of the most important steps in the consolidation of the Union. Many
who had observed the aggressive and comprehensive projects of
Hamilton, and seen them daily binding closer the bonds of union, did
not believe that they would stand the test of armed conflict. They
feared that the power of the government would wither and the people
split into warring factions when men were called upon to march in arms
against their fellow-citizens. The event proved that the new
government had vindicated its right to exist, and that the sentiment
of union was daily gaining a stronger hold upon the hearts of the
people. That this new power had not only built up a cohesive financial
system, but had shown its capacity to put down resistance to its
lawful authority with a strong hand, was largely the work of Hamilton.
It may be said that it was wholly his work, so far as any great
national policy can be projected and carried out by a single man,
independently of the support of his associates in the government and
of the body of public opinion which make possible the execution of his
plans.
The time had come when Hamilton felt that his constructive work was
done. He withdrew from the cabinet (January 31, 1795), and Oliver
Wolcott of Connecticut was appointed his successor. Hamilton chose the
moment for retiring from office with a tact and judgment unusual with
public men. He was moved partly by the desire to provide for his
family upon a more liberal scale than his modest salary under the
government permitted. He was too patriotic, however, to have
abandoned his post until he felt that his constructive work was
complete. It was with conscious satisfaction that in his report on the
public credit at the beginning of 1795 he was able to marshal the
measures already taken towards restoring order to the national
finances and point out their results. The credit of the country had
been raised from the lowest abyss of dishonor to that of the most
enlightened nations of the old world; an adequate system of taxation
had been provided for meeting the public obligations; the business
interests had been knit together in support of the government by a
national bank; a monetary system had been established; the Treasury
had been organized in its various branches upon a basis which has
survived to our day; and finally the strength of the fabric of the
Union and of the financial system had been subjected to the test of a
rebellion which, without serious bloodshed, but with a strong display
of force, had been fully and firmly subdued.
VI
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NEUTRALITY
The comprehensive measures of Hamilton for strengthening the Union
gave a definite character and policy to the Federalist party. The
foundations of this party had been laid by the struggle over the
question whether the Constitution should be accepted by the states;
but the measures of Hamilton were too strong for some of the friends
of the Constitution, and many changes occurred in the temporary
groupings of political leaders before a definite dividing line was
established between the Federalism of Hamilton on the one side and the
Democracy of Jefferson and Madison on the other. These two eminent
Democratic leaders had, indeed, been among the most earnest supporters
of the Constitution. Madison went farther than Jefferson in the
direction of Federalism, and encountered the distrust of the
states-rights element at home; but Jefferson, as has been already
seen, made several reports in the Continental Congress in favor of
declaring the United States a nation, and was the cordial promoter of
those important steps towards union,--the transfer of the Western
territory to Congress and the adoption of a common monetary system.
The plans of Hamilton in regard to the finances, however, and his
resolute policy of neutrality between France and Great Britain, ran
counter to the views of Jefferson. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the latter found himself pitted against the great Federalist
leader upon nearly every question of importance which came before the
cabinet. The feeling that he had been duped in regard to the
assumption of the state debts found vent in many complaints, which
finally bore fruit in open attacks upon Hamilton, at first made
indirectly through a clerk in the government service, and then
directly in a long letter to Washington. Jefferson gave the post of
translating clerk in the State Department to a Frenchman, Philip
Freneau, who published a journal known as the "National Gazette." In
this journal Freneau began a series of bitter and sometimes
well-directed attacks upon the measures of the administration, and
particularly those of Hamilton. A friend of Jefferson in Virginia,
Colonel Mason, approached Washington in the summer of 1791, and made a
long and severe criticism upon the Treasury measures and their effect
upon the people.
Washington continued to stand above party, and sought to mitigate the
friction between his cabinet officers. Where the judgments of Hamilton
and Jefferson differed on constructive measures, however, Washington
in nearly every case became convinced of the wisdom of the
recommendations of Hamilton. He therefore had the appearance of
leaning to his side, although he often mitigated the sharpness of the
arguments of his vigorous young minister of finance and endeavored to
temper his excess of zeal. After listening to Mason, Washington felt
that the time had come to interpose in the growing hostility between
his cabinet ministers. He submitted a brief summary to Hamilton of
the criticisms which had been made upon his projects and asked him to
submit a statement in reply. The charges were directed not only
against the substance of the financial measures, but declared that
they fostered speculation, corrupted Congress through the ownership of
the public debt by members of that body, and that Hamilton was
laboring secretly to introduce aristocracy and monarchy.
