of “necessary.” We are now speaking only in the widest sense, in which
universality is a property of all judgment whatever. If we assume that
all our intellectual natures are the same, then to be universal is a
mere consequence of being necessary. I not only feel that my judgment
is inevitable for me, but I never think of doubting that, given the
same materials, it is obligatory for every other intelligent being.
If some one disagrees with a judgment of mine, I try to put the case
before him as it is in my mind. And I am absolutely sure that if I
could do so, he {27} would be obliged to judge as I do. If it were not
so, we should never think of arguing. We should simply say, “Perhaps
his mind is differently constituted from mine,” as, in fact, with
reference to special sets of dominant ideas, and to special provinces
of experience, we often do say. But these we regard as hindrances,
imperfections, accidents. We do not doubt that the system of reason is
active in him as in us.
And thus, as reason is essentially a system, the universality of
judgment involves something more. We not only think that our judgment
is obligatory upon every one else, in as far as they have the same
materials, but we think that it must be _consistent with_ the
judgments of all other persons, just as much as with our own. If it
is inconsistent with any other judgment, we think that one of the two
must be wrong; that is, we will not admit the possibility that the real
world, as others construct it, is out of harmony with the real world as
we construct it.
Thus knowledge, being judgment, is necessary and universal, and in the
widest sense this is true of all judgments.
_Judgment is constructive_
(c) These are two properties of the Judgment, but they do not tell us
what it is. We shall of course examine its nature more fully in the
later lectures. At present we need only think of it as affirmation.
This may be simply described as “pronouncing the interpretation of our
perceptions to form one system with the data of our perceptions.” We
may at once admit the distinction between _data_ and interpretation to
be only relative. Its relativity is the consequence of the constructed
or so to speak artificial {28} character of our real world. We can get
at no data unqualified by judgment.
We may take as an example our perception of things in space. How
much of what we see is given in present sense-perception? This is a
question to which there is no definite answer. We do not know what
the presentations of vision were like before we had learnt to see as
a fully conscious human being sees. We have no right to assume, that
after we have learned to see in this way the actual sense-presentation
remains the same as it was in a different stage of our visual
education. We can give no precise meaning in the way of a time-limit
to the _presentness_ of perception. But we know this much, that it
takes a long time and many kinds of experience to learn to see as an
educated human being sees, and that this acquired capacity is never at
a stand-still, but is always being extended or diminished according to
the vitality, growth, or atrophy of our apperceptive masses. There is
always a certain element of amplification or interpretation, which by
experience, or attentive introspection we can eliminate from the data,
apparently forced upon us by reality, although these data themselves
are modified through and through both by habitual interpretation,
and by the very defining attention which aims at eliminating all
amplification from them.
But yet the whole of sense-perception has a peculiar quality in being
_present_. Artificial though it is, it yet, relatively speaking,
contains an irreducible datum. It is distinguishable from everything
which is not present. It is pervaded by something which we cannot
reduce to {29} intellectual relation, though if we withdrew from it all
that is relation, the apparent datum would be gone.
Now Knowledge is the affirmation or judgment which identifies the
constructive interpretation of our present perception with the reality
which present perception forces upon us. This is clear enough to begin
with, but will have to be modified below to suit the more circuitous or
mediate types of Judgment.
I take two examples, one from sight and one from sound.
Here is a table. In common language we should all say, “We see that
is a table.” The expression is quite correct, because human seeing
is a judgment. But yet, if you were asked to reduce your perception
to terms of sight pure and simple--I mean of visual sensation--why,
unless you were an analytic psychologist or a very skilful artist,
you would not be able to do it. To speak of one point only, you would
have to eliminate the attribute of depth and distance. That is all, so
far as mere vision is concerned, your theory and your interpretation.
The problem for an artist is to get back, at his high plane of
perceptive power, to what in theory would be the lower plane. He has to
re-translate his perception of a thing in space into a flat coloured
surface. The difference between his flat picture and a real object in
space is a rough measure of the difference made by interpretation or
implication in the datum of sense-perception when we say, judging by
sight only, “That is a table.” All the experiences of touch and motion,
from which we have learned to perceive the solidity of the object, are,
theoretically speaking, put into the judgment by us. They are not given
by the eye alone, although we cannot now {30} separate them from that
which is given by the eye alone. For the artist’s flat picture, which
I used as an illustration, is not a stage in our visual education.
Our visual education has proceeded _pari passu_ with our education by
touch and motion; and we saw objects in space as solids, long before
we reflected that for the eye alone a coloured surface would naturally
appear as flat. [1]
[1] The view that depth is a visual datum in the same sense as
breadth seems to me in flagrant contradiction with experience.
But for our present purpose the question is only one of degree,
as no one maintains, that either depth or breadth are seen
without education as an adult sees them.
