Transcribed from the 1862 Wertheim, Macintosh and Hunt edition by David
Price, email ccx074@pglaf.org
THOUGHTS
ON
A REVELATION.
BY
S. J. JERRAM, M.A.,
VICAR OF CHOBHAM, SURREY.
* * * * *
LONDON:
WERTHEIM, MACINTOSH AND HUNT,
24, PATERNOSTER ROW,
AND 23, HOLLES STREET, CAVENDISH SQUARE.
1862.
ABSTRACT OF CONTENTS.
PAGE.
Introductory: proposed mode of treating the subject 1-4
1.--Knowledge of God needful 4
,, ,, ,, cannot be obtained by direct perception of 5
God
,, ,, ,, cannot be obtained, to a sufficient extent, 6
by exercise of natural faculties
,, ,, ,, cannot be obtained by any implanted idea 6
,, ,, ,, therefore must be revealed 8
Objection arising from non-universality of a 8
Revelation answered
2.--Conditions under which a Revelation may be expected 9
to be _given_
Revelation must have a distinctive character 9
,, ,, ,, must be authenticated to original recipients 10
,, ,, ,, cannot convey a perfect knowledge of God 12
,, ,, ,, must be limited by the object designed 12
,, ,, ,, must be limited also by the state of 14
knowledge existing at the time when made
,, ,, ,, must be, in some degree, phenomenal 15
Such a Revelation appears to be the only one in 16
accordance with man's position, and also adequate
Words as a medium of Revelation must be limited by 18
ideas already existing, which ideas are also limited by
experience
Anthropomorphic notions of God; the Infinite and 19
Absolute
Ideas as a medium of Revelation; ideas and perceptions 20
distinguished, etc.
Perception as a medium of Revelation; not in itself 22
adequate
3.--Conditions under which a Revelation may be expected 26
to be _recorded_, etc.
Exact verbal record considered; difference of 26
languages, etc.
Distinction drawn as to meaning of "exact verbal 29
record"
Divine and human elements in a Revelation; variety of 29
style, etc.
Considerations as to the precise manner of recording a 31
Revelation
4.--Conditions under which a Revelation may be expected 32
to be _transmitted_
5.--Some considerations as to the conditions under which 34
a professed Revelation may be properly _accepted_
Evidence to contemporaries: miracles, doctrines, etc. 34
Evidence to others 37
Observations as to believing: aid derived from others, 37
rapidity of mental processes, intuitions
6.--Some considerations as to the Bible, as a professed 41
Revelation
Its pure morality, hold on public opinion, etc., mark 43
it out as _different_ from other books
Why a candid spirit is _especially_ needful for the 43
study of it
Its offer of supernatural aid considered 45
Its offer of supernatural aid is in accordance with 46
the general beliefs as to Providence, and prayer
THOUGHTS ON A REVELATION.
Few persons can have observed attentively the various phases of public
opinion on religious subjects during the last twenty years or more,
without noticing a growing tendency to the accumulation of difficulties
on the subject of Revelation. Geology, ethnology, mythical
interpretation, critical investigation, and inquiries of other kinds,
have raised their several difficulties; and, in consequence, infidels
have rejoiced, candid inquirers have been perplexed, and even those who
have held with firmness decided views on the distinctive character of the
inspiration of the Bible, have sometimes found it difficult to satisfy
their minds entirely, and to see clearly the grounds of their
conclusions.
The writer of these pages does not propose to attempt a detailed reply to
the various difficulties which have been raised. Answers to objections
arising from the pursuit of particular sciences are most effectually
given by those, who have made those sciences their study; nor can there
be any doubt that, if the book of nature and the Bible spring from the
same source, an increasing acquaintance with both will tend to show their
harmony with each other, and to dispel the perplexities which have arisen
from an imperfect acquaintance with either of them. It may be observed,
too, that, as it requires special knowledge on the part of a writer to
cope with special difficulties; so also does it demand acquirements, but
rarely found, on the part of the reader, to appreciate the real value,
both of the objections and answers which may be made on geological,
critical, or other special grounds.
The writer thinks that there is another method of reply--a method which
consists in giving as clear a view as can be had of the real character of
the subject against which the objections are made; and this is the kind
of answer which he proposes to attempt. The man who has a distinct and
well defined knowledge of chemical, mathematical, or any other science,
will not be greatly perplexed with difficulties which may be brought from
other sciences, touching upon that with which he is acquainted. The
knowledge which he possesses of his own particular science will enable
him, in some instances, to perceive at once the weakness of the
objections which are alleged; and, even when this is not the case, he
will see such an harmonious proportion subsisting between the various
parts of that branch of knowledge which he has been pursuing, and be so
strongly convinced of the certainty of it, that he will be justly
disposed to attribute to his own ignorance his inability to give
satisfactory replies to those difficulties which he cannot dispose of.
