officers of his day. He won his earlier laurels under Kempenfelt,
Roddam (his brother-in-law), and Howe; and his conduct at the battle of
St. Vincent obtained for him knighthood, and subsequently, in 1798, a
baronetcy. Such was the seaman whose next victory was to be the cause of
his undoing. Of the actual naval action and its consequences in bringing
about the trial, I take the following lucid account from that excellent
manual “British Naval Biography:”
“Calder was selected, in 1805, by Admiral the Hon. (afterwards Sir)
William Cornwallis (the illustrious Marquess Cornwallis’s youngest
brother), who then commanded the Channel fleet, to blockade the harbours
of Ferrol and Corunna. The force entrusted to him on this occasion was
very inadequate; for, although there were then five French ships of the
line and three frigates, and five Spanish line-of-battle ships and four
frigates, all ready for sea, in these ports, yet he had only seven sail
allotted to him; these, indeed, were afterwards increased to nine; but
although he repeatedly requested two frigates and some smaller vessels,
they never were sent to him. He, however, retained his station,
notwithstanding the manœuvres of the Brest fleet; and on being joined by
Rear-Admiral Stirling, on the 16th of July, with five sail of the line
from before Rochfort, together with a frigate and a lugger, he proceeded
to sea, for the express purpose of intercepting the French and Spanish
squadrons from the West Indies, which were supposed to consist of no
more than sixteen capital ships. Soon after this the combined fleet, of
twenty sail of the line, seven frigates, and two brigs, were descried;
while the English force amounted to no more than fifteen ships of the
line, two frigates, a cutter, and a lugger.[21]
“Although the disparity on this occasion was sufficiently startling, Sir
Robert did not hesitate in determining to bring the enemy to action.
This battle, which gave rise to so much discussion, occurred in lat. 43°
30′ north, and long. 11° 17′ west, or about 40 leagues from Ferrol, on
the 22nd of July. The British Vice-Admiral formed his fleet in compact
order, and made a signal to attack the centre of the enemy; upon which
the _Hero_, of 74 guns, that led the van squadron, fetched close up
under the lee of the combined fleet, so that when our headmost ships had
reached the enemy’s centre, their vessels tacked in succession, which
obliged Sir Robert to perform the same evolution. The battle that
immediately followed lasted upwards of four hours, and the enemy,
notwithstanding their great superiority of numbers, and every advantage
of wind and weather, lost two large Spanish ships, the _Rafael_, of 84,
and the _Ferme_, of 76 guns.
“A heavy fog had prevailed during the greater part of the day; and a
short time after the engagement commenced, it became so dense, that the
English commander was scarcely able to see his ships ahead or astern, by
which he was prevented from following up his advantage. This, in all
probability, saved the enemy from total defeat. As it was, Sir Robert
did not judge it prudent to hazard his fleet under such circumstances;
and afraid, perhaps, of risking the advantage he had already acquired,
he brought-to, in order to cover his prizes. The French and Spanish
fleet could have renewed the engagement, during the two days that
followed, having the advantage of the windward, and the British
repeatedly, by hauling on the wind, incited them to the conflict, but
this M. Villeneuve as constantly declined (and thus reserved himself for
a worse fate at Trafalgar). On the 24th the wind changed, by which the
British had the weather-gauge; but Sir Robert Calder, not thinking it
advisable to assume offensive measures, the two hostile fleets
separated.
“The vice-admiral was not only conscious that he had done his duty in
this affair, but also merited the approbation of his country. He had
kept the sea with a very inadequate force, instead of returning into
port; he had successfully blockaded a greatly superior fleet for nearly
five months; and at sea, he had fought a battle, and captured two large
ships, under circumstances where not to be defeated was equal to the
honour of a victory. The advantage lay so wholly on his side that the
adversary, although repeatedly menacing a farther trial, had been
content to forego the opportunity, and at last to sheer off. All this
was rightly appreciated by his commander-in-chief, Admiral Cornwallis,
who sent him back to Ferrol on the 17th, with twenty sail of the line.