But this impossibility of getting at an original datum only shows
how entirely we are right in saying that our world is constructed
by judgment. For the process of interpretative amplification passes
quite continuously from the unconscious to the conscious; and every
definitely expressed judgment, though perfectly homogeneous with the
processes which have qualified its datum, and though it may fall
wholly within the maximum of what in ordinary parlance we should call
a simple given perception, contains an identification of some ideal
element, enlargement, or interpretation, with that relatively given
element which reveals itself through a peculiar quality of presentness
pervading the “given” perception.
In the example “That is a table,” the unity of judgment is so well
shown that the identification becomes almost unreal. In fact, we never
judge except to satisfy an interest and so simple a judgment used as an
example, apart from any context which could explain the need for it,
has an air of unreality. You may hear a child make such a judgment {31}
constantly in the sheer pleasure of recognition. An adult would never
make it explicitly unless in some particular context; but it is made,
as I shall maintain below, by the mere glance of his eye which takes in
the table as a real object in a real world of space. Its appearance to
the eye is in this case the datum, while the interpretation consists in
construing this appearance as a solid individual existence in space.
We will look at an example in which the discrimination of elements is
easier. Take the affirmation, “That is a cab,” assuming it to be made
from merely hearing a sound. In this we can much more nearly separate
the datum or minimum of sense from our enlargement or interpretation
of it, and we know that our interpretation is liable to be wrong;
that is to say, the reality into which we ought to construe the sound
may be some other kind of vehicle, and not a cab. Now compare this
with the affirmation, “That (which I see) is a cab.” This judgment of
sight-perception, though its terms are more inextricably interwoven,
has just the same elements in it as the judgment of sound-perception,
“That (which I hear) is a cab.” In the sound-perception the structure
is quite plain. A particular complex quality in the sound suggests as
its objective explanation, what is perfectly distinguishable from it in
thought, the movement of a cab on a particular kind of pavement. The
quality of the sound, its roughness, loudness, increase and decrease,
all form points of connection with the sound of a cab as we know it,
and with the speed, weight, etc. of such a vehicle. But it is quite
easy to consider the sound in itself apart from its interpretation, and
we sometimes feel the {32} interpretation to be more immediate, and
sometimes more inferential. We sometimes say, “I hear a cab,” just as
we say, “I see one,” but in case of sound we more often perhaps say,
“That sounds like--” such and such a thing, which indicates a doubt,
and the beginning of conscious inference.
Thus we see how continuous is the mental construction of reality.
From our unreflective education in seeing, hearing, and touching, to
the explicit judgment of the trained observer, which in its turn
passes readily into inference, there is no definite break. Once the
idea of reality, or of a world, is applied in practice (I do not say
reflectively grasped), there is no further difficulty in principle
throughout the whole process of its construction.
We may then sum up so far: our knowledge, or our world in knowledge,
exists for us as a judgment, that is, as an affirmation in which our
present perception is amplified by an ideal interpretation which is
identified with it. This interpretation or enlargement claims necessity
or universality, and is therefore objective as our world, _i.e._ is
what we are _obliged_ to think, and what we are _all_ obliged to
think. The whole system in process of construction, viz. our present
perception as extended by interpretation, is what we mean by reality,
only with a reservation in favour of forms of experience which are
not intellectual at all. Every judgment then affirms something to be
real, and therefore affirms reality to be defined, in part, by that
something. Knowledge exists in the form of affirmations about reality.
And our world as existing for us in the medium of knowledge consists,
for us, of a standing affirmation about reality.
{33} _Continuous affirmation of waking consciousness_
4. This standing affirmation about reality may be described in
other words as “the continuous affirmative judgment of the waking
consciousness.” In the common logic-books you will find judgment
treated only as the “proposition,” that is, as an assertion made in
language. That is a very convenient way of treating the judgment,
and is not false, if you remember that the proposition, that is, the
assertory sentence, is rather a translation of the judgment than the
judgment itself. But the judgment expressed in a proposition is always
some one definite assertion, with a limited subject and predicate. We
shall speak of the judgment in this sense--the usual sense--later. But
to-day I want to describe the judgment in a more extended sense, that
is, as co-extensive with the waking human consciousness, so far as
aware of a world.
If Judgment consists in the extension of our perceptions by an
interpretation considered as equally real with their content, it
clearly is not confined to the particular facts and truths which from
time to time we utter in language. And more than this, everything that
we do definitely utter, implies a great deal which is not definitely
uttered. If I say, “I have to catch the train at Sloane Square to go
down to Essex Hall,” I only mention the reality of one train, one
square, and one building. But my assertion shades off into innumerable
facts, the equal reality of which as elements in my world is necessary
to make this judgment intelligible and true. It implies the real
existence of the underground railway, which implies that of London, and
therefore that of the surface of our globe in a certain definite order,
and of the civilised world. It implies the reality of this building and
of the meetings which we hold in it, of the University {34} Extension
system, and of my own life and habits as enabling me to take part in
the work of that system. Only a part of this is in the focus of my
attention as I judge; but the whole is a continuous context, the parts
of which are inseparable; and although I do not affirm the whole of it
in so many words, when I say that I am coming down here by train this
evening, yet if any part of it was not affirmed the rest would, so to
speak, fall to pieces, _i.e._ would lose relations in the absence of
which its meaning would be destroyed. Other detached parts of one’s
life and knowledge may seem to be separable from the content of such
a judgment; but on looking closely we see that this is not the case.
