The trial of Admiral Byng, and, in a less flagrant degree, that of Lord
George Sackville, had revealed the existence of a mode of prosecution
fraught with danger in the hands of a weak or malignant administration.
The means thus invented, were to throw upon the commander of an
expedition which, from some cause over which he had no control, and
possibly from the fault of Government itself, did not succeed, all the
blame and penalty of the failure. Unlike the noble and friendly
reception which Rome, in the days of its great and glorious contest with
Carthage, gave to the defeated consul Terentius Varro, because he had
not despaired of the Commonwealth;—a British general or admiral, however
distinguished on other occasions, was to be met, on his return from any
mischance, with opprobrium, criminal prosecution, and probably death.
Fortunately for the constitutional character of England, and the dignity
and independence of its military and naval service, this plan, when
attempted for the third time, utterly and signally failed. Admiral
Keppel was, indeed, not the man for such an attack, nor was the time of
it suitable either. His own credit as a commander and a man of sterling
worth, and his popularity, stood on the very firmest basis; and he
belonged to the influential Whig party, which was then rising fast into
power over a ministry as rapidly sinking under the disasters of the
American War. Poor Byng had but his merit to protect him, and he
perished; a better chance let Lord George Sackville off with his bare
life; but Keppel had the public around him, and had not only the people
in his favour, but also a giant band of personal friends. With such
protectors as Rockingham, Burke, Fox and Sheridan, persecution might do
its worst: he was invulnerable. The only thing to wonder at now is, the
madness of a Government which could participate in such a prosecution
against him. His trial is really a somewhat dull affair, as much from
the certainty of his acquittal as from the prolixity of the details; yet
it must be ever read with the deepest interest by all who advocate the
free action and the fair latitude that should be allowed to every man
who has to command the army or the navy of the British empire.
Before entering into the trial itself, it may be as well to give a short
biographical sketch of the previous career of Admiral Keppel.
The Rt. Hon. Augustus Keppel, Viscount Keppel, of Elvedon, in the county
of Suffolk, P.C., an admiral of Great Britain, and for some time First
Lord of the Admiralty, one of the pre-eminent seamen of our naval
history, was, like the unfortunate Admiral Byng, of aristocratic birth
and descent: he was the second son of Sir William Anne[14] Keppel, K.G.,
second Earl of Albemarle, by his wife Anne, daughter of Sir Charles
Lennox, K.G., first Duke of Richmond; and was the grandson of the famous
friend and companion-in-arms of William III., Arnold-Joost Van Keppel,
Lord of Voorst, whose aid to William in his acquisition of the throne at
the Revolution was rewarded with the earldom of Albemarle, and other
minor titles in the peerage of Great Britain. Augustus Keppel, the
future admiral, was born on the 2nd of April, 1725, and entered the
royal navy when thirteen years of age. He was a midshipman on board
Commodore Anson’s ship, the _Centurion_, in his voyage round the world,
in 1740. Of the dangers, distresses, and advantages of that celebrated
expedition, he therefore had his share: in particular, at the taking of
Paila, by Lieutenant (afterwards Admiral Sir Peircy) Brett. In 1741 he
had a very narrow escape; for, having on a jockey cap, one side of the
peak was shaved off close to his temple by a ball, which, however, did
him no other injury. Having been appointed, while still in his teens, in
the course of that voyage, a lieutenant, he, soon after his return, in
February, 1745, took post rank as captain of the _Maidstone_, 40, and
was very successful in capturing several French privateers; but on July
7, 1747, as he was giving chase to one, running too near shore on the
coast of France, near Nantes, his ship was unfortunately lost: himself
and crew were saved. Keppel’s picture, admirably painted by his friend,
Sir Joshua Reynolds, represents him as just escaped from that shipwreck.
Being soon exchanged, and returning to England in 1747, he was one of
the court-martial on the trial of Captain Fox, of the _Kent_, who, for
misbehaviour in the action under Admiral Hawke, was dismissed the
service. After the peace in August, 1749, Captain Keppel sailed with a
squadron, as commodore, to Algiers, to demand satisfaction or
restitution for the treasure piratically taken out of the _Prince
Frederick_ packet boat; and the matter was brought to a satisfactory and
amicable conclusion. But another act of piracy, in the succeeding year,
led him again to Algiers: he had a second audience of the Dey, and
exhorted him to consider, that a great king, like His Britannic Majesty,
was not accustomed to demand satisfaction in vain; to which the Dey made
a defiant and spirited reply; but eventually concluded the business in
friendly terms. In 1752, Commodore Keppel ably effected treaties with
the States of Tripoli and Tunis, and returned with credit from the
Mediterranean.