But, unfortunately, a different estimate of these circumstances was
formed at home. The nation had lately been pampered with naval
victories; the Lords of the Admiralty murmured; and, because the enemy
had not been completely worsted, it was alleged that the honour of the
British flag had been sullied. Bitter representations to this effect
were set forth in the public prints; and when these reached the
vice-admiral, their effects on his honourable spirit may be easily
imagined. He immediately demanded a public trial from the Lords of the
Admiralty; and, in spite of the solicitations of Nelson, who besought
him to remain, and share in those approaching triumphs of the fleet by
which every calumny would be refuted, he returned to Spithead in the
_Prince of Wales_, on board of which a court-martial assembled on the
23rd of December, 1805.”
The officers who sat on the court-martial were George Montagu, Admiral
of the White, and Commander of His Majesty’s ships and vessels at
Portsmouth and Spithead, President. Vice-Admirals: John Holloway,
Bartholomew Samuel Rowley, and Edward Thornborough. Rear-Admirals: Sir
Isaac Coffin, Bart., and John Sutton. Captains: James Bissett, Robert
Dudley Oliver, John Irwin, James Athol Wood, John Seater, the Hon.
Thomas Bladen Capel, and John Larmour. M. Greetham, Deputy-Judge
Advocate of the fleet, conducted the prosecution.
The court being opened, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder being called in,
entered, attended by the Deputy-Marshal of the Admiralty.
The Order for the trial, dated the 15th of November, 1805, and directed
to George Montagu, Esq., Admiral of the White, and Commander-in-Chief of
Her Majesty’s ships and vessels at Portsmouth and Spithead, was read,
and was as follows:—
_By the Commissioners for Executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c._—Whereas Sir Robert
Calder, Bart., Vice-Admiral of the Blue, hath, by his letter to our
Secretary, dated the 30th of September last, requested, for the reasons
therein mentioned, that an inquiry may be made into his (the said
vice-admiral’s) conduct, on the 23rd of July last, the day after his
engagement with the combined fleets of France and Spain, or, upon the
whole, or such part thereof (when in presence of the enemy) as shall
appear for the good of His Majesty’s service, and for enabling him to
give his reasons publicly for his conduct on that occasion:
And whereas we have thought fit, in compliance with the vice-admiral’s
request, and for the reasons mentioned in his said letter, that a
court-martial shall be assembled for the purpose above-mentioned, and
also for inquiring into the whole of the said vice-admiral’s conduct and
proceedings on the said 23rd of July last, and into his subsequent
conduct and proceedings until he finally lost sight of the enemy’s
ships: And to try him for not having done his utmost to renew the said
engagement, and to take or destroy every ship of the enemy, which it was
his duty to engage: We send you herewith, Sir Robert Calder’s
above-mentioned letter of the 30th of September last, and do hereby
require and direct you to assemble a court-martial, as soon as the
witnesses deemed necessary to be examined on this occasion shall be
ready, which court (you being President thereof) is hereby required and
directed to inquire into the conduct and proceedings of the said
Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Calder, with His Majesty’s squadron under his
command, on the said 23rd of July last, and also into his subsequent
conduct and proceedings, until he finally lost sight of the enemy’s
ships, and to try him for not having done his utmost to renew the said
engagement, and to take and destroy every ship of the enemy, which it
was his duty to engage accordingly.
Given under our hands, the 15th of November, 1805.
BARHAM. J. GAMBIER. PHILIP PATTON.
By command of their Lordships,
W. MARSDEN.
After the Members of the Court and the Deputy Judge-Advocate of the
fleet were severally sworn, the President then said: Sir Robert Calder,
one of your witnesses, Captain Prowse, is absent, are you willing that
the court should proceed without him, or would you wish the trial to be
postponed? And Sir Robert Calder answering that he wished the trial to
proceed, his letter of the 30th of September to the Secretary of the
Admiralty, desiring the inquiry, was then read, and was as follows:—
“PRINCE OF WALES,” off Cadiz,
“_September 30, 1805_.
“Sir,—Having learnt with astonishment, yesterday, by the ships just
arrived, and by letters from my friends in England, that there has
been a most unjust and wicked endeavour to prejudice the public mind
against me as an officer, and that my conduct on the 23rd of last
July, in particular, has been animadverted on, in the most unjust and
illiberal manner; for such it must be deemed, having been done at a
time when I was absent abroad, employed in the service of my king and
country.
