THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT.
True Moslem State Theocratic--Dual Form of the Present
Government--The Sublime Porte--Army and Navy--Internal
Administration--Financial Management--General
Corruption--Administration of Justice--Treatment of Christians--The
Ulema--The Palace Party--The Sultan.
There can be no proper understanding of the situation in Turkey
without a knowledge of the peculiar character of the Turkish
Government. That government is in reality dual in form. So far as
the outside world is concerned it is on the basis of an absolute
monarchy or despotism. The Sultan is the autocrat of his empire,
but has under him a complete organization of departments conducted
by the appropriate chiefs who form his cabinet. To the Moslem,
however, the same government bears another aspect, and side by side
with this organization that is apparent to the Western eye there is
another, which to the true Turk takes precedence of it. The original
Moslem State was distinctly theocratic in its nature, and its entire
organization was based upon the idea that religion was the controlling
element in the conduct of all affairs, national, municipal and family.
Both forms, however, centre in the Sultan himself, and under the
peculiar conditions of his life there has grown up a third element,
often distinct from and even antagonistic to the others--the palace
element. Each one of these three play an important part in the affairs
of the empire.
The Turkish Government as it stands before the world at large is
organized like any other government. The Sultan is the supreme head;
under him is the Council of Ministers, called Medjliss-i-Hass.
This consists of the following members: the Grand Vizier, the
Sheik-ul-Islam, and the Ministers of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs,
of War, of Finance, of Marine, of Commerce, of Public Instruction and
of Evkaf, together with the President of the Council of State and the
Grand Master of Artillery. These different departments constitute
what is known as the Sublime Porte, and are carried on in much the
same way as the corresponding departments in this country or in any
European country, and most of them require no special description. The
Grand Vizier, as president of the Council, holds much the same power
as the Premier in England. Theoretically he has the power to decide
matters in any department on his own judgment, and his endorsement
of an undertaking is almost sure to insure its success whether the
rest of the Cabinet approve it or not. Of the other members there
are only three whose office needs any special description. These are
the Sheik-ul-Islam, the Minister of Evkaf and the Minister of Public
Instruction.
The Sheik-ul-Islam is popularly supposed to be the head of the Moslem
religion. This, however, is not true. He is merely the representative
in this Council of the Moslem Hierarchy. Theoretically he is nominated
by the Sultan with the approval of the Ulemas, or general body of
Moslem Doctors of Law. Practically he is the choice, as are the other
members of the Council, of the Grand Vizier, who has the privilege
usually of making up his own Cabinet, as has the English Premier.
His membership in the Council is in most cases honorary rather than
important. Only under rare instances does he come into position to
exercise any positive influence upon affairs. On the occasion of the
death of Sultan Abdul Aziz, the conspirators applied to the Ulema, who
made a statement that the Sultan was not fit to govern, and as their
mouthpiece the Sheik-ul-Islam issued a decree of _fetva_, which made
his deposition lawful. So also when it became necessary politically to
replace Murad by his brother Abdul Hamid, the Sheik-ul-Islam was called
upon, and, agreeably to the influences brought to bear, issued the
order. There have been similar instances at other times, but since the
reorganization of the empire by Sultan Mahmud II the office has been as
a rule honorary rather than practical.
The Minister of Public Instruction is a Cabinet Minister by virtue of
the peculiar relations existing between the government and the Mosque
schools, and the necessity, under a despotic government, of watching
that nothing shall be taught in one school that shall antagonize what
is taught in another, or be in the slightest degree derogatory to
the general government. The important duty in regard to the schools
connected with the Mosques, has to do not so much with the education
itself as with the control of that very large portion of the revenues
of the country which is applied to their support. Another department
under the same head is that of the censorship. How important a
department this is will be manifest later on, illustrations of it
being given in the chapter on the condition of the empire in 1894. The
countries where this department occupies a somewhat parallel position
are Russia, Austria and Spain, where the censorship is very rigid and
the oversight by the government of all departments of instruction is
very complete.