_Real_ knowledge cannot of course be overthrown; and, although it is
often difficult to decide what knowledge is of this description, the task
of arriving at a tolerably correct conclusion with regard to such
subjects as fall within the range of our faculties, must not be regarded
as an hopeless one.
When clear definitions have been given, disputants have often found that
there is no further room for discussion; and, even when this is not the
case, the force of objections can, under such circumstances, be more
accurately weighed, and the real points of attack and defence more
clearly perceived. If a man were to say, in a mixed company, that there
was no taste in an apple, many sensible men, unacquainted with his exact
meaning, might be inclined to dispute the assertion, and to say that the
statement was contrary to common experience; but, if he explained his
meaning to be, that taste is a quality of a sentient being, and that
there is nothing in the apple of this kind, or corresponding to it,
everybody then would see the truth of his assertion, and all ground of
dispute would be removed. We will take another case. Those who hold
strong Protestant views frequently say, that the "religion of the Bible
is the religion of Protestants." This, for most purposes, expresses their
meaning forcibly and well, and the mind, in practice, usually supplies
the necessary limitations. It does not, however, always happen that
these limitations are consciously present to the mind, or that the person
who practically receives the right impression might not be greatly
puzzled by the subtle reasonings of objectors. The _dictum_, quoted
above, does not mean, as might at first sight appear, that we are to make
use of no other means than the Bible in the investigation of Divine
truth, and that the wisdom of the present and past ages is to go for
nothing. No one _could_ thus isolate himself from other influences; and,
if he could, it would not be _desirable_. What is really meant is, that
all truth necessary for salvation is contained in the Bible, "so that
whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be
required of any man that it should be believed as an article of faith,"
etc.; in other words, that the Bible is the ultimate and sole standard of
appeal. This of course may be, and is disputed; but, when the statement
is put in a clear and well defined shape, many apparent objections vanish
at once, and the real points of attack and defence are made evident. If,
then, we can obtain ideas, on the subject of revelation, which shall be,
upon the whole, distinct, and worthy of being received as true, much will
be done to remove objections, and to satisfy a reasonable mind.
The proposed investigation will necessarily be, in some degree, of an _a
priori_ character; not, however, as we trust, so much so as to render it
vague and without practical value. It will be _a priori_, inasmuch as it
will not assume the existence of a revelation, and then proceed to
examine its character. This would be to beg the question at issue. It
will not be _a priori_, so far as it consists in instituting an inquiry
into the faculties of the human mind, and their capacity to receive a
revelation; and into this it will be found that the investigation will
mainly resolve itself.
* * * * *
1. We may commence our inquiry into the subject by noticing, _that a
knowledge of God_, _to be obtained in some way or other_, _seems almost
essential to the well-being of man_. If it be granted, that there is
such a Being--and few, it is presumed, would go so far as to deny
this--it must be of great importance for us to know the relationship in
which that Being stands to us, and we to Him. We can hardly suppose it
possible that an Infinite Being, in some sense, as we suppose will be
generally allowed, the Governor of the world, should not have an
important relation to _all_ other existences; much less, that the
relation which He bears to _man_, the most noble existence of which we
have any actual experience, should be of an insignificant character.
Looking, too, upon man as a free and moral agent, accountable, as
conscience declares, for his actions to his fellow-men, it seems almost
certain that he must be also responsible for his acts in relation to the
Deity. The general belief of mankind, in all ages and in all places,
tends to the same conclusion; and, if it be admitted that there is an
eternal world into which the consequences of our actions follow us, a
knowledge of the relationship in which we stand to God becomes of still
greater importance. But if this knowledge probably may be, and, should
the general belief of the world have a foundation in fact, certainly is,
of great importance, it can hardly be supposed that a God of love would
allow us to remain in ignorance of it; and the question arises, _how it
is to be obtained_.
It may be observed, first of all, that _the Deity does not_, _like other
objects_, _come within the direct cognizance of our perceptive
faculties_. We have an organization, by means of which we are enabled to
perceive various objects around us; and, by travelling to other lands, we
can obtain a knowledge of many things of which we had before been
ignorant. We perceive also what is going on within us. The telescope
and the microscope reveal to us wonders which, without their
intervention, we could never have discovered. But we cannot through the
instrumentality of any of our faculties perceive God. Travel where we
will we cannot find Him out. No appliance of art has availed to disclose
Him to us. If any philosophers conceive that they can intuitively gaze
upon God, other philosophers declare their ignorance of any intuition of
this kind, and assuredly the common people, who most stand in need of
clear notions on the subject, and who would hardly be neglected by a
beneficent God, are altogether unconscious of it. The knowledge of Him,
therefore, if obtained at all, must be had in some other way.
