There is another consideration, connected with this portion of the

subject, which well deserves attention. A conclusion may be a very

correct one, and may have been reached by a very satisfactory process,

although the person who has made it, may be unable to state the grounds

upon which it rests, or meet the objections which may be made against it.

This applies not only to those cases, where the conclusion mainly rests

upon trust, but also to others. An eminent statesman recommended a

person going out in an official capacity, to give his decisions

confidently, but not to venture to declare the reasons. The decisions

would probably be right, but the reasons, as _stated by him_, might not

be. It need not be inferred from this that the reasons upon which he

would really act were wrong, but rather that from want of practice, or

power of analysis, or some other cause, he would be unable to bring them

out correctly. The processes of thought pass so rapidly through the

mind, that even the most practised thinkers often find it difficult to

arrest them in their progress, and state the various steps by which they

have arrived at their conclusions. The simplest and most certain grounds

of our conclusions are, in fact, not unfrequently those which it is most

difficult to bring out into distinct view. They have so often passed

through the mind that we have ceased to notice them, although, all the

while, they contribute essentially to the judgment which is formed; or

they lie so far back, in the depths of our consciousness, that it is

almost impossible to recover them. Necessarily, nothing can be so

simple, or so certain, in one sense, as intuitions, that is, those things

which we know or believe without any intermediate process of thought, and

yet, down to the present time, those who have most deeply studied the

subject hesitate to decide exactly as to what are intuitions, and what

are not. We conclude then that, while, on the one hand, we should not

discredit the rational powers of men, as if they were unequal to perform

the task allotted to them; we must not, on the other, be easily shaken

with regard to conclusions which have been made with care and

consideration, because we may be unable to trace out accurately the

arguments by which they are supported, or answer the objections which are

made against them.

We have now considered revelation with regard to the conditions under

which it may be expected to be _given_, _recorded_, and _transmitted_,

with a view to its being _accepted and believed_. We do not for a moment

suppose that we have removed every difficulty; but if we have upon the

whole, made clear to our readers the nature of these conditions, or,

where this has not been done, indicated the points at which difficulties

exist, our chief purpose will have been answered.

* * * * *

6. Here we might leave the subject, but we cannot forbear adding some

further observations in reference to that professed revelation of God's

will which is to be found in the Bible. It is not our intention to

attempt a summary of the various evidences which exist to show that it is

a real one; nor is it our design to reply at length to the objections

which have been made to invalidate it. There are however some obvious

facts which meet us on the threshold of the inquiry, and which can be

estimated at their just value by any candid inquirer, to which we would

direct attention.

We find for instance that the Bible contains a purer system of morality,

and conveys a clearer insight into the unity and nature of God, than is

to be found in any other book; and that, although it is the composition

of men, many of them ignorant and unlearned, who have lived at different

times, and occupied very dissimilar positions in life, there is,

nevertheless, a wonderful similarity in the main outlines of religious

truth, as delivered by all the writers. We know, however, still further,

that the morality and precepts of the Bible, although confessedly of a

pure and holy character, are, nevertheless, not of such a kind as to fall

in with the wishes and passions of mankind. To believe that morality

must extend to thoughts as well as actions, and that an all-seeing God

notices, and will one day call all men to a strict account, is not a

matter which, if we may judge from what we see around us, is agreeable to

the feelings of most men. Nor, if we look to the great remedy proposed

for the sin of man, such, we mean, as it is supposed to be, by the great

majority of professing Christians, namely, the atoning sacrifice made by

the Son of God, do we find here again a matter which either the reason or

the feelings of men generally are ready to lead them to adopt. We see

too, that in all ages unbelief has, more or less, existed, and objections

have been, from time to time, brought forward which appeared likely to

have considerable power in undermining the existing belief in the Bible.

