Up to this time the war in the West had been largely an affair of
skirmishes. A body of Union troops would find itself confronting a
Confederate force, one of the two commanders would attack and a fight
would follow; or the Confederates would march into a town and their
opponents would attempt to drive them out of it, not because it was
of any particular value, but because the other side held it.
"See-a-head-and-hit-it" strategy governed the day and no plan worthy
of the name had been adopted for conducting the war on scientific
principles.
But Grant had studied the maps to some purpose in his office at Cairo
and he realized that the possession of the Mississippi River was the
key to the situation in the West. As long as the Confederates controlled
that great waterway which afforded them free access to the ocean
and fairly divided the Eastern from the Western States, they might
reasonably hope to defy their opponents to the end of time. But, if they
lost it, one part of the Confederacy would be almost completely cut off
from the rest. Doubtless, other men saw this just as clearly and quite
as soon as Grant did; but having once grasped an idea he never lost
sight of it, and while others were diverted by minor matters, he
concentrated his whole attention on what he believed to be the vital
object of all campaigning in the West.
The Tennessee River and the Cumberland River both flow into the Ohio,
not far from where that river empties into the Mississippi. They,
therefore, formed the principal means of water communication with the
Mississippi for the State of Tennessee, and the Confederates had created
forts to protect them at points well within supporting distance of each
other. Fort Henry, guarding the Tennessee River, and Fort Donelson,
commanding the Cumberland River, were both in Grant's district, and in
January, 1862, he wrote to General Halleck, his superior officer in St.
Louis, calling attention to the importance of these posts and offering
suggestions for their capture. But Halleck did not take any notice of
this communication and Grant thereupon resolved to go to St. Louis and
present his plans in person. This was the first time he had been in the
city since the great change in his circumstances and those who had known
him only a few years before as a poverty-stricken farmer and wagoner
could scarcely believe that he was the same man. He had, as yet, done
nothing very remarkable, but he held an important command, his name was
well and favorably known and he had already begun to pay off his old
debts. All this enabled his father and mother to regain something of the
pride they had once felt for their eldest son, and his former friends
were glad to welcome him and claim his acquaintance.
Pleasant as this was, the trip to St. Louis was a bitter disappointment
in other respects, for Halleck not only rejected his subordinate's
proposition for the capture of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, but
dismissed him without even listening to the details of his plan. Most
officers would have been completely discouraged by such treatment, but
Grant had been accustomed to disappointments for many years and did not
readily despair. Meeting Flag-Officer Foote who had charge of a fleet
of gun boats near Cairo, he explained his idea and finding him not only
sympathetic, but enthusiastic, he and Foote each sent a telegram to
Halleck assuring him that Fort Henry could be taken if he would only
give his consent. These messages brought no immediate response, but
Grant continued to request permission to advance until, on the 1st of
February, 1862, the necessary order was obtained and within twenty-four
hours the persistent officer had his expedition well upon its way.
His force consisted of some 15,000 men and seven gun boats, and Halleck
promised him reënforcements, sending a capable officer to see that they
were promptly forwarded. This officer was Brigadier General Sherman who
thus, for the first time, came in touch with the man with whom he was
destined to bring the war to a close. Four days after the troops started
they were ready to attack and the gun-boats at once proceeded to
shell the fort, with the result that its garrison almost immediately
surrendered (February 6, 1862), practically all of its defenders having
retreated to Fort Donelson as soon as they saw that their position was
seriously threatened.
Grant promptly notified his Chief of this easy conquest, at the same
time adding that he would take Fort Donelson within forty-eight hours,
but he soon had reason to regret this boast--one of the few of which
he was ever guilty. Indeed, his troops had scarcely started on their
journey when rapid progress became impossible, for the rain descended
in torrents, rendering the roads impassable for wagons and cannon, and
almost impracticable for infantry or cavalry. Moreover, many of the men
had foolishly thrown away their blankets and overcoats during the march
from Fort Henry and their suffering under the freezing winter blasts was
exceedingly severe, especially as camp fires were not permitted for
fear that their smoke would attract the gunners in the fort. Under these
circumstances the advance was seriously delayed, and it was February
14, 1862--six days after he had prophesied that he would take the
place--before Grant had his army in position. By this time, however,
the gun-boats had arrived and he determined to attack at once, although
Halleck had advised him to wait for reënforcements to occupy Fort Henry,
lest the Confederates should recapture it while his back was turned.
There was, of course, a chance of this, but Grant felt sure that if he
delayed the Confederates would seize the opportunity to strengthen
Fort Donelson, and then 50,000 men would not be able to accomplish what
15,000 might immediately effect. He, accordingly, directed Foote
to bombard the fort at once from the river front and try to run its
batteries. Desperate as this attempt appeared his orders were instantly
obeyed, the fearless naval officer forcing his little vessels into the
very jaws of death under a terrific fire, to which he responded with a
hail of shot and shell.
