While the remnants of McClellan's fine army were recuperating from the
rough handling they had received, Lee was developing a plan to remove
them still further from the vicinity of Richmond. Harrison's Landing
was too close to the Confederate capital for comfort and the breastworks
which the Union commander erected there were too formidable to be
attacked. But, though he could not hope to drive his adversary away
by force, Lee believed that he could lure him from his stronghold by
carrying the war into another part of Virginia. The opportunity to
do this was particularly favorable, for the Union forces in front of
Washington, consisting of about 45,000 men, had been placed under
the command of General John Pope. Pope had served with Grant in the
Mississippi campaign and had begun his career in the East by boasting of
the great things he was about to accomplish, referring contemptuously
to his opponents and otherwise advertising himself as a braggart and a
babbler. He had come, so he told his soldiers in a flamboyant address,
from an army which had seen only the backs of its enemies. He had
come to lead them to victories. He wanted to hear no more of "lines of
retreat" or backward movements of any kind. His headquarters were "in
the saddle" and his mission was to terrorize the foe.
These absurd proclamations pretty thoroughly exposed Pope's character,
but he had been at West Point with General Longstreet, one of Lee's
ablest advisers, and that officer speedily acquainted his chief with the
full measure of his opponent's weaknesses. This was exceedingly useful
to Lee and when he discovered that McClellan and Pope were pulling at
different directions like balky circus horses, while Halleck with one
foot on each was in imminent peril of a fall, he determined to take
advantage of the situation and hasten the disaster.
McClellan, having 90,000 men, wanted Pope to reënforce him with his
45,000, and thus insure a renewal of his campaign against Richmond.
But this, of course, did not suit Pope who wished McClellan's army to
reënforce him and march to victory under his banner. But while each of
the rivals was insisting that his plan should be adopted and Halleck,
who held the chief of command, was wobbling between them, trying to make
up his mind to favor one or the other, Lee took the whole matter out
of his hands and decided it for him. He did not want McClellan to be
reënforced; first, because he was the abler officer and, second, because
he had or soon would have more than sufficient men to capture Richmond
and might wake to a realization of this fact at any moment. From the
Confederate standpoint it was much safer to have Pope reënforced, for he
did not have the experience necessary to handle a large army. Therefore,
the more troops he had to mismanage the better. Moreover, Lee knew that
McClellan would cease to be dangerous as soon as he was obliged to
send any part of his forces away, for, as usual, he imagined that his
opponents already outnumbered him and that the withdrawal of even a
single regiment would place him practically at their mercy.
Carefully bearing all these facts in mind and thinking that it was about
time to force Halleck to transfer some of McClellan's troops to Pope,
Lee ordered Jackson to attack the man who thus far had seen "only the
backs of his foes." But at the Battle of Cedar Mountain, which followed
(August 9, 1862), his enemies would not turn their backs and the fact
evidently alarmed him, for he immediately began shouting lustily for
help. Perhaps he called a little louder than was necessary in order to
get as many of his rival's men as possible under his own command, but
the result was that McClellan's army began rapidly melting away under
orders to hurry to the rescue.
Lee's first object was, therefore, accomplished at one stroke and,
as fast as McClellan's troops moved northward, he withdrew the forces
guarding Richmond and rushed them by shorter routes to confront Pope,
whom he had determined to destroy before his reënforcements reached
the field. Indeed, a very neat trap had already been prepared for that
gentleman who was on the point of stepping into it when he intercepted
one of his adversary's letters which gave him sufficient warning to
escape by beating a hasty retreat across the Rappahannock River. This
was a perfectly proper movement under the circumstances, but in view of
his absurd ideas concerning retreats it opened him up to public ridicule
which was almost more than a man of his character could endure. He
was soon busy, therefore, complaining, explaining, and protesting his
readiness to recross the river at a moment's notice.
But, while he was thus foolishly wearing out the telegraph lines between
his headquarters and Washington, Lee was putting into operation a plan
which would have been rash to the point of folly against a really able
soldier but which was perfectly justified against an incompetent. This
plan was to divide his army, which numbered less than 50,000 men, into
two parts, sending "Stonewall" Jackson with 25,000 to get behind the
Union forces, while he attracted their commander's attention at the
front. Of course, if Pope had discovered this audacious move, he could
easily have crushed the divided Confederate forces in turn before either
could have come to the other's rescue, for he had 70,000 at his command.
But the armies were not far from Manassas or Bull Run, where the first
important engagement of the war had been fought and Lee know every inch
of the ground. Moreover, he believed that all Pope's provisions and
supplies upon which he depended for feeding his army were behind him,
and that, if Jackson succeeded in seizing them and getting between the
Union army and Washington, Pope would lose his head and dash to the
rescue regardless of consequences.
Great, therefore, as the risk was he determined to take it, and Jackson
circled away with his 25,000 men, leaving Lee with the same number
confronting an army of 70,000 which might have swept the field. But its
commander never dreamed of the opportunity which lay before him and he
remained utterly unsuspicious until the night of August 26, 1862, when
his flow of telegrams was suddenly checked and he was informed that
there was something the matter with the wires connecting him to
Washington. There was, indeed, something the matter with them, for
Jackson's men had cut them down and were at that moment greedily
devouring Pope's provisions, helping themselves to new uniforms and
shoes and leaving facetious letters complaining of the quality of the
supplies.
For a while, however, the Union general had no suspicion of what was
happening, for he interpreted the interference with the telegraph wires
as the work of cavalry riders whom a comparatively small force could
quickly disperse. But when the troops dispatched for this purpose came
hurrying back with the news that Jackson's whole army was behind them,
he acted precisely as Lee had expected, and completely forgetting to
close the doors behind him, dashed madly after "Stonewall," whom he
regarded as safe as a cat in a bag.
The door which he should have closed was Thoroughfare Gap, for that was
the only opening through which Lee could have led his men with any hope
of arriving in time to help his friends, and a few troops could have
blocked it with the utmost ease. But it was left unguarded and Pope had
scarcely turned his back to spring on Jackson before Lee slid through
the Gap and sprang on him.
The contest that followed, called the Second Battle of Bull Run or
Manassas (August 30, 1862), was almost a repetition of the first, except
that in the earlier battle the Union soldiers had a fair chance and on
this occasion they had none at all. Indeed, Lee and Jackson had Pope so
situated that, despite the bravery of his men, they battered and
pounded him until he staggered from the field in a state of hysterical
confusion, wildly telegraphing that the enemy was badly crippled and
that everything would be well, and following up this by asking if the
capital would be safe, if his army should be destroyed. It is indeed
possible that his army would have been reduced to a mere mob, had it not
been for the proximity of the fortifications of Washington, into which
his exhausted regiments were safely tumbled on the 2nd of September,
1862.
Thus, for the second time in two months, Lee calmly confronted the
wreck of an opposing host, which, at the outset, had outnumbered him and
confidently planned for his destruction.