In 1755, he sailed as commodore in the _Centurion_, for Virginia, having
on board General Braddock, and under his convoy a fleet of transports,
with 2,000 troops, to drive the French from their encroachments on the
Ohio. The event of that expedition, as is well known, was unfortunate,
and would have been more so, but for the co-operation of Keppel. During
his absence he was elected to Parliament for the city of Chichester, in
the room of his brother, who had succeeded to the earldom of Albemarle
at his father’s death. In January, 1757, Keppel was the junior member of
the memorable court-martial, at Portsmouth, which tried Admiral Byng;
and (for the law gave him no alternative) he was obliged to concur in
the sentence which adjudged the admiral to be shot to death. He,
however, strenuously endeavoured to save him; and in his place in the
Commons, applied to the House on behalf of himself, and several other
members of the court-martial, praying the aid of Parliament to be
released from the oath of secrecy imposed on courts-martial, in order to
disclose the grounds on which that sentence was passed. The obvious
intent of this leave to disclose, was to allow the members of the
court-martial to openly comment on and protest against the monstrosity
of a law which compelled them to an award of death for an error in
judgment; and thus might they avert its effects. The Commons listened to
the prayer; the sentence was for the moment respited, and a bill passed
the House to release the members of the court-martial from the
obligation of the oath of secrecy. But the upper House was less
merciful; after examining the several members of the court-martial, the
Lords unanimously rejected the bill. To the third question, among those,
which the Lords put to the members of the court-martial on that
occasion, viz., the question,—“Whether you are desirous the present bill
should pass?”—Keppel, with Rear Admiral Norris, and Captain (afterwards
Sir John) Moore, answered in the affirmative; and to the fourth
question,—“Whether you are of opinion that you have any particulars to
reveal relative to the case of, and the sentence passed upon, Admiral
Byng, which you judge necessary for His Majesty’s information, and which
you think likely to incline His Majesty to mercy,”—Keppel replied, “I
think that I cannot answer that question without particularising the
reasons for my vote and opinion.” The House, by not passing the bill,
would not allow him to do so, and the shameful sentence was, despite of
his humane endeavour, carried into execution. Commodore Keppel, in 1758,
sailed from Spithead with a squadron and land forces, on an expedition
against the French settlements at Goree, on the coast of Africa, which
he reduced by a vigorous attack. In Hawke’s memorable naval victory over
the French armament under Conflans, Captain Keppel, in the _Torhay_, had
a brilliant share; he sunk the enemy’s ship, _Thésée_, of equal force to
his own vessel, at the second broadside. Again, while in command of the
_Valiant_, he victoriously served under Sir Edward Hawke in Quiberon
Bay. In October following, just before King George II.’s death, he was
appointed to command the fleet on an intended expedition, in which
General Kingsley was to command the troops; and His Majesty saw a
battalion of the foot guards march by Kensington Palace for that purpose
two days only before his death. The royal demise occasioned a suspension
of the expedition. In 1761, Commodore Keppel commanded the British fleet
at the celebrated reduction of Belleisle; and in 1762, he contributed
greatly to the reduction of the _Havannah_, being second in command
under Sir George Pocock, who said, “that Keppel executed the service
under his direction with the greatest spirit, activity, and diligence.”