The Minister of Evkaf has duties entirely unlike those of any cabinet
minister in European countries. They arise from the inevitable mingling
of the two characteristics of the Turkish Government. The term _vakouf_
is applied to property which in one form or another is directed to
religious uses and generally indicates that belonging to the Mosques.
It is acquired in two ways; the property of any man who dies intestate
reverts under Turkish law not to the State itself, but to the nearest
Mosque. In addition to this, if any man desires to secure special
divine favor, such as is awarded particularly to the charitable,
according to Moslem teaching, he may transfer during his lifetime or
deed after his death any portion of his property to any particular
Mosque. He, however, has the privilege of securing an annuity based
upon this property to some member of his own family or some one whom
he desires especially to favor. The result is that a very large
amount, estimated at from one-third to one-half, of the real estate in
the Turkish Empire is owned by the Mosques in this way; the income,
however, not by any means being entirely under the control of the
Mosques themselves. It is evident that the direction of this involves a
very extended organization, and the elevation of it into a department
whose head shall be in the Cabinet was perfectly natural. It will be
easily seen that the style of questions arising in such a case is very
varied. Where a person wishes to buy real estate the first thing he has
to do is to find out whether it, or any portion of it, is _vakouf_. If
so, he must, in making his contract, bind himself to pay the regular
tax directly to the Mosque or to the holder of the annuity. This can
be done without great difficulty. But in case he should die and the
property be divided according to law among his heirs, and one of those
heirs should die, then the portion of that heir goes to the Mosque.
Various methods have been devised to overcome such difficulties. Two
are provided for by Turkish law: (1) A lump sum may be paid to the
Mosque, securing complete quittal of all claims; (2) The purchaser
may find some unencumbered property, and, by payment to its owners of
a consideration, secure its acceptance by the Mosque in lieu of the
property that he wishes.
The military departments of the government are organized and officered
very much as in other governments. The army is divided into the
Nizam, or regular army; the Redif, or reserves, and the Mustahfiz, or
veterans. Military service is compulsory on all able-bodied Mohammedans
for six years in the regular army, eight years in the reserve, and six
in the veteran service. There are, however, the following exceptions:
(1) All Turks residing in Constantinople and its suburbs are released;
(2) Those who are infirm, are the sole support of their families, or
for any special reason may claim exception, are required to go through
from six to nine months’ drill in the regular battalion in the first
year of their service, and thirty days’ drill at their homes in every
subsequent year, and are also liable on emergency to be called to
join the regular army. Non-Moslems are prohibited from entering the
military service, but instead pay an exemption tax, which is levied
alike on males of all ages. The effect of this has been to create a
heavy strain upon the Moslem population throughout the empire, while
the Christians have found it to their advantage to pay the tax rather
than to endure the conscription. In the apportionment of the troops it
has been the rule never to allow soldiers to serve in the districts
near their homes. Thus the troops employed in the garrisons in the
north are levied from among the Moslems of Syria and Mesopotamia, while
those accustomed to the snows and high altitudes of Asia Minor are sent
into the heated plains of the south. Whatever advantage might result
from this separation from their homes is more than counterbalanced
by the strain upon the physical constitution. The total effective
force of the regular Turkish army in times of peace is estimated at
about 150,000 men and 9,800 officers, divided into 264 battalions of
infantry, 189 squadrons of cavalry, 104 batteries of field artillery,
36 batteries of mountain and 29 battalions of garrison artillery, 4
battalions of infantry train, 14 battalions of artificers, 3 battalions
of fire brigade, 22 companies of engineers, 2 sanitary companies and 1
telegraph company. The total force that it is estimated might be put
into the field under the present system is said to be about 800,000
men. The rank and file is of excellent material. There are no better
soldiers in the world than the Turks. They are faithful, obedient,
fearless, and accustomed to the utmost frugality of life. The same,
however, cannot be said of the officers. There are brave, efficient men
among them; but for the most part they show the same defects as other
Turks in official position, and their weakness affects very seriously
the whole army.
