CHAPTER XIV. THE SECOND PUNIC WAR.--FROM THE PASSAGE OF THE PYRENEES TO

THE BATTLE OF CANNAE. (218-216.)

In the spring of 218 Hannibal started from Carthago Nova to invade

Italy. His army consisted of 90,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 37

elephants. His march to the Pyrenees occupied two months, owing to the

opposition of the Spanish allies of Rome. Hannibal now sent back a

part of his troops, retaining 50,000 infantry and 9,000 cavalry, all

veterans. With these he crossed the mountains, and marched along the

coast by Narbo (Narbonne) and Nemansus (Nimes), through the Celtic

territory, with little opposition. The last of July found him on

the banks of the Rhone, opposite Avenio (Avignon). The Romans were

astonished at the rapidity of his movements.

The Consuls of the year were SCIPIO and SEMPRONIUS. The former had been

in Northern Italy, leisurely collecting forces to attack Hannibal in

Spain; the latter was in Sicily, making preparations to invade Africa.

Scipio set sail for Spain, touching at Massilia near the end of June.

Learning there for the first time that Hannibal had already left

Spain, he hoped to intercept him on the Rhone. The Celtic tribes of the

neighborhood were won over to his side. Troops collected from these were

stationed along the river, but Scipio's main army remained at Massilia.

It was Hannibal's policy to cross the river before Scipio arrived with

his troops. He obtained all the boats possible, and constructed numerous

rafts to transport his main body of troops. A detachment of soldiers

was sent up the river with orders to cross at the first available place,

and, returning on the opposite bank, to surprise the Celtic forces in

the rear. The plan succeeded. The Celts fled in confusion, and the

road to the Alps was opened. Thus Scipio was outgeneralled in the very

beginning.

His course now should have been to return to Northern Italy with all his

forces, and take every means to check Hannibal there. Instead, he

sent most of his troops to Spain under his brother Gnaeus Scipio, and

himself, with but a few men, set sail for Pisae.

Meanwhile Hannibal hurried up the valley of the Rhone, across the Isara,

through the fertile country of the Allobroges, arriving, in sixteen

days from Avenio, at the pass of the first Alpine range (Mont du Chat).

Crossing this with some difficulty, owing to the nature of the country

and the resistance of the Celts, he hastened on through the country of

the Centrones, along the north bank of the Isara. As he was leaving this

river and approaching the pass of the Little St. Bernard, he was again

attacked by the Celts, and obliged to make the ascent amidst continual

and bloody encounters. After toiling a day and a night, however, the

army reached the summit of the pass. Here, on a table-land, his troops

were allowed a brief rest.

The hardships of the descent were fully as great, and the fertile

valley of the Po was a welcome sight to the half-famished and exhausted

soldiers. Here they encamped, in September, and recruited their wearied

energies.

This famous march of Hannibal from the Rhone lasted thirty-three days,

and cost him 20,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry.

The Romans were still unprepared to meet Hannibal. One army was in Spain

under Gnaeus Scipio; the other in Sicily, on its way to Africa, under

the Consul Sempronius. The only troops immediately available were a

few soldiers that had been left in the valley of the Po to restrain the

Gauls, who had recently shown signs of defection.

Publius Cornelius Scipio, upon his return from Massilia, took command of

these. He met Hannibal first in October, 218, near the river Ticinus,

a tributary of the Po. A cavalry skirmish followed, in which he was

wounded and rescued by his son, a lad of seventeen, afterwards the

famous Africanus. The Romans were discomfited, with considerable loss.

They then retreated, crossing the Po at Placentia, and destroying the

bridge behind them. Hannibal forded the river farther up, and marched

along its right bank until he reached its confluence with the Trebia,

opposite Placentia. Here he encamped.

Meanwhile Sempronius, who had been recalled from Sicily, relieved the

disabled Scipio.

Early one raw morning in December, 218, the vanguard of the

Carthaginians was ordered to cross the Trebia, and, as soon any

resistance was met, to retreat. The other troops of Hannibal were drawn

up ready to give the enemy a hot reception, if, as he expected, they

should pursue his retreating vanguard. Sempronius was caught in the

trap, and all his army, except one division of 10,000, was cut to

pieces. The survivors took refuge in Placentia and Cremona, where they

spent the winter. Sempronius himself escaped to Rome.

The result of TREBIA was the insurrection of all the Celtic tribes in

the valley of the Po, who increased Hannibal's army by 60,000 infantry

and 4,000 cavalry. While the Carthaginian was wintering near Placentia,

the Romans stationed troops to guard the two highways leading north from

Rome and ending at Arretium and Ariminum, The Consuls for this year were

GAIUS FLAMINIUS and GNAEUS SERVILIUS. The former occupied Arretium, the

latter Ariminum. Here they were joined by the troops that had wintered

at Placentia.