In 1763, he was a Lord of the Admiralty; in 1765, he was appointed rear,
and in 1770 vice, admiral of the blue. Keppel had thus risen to the very
highest repute, and deservedly so. He was a man of cultivated mind and
generous soul, and was a thorough British sailor,—brave, prudent,
energetic, and indefatigable. His frankness, affability and good humour,
won him the unbounded love of the seamen, who gave him the affectionate
and familiar title of “Jack’s protector.” It was in the very midst of
this credit and popularity that the Government of the day—the disastrous
administration of Lord North—sought to re-enact against Keppel the
tragedy of Admiral Byng. The occasion was this:—
The court of France having, in February, 1778, acknowledged the
independence of America, proceeded to make an open avowal of the hostile
sentiments they had long entertained against England, by detaining all
British ships to be found in the French ports. Orders were, in
consequence, given by the British ministry to fit out a fleet of twenty
sail of the line with the utmost expedition; the command of which was
offered to Admiral Keppel. As the ministry had, in a great measure, lost
the confidence of the country, the eyes of the whole nation were turned
on Keppel, in whose appointment every one seemed to feel his own
security included. On this occasion, therefore, he had a great deal to
risk. His well-earned fame was now to be staked on the doubtful issue of
a single battle. The part he had taken in politics, and the close
friendship in which he lived with the leading members of the opposition,
augmented these difficulties, and even rendered the command that was
offered him extremely hazardous; for the ministers were his political
enemies, and political hostility at this time was carried to a very
great height. Any failure, therefore, whether proceeding from
unavoidable accident, or those misfortunes which the wisest and bravest
cannot repel, might attach censure on him, and be attended with
disagreeable, if not with dangerous, consequences. A due consideration
of all these incidental difficulties made him hesitate in accepting an
appointment so pregnant with danger from the hands of ministers; but in
consequence of a royal message delivered to him through the first lord
of the admiralty, he attended in the closet to receive the commands of
his sovereign; and in that and the subsequent royal audiences, he
delivered himself with that plainness, candour, and sincerity, which so
strongly marked his character. He particularly took the liberty of
observing, that he served in obedience to His Majesty’s commands, that
he was unacquainted with his ministers _as ministers_, and that he took
the command as it was, without making any difficulty, and without asking
a single favour, trusting only to His Majesty’s good intentions, and to
his generous support and protection. Keppel sailed from St. Helen’s on
the 13th of June, 1778, with a naval force and with unlimited
discretionary powers. But this force was of no more than twenty sail of
the line, many of which were in a bad state of equipment, and was
extremely inadequate for the important service which was entrusted to
him. On the one hand, it was well known that France had a large fleet at
Brest ready for sea; and, on the other, the great commercial fleets of
England were on their passage home from the East and West Indies.
Besides, the defence of these fleets, he had to protect the extensive
coast of Great Britain, together with those invaluable reservoirs of her
naval power, in which were equally included her present strength and her
future hope.
After much mature consideration, Keppel finally resolved to yield
everything to what he conceived to be a faithful discharge of the great
trust reposed in him. He wisely thought that the only fleet which was
then prepared to protect the commerce and the coast of his country,
ought not to be hazarded against vast odds, either upon personal or
professional punctilio. His conquest over the feelings of pride, was so
extremely difficult, that he afterwards declared, “he never in his life
felt so deep a melancholy, as on finding himself even for the moment
obliged to turn his back on France; and that his courage was never put
to such a trial as in that retreat; but that it was his firm persuasion
his country was saved by it.” The fleet returned to Portsmouth on the
27th of June, and being joined by such ships as were ready, the admiral
sailed again on the 9th of July, with twenty-four sail of the line, and
two days afterwards was joined by six more. In all, therefore, he had
now thirty sail of the line, four frigates, and two fire-ships. The day
before Keppel’s departure from Portsmouth, the great French fleet,
amounting to thirty-two sail of the line, and a vast number of frigates,
sailed from Brest, under the command of the Count d’Orvilliers.
The actual encounter with the French cannot be better described than in
the narrative of it given by Mr. C. D. Yonge, in his “History of the
British Navy:” he writes thus:—
“On the 9th of July, 1778, Keppel again put to sea with a splendid
fleet of thirty sail of the line and four frigates. With him were the
Vice-Admirals Sir Hugh Palliser, Bart. (a Lord of the Admiralty at the
time), and Sir Robert Harland, Bart.; and, among his captains were,
John Jervis, of the _Foudroyant_, 80 (afterwards Earl St. Vincent),
and in the _Robust_, 74, Captain Alexander Hood, afterwards Viscount
Bridport. The French fleet had quitted Brest the day before; the
commander-in-chief was the Comte d’Orvilliers; and among the
subordinate admirals was a prince of the royal blood, the Duc de
Chartres, subsequently known as that Duc d’Orleans who voted for the
murder of his relation and king, the hapless Louis XVI. The Duc de
Chartres was one of the vilest of cowards;[15] and being also given,
as such people sometimes are, to boasting of the exploits he intended
to perform, he had lately announced to Admiral Sir George Rodney, at
Paris, his appointment to a command in the fleet which was to combat
Keppel. Rodney predicted that the result of the meeting would be that
His Royal Highness would be conducted to England to learn English; but
he and his commander did their best to defeat the prophecy by avoiding
the battle for which he had professed so much eagerness.
Before he regained his old station off Brest, Keppel learnt that the
French were at sea; and accordingly he kept off the land to search for
them. The weather was so hazy that the two fleets nearly passed one
another unconsciously; but on the afternoon of the 23rd the fog suddenly
cleared off, and, to the surprise of both, they found themselves within
a few miles of each other, some leagues to the west of Ushant.