The Turkish navy is the laughing stock of all who know anything about
it. In numbers it is strong, and probably, if it were kept in repair
and sufficiently well manned, it might be available for warfare. As a
matter of fact, its principal use for the last few years has been to
make annual trips from the inner harbor to the Bosporus and back again,
in which trips it has to pass the two bridges that span the Golden
Horn, and if it gets through without really damaging the bridges,
it is matter of public comment and congratulation in the press. The
present navy owes its origin to the ambition and extravagance of Sultan
Abdul Aziz, who, having found that money was to be had in Europe for
the asking, paid little attention to the conditions of the payment
of interest, and borrowed right and left for the purpose of building
palaces, public works of various kinds, and a navy. He had, however,
to import engineers and officers; for seamen he relied in some degree
upon Dalmatians, but they could not supply the demand, and he fell back
upon the Turks. The Turks are as poor sailors as most Orientals, and as
a matter of fact the fleet has been and is worth next to nothing for
offensive or even for defensive purposes. The general collapse of the
finances of the empire has made it difficult to pay the engineers; the
ships have not been well cared for, and are practically of no account
in estimating the strength of the nation. There are 15 armor-clad ships
of considerable power, and 42 others, some of them of very little
value. Its nominal strength is 6 vice-admirals, 11 rear admirals, 208
captains, 704 under officers, 30,000 sailors, and 9,460 marines.
The department which at present attracts most attention is that
of the Interior. For administrative purposes the empire is divided
into vilayets (provinces), which are subdivided into sanjaks or livas
(governments or arrondissements), these again into kazas (counties),
and these into nahies (communes). The governors of these divisions are
styled Valis, or Walis, Mutessarifs, Kaimakams and Mudirs. The first
two officers, who have the title of Pasha, and the third, are appointed
by the Council of State at Constantinople, the fourth by the Valis.
The last is generally some local magistrate; the others are usually
from places at some distance from where they hold office. Their duties
are both judicial and executive, and each is practically autocrat
within his own jurisdiction, subject only to his immediate superior.
There is a council connected with each of these offices, composed of
prominent members of the different communities, Moslem and Christian,
whose business it is to advise the governor in the many details of his
office. The different communities have a loose organization called the
medjliss, which meets on occasion to discuss local matters, and which
is represented in a sort of council associated with the governor. The
general character of the provincial government is largely dependent
upon the Governor-General, or Vali. If he is a man who seeks to deal
justly by the people, and who has a pretty firm hand, there is order
and quiet, for the people are usually peaceable. If he is an avaricious
man, that characteristic, always existent to a greater or less degree,
pervades the whole administration, and the shrewdest politicians
come out best. If he is easy-going, caring more for his comfort, or
_kef_, his subordinates do much as they please, and that pleasure
is, as a rule, to fleece the people to the best of their ability.
Occasionally, though it must be said rarely, the governor is a man of
marked brutality, and then woe betide any in city or country who for
any reason incur his hostility. When it is remembered that appointments
to provincial offices are seldom made with any reference to the welfare
of the province, but usually as a matter of favor to some one who
desires to recover wasted fortune, or whom revenge seeks to remove
from Constantinople, it will be readily seen that the chances are all
in favor of poor rather than good government. Taking into account also
the fact of the absolute autocracy of the governor, and the utter lack
of supervision, the wonder is not that the provinces are governed so
badly, but that they are not governed worse.
The financial management of the government is probably the worst
in existence. Properly speaking, Turkey has no finance. There are
revenues, but no regular way of collecting them. There are salaries,
but no regular way of paying them. The result is chaos. From the Sultan
down to the lowest grade in the public service it is a scramble for
money, each one getting all he can and giving up as little as possible.