Persecution also has exercised its influence, and, it might frequently

have been supposed, according to human calculations, that it would have

availed to destroy all credence in it. And yet, notwithstanding all

these circumstances, to which we have referred, it is an incontrovertible

fact that a professed belief in the Bible, as a revelation from God,

exists most widely. It is, we may add, not a little worthy of being

remarked that the nomenclature of the Bible has obtained such a strong

hold on the public mind, in our own day, that many who deny inspiration

in any distinctive sense, still retain the use of this and other words,

as if afraid to make it plain how far they differ from those opinions

which are commonly received.

The present age is certainly more enlightened than any which has preceded

it; but, hitherto at least, a professed belief in the orthodox doctrines

of religion has increased rather than diminished. We find moreover that

persons of all ranks, and every kind of mental calibre, have declared

that they find something in the Bible which they do not find in any other

book; something, in fact, which, when duly received, comes home to their

hearts as men, and seems admirably adapted to the deepest wants of human

nature. We see too that those who appear to have accepted the Bible most

fully, and to hold it most firmly, have been so much impressed with a

sense of its importance to the world at large, as to have endeavoured,

often at considerable risk and expense, to communicate to others, both

at-home and abroad, the knowledge of those things which they have

received as truths--a method of proceeding which has not been adopted,

and, in fact, could not have been, without a manifest absurdity, by those

who profess to believe in the inspiration of Plato, Milton, Shakespeare,

and other great, but, according to common opinion, uninspired men. All

these and various other considerations which might be adduced seem to

mark out the Bible, as being a book at least _different_ from all other

books, and to lead to the presumption that it may contain that knowledge

of God which, as has been remarked in the earlier part of these

"Thoughts," it appears most important for men to be acquainted with, and

a revelation of which, in some way or other, has been very commonly

believed in. Assuredly there is a strong presumption in its favour, and

the _onus probandi_, in our own day, lies with those who deny its claims

to acceptance. Whether however the Bible actually is, or contains a

revelation from God is still a fair subject for reverent examination.

Without attempting to enter upon such an examination here, we may,

without impropriety, offer a suggestion as to the _spirit_ in which it

should be conducted. It must be remembered that the examination of a

theological, or any other subject which bears upon the interests of our

daily lives, involves principles of a very different character from those

which are connected with an investigation of the science of number, or

any other abstract science. Mathematical and numerical investigations

advance from principles which are clearly defined, and almost universally

acknowledged to be self-evident; the reasoning also is of such a kind as

to preclude the admission of error. In theology the case is different.

There, it is difficult to define with accuracy the points from which the

reasoning commences, and also to exclude, with certainty, the possibility

of error in the reasoning itself. There is, too, another essential

difference between abstract sciences and other subjects of inquiry. It

is not only self-evident that two straight lines cannot enclose a space,

but the judgment which the mind gives on the subject is not in any danger

of being disturbed by the feelings. In theology, however, the matters

which come under consideration are so mixed up with our nearest and

dearest interests, that the feelings are called into play at every step

of the investigation, and a just balance of the judgment cannot be

preserved without the exercise of much care. Hence the necessity of

endeavouring to preserve a candid and unruffled spirit in all enquiries

connected with religion. No doubt those feelings which a beneficent God

has implanted with a view to assist us in deciding, are to have their due

weight; but certainly there is need of caution, lest they influence us

unduly. If the judge thinks it needful to charge the jury to dismiss

from their minds everything which might tend to influence their judgments

in an improper manner, and attend only to the evidence, even though the

matter about which they have to decide is usually one in which they have

no personal interest; it certainly does not appear unnecessary to give a

similar caution on a subject, with regard to which feeling has assumed so

strong a form as to give rise to the name, _odium theologicum_. We

deceive ourselves, if we imagine that we approach the subject without any

danger of judging it unfairly. This caution, undoubtedly applies to

_all_ who discuss theological questions; but we think that we shall not

be making an unwarranted assertion, if we say that it applies in a

special manner to those who _impugn_ the Bible revelation, when it is

remembered that the doctrines contained in it, as they have generally

been received by those who are called orthodox Christians, are of such a

kind as very commonly to excite, in the first instance at least, a strong

feeling of opposition. The Bible itself intimates this, and common

experience bears witness to it as being a fact. We are not now saying

that the doctrines of the purity and holiness of God, the dreadful nature

of sin, the need of an atonement, the inability of man to present himself

before God in merits of his own, and others of a similar kind are true;

but we may properly say that, whether true or false, they are such as

frequently raise a strong feeling of opposition; and therefore that those

who examine them, with the view of ascertaining their character, stand in

_special_ need of the caution to preserve a calm and candid spirit.