“I must, therefore, request you will be pleased to move the Lords
Commissioners of the Admiralty to grant an inquiry into my conduct on
the 23rd July last, or upon the whole, or such part of it (when in
presence of the enemy), as shall appear to their lordships, for the
good of His Majesty’s service, and for the purpose of enabling me to
give my reasons, publicly, for my conduct at that time, and to refute
such unjust, illiberal, and unfounded assertions, when I trust I shall
make it appear to the satisfaction of my King, country, and friends,
that no part of my conduct and character, as an officer, will be found
deserving of those unfavourable impressions, which, at present, occupy
the public mind, being conscious that everything in my power, as an
officer, was done for the honour and welfare of my king and country,
after a very mature investigation of all the existing circumstances,
and the very critical situation I was placed in, with the squadron I
had the honour to command, at the time alluded to.
“I am, Sir,
“Your most obedient humble servant,
“R. CALDER.”
“William Marsden, Esq.,
“Admiralty.”
The trial then proceeded: the witnesses were, of course, chiefly the
admirals and captains who had acted under him in the engagement. The
point at issue was brief, and simply this: Did or did not the admiral do
his best to renew the battle which had already gone in his favour? The
witnesses for the prosecution inferred, rather than positively said, he
did not; the witnesses for Calder, to a man, asserted that a renewal of
the fight was beyond his power.
The following are the mainly pertinent and interesting portions of the
evidence for the prosecution:—
Rear-Admiral Charles Stirling, who in “the _Glory_,” shared in the
action, showed in his testimony a bias against Calder. He was asked:—
_Q._ Did the vice-admiral make any signal, or show any disposition to
endeavour to renew the action?
_A._ I have before stated, that it appeared to me, that the admiral’s
object was to keep company with the crippled ships on that day; and I
saw no other signal indicative of an intention to renew the combat,
after he had asked, if any of the ships wanted to lay to.
_Q._ Did the vice-admiral take any steps to direct the British fleet to
bear up after the enemy on the 24th?
_A._ The British fleet continued standing from the enemy from the time I
before mentioned that we were.
_Q._ Could the British fleet have pursued the enemy with advantage on
the 24th, they steering to the southward and by east, and the wind being
N. and by E.?
_A._ I don’t know any objection to the British fleet following the
enemy, if the admiral had thought proper to do so.
_Q._ Did the vice-admiral at any time on the 24th show any disposition
to renew the action?
_A._ I think that question answered by the preceding one.
_Court._—That is a specific question.
_A._ We continued, as I said before, to steer from the enemy.
_Q._ Did the vice-admiral, according to your remarks and observations,
do everything that might have been done to renew the action, and to take
and destroy every ship which it was his duty to engage?
_A._ We never attempted to renew the action, or laid our heads towards
the enemy, as I have said before; it appeared to me the admiral’s object
was to cover the crippled ships.
_Court._—At the time the British fleet bore down to the crippled ships,
in what state was the _Windsor Castle_?
_A._ She appeared to have lost her fore-top-mast, and not able to make
sail.
_Q._ What other ships of the British fleet were unable to keep company
with the vice-admiral, had he endeavoured to bring the enemy to action?
_A._ I don’t know that any other ship was disabled.
Sir R. Calder cross-examined Admiral Stirling thus:
_Q._ Did you receive a letter from me, on service, after the action?
_A._ Yes; I had two letters from Sir Robert Calder, after the action, on
service, of different dates.
_Q._ Did the first give any reason, and what, for standing to the
northward, with the _Windsor Castle_ and prizes.
_A._ I have the letter here.
_Court._—That will be most satisfactory.
The letter was then read.
“PRINCE OF WALES,” at Sea,
“_24th July, 1805_.
“My dear Sir,—Permit me to return you my most heartfelt thanks for your
unremitting attentions, and for the very gallant support you rendered me
during the whole of the action on the 22nd instant. Had the weather been
favourable, and we could have seen to have made the necessary signals,
to have availed ourselves of some of the mistakes of the enemy, I am
fully convinced we should have made the victory much more complete. I
was obliged to stand to the northward thus far, in order to cover the
_Windsor Castle_, and the two captured ships. I think they are now safe
from the combined, as well as the Rochefort squadron, and I am going
back to Cape Finisterre, in hopes of seeing Lord Nelson; if I do not, I
shall proceed off Ferrol, to see if any favourable opportunity should
offer, when I may hope to attack the enemy with advantage. Wishing us
all possible success,
“I am, my dear Stirling,
“Ever yours most truly and sincerely,
“(Signed) ROBERT CALDER.”