But may not an adequate knowledge of God be obtained _by the exercise of
the faculties of the human mind upon external nature_, _or in some other
way_? The Apostle St. Paul says something which rather favours this
view, when he declares that "the invisible things of Him from the
creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things
that are made, even His eternal power and Godhead; so that they are
without excuse" (Rom. i. 20): and we believe that a considerable insight
into the nature of God, and the probable character of His dealings with
us may be obtained in the manner to which we have referred. Still we
have only to look at the ever varying and degrading notions which have,
at all times, prevailed in many parts of the world respecting the Divine
Being, to perceive that a more clear method of obtaining knowledge about
Him would, to say the least of it, be a most valuable boon. The method
under consideration has not practically issued as we might have hoped
that it would; and therefore there is reason to expect, that God might
make use of some more direct way of communicating to us a knowledge of
Himself.
Another possible mode of communicating a knowledge of God would be, _by
implanting in the mind of man_, _an idea corresponding_, _so far as might
be needful_, _to the nature of God_. But a belief in the existence of
anything of this kind is open to several objections. If such an idea
existed, it must, to answer the required end, be sufficiently clear and
well defined to give at least a tolerably accurate notion of the Deity,
and must also bring with it a well-grounded conviction of its
correspondence to the reality. But the variety of opinions which have
been entertained on the subject forbid us to believe that any such idea
as this exists. Search as far as we can into our own minds, we are
unable to discover anything approaching to such a notion of the Divinity.
It appears too, that, notwithstanding some speculations as to time and
space, which, in the opinion of some, bear a slightly exceptional
character, there is no good reason to believe that we acquire other kinds
of knowledge in the manner under consideration; and, if this be so, there
is a strong presumption against a knowledge of the Deity being obtained
in this way.
As however some confusion of mind not uncommonly prevails on this
subject, we will endeavour to explain our meaning more fully. We
possess, as it appears to us, certain capacities for obtaining knowledge,
and for retaining, and disposing our knowledge, when obtained, in
different ways; but we are not born with the actual possession of
knowledge; nor, so far as we can see, is knowledge, at any subsequent
time, obtained by us, except by means of the capabilities to which we
have referred. We have by nature powers of knowing objects, both
external to our organization, and internal; but the objects themselves,
and not the representations of them, are presented to us before we know
them. We are conscious of seeing, and smelling, and tasting, and
feeling, etc.; but they are the things themselves which we see, and
smell, and taste, and feel, in the first instance, although afterwards we
are able to contemplate the representations of them which are formed in
the mind. There is within us, no doubt, a capability of apprehending, in
a sufficient degree, the perfections of God, when they are declared to
us; but a knowledge of these perfections does not naturally exist within
us. We conclude, then, that, as the Deity is not directly perceived by
us, has not in practice been adequately discerned by any process of the
mind, and is not made known to us by any connate, or subsequently
implanted idea, we must be indebted to revelation, in the main, for any
knowledge we may obtain respecting Him. We do not consider it necessary
to enter into a discussion of Pantheistic views, inasmuch as we have yet
to learn that Pantheism has ever furnished any definite ideas respecting
the nature of God which will bear the test of a close examination as to
their reality. We think, too, that it is destructive of the personality
of either God, or man, or both, and thus does away with all real relation
between the two.
Before proceeding to the investigation of what we mean by a revelation,
we will endeavour to answer an objection which may be raised. It may be
alleged that, if a true knowledge of God is of such great consequence to
man, it appears strange that such differing opinions should have been
held on the subject, and that God's revelation--on the supposition that
there is one--should not have been more extensively promulgated, and
declared with more irresistible evidence. There is no doubt a difficulty
here. It does not however attach _especially_ to the subject of a
revelation; but meets us at all points, when we consider the unequal
distribution of the blessings of nature. Why many persons should be
destitute of the advantages which others enjoy, and why some should pass
a life of suffering, while others are surrounded with every comfort, are
questions which naturally arise in the minds of reflecting men, but which
have hitherto remained without full and satisfactory answers. He who
would give a complete reply must have clearer views, than have yet been
obtained, with regard to the origin of evil. It may be observed too
that, on the supposition that the Bible is a real revelation from God,
and bearing in mind the vast number of the human race to whom it has
already been given, and its capability of future communication, it far
more nearly meets the difficulty, than abstruse speculations respecting
the Deity, which can scarcely be apprehended even by philosophers, and
which are to the mass wholly unintelligible.
* * * * *
2. Let us now examine _the conditions under which a revelation may be
expected to be given to the original recipients_.