It was not difficult for Hamilton to brush away most of these
criticisms. This he did in the cool, logical manner of which he was a
master by numbering each objection to his policy and measures and
showing that it was not founded upon solid reasoning or fact. Hamilton
would have done well to have rested his case upon his letter to
Washington, but he was now convinced that Jefferson was behind the
attacks upon him, and he determined to strike back. He began a series
of anonymous communications through the Federalist organ, "Fenno's
Gazette," which showed all his usual vigor and force of reasoning, but
which only intensified the bitterness in the cabinet. President
Washington was deeply disturbed by this open outbreak of hostilities,
and remonstrated by letter with both Hamilton and Jefferson. Hamilton
suspended his attacks, while Jefferson confined his hostility to less
open methods.
When Congress met at the close of 1791, Giles of Virginia, a
loud-spoken, hot-headed member of the House, called for accounts of
the various foreign loans made by the government. An attempt was made
to prove corruption in the management of the Treasury. Hamilton could
not have found a better opportunity for defending himself, if he had
sought it. He was no longer shut up to the unsatisfactory methods of
unsigned communications through newspapers, but was in a position to
speak openly and boldly in exposition and defense of his measures.
Report after report was sent to Congress, setting forth the operations
of the Treasury with a lucidity and power which silenced the
opposition and almost overwhelmed Madison, who had been forced as a
party leader to accept the responsibility for the attacks. The
reports, to any one who understood the subject, were absolutely
convincing of the soundness and wisdom of Hamilton's measures.
Jefferson, perhaps, had some right to complain of the influence which
Hamilton exerted over that department of the government which properly
belonged under his exclusive jurisdiction. This was the management of
foreign relations. Hamilton had such definite and well-considered
views on foreign policy as well as finance that he could not forbear
presenting them in the cabinet. His superiority in definiteness of aim
and energy no doubt led him to believe that he was fitted for the
functions of prime minister and that he was justified in exercising
them as far as he could. The course of Washington encouraged him to
the extent that the President often gave the preference to his views
over those of Jefferson, but it was far from the purpose of the
President to make any distinction in rank or in his confidence between
his ministers. Hamilton, although an admirer of the British political
system, permitted himself few prejudices in his theory of the foreign
policy of the United States. Though often charged with British
sympathies, he leaned much less towards Great Britain than Jefferson,
through his admiration of the spirit of the French Revolution, leaned
towards France.
The foreign relations of the country began to become acute with the
outbreak of war between England and France in 1793. France had already
abolished royalty, expelled the nobles, sent Louis XVI. to the
scaffold, and was on the eve of the terrible massacres which did so
much to revolt even her best friends outside the country. The news of
war reached the United States early in April, 1793. News came also
that a minister from the French Republic had landed at Charleston and
would soon present his credentials at Philadelphia. Hamilton sent post
haste for Washington, who was at Mount Vernon. The outbreak of war
meant danger to American commerce on the ocean and the risk of trouble
with both powers over the neutrality laws. The serious question
confronting the American government was whether they should maintain
strict neutrality between the belligerents or should side with France,
to whom they were bound by the treaties made with her when she came to
the rescue of the colonies. When Washington reached Philadelphia, he
found both Jefferson and Hamilton ready with suggestions for meeting
the crisis, but these suggestions differed widely. Jefferson, although
not an advocate of war against England, believed that Congress should
be called together in extra session to deal with the emergency.
A stronger programme was urged upon the President by Hamilton. He
regarded the question of neutrality and the reception of the French
envoy as one for the executive rather than for Congress. He believed
also that these subjects would be safer in the hands of Washington
than midst the passions of a legislative body. He drew up a statement,
embodying a series of questions regarding the policy of the United
States, which was laid by Washington before the cabinet. The first
question was whether a declaration of neutrality should be issued.
This was decided in the affirmative, and the proclamation was soon
issued by Washington. It was decided that the French minister, Genet,
should be received, but that early occasion should be taken to explain
to him that the United States did not consider themselves bound by the
treaties to plunge into war in behalf of France. While it was admitted
by Hamilton that it would not be the province of the United States
under ordinary circumstances to cavil over the character of the
government in France, but would be their duty to accept the government
which existed, nevertheless, the extraordinary events which had taken
place at Paris justified a certain reserve towards the revolutionary
powers.
Entirely apart from the changes in the character of the French
government, it was felt by Hamilton that the time had come to give an
interpretation to the early treaties in harmony with a more
unchallenged independence for the United States, and a more
complete separation from the intrigues of European politics. The
radical character of the Revolution in France, and the action of the
French government itself, gave an excuse for an interpretation of the
treaties which otherwise might not have been found without blushing.
The treaties provided for a defensive alliance with France, and it was
promptly decided by the cabinet that the war of France against Great
Britain was not defensive. Hamilton proposed not only to revise the
treaties, but to resist by the utmost efforts of the federal
government the enlistment of men and the fitting out of privateers in
America in aid of the French. He did not propose, as some of the
friends of France would have desired, that the proclamation of
neutrality should be only a mask for underhanded aid to that country.