Many of the revenues are mortgaged to pay the loans contracted, chiefly
during the extravagant reign of Abdul Aziz, and are under the absolute
control of a commission of foreigners. The tithes are farmed out to
the highest bidders, who have the whole power of the government at
their disposal to enable them to collect all they can, on the general
principle of a division of any profits between the collectors and
the authorities. Tax receipts are repeatedly refused, so that when
subsequent collectors come they can take advantage of their absence to
collect back taxes to the very limit of possibility. Enumerators for
personal taxes make their lists small so as to lessen the amount for
which they are held responsible, while in view of this they levy on the
community as high as the community will give. Importers try to secure
undervaluation of their goods, land-owners undervaluation of their
land, peasants hide their grain, and men will often bear imprisonment,
and even the severest beating, rather than reveal their deposits.
In case of special need at Constantinople, requisition is made upon
some province for a certain sum. Forthwith all the efforts of every
member of the administration of that province are directed to two
things: (1) to lessen if possible the amount demanded; (2) to secure
for themselves a portion of the money that must be collected. Spies and
informers abound on every hand, and exceptional harvests, fortunate
investments, fat legacies, are made the pretexts of all sorts of
pressure. Salaries are always in arrears for months, and sometimes
years. The announcement that the treasury is to pay a month’s salary to
the clerks of the departments, or to the army and navy, is a matter of
public comment and advertisements in the newspapers. But people must
live. Hence bribery and extortion rule everywhere. Judges, officials
of every grade, even heads of departments, rely for their support, not
upon the government itself, but upon what influence they can exert on
the lives and fortunes of others, and upon appropriating at least a
little of what passes through their hands.
The general conduct of the various departments is thus inevitably
the poorest. There is not the faintest pretense of civil service. All
appointments go by favor, and, with rare exceptions, the amount of work
accomplished is lamentably, even ludicrously, small. It is absolutely
impossible to get anything done in any of the departments except by
one of two means: constant pressure combined with the endorsement of
a superior official, or the most unblushing bribery. Fees abound on
every hand, and are given openly without any apparent idea that there
is anything derogatory to the officials in taking them. In the Custom
House there is a regular scale of fees; so much to the porter who
takes things out of the lighter; so much to the inspector; so much
to the clerk, and so on from the bottom up. The inevitable result is
that there is false swearing on every hand, and the dues supposed to
be received seldom reach intact the treasuries of the government.
When it comes to the question of securing concessions, the matter is
still worse. Some ten years ago a small book, called “Minor Memoirs
of Turkey,” was published, full of curious details. Among them was
a list of bribes received by dignitaries of the Ottoman Government;
they included 75,000 Turkish pounds paid by a railway company to
two secretaries, a chamberlain at the palace, a minister in the
cabinet, etc. A tobacco monopoly company paid 12,000 pounds to various
officials; the directors of a bank in Galata remitted 125,000 pounds
as an agent for some enterprise. The court chamberlain received 60,000
pounds from Baron ----, through a certain effendi, for a concession.
Whether these particular instances are absolutely correct or not, makes
very little difference. It is perfectly notorious, and has been for
years, that every concession of any kind for public works has to pass
the gauntlet of bribes from the lowest official at the Sublime Porte to
the palace itself. It is true that some enterprises are carried through
without bribes, but they owe their success to personal favor. One who
was well posted in Turkish Government dealings has said, that “strong
as Baksheesh Pasha is, Khatir Pasha is still stronger.” (Khatir is what
is done out of courtesy. If a Turk is asked to do a thing as a personal
favor, it lays a heavier obligation upon him than even the presentation
of a bribe, if the personal relations are at all intimate.) To give in
anything like full detail a description of the methods adopted in the
different departments of the Turkish Government, would require several
chapters of itself, and would reveal an amount of trickery, deception
and fraud which would be almost incredible. In the administration
of justice there is a system of laws and of courts based upon the
Napoleon code. There is a certain amount of regular law practiced.