It may be observed in the first place that a revelation _must possess
some distinctive character_. Even, if it should turn out that there is
no such thing in reality at all, at least the notion which we form in our
minds must possess such points of difference as to distinguish it from
all other notions. It appears needful to bear this in mind, obvious
though it is, because there are not a few, in the present day, who
deprive the word, revelation, of nearly all the distinguishing features
which have commonly been supposed to attach to it, and so extend the
meaning of the word inspiration as "sometimes to believe it in poets,
legislators, philosophers, and others gifted with high genius," (Essays
and Reviews, p. 140). What this means it is hard to say. Shakespeare,
Milton, Newton, and others certainly did not imagine that they had direct
communication with God; that they revealed to us His nature, and the
relation in which He stands to us; predicted future events, etc., in the
same sense that Moses, David, Isaiah, and the other writers of the Bible
are supposed to have done. If they actually did anything of this kind,
they were assuredly wholly unconscious of their power; nor, we may add,
has common opinion held that they afforded information on the same
subjects as those which the writers of the Bible handled. Admirers of
our poets, and philosophers, have not considered it necessary to
promulgate what they have found in their writings, as matters in which
the spiritual, and, possibly, eternal interests of man are vitally
concerned; although believers in the Bible, and even in Mahomet, have
done so. The word inspiration, in fact, as used in the passage above
quoted, involves a confusion of ideas which we should hardly have
expected to find in the writings of any one who professed to speak
accurately, and appears scarcely pardonable, or even honest, in the case
of so acute a thinker, as the late Mr. Baden Powell. We are not now
saying that the Bible is a revelation from God, or even that there is
such a thing as a distinctive revelation at all. All we assert is, that
the idea of such a thing is a very common one, and that it is very
different from that which is usually held with regard to the works of
Newton, Milton, and other gifted sages and philosophers. We might add,
in passing, that, unless the Bible be an imposture--in which case it
ought to be regarded as far inferior to the works of genuine and truthful
poets and philosophers--it does correspond, as we trust will be seen, on
an examination of its contents, to the idea referred to.
Still further, revelation must not only have some distinctive character;
but, in order to be effectual for its purpose, _it should carry along
with it_, _to the original recipients_, _a reasonable conviction of its
authenticity_. The Bible speaks of several professed modes of
communication, and accepting them according to the ordinary meaning of
words, and not in any mythical, or ideological sense, they appear to be
such as might answer for the purpose of authentication. The Lord talked
with Abraham. He appeared in a burning bush to Moses, spake to him and
the children of Israel on Mount Sinai, and conversed with him afterwards
on the top of that mountain, during a period of forty days. He spake in
the night to Samuel. He appeared in a vision to Isaiah and others. To
some He made Himself known in dreams. Christ spake to His disciples.
All these are evidently ways in which God might communicate with man; and
there is no difficulty in supposing that the attendant circumstances,
such for instance as some of those recorded in the Bible, might be of
such a kind as to authenticate the communication. It would be idle to
argue that, because God does not make Himself known in any of these ways
now, He has never done so; for, to omit other considerations, we may
observe that, in accordance with the economy which prevails in the works
of God, we have no reason to suppose that He would make special
revelations to more persons than might be necessary for the purpose He
had in view. If He revealed Himself to them, the promulgation of the
revelation would be naturally and safely left to more ordinary
instrumentality. At the present time, so far as Christians are
concerned, they do not expect a special revelation to themselves,
because, as they believe, God has already communicated all that He
desires them to know.
But supposing a revelation to be sufficiently authenticated,--What may be
reasonably expected as to the _extent_ of it? It is, we think, clear in
the first place that _no perfect knowledge of God and His relation to us
could be communicated_. Even if a direct presentation of the Infinite
were given, the capacity of man could not grasp it, and therefore the
result would be a finite conception; and, if the revelation were made by
words or other signs, it is plain that these can only express the finite
ideas of which they are the symbols.
Nor is there anything in this which need excite our surprise; for the
limited nature of our knowledge with regard to God would be analogous to
that which we have about other things. There is nothing with regard to
which our knowledge is not limited. Some may be ready to affirm that we
do not know things in themselves at all, but only the effects produced
upon us, or their relation to us. We are not about to maintain this
proposition; but it is at any rate plain that the most familiar objects,
as science advances, often disclose to us new qualities, and that we have
no reason to suppose that we are fully acquainted with all the qualities
of even the simplest substances. There is no reason to expect that the
book of revelation should be more explicit than that of nature.
Not only, however, _must_ our knowledge, derived from revelation, be, in
some degree, limited; but it is not difficult to see, why _it would be
probably kept even within the range of what it is possible for us to
know_. We can readily understand that the object of God in making a
revelation would be to inform us about those things only, a knowledge of
which might be essential to our interests; and here again the analogy of
the natural world comes in to assist us. God has given to each existence
such qualities as are requisite for the position in which it is placed.