So long as we are awake, our whole world is conceived as real, and
forms for us a single immense affirmation, which hangs from present
perception, and shares its constraining power. My present perception
is the illuminated spot, and shades off gradually into the rest which
forms the background, receiving from this background its organised
systematic individuality, while impressing upon it a relation to
its own sensuous presentness. We have only to reflect, in order to
illustrate this connection, on the way in which the idea of London
forms a determining background for the present perception of this
room, while on the other hand it is perceived by us as real in our
presentation of this room.
And indeed the simplest example of what I am pointing out is the
arrangement of objects and places in space. The visual picture which
each of us forms of this room is certainly an affirmative judgment. It
is a judgment because it consists of ideas affirmed as true of reality.
As we look round, all the distances of the objects and the walls from
{35} each other, and their shapes and position, seem to be imprinted on
our minds without an effort. But really they are conclusions from long
education in the art of seeing and from the experience of the other
senses. They are an enlargement or interpretation of sense-perception,
taken as real, _i.e._ as forming a system which is one with the
content of sense-perception, and touches us through sense-perception,
and therefore they exist for us in the form of Judgment. And, as I
described before, our whole world, both of things in space and of our
own history and circumstances, is also affirmed as the background
implied in this picture. That is to say, it is all connected together,
it is all taken as equally real, and it is all vouched for by its
connection with what is given to us in perception. What do we mean by
saying that the Antipodes are real, and implied in my perception of
this room? We mean that they are an element, necessary to educated
thought, in the same system with which I am in contact at this moment
by sight, touch, and hearing, the system of reality. And though I may
not have explicitly thoughts of them since entering the room till now,
yet, if they were no part of my affirmed system of ideas, my perception
of anything in space would be quite different from what it is.
This sense of necessary connection is confined, I think, to our
_waking_ consciousness. Of course there are degrees between waking and
dreaming; but I should be inclined to set up the presence or absence
of judgment as a very fair test of those degrees. We say that a man
is _awake_ in as far as he is aware (i) of a reality which is not his
mere course of consciousness, and (ii.) of the same reality of which
other {36} people are aware; _i.e._ in as far as he identifies his
present perception with a reality, and that the real reality. It is
said that surprise, _i.e._ the sense of conflict between expectation
and the reality, is absent In dreams, and in a very remarkable passage
Aeschylus identifies the life of the savage in his (imaginary)
primitive state with a dream-life, considered as a life of sensuous
presentation, in which the interpretative judgment of perception was
absent. With extraordinary profoundness, in portraying this all but
animal existence, he strikes out all those relations to the objective
world by which man forms for himself a system that goes beyond the
present, so as to leave the stream of presentation without any
background of organised reality. [1]
[1] I quote from Mrs. Browning’s Translation of the _Prometheus
Bound_, which seems close enough for the present purpose.
“And let me tell you, not as taunting men,
But teaching you the intention of my gifts,
How first, _beholding, they beheld in vain.
And hearing, heard not, but, like shapes in dreams_,
Mixed all things wildly down the tedious time,
Nor knew to build a house against the sun
With wicketed sides, nor any woodwork knew,
But lived, like silly ants, beneath the ground,
In hollow caves unsunned. There came to them
No steadfast sign of winter, nor of spring
Flower-perfumed, nor of summer full of fruit.
But blindly and lawlessly they did all things,
Until I taught them how the stars do rise
And set in mystery, and devised for them
Number, the inducer of philosophies.
The synthesis of letters, and besides,
The artificer of all things, Memory,
That sweet muse-mother.” _Pr_., v. 445, ff.
The expression “seeing saw not, and hearing heard not” appears to
suggest the contrast of presentation and objective perception.
{37} It may be asked, “Why should not a man form for himself a system
which interprets his own perception, but is discrepant from the system
of every one else? Should we in that case count him as awake?” Yes, he
would be awake, but he would be mad. Suppose, being a common man, he
interprets all his perceptions into a system which makes him out to
be King of England; in such a case he cannot be set down as dreaming,
because he is alleging a connection which goes beyond his present
perception, and has, ostensibly, been propounded as an interpretation
of it into a systematic order of things. He has in short _a_ world, but
he has broken away from _the_ world, and therefore we pronounce him
mad. A completely new vision of life may cause a man to be thought mad.