The situation was made as difficult as possible for the government by
the hot temper and indiscretions of the new French minister. These
qualities in him were encouraged by the reception which he received
on the way from Charleston to Philadelphia. He was everywhere welcomed
with such enthusiastic demonstrations of sympathy for France as tended
to make him believe that he was something more than the diplomatic
representative of a foreign country, and could safely interfere in the
politics of the United States. As he approached Philadelphia (May 16,
1793) he found Captain Bompard of the French frigate L'Ambuscade ready
to fire a salute of three guns, and men on swift horses posted along
the road to give notice to the citizens of his coming.
Genet had no sooner landed at Charleston than he began to fit out
privateers to prey upon British commerce. The Ambuscade herself, which
brought Genet to Charleston, seized several English merchant vessels
on her way to Philadelphia, and crowned her insolence to the United
States by seizing an English vessel, the Grange, within the Delaware
capes, in the jurisdiction of the United States. The Grange was
restored to her owners, but her seizure was only one of many flagrant
violations of international law which were systematically carried out
by the French, and which were defended and often planned by Genet.
When the Polly was stopped from leaving New York fitted out for a
French privateer, Hauterive, the French consul, addressed a note to
Governor Clinton, telling him it was not in a land where Frenchmen had
spilled their blood that they were to be thus harassed. When the
Little Sarah was fitted out as a privateer in Philadelphia, Hamilton
and Knox urged that a battery be placed on one of the islands and that
the vessel be fired upon if she attempted to leave the harbor.
Jefferson was hoodwinked by assurances from Genet that the vessel
would not sail, and himself indulged in some glittering talk against
the United States joining in "the combination of kings against
France." The vessel at once put to sea, and Washington was so
indignant that Jefferson was almost driven to resignation.
Hamilton had a more direct interest officially in the demands of Genet
for money which was owed to France. Genet not only asked for the
anticipation of payments soon to mature, but insisted that he should
receive the whole amount of the debt. He threw a bait to American
sentiment by the suggestion that the money would be spent in the
United States for provisions and supplies. Hamilton treated his rude
demands just as he would those of any other creditor. He was willing
to anticipate certain payments when the Treasury resources justified
it, but absolutely refused to do more. Genet then threatened to pay
for what he bought with drafts upon the Treasury. Hamilton coolly
retorted that the drafts would not be honored. The Frenchman was
compelled to consume his wrath, not exactly in silence, but without
result upon the government.
Genet, encouraged by some of the enemies of the administration,
succeeded in working up a strong pro-French sentiment in various parts
of the country. At a dinner in Philadelphia, following his arrival,
songs were sung to France and America, and the red cap of liberty,
which had been forced upon the reluctant head of Louis XVI. in the
great demonstration of the preceding August at the Tuileries, was
passed around the table and successively worn by each of the American
guests. Hamilton, who never had much confidence in pure democracy,
went close to the other extreme in his alarm over these signs of
public opinion. He felt compelled in the summer of 1793 to publish a
series of essays signed "Pacificus," defending the policy of the
administration. These papers, in the language of Mr, Lodge, "served
their purpose of awakening the better part of the community to the
gravity of the situation, and began the work of rallying the friends
of the government to its active support." Genet addressed such
offensive letters to the Department of State, and his conduct became
so intolerable, that the cabinet agreed to send the correspondence to
Paris and ask for his recall. Genet himself published a letter which
revealed his insolence to the public, and caused a revulsion of
sentiment which brought the more sober men of all parties to the side
of Washington. Genet's course was run, and in February, 1794, his
successor came out from France.
Hamilton soon had opportunities for proving that his policy of
neutrality was directed as much against English as against French
aggression. When Great Britain issued the first Orders in Council,
directing the seizure of all vessels loaded with French produce,
Hamilton declared the British order an outrage, and urged the
fortification of the seaports and the raising of troops. He exerted
himself, however, to restrain popular passion and preserve peace. He
suggested to Washington that a special mission be sent to London to
treat with the British government. The idea was cordially accepted by
Washington. He desired to send Hamilton, but the Virginia party,
headed by Madison and Monroe, strongly opposed the appointment. They
were embittered by recent party conflicts, and regarded Hamilton as
too friendly to British interests. Chief Justice John Jay of New York
was then recommended by Hamilton for the mission. Opposition was made
even to Jay, but the nomination was confirmed (April 19, 1794), and
Hamilton himself drew the outline of the instructions with which Jay
sailed from New York.
The conflict over the treaty which Jay brought back in the following
winter was one of the most bitter ever waged in American politics. The
contracting parties to the treaty--the United States and Great
Britain--looked at the situation from widely different points of view.