Ascending through the various classes of animals, we find, as we advance,
the capacities for knowledge increasing, and bearing a relation to their
actual circumstances. The mole is not endowed with the far-seeing vision
which is essential to the well-being of the eagle: nor, on the other
hand, has the eagle the power of threading its way through the earth,
without which the mole could not exist. Viewing man in relation to the
natural world, we find that he has the power of obtaining that kind of
knowledge which is necessary to his welfare here, although, in many
respects, he is far surpassed by the keener perceptions of the inferior
animals. God has in fact ordered and limited his knowledge with an
express reference to the position which he is called upon to occupy.
This throws light upon the subject of revelation. It is reasonable to
expect that God would limit the knowledge communicated in that way also,
by a consideration of the state in which man is placed here, and of that
which, upon the supposition of a future state, he is to occupy hereafter.
So far as we have yet gone, there does not appear to be any reason why
the knowledge, although limited, should not be accurate as far as it
goes. Though we do not know all the properties of particular objects, we
may know some of them, and may also safely reason about those with which
we are acquainted, so long as we are careful not to introduce into the
reasoning anything which does not result from our actual knowledge; and
so, turning from nature to a revelation, we may learn much from it about
God, as for instance, that He is a God of love and holiness; that He will
act towards us in a particular manner; that He will punish some actions
and recompense others; and this knowledge also may be a true knowledge,
so far as it goes, and one that we may safely act upon, although we may
still be in ignorance of His exact nature and many points of our
relationship to Him.
There is, however, a light in which revelation must be viewed, which
involves considerations of a somewhat different character from those
hitherto noticed, and to this we now turn. A revelation must not only be
limited by the extent of the human capacity for receiving it, and by the
proposed object of it, but also, in a considerable degree, by _the state
of knowledge existing in the world at the time it is made_. In fact,
without some such limitation, it would be unintelligible, and,
consequently no revelation. As this truth has frequently been
misapplied, we will endeavour to explain, as accurately as we can, our
meaning. God could, perhaps, if He thought proper, give in an ignorant
age a revelation, as full and explicit, as in a more enlightened
period--a revelation we mean which should be understood--but it must be
remembered that this could only be effected by altering the conditions
under which human knowledge is acquired. For example, to have given a
correct theory of the motions of the heavenly bodies, before the age of
Newton, would have been impossible, without an entire change both in the
existing state of knowledge, and also in the method of acquiring it.
Down to the present time all history and experience testify to the fact
that the acquisition of knowledge is _gradual_; but such a revelation, as
that to which we have referred, would require that it should be made _per
saltum_. If knowledge were given in this way the usual course would be
completely changed; and not only so, but the knowledge communicated would
be altogether out of proportion to that possessed on other points, and
would place those who had it in a false and unsatisfactory state with
regard to the world in which they lived. To see this we have only to
picture to ourselves the condition of a man living in a savage, or only
partially civilized state of society, with his mind preternaturally
expanded to that of a Newton, and put into possession of the knowledge
which he had on some of those subjects which the Bible touches on. How
entirely out of harmony would he be with his fellow-men, and everything
around him! and, how unable would he be even to pursue his studies for
want of those instruments, books, and appliances which a more advanced
state of society alone can produce! A revelation of this kind would
clearly not be a boon, but an injury to him. It may be observed,
moreover, that a revelation, adapted to the knowledge even of a Newton,
would neither exactly correspond with facts, nor obviate all the
difficulties which a more enlightened age might discover. We do not stop
to dwell upon the obvious fact, that such a revelation, as that which we
have been noticing, would require not only a preternatural expansion of
faculties in the person to whom it was made, but also a similar
expansion, or, if not, a long educational process in the case of all
those who should receive it. We conclude, then, that a revelation must
be adapted to, and in a great degree limited by, the state of knowledge
existing in the world at the time when such revelation is made.
This leads us to a consideration of the _necessarily phenomenal character
of some portions of a revelation_, respecting which objections against
the Bible have been frequently raised. We will, to explain our views,
take as an example, the familiar instance of the sun and earth.
According to appearance the sun moves, and the earth is stationary: but
science has demonstrated that the opposite to this is the real state of
the case. What line might it be expected that a revelation would take,
when it had to deal with a case of this kind? Should it speak according
to appearances, or realities? This, we believe, is the exact point to be
considered, and we do not think, when fairly put, that it is one about
which there is much difficulty. If a revelation were given to an
ignorant people, in accordance with the reality, it is quite clear that
they would not be in a condition to receive it, and would therefore,
probably, reject it as absurd; but if the description were given
according to the appearance presented, then no difficulty would be felt.