[1]
[1] See Browning’s _Epistle of Karshish_.
The whole world, then, of our waking [1] consciousness may be treated
as a single connected predicate affirmed as an enlargement of present
perception. All that we take to be real is by the mere fact of being so
taken, brought within an affirmative judgment.
[1] I do not mean to say that judgment and consciousness of
a world can be wholly absent in dreams, and often no doubt
they are distinctly present. But in those dreams, in my own
experience the normal ones, which leave behind a mere impression
that unrecognisable images have passed before the mind, judgment
and the sense of reality must surely have all but disappeared. I
am inclined to think that dreams are very much rationalised in
recollection and description.
_Comparison with world as Will_
5. To further illustrate the relation of what, in our permanent
judgment, is distinctly thought, what is dimly thought, and what is
implied, let us look for a moment at what we may call “the world
as will.” This is _not_ the doctrine of Schopenhauer in his work,
_The World as Will and Idea_, {38} although the two conceptions have
something in common. His is a metaphysical doctrine, in which he says
that the fundamental reality of the Universe must be conceived as
Will. We have nothing to do with that. We are speaking merely of what
the world is for us, and for us it is not only a system of reality
but a system of purposes. Our world of will is a permanent factor of
our waking consciousness, just as much as our world of knowledge.
Now our will is made up of a great number of purposes, more or less
connected together, just as our knowledge is made up of a great number
of provinces and regions more or less connected together. And just as
in our knowledge at any moment much is clear, much is dim, much is
implied, and the whole forms a continuous context, so it is with our
purposes.
When, for example, one stands looking at a picture, one’s immediate
conscious purpose is to study the picture. One also entertains dimly or
by force of habit the purpose to remain standing, which is a curious
though common instance of will. We do not attend to the purpose of
walking or standing, yet we only walk or stand (in normal conditions
of mind) as long as we will to do so. If we go to sleep or faint, we
shall fall down. Purpose, like judgment, is confined to the waking
consciousness.
But further; the purpose which one entertains in standing to look at a
picture is not really an isolated pin-point of will. It is uppermost
in the mind at the moment in which we carry it out, but it is only the
uppermost stratum, or perhaps rather the present point attained upon a
definite road, within an intricate formation or network of purposes,
which taken together constitute the world of will. The purpose of
looking {39} at a picture shades off into the more general purpose of
learning to take pleasure in what is good of its kind, which is again
set in a certain place within the conception of our life and the way
in which we desire to spend it, and our purposes throughout every
particular day are fitted into one another, and give a particular
setting and colour to each other, and to each particular day, and week,
and year.
Now less or more of all this may be clearly in the mind when we are
carrying out a particular momentary aim. But it is quite certain that
in a human life the particular momentary aim derives its significance
from this background of other purposes; and, if they were to fall away,
the distinct momentary purpose would change its character and become
quite a feeble and empty thing.
Thus we have, in our world of will, a parallel case which illustrates
the nature of our world of knowledge. There is the clear will to look
at the picture, the dim will to continue standing, and the implied will
to carry out certain general aims, and follow a certain routine or
course of life, which gives the momentary purpose its entire setting
and background.
I have spoken of the will in order to illustrate the judgment, because
the dim and implied elements are perhaps more easy to observe in the
case of the will. Almost all our common waking life is carried on by
actions such as walking and sitting, which we hardly know that we
will, but which we could not do if we did not will them. And also the
greater part of our life is rather within a sphere of will which has
become objective for us in our profession, interests, and ideals, than
a perpetual active choice between {40} alternatives such as brings the
act of volition before us in the most striking way. Just so it is with
judgment. Our speaking and writing is a very small part of our judging,
just as our conscious choice between alternatives [1] is a very small
part of our willing.
[1] I do not for a moment suggest that our “conscious choice” is
ultimately different in kind from our habitual persistence in a
course of life. I only take it as an instance in which we fully
attend to our volition.
_Distribution of Attention_
6. Thus the world of knowledge and the world of will must each of them
be regarded as a _continuum_ for the waking consciousness. Whenever
we are awake, we are judging; whenever we are awake we are willing.
The distribution of attention in these two worlds is very closely
analogous. In both, it is impossible to attend to our whole world at
the same moment. But in both, our world is taken as being a single
connected system; and therefore (i.) attention shades off gradually
from the momentary focus of illumination into less and less intensity
over the other parts of the continuous judgment or purpose; but (ii.)
that which is _in_ the focus of attention depends for its quality upon
that which is less distinctly or not at all in the focus of attention.
And as attention diminishes in intensity, the implication of reality
does not diminish with it. In other words, in spite of the inequality
of attention, the reality of our whole world is implied in the reality
of which at any moment we are distinctly aware. But being distinctly
aware of reality is another name for judgment.