In the spring, Hannibal, instead of attempting to pursue his march by

either of the highways which were fortified, outflanked the Romans by

turning aside into Etruria. His route led through a marshy and unhealthy

country, and many soldiers perished. Hannibal himself lost an eye from

ophthalmia. When he had arrived at Faesulae a report of his course first

reached Flaminius, who at once broke camp and endeavored to intercept

his enemy. Hannibal, however, had the start, and was now near LAKE

TRASIMENUS.

Here was a pass with a high hill on one side and the lake on the other.

Hannibal, with the flower of his infantry, occupied the hill. His

light-armed troops and horsemen were drawn up in concealment on either

side.

The Roman column advanced (May, 217), without hesitation, to the

unoccupied pass, the thick morning mist completely concealing the

position of the enemy. As the Roman vanguard approached the hill,

Hannibal gave the signal for attack. The cavalry closed up the entrance

to the pass, and at the same time the mist rolled away, revealing the

Carthaginian arms on the right and left. It was not a battle, but a mere

rout. The main body of the Romans was cut to pieces, with scarcely any

resistance, and the Consul himself was killed. Fifteen thousand Romans

fell, and as many more were captured. The loss of the Carthaginians was

but 1,500, and was confined mostly to the Gallic allies. All Etruria

was lost, and Hannibal could march without hindrance upon Rome, whose

citizens, expecting the enemy daily, tore down the bridges over the

Tiber and prepared for a siege. QUINTUS FABIUS MAXIMUS was appointed

Dictator.

Hannibal, however, did not march upon Rome, but turned through Umbria,

devastating the country as he went. Crossing the Apennines, he halted on

the shores of the Adriatic, in Picenum. After giving his army a rest, he

proceeded along the coast into Southern Italy.

The Romans, seeing that the city was not in immediate danger, raised

another army, and placed the Dictator in command. Fabius was a man of

determination and firmness, well advanced in years. He determined to

avoid a pitched battle, but to dog the steps of the enemy, harassing him

and cutting off his supplies as far as possible.

Meanwhile Hannibal again crossed the mountains into the heart of

Italy to Beneventum, and from there to Capua, the largest Italian city

dependent upon Rome. The Dictator followed, condemning his soldiers to

the melancholy task of looking on in inaction, while the enemy's cavalry

plundered their faithful allies. Finally, Fabius obtained what he

considered a favorable opportunity for an attack. Hannibal, disappointed

in his expectations that Capua would be friendly to him, and not being

prepared to lay siege to the town, had withdrawn towards the Adriatic.

Fabius intercepted him near Casilinum, in Campania, on the left bank of

the Volturnus. The heights that commanded the right bank of the river

were occupied by his main army; and the road itself, which led across

the river, was guarded by a strong division of men.

Hannibal, however, ordered his light-armed troops to ascend the heights

over the road during the night, driving before them oxen with burning

fagots tied to their horns, giving the appearance of an army marching by

torchlight. The plan was successful. The Romans abandoned the road and

marched for the heights, along which they supposed the enemy were going.

Hannibal, with a clear road before him, continued his march with the

bulk of his army. The next morning he recalled his light-armed troops,

which had been sent on to the hills with the oxen. Their engagement with

the Romans had resulted in a severe loss to Fabius.

Hannibal then proceeded, without opposition, in a northeasterly

direction, by a very circuitous route. He arrived in Luceria, with much

booty and a full money-chest, at harvest time. Near here he encamped in

a plain rich in grain and grass for the support of his army.

At Rome the policy of Fabius was severely criticised. His apparent

inaction was displeasing to a large party, and he was called Cunctator

(the Delayer). At length the assembly voted that his command be shared

by one of his lieutenants, Marcus Minucius. The army was divided into

two corps; one under Marcus, who intended to attack Hannibal at the

first opportunity; the other under Fabius, who still adhered to his

former tactics. Marcus made an attack, but paid dearly for his rashness,

and his whole corps would have been annihilated had not Fabius come to

his assistance and covered his retreat. Hannibal passed the winter of

217-216 unmolested.

The season was spent by the Romans in active preparations for the spring

campaign. An army of 80,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry was raised and

put under the command of the Consuls, LUCIUS AEMILIUS PAULLUS and GAIUS

TERENTIUS VARRO. It was decided to test Hannibal's strength once more in

open battle. His army was only half as strong as the Roman in infantry,

but was much superior in cavalry.

In the early summer of 216 the Consuls concentrated their forces at

CANNAE, a hamlet near the mouth of the Aufidus. Early one morning in

June the Romans massed their troops on the left bank of the river, with

their cavalry on either wing, the right under Paullus, and the left

under Varro. The Proconsul Servilius commanded the centre.

The Carthaginians were drawn up in the form of a crescent, flanked by

cavalry. Both armies advanced to the attack at the same time. The onset

was terrible; but though the Romans fought with a courage increased by

the thought that their homes, wives, and children were at stake, they

were overwhelmed on all sides. Seventy thousand fell on the field,

among whom were Paullus, Servilius, many officers, and eighty men of

senatorial rank. This was the most crushing defeat ever experienced by

the Romans. All Southern Italy, except the Latin colonies and the Greek

cities on the coast, went over to Hannibal.

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