D’Orvilliers had probably been ignorant of Keppel’s return to England
for reinforcements. At all events, he believed him to be far weaker than
he really was, and at first showed every inclination to fight; but when,
on approaching nearer, he ascertained the real strength of the British
fleet, he showed that he had no idea of engaging on equal terms. He
resolved to decline the battle; and his possession of the weather-gauge
enabled him to do so. His conduct was a practical acknowledgment of the
inferiority of French to British sailors; for more equal fleets could
not be found. The French line-of-battle ships exceeded the English in
number by two; but the English ships were rather the larger; and the
English had two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight guns, to two
thousand two hundred and seventy-six, that composed the armament of the
French. In frigates, D’Orvilliers had a decided advantage; but however
useful they might be before or after the battle, in the actual conflict
they were not likely to have much weight. A fairer opportunity of
testing the naval merits of the two nations could not be imagined.
D’Orvilliers, however, kept away, and the next day was seen moving off
in full retreat. Keppel, signalling to his fleet to form in fine of
battle, and to chase, pursued with every sail his ships could carry;
and, as two of the Frenchmen had fallen to leeward, he endeavoured to
cut them off, in the hope of thus forcing his antagonist to a battle in
order to save them. D’Orvilliers thought more of saving himself, and
left the stragglers to their fate: their speed enabled them to escape,
but they were unable to rejoin their comrades. The 24th, the 25th, the
26th, passed without any variation of the circumstances or relative
positions of the two fleets. The French continued their retreat; we
continued our pursuit. In the afternoon of the 26th, Keppel, thinking he
was losing time by keeping his fleet in line of battle, hauled down that
signal which had been constantly flying from the time he first saw the
enemy, but still he kept up the signal to continue the chase.
“The French ships, however, as has been mentioned before, were generally
superior to ours in sailing qualities, so that the chase would in all
probability have been entirely fruitless, had not the wind suddenly
shifted on the morning of the 27th from south-west to west-south-west;
and, though this does not appear a very great change, it was sufficient
to prevent the French admiral from any longer having the entire option
of engaging in or avoiding a battle. It put in Keppel’s power to force
on at least a partial action, and he instantly availed himself of the
chance thus unexpectedly afforded him; but he found himself in some
difficulty. The eagerness with which he had hitherto pressed on the
chase had somewhat scattered his fleet. Harland was four miles off, on
the _Victory’s_ weather quarter; Palliser, in the _Formidable_, was
three miles or more to leeward, and as the way in which he handled his
ship seemed to show a disposition to increase that distance, Keppel,
desiring to unite his squadron to his own, signalled to Palliser to
chase to windward. Finding an action inevitable, D’Orvilliers, to
preserve his line of battle unbroken, caused his fleet to wear; but that
and some other evolutions threw them into great disorder, and brought
them nearer to the enemy whom their chief object was to avoid. These
manœuvres had occupied nearly four hours. At last, a little before noon,
Keppel made the signal to attack, and Sir Robert Harland, who commanded
the van division, led the fleet gallantly into battle, passing along the
French line, receiving their fire without returning it till he came up
to their leading ships. Keppel followed with the centre, in like manner
reserving his fire till he got alongside the French admiral himself,
whom he had marked for his own especial antagonist, and was soon joined
by Palliser and his squadron. For nearly two hours both fleets were
hotly engaged. The loss of life was lightest in ours; but, from the
French practice of aiming chiefly at the rigging, many of our ships were
far more crippled than any of theirs. Keppel’s own flag-ship, the
_Victory_, had received great damage; and five more of our ships were so
much disabled that the admiral was not altogether without apprehension
of losing some of them. Palliser’s ship, the _Formidable_, had suffered
as severely as any, and Sir Hugh had been the first to quit the line.
When the battle had lasted nearly two hours, with a view of enabling him
to renew the action, and also of protecting the crippled ships, Keppel
made the signal to wear. Harland and his division obeyed; but Palliser
took no notice of the signal, making no attempt to renew the action
himself, and, as was afterwards alleged, by his example preventing the
rest from going to the admiral’s support. Later in the afternoon, Keppel
sent a frigate to him with an express order to bear down; but the sun
went down, and it was not till daylight the next morning that the
_Formidable_ again took up the station assigned for her. But long before
daylight all hope of renewing the battle was past. The lights of the
enemy had been visible to our men all night; but, when day broke, it was
discovered that they proceeded from only three ships. D’Orvilliers had
stolen away with his main body, and, to prevent any suspicion of his
flight from occurring to the British admiral, he had left three of his
fastest sailers to keep up the same lights that were shown by the
flag-ship, with instructions to set all sail and rejoin him as soon as
daylight should reveal to the English the delusion that had been
practised. Once more Keppel chased for an hour or two, and then, finding
his efforts to overtake the enemy perfectly fruitless, he returned to
Plymouth to repair the damage he had received.