The question, however, is pressed--whether such a mode of representation
is consistent with the truthfulness which may be expected in a
revelation.
It might, we think, be a sufficient reply to say that, as, according to
our former reasoning, it is, in many cases, the only possible mode of
revelation consistent with the established order of things, we may well
be content with it; but we will pursue the subject a little further, with
the view of making clear how the matter stands. It may be observed that,
if absolute truth on a particular subject cannot be communicated, the
nearest approximation to it is, not only all that can be expected, but is
in itself highly desirable. If a man is unable to receive as full an
apprehension of a thing as we have ourselves, we must endeavour to give
him the most perfect information which he is capable of receiving. We do
not injure him by doing this, but we should injure him if we omitted to
do it. If a man, who had lived all his life in the Arctic regions, and
had never heard of any other country, were to be brought to England, it
would not be necessary to tell him, with a view to his comfort here, the
motion of the earth with regard to the sun, and the causes of the length
of our days and nights, and of the variation of the seasons. To enter
into these matters would confuse his mind, and the man, if he had to earn
his living, would starve while he was acquiring the knowledge of them.
By such a course of proceeding we should, in reality, do him a great
injustice. Instead of attempting anything of the kind, we should
naturally give him such information as might be requisite for his
practical guidance, in a popular manner, and leave to himself the
acquisition of such scientific truth as he might be desirous of becoming
acquainted with. In a word, we should describe to him things as they
appear to be, and in this respect our description would be, in a certain
sense, true; we should not describe them as they really are, and so far
our description would not be in strict accordance with the facts of the
case. We were about to say that it is a choice of difficulties; but, is
there any real difficulty in the case? Does not the common sense of
mankind declare that the mode of proceeding which we have described is
the only proper one, and that there is no real untruthfulness in it? It
may be noticed too that even scientific men continually make use of it
amongst themselves, and in their intercourse with others, and this
without any charge of untruthfulness being brought against them. What
objection then can possibly lie against the adoption of the same method
in a revelation? {17} The supposed object of a revelation is to save the
soul, or, at least, to advance in a material degree our spiritual
interests. Is that to be put aside till the world has learnt scientific
truth, and is able to converse in scientific language? We feel no
difficulty in leaving the answer to this question to the common sense of
mankind in general. We conclude, then, that as phenomenal truth is in
many cases the only truth which can possibly be afforded, and the
imparting of it is a boon, and not an injury, there is no reason why the
Deity should not, when He sees fit, make use of this mode of
communication in revelation.
We will now notice, distinctly, _words as a medium of revelation_. It is
plain, that in communicating knowledge, they are only effectual by
calling up in the mind of the hearer ideas _already_ existing. To speak
to a man who has been blind from his birth, of colours would be useless,
because he has had no experience of them, and consequently no ideas
corresponding to them. Words may bring up ideas in a different
_combination_ from any which had previously existed in the mind of the
person spoken to; but they cannot _create_ ideas. They may make the
hearer acquainted with something which he has never actually perceived;
may cause him to reason in a new manner; to see a familiar object in a
fresh light, or, in some other way, bring the faculties of the mind into
play; but still the mind, so far as instruction by words is concerned,
can only act upon its previous stores, and analyze or combine them into
new forms. This being the case, it is clear that a revelation, so far as
it is made by words, must be limited by the ideas previously existing in
the mind of the person to whom it is made. These ideas, too, however
numerous and refined they may be, are limited by the experience which a
man has had of the external world, and of himself. He cannot get beyond
these. If, then, God should think fit to reveal, in words, a knowledge
of Himself, or any other object which does not come within the direct
cognizance of our perceptive faculties, this can only be effected by
calling up in the mind, through the words, some new combination of ideas
already possessed. This may not correspond precisely with the object,
respecting which the revelation is made; but, as it is the only way in
which a revelation by words can be effected, we have no just reason to
find fault with it. All we have a right to expect, is that the words
should call up in the mind those ideas which best represent the object
designed to be revealed.