It will not be out of place to introduce here another consideration which

has a bearing upon this part of the subject, namely, the _supernatural

aid_ which the Bible offers towards the understanding and acceptance of

its doctrines. It is quite conceivable that a state of things might

exist in which such aid would be wholly unnecessary. We might suppose a

case in which the nature of man was so entirely in harmony with itself,

and so exactly attuned to the truths of a Divine revelation, as readily

to accept it, when it was presented; but the question we have to decide

is, whether man's nature is actually in this state or not. Observation

leads us to believe that it is not. Whether we accept the scripture

statement of the fall or not, we must not shut our eyes to the fact that

it is difficult for virtue to force its way, while vice has many

votaries. However convincing, abstractedly, the reasons may be to

enforce the claims of virtue, it is evident that they possess but little

power to lead the large majority of mankind. History and experience

testify to this. Scarce any deny the evidence in favour of virtue,

although few are content to be governed by it. Now it may be fairly

presumed that any revelation which the Divine Being might make would be

in the interests of virtue; it may be reasonably expected too that it

would be supported by strong evidence: but, if, as actual observation

makes it clear is the case, the feelings of mankind are more inclined to

reject than accept the claims of virtue, the evidence, however strong,

will not produce the effect which it would, if the mind were more justly

balanced, and thus the revelation will be in danger of being rejected.

Such rejection, be it remembered, need not result from any deficiency of

evidence, but may arise from an indisposition to receive it. For our own

part we believe that the evidence in favour of the orthodox views of

scripture statements is far stronger than can be found in support of any

other subject of a like kind: but, at the same time, taking into

consideration the actual tendencies of human nature, we are not surprised

that it does not produce the effect which it should do; and therefore it

appears to us not unreasonable to suppose that God might exercise some

such supernatural power upon the mind, as the Bible speaks of, with the

view of disposing it to the reception of a revelation.

That God does at times interfere in a manner, out of the usual course of

His Providence, with regard to other matters, especially in answer to

prayer, is believed almost universally. We cannot enter here into a

discussion as to the foundation of the belief; but, certainly so long as

the records of mankind go back, and so far as the experience of the

present day conducts us, the belief has been entertained, and prayer

seems to be the natural expression of man's heart in all cases of

difficulty. Men _will_ believe in, and appeal to, a supernatural power,

and it is hard to suppose that a tendency so universal and deeply seated,

should have no solid foundation. But if prayer, for aid and direction

from above, is the natural outpouring of man's heart with regard to the

more ordinary affairs of life, there appears to be no reason why prayer

should not be offered up for counsel and guidance with regard to a

professed revelation, and that an answer should be expected. At least,

it can hardly be said that those have fairly tested the claims of

scripture to be received as a revelation from God, who have not complied

with the conditions which it has laid down as to the manner in which it

should be studied.

We now leave the subject, drawing the attention of our readers to the

prayer of one of our greatest poets, and earnestly hoping that his prayer

may be theirs:--

. . . What in me is dark,

Illumine; what is low, raise and support;

That to the height of this great argument

I may assert Eternal Providence,

And justify the ways of God to man.

_Paradise Lost_.

* * * * *

LONDON: WERTHEIM, MACINTOSH, AND HUNT.

_By the same Author_,

THOUGHTS ON MIRACLES.

PRICE SIXPENCE.

Footnotes:

{17} On the subject of the Mosaic cosmogony, see a very interesting

Letter from Sir Isaac Newton to Dr. Thomas Burnet, in Sir David

Brewster's "Life of Newton," pp. 450-453.

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