“No ship was taken on either side, the number of our killed and wounded
did not amount to above three-fourths of the loss sustained by the
French; but the question of who were the victors was most clearly
determined by a proof far more incontestable than any such minute
calculation. The flight of the French, for their course on the 28th can
be called by no other name, acknowledged their defeat in the most
forcible manner. But, after having made such efforts to fit out a
sufficient fleet, the British nation was not contented with a victory
which required arithmetic and logic to prove it to have been one.
Murmurs soon began to be heard, which presently assumed the definite
shape of complaints that Palliser, by his disobedience to his
commander’s signals, had prevented the renewal of the action, and by so
doing had enabled the French to escape. In his official despatch Keppel
was so far from having complained of Palliser’s behaviour, that he
expressly named him as, “by his spirited conduct, having deserved much
commendation.””
Before proceeding further, however, it should be here stated in fairness
to the Count D’Orvilliers, (whom Keppel himself, in his defence, does
not blame,) that Mr. Yonge seems to have taken rather a severe and
incorrect view of the Count’s conduct in evading an engagement:
D’Orvilliers, on the contrary, had great reasons for avoiding a battle,
and his retreat was really a success. Another writer, the author of an
excellent “British Naval Biography,” to whom I am much indebted in this
article, puts the point very clearly, thus:
“It must not be attributed to any want of spirit in D’Orvilliers that he
thus obstinately declined a battle. The motives of both commanders
exactly corresponded with the different lines of conduct they pursued.
Our East and West India convoys, of immense value, were on their return
home, and hourly expected. The position maintained by the French fleet
was extremely favourable for intercepting those convoys in the course
they were expected to hold; and from the situation of the hostile
fleets, and the state of the wind, they might have been captured in the
English admiral’s sight, without a possibility of his preventing it. On
the other hand, Keppel’s fleet effectually cut off that of his adversary
from the port of Brest. It was, therefore, no less the object of Keppel
to bring the enemy to an immediate action, than it was that of
D’Orvilliers to avoid it.”
It was so, in fact, understood by the British public, who felt, at once,
that the French had gained a great advantage, and that this action of
July, 1778, had not been of that bold and decisive character which the
country was used to expect from the navy.[16] The event gave rise to
much animadversion, and at last was discussed by the newspapers and
periodicals of the day with furious animosity. Party feeling embittered
the question; for though Admiral Keppel was employed on account of his
ability and experience, he was hostile to the then administration, so
that any attempt to disparage him was attributed to the malevolence of
the government.
In the House of Commons, of which both Admirals Keppel and Palliser were
members, a motion was made for an inquiry, whereupon Admiral Keppel
rose, and gave an account of his conduct from the time he assumed the
command of the fleet. He declared, “That if he was again to go over the
business of the 27th of July, he would conduct himself in the same
manner. He said, everything he could do against the enemy had been done;
but observed, at the same time, that the oldest and most experienced
officers would discover something in every engagement, with which they
were previously unacquainted; and he acknowledged that that day had
presented something new to him.” Sir Hugh Palliser defended himself with
much warmth, and accused Keppel of inconsistency in having officially
commended his conduct, and in now wishing to insinuate that he had
neglected to perform his duty. To this the admiral replied, “That the
official praise which he had bestowed on all the officers under his
command, to obviate discord, did not oblige him to authenticate
statements which would impeach himself; but now, when called upon to
speak out, he would inform the House, and the public, that the signal
for coming into the _Victory’s_ wake, was flying from three o’clock in
the afternoon till eight in the evening unobeyed; at the same time he
did not charge the vice-admiral with actual disobedience, because he was
fully persuaded of his personal bravery, and believed that if any
inquiry was considered necessary that he would be able to justify
himself.” This altercation led to a great deal of mutual recrimination
between the two admirals, until at length Sir Hugh Palliser, on the 9th
of December, delivered in an accusation to the Board of Admiralty, of
which he was himself one of the lord commissioners. This accusation
consisted of five separate charges against Keppel, for misconduct and
neglect of duty in the action of the 27th of July; and the Board
immediately ordered the admiral to be tried by a court-martial.
On the 7th of January, 1779, the signal was made for all the admirals
and captains of His Majesty’s fleet to come on board the _Britannia_ in
Portsmouth harbour.
Then the Judge-Advocate General, Sir Charles Gould, LL.D., read the
order sent by the Lords of the Admiralty to Sir Thomas Pye, admiral of
the white, to hold the court-martial, dated the 31st of December, 1778,
signed Sandwich, T. Buller, Lisburne: and for adjourning to the Governor
of Portsmouth’s house.