This may tend to throw some light upon what are called anthropomorphic
ideas of God. These have sometimes been spoken of as inadequate, and
degrading. Inadequate they certainly are, as every notion which we can
have of the Deity must be; but we are unable to see in what way they are
degrading. Almost every nation, following apparently the necessity of
our nature, has clothed its gods in the objective form of some familiar
animal, or other existence, and endowed them with qualities of which they
had experience. What wonder then if God, seeing that He must, unless the
conditions of our nature were altered, make use of ideas with which we
are already familiar, should adopt an anthropomorphic representation of
Himself, purified, exalted, and adapted, as far as possible, to His own
infinite perfections? In fact, we know not how God could declare Himself
as just, righteous, pure, and loving, or reveal our responsibility to
Himself, without a reference to man, inasmuch as he is the only being, of
which we have any actual experience, who possesses, even in a limited
degree, qualities of such a description. Assuredly then it cannot be a
degrading notion of the Deity to regard Him as invested with the highest
attributes of which we have a conception. We are aware that some
philosophers talk much of the Infinite, and the Absolute, as conveying
more exalted notions of the Divine Being. What the exact meaning of
those terms is philosophers find it difficult to declare, and the common
people are almost wholly unable to understand. Certainly such highly
abstract terms convey little distinct meaning. It will be found upon
examination, that the word "Infinite," to stir in any degree the depths
of our nature, must be combined with some quality with which we are
familiar. Infinite love, infinite justice, infinite purity, are things
which we can in some degree understand and appreciate; but the point
which we understand best is not the "Infinite," but the finite,--the
love,--the justice,--the purity; and these are ideas taken from what we
find in some imperfect degree in ourselves. To those who believe that
man was made "in the image of God," and that the Word, being God, became
also man, the train of thought here indicated will come home with
additional force.
What has been said with regard to a revelation, made by words, applies,
in its main points, to a revelation made directly to the mind through
_ideas_, without the intervention of words. To see this clearly, let us
bear in mind the distinction between a perception and an idea. An idea
is the result of a perception. We perceive a rose when it is presented
to our senses, and we see, smell, or touch it. We have an idea of it,
when, not being any longer presented, we think of it, and call to mind
its qualities. We are said to have a perception of anger, or love, or
any other emotion, when those feelings are present to the mind. We have
ideas of them, when we think about them. It is not our object to enter
upon any abstruse discussion as to the origin of ideas. What has been
just advanced will be generally admitted by metaphysicians, and readily
understood by others. Hoping, then, that the distinction between an idea
and a perception will be carried in the mind, we will proceed with our
argument. There is no difficulty in supposing--and this, we believe,
corresponds very closely to an opinion commonly entertained respecting
inspiration--that God could, without the intervention of words, call up
in the mind such ideas as He might think fit. For instance, instead of
speaking the words, "Thou shalt do no murder," He might, in a
preternatural manner, excite in the mind the ideas corresponding to them.
Still, however, unless we suppose the conditions of human thought to be
altered in a manner for which we have no analogy, the ideas of a man,
killing, etc., must previously exist in the mind, or the revelation would
be unintelligible. Whether, then, the ideas are called up, through the
instrumentality of words, or in some other way, is immaterial to our
present argument. The point we insist on is that, except in the case of
actual perception, the communication of knowledge, by revelation, or
otherwise, _must be limited by the ideas previously existing in the mind
of the person to whom the communication is made_. These ideas may be
combined into new forms, and new relations may be discovered between
them, or they may be analyzed into their constituent parts, but we cannot
transcend the ideas themselves, except by new perceptions.
Let it not, however, be imagined that a revelation, conveyed through the
instrumentality of ideas previously existing, must be so narrow as to
convey little or no new information, or instruction. We have only to
look at the works of Milton, Newton, Shakespeare, and other great men, to
see the almost endless variety with which ideas, and the relations in
which they stand to each other, may be so combined and disposed, as to
minister to the imagination, or enrich the mind with fresh stores of
knowledge. All the information which we derive from books, or
conversation, is obtained in this way, and to it we must probably
attribute by far the largest portion of our mental acquisitions, after
the period of childhood. So far, indeed, as the promulgation of a
revelation by its original recipients is concerned, it appears plain that
it must be made, almost necessarily, through the instrumentality of
words, inasmuch as they are the best signs which can be made use of in
the communication of knowledge.
Before, however, proceeding to this portion of the subject, it appears
desirable to make a few additional observations with regard to a
revelation by _perception_. We have already had occasion to notice that
"the Deity does not, like other objects, come within the direct
cognizance of our perceptive faculties" (p. 5), and that, "even if a
direct presentation of the Infinite were given . . . the result would be
a finite conception" (p. 12). It may, however, be imagined that a direct
presentation, even though issuing in a finite conception, or a
representation either addressed _ab extra_ to our perceptive faculties,
or brought before us in a vision, or a dream, or otherwise, would convey
to the mind a more correct apprehension of God's nature than could be
obtained in any other way. These cases, though differing in some
particulars, may, for our present purpose, be regarded as identical, and
treated as perceptions. Now there can be no doubt that a perception
conveys a more vivid impression to the mind than a description; and we
may, therefore, reasonably suppose that, in a revelation, God might use
this method of communicating knowledge in those cases to which it might
be specially adapted. Thus, for instance, if God designed to give an
idea of some place or being which we had never seen, He might effect
this, in a very perfect manner, by bringing such a place or being, either
in reality, or by representation, within the range of our perceptive
faculties. The appearance vouchsafed by God to Moses (Exod. xxxiii.