Sir Robert Calder produced a letter, and said, is this the answer to
that letter?
_A._ It is not the answer, but is written in reply. I sent, by the same
conveyance, a letter to the vice-admiral on public service.
_Sir Robert Calder._—You will observe they are not of the same date—one
is the 24th, the other the 25th.
The letter from Rear-Admiral Stirling was then read.
“GLORY, _25th July, 1805_.
“My dear Sir,—I thank you much for your letter of yesterday; and can
assure you, with great truth, I meant, and do mean to give you all the
support in my power.
I hope you made a good tale to please John Bull, for you had a good
subject to write on; and I think you have convinced Mons. Bonaparte that
he cannot always get to sea and home again with impunity.
Excuse haste, and believe me,
Most truly yours,
(Signed) CHAS. STIRLING.”
“Sir Robert Calder, Bart.”
_A._ I should not have written so to my commanding officer, on public
business: that was a private letter.
A conversation took place about the reading the public letter.
_Sir Robert Calder._—“I have no wish that any paper should be withheld;
but, if the rear-admiral has any objection, I do not wish this should be
read.”
_Rear-Admiral Stirling._—“I have no objection.”
The letter was then read.
“GLORY,” _24th July, 1805_.
“My dear Sir,—I congratulate you on the capture of the two Spaniards
from a force so very superior to that opposed to it, and I think, if the
three ships, which at one time showed a disposition to support them, had
followed the intention, the consequence might have been decisive.
“The great object I had in view was to obey your orders, by keeping in a
compact line, whilst the signal for that purpose remained in force, and
therefore, as the _Raisonable_ closed with you, my captain took care
that nothing could pass between her and this ship.
“On the surrender of the Spaniards, I directed the _Warrior_ to send and
assist in taking possession, and afterwards sent similar orders to the
_Thunderer_, as there was no knowing, from the thickness of the weather,
what might otherwise be the consequence, if your attention was confined
to the van. I likewise ordered the _Egyptienne_, when I got sight of
her, to get the prizes on the same tack with us, and to tow them to
leeward of our line, which orders will, I hope, meet with your
approbation. I know not why there was a separation in the night. Captain
Linzee went in pursuance of his instructions, and rejoined me before the
morning.
“We had only one man killed, and four wounded; the fore-yard was grazed,
which we have fished; and what was otherwise hit, was not of any
consequence.
“I have great pleasure of bearing testimony to the zeal of Captain
Warren and his officers, and feel much confidence from the good conduct
of the crew belonging to the ship where my flag is flying, if our good
fortune should again lead us against the foes of our country.
“Believe me, with great esteem, dear Sir,
“Your most obedient humble servant,
“(Signed) CHARLES STIRLING.”
“Sir Robert Calder, Bart.”
_Rear-Admiral Stirling._—I believe that letter was sent to the admiral
on the 25th, and I had the honour to wait upon him in the afternoon, by
his permission; and to the best of my recollection that was my reason
for not returning an official answer. I do not recollect any other
communication with the admiral, from about midnight of the 22nd.
_Q._ Did I not always place the British squadron between the enemy and
the _Windsor Castle_ and prizes, when they were in tow?
_A._ The British fleet was always between them.
_Q._ Was not the British squadron always placed by me between that of
the enemy and the port of Ferrol, while the enemy remained in sight?
_A._ The British fleet was nearer to Ferrol than the enemy, till they
crossed our stern on the 24th.
_Q._ When they crossed our stern could the enemy have fetched Ferrol?
_A._ I do not think they could, as we had the wind.
_Court._—What distance was the British fleet from Rochefort, on the
morning after the action?
_A._ I don’t know; the chart will tell. By my master’s reckoning, Cape
Finisterre bore S.E. and by E. forty leagues.
Rear-Admiral George Martin, who was captain of the _Barfleur_ in the
action, was asked,—
Considering the wind, and the relative situation of the two fleets,
during the 23rd of July, could the British fleet have neared the enemy,
and renewed the engagement?
_A._ The enemy being rather abaft the beam, the British fleet would have
neared the enemy had they tacked. But whether they could have renewed
the engagement, I cannot say. That must, in great measure, have depended
on the enemy, they being to windward.
_Q._ Did the vice-admiral make any signal, or show any disposition to
renew the action on that day?
_A._ No.