Had McClellan not absurdly overestimated the number of troops opposed to
him when his army neared Sharpsburg on the 15th of September, 1862, he
might have defeated Lee and possibly destroyed or captured his entire
force. Never before had a Union commander had such an opportunity
to deliver a crushing blow. He had more than 80,000 men under his
control--fully twice as many as his adversary; he had the Confederate
plan of campaign in his hands and such fighting as had occurred with
the exception of that at Harper's Ferry had been decidedly in his favor.
Moreover, Lee had recently met with a serious accident, his horse having
knocked him down and trampled on him, breaking the bones of one hand,
and otherwise injuring him so severely that he had been obliged to
superintend most of the posting of his army from an ambulance. By a
curious coincidence, too, "Stonewall" Jackson had been hurt in a similar
manner a few days previously, so that if the battle had begun promptly,
it is highly probable that he, too, would have been physically
handicapped, and it is certain that his troops could not have reached
the field in time to be of any assistance.
To Lee's immense relief, however, McClellan made no serious attack
on either the 15th or 16th of September, but spent those two days
in putting his finishing touches on his preparations, and before he
completed them that Opportunity "which knocks but once at each man's
gate" had passed him by, never to return.
The battle of Antietam or Sharpsburg began at dawn of the 17th, but by
that time Jackson had arrived and both he and Lee had so far recovered
from their injuries that they were able to be in the saddle and
personally direct the movements of their men. The Confederate position
had been skillfully selected for defense on the hills back of Antietam
Creek and McClellan's plan was to break through his opponent's line,
gain his rear and cut him off from retreat. But Lee, who had closely
watched the elaborate massing of the Union forces for this attempt,
was fully prepared for it and the first assault against his line was
repulsed with fearful slaughter. No subtle strategy or brilliant tactics
of any kind marked McClellan's conduct of the battle. Time and again
he hurled his heavy battalions against his opponent's left, center and
right in a desperate effort to pierce the wall of gray, and once or
twice his heroic veterans almost succeeded in battering their way
through. But at every crisis Lee rose to the emergency and moved his
regiments as a skillful chess player manipulates his pieces on the
board, now massing his troops at the danger point and now diverting
his adversary's attack by a swift counter-stroke delivered by men
unacquainted with defeat. Both his hands were heavily swathed in
bandages and far too painful to admit of his even touching the bridle
rein, but he had had himself lifted into the saddle and for fully
fourteen hours he remained mounted on "Traveller," his famous war horse,
watching every movement with the inspiring calmness of a commander born
to rule the storm.
The situation was perilous and no one realized its dangers more keenly
than he, but not a trace of anxiety appeared upon his face. Only twice
was he betrayed into an expression of his feelings, once when he asked
General Hood where the splendid division was which he had commanded in
the morning and received the reply: "They are lying in the field where
you sent them," and again when he directed the Rockbridge battery to
go into action for a second time after three of its four guns had been
disabled. The captain of this battery had halted to make a report of
its condition and receive instructions, and Lee, gazing at the group of
begrimed and tattered privates behind the officer, ordered them to renew
their desperate work before he recognized that among them stood his
youngest son, Robert.
Very few men in the Confederate commander's position would have suffered
a son to serve in the ranks. A word from him would, of course, have
made the boy an officer. But that was not Lee's way. To advance an
inexperienced lad over the heads of older men was, to his mind, unjust
and he would not do it even for his own flesh and blood. Nor had his son
himself expected it, for he had eagerly accepted his father's permission
to enter the ranks and had cheerfully performed his full duty, never
presuming on his relationship to the Commander-in-Chief or asking favors
of any kind. All this was known to Lee but this unexpected meeting at
a moment when privates were being mowed down like grass was a terrible
shock and strain. Nevertheless, it was characteristic of the man that no
change was made in the orders of the Rockbridge battery, which continued
on its way to the post of danger and, with young Lee, gallantly
performed the work he had called on it to do.
By night the Confederates still held the field, but the struggle had
cost them nearly 11,000 men, reducing their force to less than 45,000,
while McClellan, despite even heavier losses, had more than 74,000 left.
Lee, accordingly, withdrew his army under cover of darkness to another
part of the field and again awaited attack. But McClellan neither
attacked nor attempted anything like a pursuit until his opponent
was safely out of reach, being well satisfied with having checked
the advance of his formidable foe and spoiled his plans. This he was
certainly entitled to claim, for Lee's campaign against Maryland and
Pennsylvania was effectually balked by his enforced retreat.
Indeed, it is quite possible that had McClellan been adventurous he
might have ended the war at Antietam, for the day after the battle he
outnumbered his opponents at least two to one and possessed enormous
advantage in the way of equipment and supplies. But the Union commander,
though he possessed a genius for army organization and knew the art of
inspiring confidence in his men, was no match for Lee in the field, and
he probably realized this. At all events, he displayed no anxiety to
renew hostilities and when urged, and at last positively ordered to
advance, he argued, protested, offered excuses for delay and in fact did
everything but obey.
Weeks thus slipped by and finally Lee himself became impatient to know
what his adversary was doing. He, accordingly, again summoned Stuart and
ordered him to repeat the experiment of riding around the opposing army.
News of this second, almost derisive defiance of McClellan soon reached
the North, for Stuart, swiftly circling his right flank, suddenly
appeared with 1,800 men at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, terrorizing the
country and destroying vast quantities of stores. Stern and indignant
orders from Washington warned the Union Commander that this time he must
not permit the daring troopers to escape. But only a few scouts were
captured, and once more Stuart sped safely back to his chief with full
information as to the strength and position of the Federal lines.
Even this did not arouse McClellan, and two more weeks of inaction
passed before he again set his vast army in motion. But by this time,
the demand for his dismissal had become clamorous and, on November 5,
1862, President Lincoln reluctantly removed him from command.