19-23), the vision of Ezekiel (Ezek. xxxvii. 1-10), and the description
given by St. Paul (2 Cor. xii. 1-4), will serve as illustrations of our
meaning.
It must not, however, be taken for granted that such a mode of revelation
would, in every case, be possible; or that, if possible, it would always
be the best method of communication. So far as we can see, no mere
presentation, or representation of the Deity, could, in itself, give any
deep insight into His moral character, or the relation in which He stands
to us. Even if the Deity were constantly present, we know not how we
could obtain any accurate knowledge of His attributes, except by
observation of His words and acts. If we had been introduced to the
philanthropist, Howard, we could not have become acquainted with his
excellence by merely gazing at his countenance. We must have listened to
his words, and followed him to those scenes of misery which he was in the
habit of visiting, if we would obtain a clear understanding of his
benevolence. So too, the holiness, love, and other moral perfections of
the Deity, are not matters which can be apprehended from any mere
intuition of the Divine nature. A glorious exhibition of the Divine
presence, such, for instance, as that described in Exodus, as having
occurred on Mount Sinai, might inspire feelings of awe, and enable those
who witnessed it to apprehend more clearly, perhaps, than could have been
effected in any other way, the dignity and majesty of God; but, for a
revelation of His moral nature, and the relation in which He stands to
man, we must look more to words--such words, for instance, as He is said
to have spoken to the children of Israel at that time, and afterwards,
during forty days, to Moses. While, then, we think that a revelation by
perception, with regard to some things, might be expected, we do not
consider that it would convey a large amount of information, unless it
were combined with a revelation through words. Words are, in fact, the
most natural and effectual mode of imparting most kinds of knowledge, and
we may, therefore, reasonably expect that, in any revelation which the
Divine Being might think fit to make to man, they would form a chief
method of communication. When we thus speak of words in connection with
a revelation, we do not mean only words addressed actually to the ear,
but also such, as in a dream or vision, may appear to be spoken. We
desire also that it should be remembered that, for the main purpose of
our argument, it is not so much words as _ideas_ which we wish to keep in
view. What we chiefly wish to leave on the mind is, that a revelation,
except so far as a new perception may be given, _must be limited by the
ideas previously existing in the mind of the person to whom it is made_.
It may be reasonably expected that God would make use of those ideas
which were best adapted to His purpose, but not that He should transcend
the ideas themselves. If, too, we suppose that a new perception is
given, that perception could not be explained to others, except through
the instrumentality of such ideas as those to which we have referred.
Our object hitherto has been to explain the conditions under which a
direct revelation from God may be expected to be _given_. If we have
been able to remove from the minds of our readers vague and indefinite
notions on the subject, and to put, in their place, something clearer and
more distinct, our object thus far will have been answered.
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to state that, by what has been said
above, we do not intend to intimate that the recipient of a direct
revelation must, necessarily, always understand the exact meaning of such
a revelation. It may contain a hidden meaning, to be evident at some
future time. Thus, for instance, on the supposition that the first
chapter of Ezekiel is a revelation from God, it is probable that the
meaning of it was as unintelligible to Ezekiel, as it is generally
considered to be at the present time. But the meaning of the words
themselves, and their connection with each other are clear. It is in the
application that the difficulty arises. So, too, as advances are made in
knowledge, words, and the ideas belonging to them, acquire a more
extended and fuller meaning. The ideas involved in the word, _sun_, are
very different to the philosopher and the peasant; and some ideas
contained in a revelation may be of such a kind as not to be fully
understood till more knowledge has been acquired, than existed at the
time when the revelation was made. But to suppose that the words convey
no meaning to the original recipient of the revelation, is to say that no
revelation is made to him at all, and it certainly hardly appears
probable that the Divine Being should make a communication which could
answer no end to the person to whom it was addressed.
* * * * *
3. We now proceed to an examination of the conditions under which _a
revelation may be recorded_, _or otherwise made known by the person who
has received it_. Here we see at once that, for all practical purposes,
the method of communication must be _words_; for it is not necessary to
take into account such visual representations as might be made to the eye
by painting or otherwise. Words may be oral, or written. As the latter
are more likely to be well weighed and definite than the former, and are,
moreover, better calculated to hand down a truth from age to age, we
shall confine our attention to them, although what we have to say is, in
a great degree, applicable to spoken words also. We start with the
supposition that God has already made known to some particular person, as
perfectly as He has thought fit, and, it may be, as perfectly as the
nature of the subject admitted, or the capability of the person to whom
the communication has been made would allow, some truth which is to be
recorded for the benefit of the present, and future generations. The
question we have to answer is,--how this may be most effectually
accomplished.