Grant watched this spectacular combat with intense interest, waiting for
a favorable moment to order an advance of his troops, but to his bitter
disappointment one after another of Foote's vessels succumbed to the
deadly fire of the water batteries and drifted helplessly back with the
current. Indeed, the flagship was struck more than sixty times and Foote
himself was so severely wounded that he could not report in person,
but requested that the General come on board his ship for a conference,
which disclosed the fact that the fleet was in no condition to continue
the combat and must retire for repairs.
There was nothing for Grant to do, therefore, but prepare for a siege,
and with a heavy heart he returned from the battered gun-boat to give
the necessary orders. He had scarcely set his foot on shore, however,
before a staff officer dashed up with the startling intelligence that
the Confederates had sallied forth and attacked a division of the army
commanded by General McClernand and that his troops were fleeing in a
panic which threatened to involve the entire army. Grant knew McClernand
well. He was one of the Congressmen who had made speeches to the 21st
Illinois and, realizing that the man was almost wholly ignorant of
military matters and utterly incapable of handling such a situation, he
leaped on his horse and, spurring his way across the frozen ground to
the sound of the firing, confronted the huddled and beaten division just
in the nick of time. Meanwhile, General Lew Wallace--afterwards famous
as the author "Ben Hur"--had arrived and thrown forward a brigade to
cover the confused retreat, so that for the moment the Confederate
advance was held in check. But despite this, McClernand's men continued
to give way, muttering that their ammunition was exhausted. There were
tons of ammunition close at hand, as the officers ought to have known
had they understood their duties, but even when assured of this the
panic-stricken soldiers refused to return to the field. They were in no
condition to resist attack, they declared, and the enemy was evidently
intending to make a long fight of it, as the haversacks of those who had
fallen contained at least three days' rations. This excuse was overheard
by Grant and instantly riveted his attention.
"Let me see some of those haversacks," he commanded sharply, and one
glance at their contents convinced him that the Confederates were not
attempting to crush his army, but were trying to break through his lines
and escape. If they intended to stay and defend the fortress, they would
not carry haversacks at all; but if they contemplated a retreat, they
would not only take them, but fill them with enough provisions to last
for several days. In reaching this conclusion Grant was greatly aided
by his knowledge of the men opposing him. He had served in Mexico with
General Pillow, the second in command at Fort Donelson, and, knowing him
to be a timid man, felt certain that nothing but desperation would ever
induce him to risk an attack. He also knew that Floyd, his immediate
superior, who had recently been the United States Secretary of War,
had excellent reasons for avoiding capture and, putting all these facts
together, he instantly rose to the occasion.
"Fill your cartridge boxes, quick, and get into line," was his order to
the men as he dashed down the wavering lines. "The enemy is trying to
escape and he must not be permitted to do so!"
The word flew through the disordered ranks, transforming them as it
passed, and at the same time orders were issued for the entire left
wing to advance and attack without a moment's delay. This unexpected
onslaught quickly threw the Confederates back into the fortress, but
before they again reached the shelter of its walls the Union forces had
carried all the outer defenses and had virtually locked the door behind
their retreating adversaries.
From that moment the capture of the imprisoned garrison was only
a question of time, and within twenty-four hours Grant received a
communication from the Confederate commander asking for a truce to
consider the terms of surrender. To his utter astonishment, however,
this suggestion did not come from either General Floyd or General
Pillow but from Simon Buckner, his old friend at West Point, who had so
generously aided him when he reached New York, penniless and disgraced
after his resignation from the army. This was an embarrassing situation,
indeed, but while he would have done anything he could for Buckner
personally, Grant realized that he must not allow gratitude or
friendship to interfere with his duty. He, therefore, promptly answered
the proposal for a truce in these words:
"No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be
accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."
[NOTE from Brett: The full letter is also shown in Grant's handwriting
which leaves something to be desired. I will do my best to transcribe it
below:
Hd Qrs. Army in the Field Camp Fort Donelson, Feb. 16th 1862
Cmdr. S. B. Buckner Confed. Army.
Sir,
Yours of this inst. proposing armistice, and appointment of
Commissioners to settle terms of Capitulation is just received. No terms
except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted.
I propose to move immediately upon your works.
I am Sir, very respectfully, your obt. svt. [obedient servant], U. S.
Grant Brig. Gen.]
But no more fighting was necessary, for Buckner yielded as gracefully as
he could, and on February 16, 1862, he and the entire garrison of
about 15,000 men became prisoners of war. Generals Pillow and Floyd, it
appeared, had fled with some 4,000 men the night before, leaving Buckner
in charge and as Grant's force had by that time been increased to 27,000
men, further resistance would have been useless.
The capture of these two forts gave the Union forces command of the
Tennessee and the Cumberland Rivers, and to that extent cleared the way
for the control of the Mississippi. It was the first real success which
had greeted the Union cause and it raised Grant to a Major-Generalship
of Volunteers, gave him a national reputation and supplied a better
interpretation of his initial than West Point had provided, for from the
date of his letter to Buckner he was known as "Unconditional Surrender"
Grant.