Here, however, the Moslem organization comes into such close relation
with what we may call the European organization, that special reference
is reserved for a later paragraph. The policing of the country is in
the hands of the military, although the police force is a different
organization from that of the regular army.
The personnel of the different departments is almost entirely Moslem,
except where Turks are simply incapable of performing the duties.
To Mahmud II must be given the credit of recognizing the superior
ability of his Christian subjects, and of employing them in the
various departments of the government. His practice was enlarged upon
by Sultans Abdul Medjid and Abdul Aziz. When the present Sultan came
to the throne, Armenians and Greeks were quite numerous as clerks in
the various departments. Some rose to high position and were greatly
honored. During the present reign, however, the number of these has
been steadily diminishing, and their places have been taken by Turks.
The Turk, not being well adapted to bureaucratic work, the general
conduct of the empire has suffered proportionately. It is to be noted
that the diplomatic service of the Turkish Empire is chiefly in the
hands of the Greeks. There are few, if any, Armenians. In the local
administrative service the Armenians outnumber the Greeks. The presence
of these men in the service is referred to as indicative of the kindly
feeling of the government for the Christian subjects. This does not
by any means follow. Their presence is due, not to any favor on the
part of the Sultan or his ministers, but to the fact that they are
absolutely essential for the efficient conduct of the government.
Turning now to the Moslem organization, we find that originally it
was not dissimilar in form to the other. It is based, however, upon an
entirely different idea. In it the Sultan is not an executive, but is
the caliph; primarily the defender of the faith, and only incidentally
the governor of the people. He has associated with him the different
prefects, practically ministers, who are his subordinates, and yet
autocrats each in his own department under his general authority. So
far as relations to foreign governments are concerned, there is not
so much of difference. In the conduct of home affairs the difference
is very marked, especially in the Department of Justice. There the
whole principle of judgment is based upon the Moslem law, including
both the Koran and the traditions. Those traditions recognize as the
fundamental principle of law the faith and declaration of belief in the
unity of God. Every person who denies that is an idolater, and unworthy
of position equal to that of the true Moslem. Thus no Christian
testimony is available in a court of law, and in any difference between
himself and a Moslem, his interest is entirely a secondary matter.
The fact that the traditions were very inchoate and uncertain left
an enormous amount of room for all kinds of legal quibbles. So long
as the conduct of the courts was on this basis pure and simple, the
absolute subordination of the Christians was very plain. They had no
rights of any kind, and when, by virtue of a sort of rude justice, they
occasionally were treated honorably, it was so much clear gain. When,
however, the new organization was brought side by side with the old,
and the Napoleon code was made of equal importance with the law of the
Cheri, then there was a constant strife as to which should get the
better of the other, and between the two, even less of justice was done
than was accomplished by the former, except where there were influences
at work to compel, through diplomatic pressure, the granting of just
dues.
An illustration will give an idea of the situation better than any
general description. A foreigner purchased a house in an interior city
of Turkey which had been offered for open sale by the government, which
had sequestered it in lieu of taxes due from its owner, an Armenian. A
thorough government title was given, and possession seemed absolutely
sure. After a few years the original owner died, leaving a son who had
not yet attained his majority. Meanwhile the foreigner had improved
the property so much that it had doubled, perhaps tripled, in value.
The son, on coming of age, wanted to get back his ancestral property,
and applied to the courts, claiming that the original seizure by the
government was unjust, inasmuch as according to the Moslem law the
rights of a minor could not be prejudiced by the debts of the father.
The thing was brought before the local cadi, and for a consideration he
decided in favor of the young man, and the foreigner was immediately
ordered to leave. There had been no opportunity for his case to be
presented; simply the instructions came from the courts that he was
to withdraw, and a platoon of soldiers was sent to enforce the order.