Jay secured the promise of the withdrawal of the British troops from
the frontier posts and an agreement to compensate Americans for losses
through British privateering. The last was an important concession,
because it covertly admitted the British position in regard to
privateering to be in conflict with international law. Some important
commercial concessions were also made by Great Britain, which were
regarded at London as purely gratuitous. But the treaty failed to
secure any compensation for the claims of American citizens for
negroes and other property carried away by the British troops, and
American vessels were forbidden carrying to Europe from English ports
or even from the United States coffee and the other chief colonial
products. Among the latter was named cotton, which was then just
becoming a large element in the production of the South.
Hamilton himself is said to have characterized the treaty as "an old
woman's treaty," when he first read it, but it soon became evident
that it must be accepted substantially as presented, if war was to be
avoided. Washington called the Senate in extra session in June, 1795,
and after two weeks' debate in secret session the treaty was ratified
by exactly the necessary two thirds vote,--twenty to ten. It was not
until the adjournment of the Senate that the contents of the document
reached the public through Senator Mason of Virginia. The news was
followed by town meetings all over the country demanding that
President Washington refuse to exchange ratifications. So intense was
the feeling that a vessel suspected of being a British privateer was
seized and burned at Boston, a great meeting in Faneuil Hall ordered
a committee to take a protest to Philadelphia, and Hamilton himself
was stoned and refused a hearing at a meeting in New York. But
Washington remained calm. Hamilton, as the responsible leader of the
party, took up the cudgels for ratification. He submitted an elaborate
argument to the cabinet (July 9, 1795), and with an amendment which
the Senate recommended and Great Britain accepted, the treaty went
into operation.
VII
HAMILTON AS A PARTY LEADER
The ratification of the Jay treaty did much to shake the power of the
Federalists, and for a moment seemed to threaten their ruin. It was
divisions in their own ranks, however, which contributed as much to
this event as any real blunders in public policy. Hamilton was not at
his best in conciliating those who differed from him, and he did not
encounter a more yielding or tactful associate in John Adams. Hamilton
had gone out of his way with little reason at the first presidential
election, in 1788, to secure votes against Adams. His avowed object
was to insure the election of Washington by preventing a tie vote
between Washington and Adams. The original Constitution authorized
each elector to vote for two persons for President and Vice-President,
without designating the office for which either was voted for. This
led to complications which were corrected by an amendment after the
election of 1800. In the case of the first election, however, few sane
men doubted that Washington would have the majority of the votes, and
the only effect of the intrigue of Hamilton was to reduce the vote for
Adams to a point which almost caused his defeat. Hamilton supported
Adams in the second election, in 1792, and the relations between the
two men were reasonably cordial.
When Washington retired from the presidency, in 1797, the commanding
men in the Federalist party were Hamilton, John Jay, Thomas Pinckney,
and John Adams. Hamilton was the controlling mind in the consultations
of the leaders rather than the sort of man who appealed to the people.
He was not seriously thought of by himself or others as a candidate
for President. Jay was barred by the odium attaching to the treaty
with Great Britain. The choice was therefore reduced to Pinckney and
Adams. Most of the leaders were for Adams, who was superior to
Pinckney in Revolutionary services and ability. It was determined
that the Federalist electors should vote for both Adams and Pinckney,
with the purpose of choosing the former for President and the latter
for Vice-President. Hamilton on this occasion urged that all the
Federalist electors should vote for both Adams and Pinckney. If each
had received an equal number of votes, the choice would have been
thrown into the House and Adams would probably have been elected.
Hamilton erred in letting it be known that he was indifferent whether
the outcome was favorable to Adams or Pinckney, especially when there
was a strong suspicion that he was really for Pinckney. Party
discipline had not then reached its modern development, and votes were
thrown away by Federalist electors,--in the North to prevent a
majority for Pinckney over Adams and in the South to prevent the same
chance in favor of Adams.
The result of these jealousies was that Adams barely escaped defeat.
He was chosen by a plurality of three, but Pinckney was beaten, and
Jefferson, having the next highest vote, was elected Vice-President.
Adams became firmly convinced that Hamilton was his personal enemy and
would stop at nothing to injure him. That Hamilton was recognized by
all the party leaders as the master mind and the guiding spirit of the
party made no difference to a man of the hot temper and resolute
spirit of John Adams. Tact and conciliation were as far removed from
his nature as from that of any American public man. The indifference
of Hamilton whether he was beaten by Pinckney, in connection with
Hamilton's intrigue in 1788, had convinced Adams that Hamilton did not
feel proper respect for him, and that he was seeking to dictate the
policy of the administration and to thwart and degrade him. Adams
resented any sort of suggestion or consultation, and took delight in
disregarding the suggestions of Hamilton, while the latter struck back
through several members of the cabinet, who were more in sympathy with
him than with the President.