Being a foreigner, however, he had the right to refuse entrance to the
Turkish troops, and the matter was referred to Constantinople. There
it was brought before the regular court, and the representatives of
the foreigner said, “If the man has been defrauded, why, that is not
our business. The government gave us a good title and took our money;
we have improved the property. Now, if the house belongs to this young
man, we shall bring suit against the government for the money paid, the
interest paid upon that money, and for the value of the improvements.”
They utterly refused to go into the question of the original
sequestration. This put the government in a difficult position. They
were entirely unwilling to pay the money, and at the same time there
was the decision of their courts. So an experienced Moslem jurist was
called in, and he found that by some other precept of Moslem law the
minor had lost his rights through not having presented his claim on
a certain date. The result of the whole thing was that the property
remained in the hands of the foreigner.
Two other points deserve special mention: the position of Christians
in the courts, and the general relation of the government as a
protector. According to the true Moslem position, as stated above, no
infidel (and all non-Moslems are infidels) has any standing before
the law. His word is of no value, and his testimony is worthless in
comparison with that of the true believer. Under the general reforms
inaugurated by Sultan Mahmud and carried on by his successor, this was
changed in theory, and, by the Hatti Humayoun, the Christian’s witness
was accepted on a par with that of the Moslem. Had the new code been
the only one in force, or had it been possible to institute courts all
over the country, it would have been comparatively easy to accomplish
the change; but the continuance of the old system throughout the rural
districts, and in many matters, notably real estate transfers in the
cities, occasioned great confusion, which worked constantly to delay
and hamper the development of the Christians. As a matter of fact, the
local courts throughout the empire, in matters affecting Moslems and
Christians, have been and still are conducted on the general basis of
the distinctively Moslem law, and not on that of the Napoleon code.
The same thing is true of the general relations of the Christians
to the government in all matters regarding his protection. The old
formula was, “Islam, tribute, or the sword,” with an at least implied
pledge of protection for those who accepted the tribute. This was
assured to the Christians by various edicts, notably the Hatti
Humayoun. Yet repeatedly it has been manifest that the old Moslem law
is practically in force, according to which the moment a Christian
becomes in any way an element of uneasiness in the community, or of
hostility to the government, he may be suppressed. A doctor of Moslem
law, when questioned on this point, frankly acknowledged the truth
of the statement, and went on to say that even if the Christian had
done nothing, he might be incited to some overt act which would give a
pretext for suppressing him. This fact throws a flood of light on the
claim of the Turkish Government that it has been suppressing rebellion.
This distinctively Moslem idea is represented in the actual government
of Turkey in many ways. The Sheik-ul-Islam is its formal representative
in the cabinet, but it has absolute control over the Board of Censors,
in the Department of Public Instruction, as will be seen in the chapter
on the situation in 1894. It is also dominant in the Department of
Evkaf, and practically, though not theoretically so, in the Department
of Justice. In the interior provinces, however, with rare exceptions,
it rules everywhere. The exponents are chiefly the cadis in the
villages and towns, who look with marked disfavor on the new-fangled
judges who have usurped their privileges, and who strive by every means
to arrest their supremacy. In close sympathy with them are the Moslem
priests, especially the Ulema, or Doctors of Moslem law, the Softas, or
students of law. All of these are bitterly opposed to the introduction
of what they consider the infidel code, and do not scruple to do all
in their power to make it of no effect. When their numbers and their
wide distribution are taken into account, it will be readily seen that
while the paraphernalia of the Turkish Government is to all appearances
in accord with modern and European ideas, there is an influence not so
visible, but very powerful, which renders it of extremely little value
in the actual conduct of the affairs of the empire.
No one can live in Constantinople for any length of time, least
of all have much dealing with the government, without learning the
meaning of the term, “The Palace.” Theoretically it means the Sultan,
with his environments of police officials and attendants; practically
it means in most cases those officials themselves, the Sultan being
considered apart. Those officials include the officers of the palace,
the chamberlain, chief eunuch and private secretaries. There is also
the introducer of ambassadors; and aside from these there is generally
a small coterie of men in whom the Sultan has personal confidence.
They hold no definite official position, but live near the palace and
are summoned at any time that the Sultan desires their counsel. In
addition to these there is usually a small company of ecclesiastics or
of Dervishes, who have varying influence with the Sultan. The power
of these different officials varies greatly at different times, and
also as one subject or another comes up. Under some previous reigns,
when the personal comfort of the Sultan was predominant in his plans,
the chief eunuch was often practically the ruler of the empire. It was
said that he had considerable influence in the reign of Abdul Aziz.
Under the present Sultan it is generally understood that he is purely a
palace official, with no relation to outside matters. The introducer of
ambassadors is generally a man personally agreeable to the Sultan, and
who, by virtue of his acquaintance with the different representatives
of the foreign governments, is able, in quiet, unofficial ways, to
exert considerable influence. One man who has for a long time been
quite prominent is the well-known General Osman Pasha. His heroic
defense of Plevna made him quite a hero in Turkish eyes, and his
influence in many things has been quite noticeable. With regard to the
Dervishes, it is difficult to speak with any degree of certainty. They
are men gathered from different parts of the empire, who for one reason
or another, perhaps personal, perhaps due to the locality from which
they came, have made themselves agreeable to the Sultan or have made
themselves useful. In general they represent to him the distinctively
Moslem feeling of his empire and of the general Moslem world. There
have been many reports as to their overpowering influence, and names
have been given of one and another who seemed to dominate the Sultan
absolutely. These reports must be taken with large allowance. While
undoubtedly they have manifested considerable power on different
occasions, it may be questioned whether that power has been at any time
prominent or predominant, whether they have not more often been the
tools of the Sultan rather than his masters.
One other department should be mentioned, the Council of State or
Privy Council. This is a large body, made up of most of those who have
been prominent in public affairs. They may have been members of the
Cabinet or not. Their duties are advisory rather than official. The
only one among them having a definite position is the president, who
is also a member of the Porte or Cabinet. In ordinary times they do
not appear before the public to any great degree. On some occasions,
however, they form a very influential element in the management of
affairs. Reference has been also made to the Ulema. Of these there is
no definite organization. It is a general body including the prominent
instructors in Moslem law connected with the different Mosques.
They appear in the regular government only in the person of the
Sheik-ul-Islam, who is a member of the Cabinet or Sublime Porte.
Dominating all these departments is the Sultan himself. His word is
law, and no official order of the Porte, the Council of State, or
connected with the Palace, can stand against his personal displeasure.
At the same time, as in all autocratic governments, he is by no
means an absolutely independent ruler. He is compelled by force of
circumstances to recognize the very diverse interests about him; to
realize that he must on the one hand keep on good terms with the
nations of Europe, and not less carefully guard against offending those
who have a great hold upon his Moslem subjects, and who may influence
very seriously his position as Caliph of the Moslem world. It is thus
that the personality of the Sultan is, after all, the most important
element in the Turkish Government. In cases like the Conqueror of
Constantinople, Mahmud II, and others, that influence is positive;
in the case of others it is negative, and the positive influence has
rested with one or another branch of the government. Under the present
reign the positive influence of the Sultan himself is a most important
factor, recognized as such by all who have come into personal contact
with him. And no one who has followed the course of his reign can fail
to recognize the great degree to which Abdul Hamid III has impressed
his individuality upon the Turkish Government.
[Illustration:
ROBERT COLLEGE, situated on the heights of Rumeli Hissar, about six
miles up the Bosporus from the city of Constantinople. Just below is
the place where Darius crossed the Bosporus and where Mohammed II.
built his famous castles.]
[Illustration:
THE BOYS’ HIGH SCHOOL IN SMYRNA. It is under the care of the American
missionaries. The students are of all nationalities, Armenian, Greek,
English, and other Europeans. The house is a good illustration of the
style of building. There are no chimneys, their place being taken by
stovepipes, as seen in the picture.]