The second occasion on which General Taylor was said to have donned his

uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the Flag Officer of the

naval squadron off the mouth of the Rio Grande. While the army was on

that river the Flag Officer sent word that he would call on the General

to pay his respects on a certain day. General Taylor, knowing that

naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on all

occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive his

guest in the same style. His uniform was therefore got out, brushed up,

and put on, in advance of the visit. The Flag Officer, knowing General

Taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it

would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian's

dress, left off his uniform for this occasion. The meeting was said to

have been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principally

apologetic.

The time was whiled away pleasantly enough at Matamoras, while we were

waiting for volunteers. It is probable that all the most important

people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we

got there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparently

existed. It was the policy of the Commanding General to allow no

pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use

without satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was afforded

than the people had ever known before.

Among the troops that joined us at Matamoras was an Ohio regiment, of

which Thomas L. Hamer, the Member of Congress who had given me my

appointment to West Point, was major. He told me then that he could

have had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed a

brigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. I

have said before that Hamer was one of the ablest men Ohio ever

produced. At that time he was in the prime of life, being less than

fifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising long

life. But he was taken sick before Monterey, and died within a few

days. I have always believed that had his life been spared, he would

have been President of the United States during the term filled by

President Pierce. Had Hamer filled that office his partiality for me

was such, there is but little doubt I should have been appointed to one

of the staff corps of the army--the Pay Department probably--and would

therefore now be preparing to retire. Neither of these speculations is

unreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men control

their own destiny.

Reinforcements having arrived, in the month of August the movement

commenced from Matamoras to Camargo, the head of navigation on the Rio

Grande. The line of the Rio Grande was all that was necessary to hold,

unless it was intended to invade Mexico from the North. In that case

the most natural route to take was the one which General Taylor

selected. It entered a pass in the Sierra Madre Mountains, at Monterey,

through which the main road runs to the City of Mexico. Monterey itself

was a good point to hold, even if the line of the Rio Grande covered all

the territory we desired to occupy at that time. It is built on a plain

two thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and the

situation healthy.

On the 19th of August the army started for Monterey, leaving a small

garrison at Matamoras. The troops, with the exception of the artillery,

cavalry, and the brigade to which I belonged, were moved up the river to

Camargo on steamers. As there were but two or three of these, the boats

had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were

up. Those who marched did so by the south side of the river.

Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade

commander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force.

One day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the

month of August, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly for

Northern men. The order of marching was changed and night marches were

substituted with the best results.

When Camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the Mexican

hamlet. I was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the

regiment. The teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport

all supplies from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande over the level

prairies of Texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the

reinforced army in a mountainous country. To obviate the deficiency,

pack mules were hired, with Mexicans to pack and drive them. I had

charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack

train to supplement them. There were not men enough in the army to

manage that train without the help of Mexicans who had learned how. As

it was the difficulty was great enough. The troops would take up their

march at an early hour each day. After they had started, the tents and

cooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could be

lashed to the backs of the mules. Sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and

mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. It

took several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time

we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing

so long with their loads on their backs. Sometimes one would start to

run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; others

would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on

the top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part of

their loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling

while they would take the other. I am not aware of ever having used a

profane expletive in my life; but I would have the charity to excuse

those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of Mexican

pack mules at the time.

CHAPTER VIII.

ADVANCE ON MONTEREY--THE BLACK FORT--THE BATTLE OF MONTEREY--SURRENDER

OF THE CITY.

The advance from Camargo was commenced on the 5th of September. The army

was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's

march. The advance reached Cerralvo in four days and halted for the

remainder of the troops to come up. By the 13th the rear-guard had

arrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as

before, a day separating the divisions. The forward division halted

again at Marin, twenty-four miles from Monterey. Both this place and

Cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen

running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when the

people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must

have given them a favorable opinion of Los Grengos--"the Yankees." From

Marin the movement was in mass. On the 19th General Taylor, with is

army, was encamped at Walnut Springs, within three miles of Monterey.

The town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and is

backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation. To the north, between

the city and Walnut Springs, stretches an extensive plain. On this

plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a

strong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of

"Black Fort." Its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full

extent of their range. There were two detached spurs of hills or

mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were also

fortified. On one of these stood the Bishop's Palace. The road to

Saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of

the guns from these heights. The lower or eastern end was defended by

two or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry.

To the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that

the range of foot-hills. The plaza in the centre of the city was the

citadel, properly speaking. All the streets leading from it were swept

by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. The

house-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by

the use of sand-bags for parapets. Such were the defences of Monterey

in September, 1847. General Ampudia, with a force of certainly ten

thousand men, was in command.

General Taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, in

three divisions, under Generals Butler, Twiggs and Worth. The troops

went into camp at Walnut Springs, while the engineer officers, under

Major Mansfield--a General in the late war--commenced their

reconnoissance. Major Mansfield found that it would be practicable to

get troops around, out of range of the Black Fort and the works on the

detached hills to the north-west of the city, to the Saltillo road.

With this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off from

receiving further supplies, if not from all communication with the

interior. General Worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was

given the task of gaining possession of the Saltillo road, and of

carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. He

started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. The divisions

under Generals Butler and Twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and

north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the

movement under General Worth. Worth's was regarded as the main attack on

Monterey, and all other operations were in support of it. His march

this day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily

about the Bishop's Palace and the other outside fortifications on their

left. General Worth reached a defensible position just out of range of

the enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouacked

for the night. The engineer officers with him--Captain Sanders and

Lieutenant George G. Meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious

National army at the battle of Gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to the

Saltillo road under cover of night.

During the night of the 20th General Taylor had established a battery,

consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar,

at a point from which they could play upon Black Fort. A natural

depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it

from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on

the crest nearest the enemy. The 4th infantry, then consisting of but

six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while

they were intrenching themselves and their guns. I was regimental

quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp

and the public property at Walnut Springs. It was supposed that the

regiment would return to its camp in the morning.

The point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work

performed without attracting the attention of the enemy. At daylight

the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what

seemed to me at that day, great fury. My curiosity got the better of my

judgment, and I mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was

going on. I had been there but a short time when an order to charge was

given, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where I had been

ordered to stay--I charged with the regiment. As soon as the troops were

out of the depression they came under the fire of Black Fort. As they

advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower,

end of the city, and of musketry. About one-third of the men engaged in

the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. We

retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and

perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from Walnut

Springs. I was, I believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the

charge who was on horseback. When we got to a lace of safety the

regiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it. The

adjutant of the regiment, Lieutenant Hoskins, who was not in robust

health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in the

charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that

he could be mounted also. I offered him my horse and he accepted the

offer. A few minutes later I saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man,

mounted, not far away. I ran to him, took his horse and was back with

the regiment in a few minutes. In a short time we were off again; and

the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that I recollect of

being in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower

batteries. The adjutant to whom I had loaned my horse was killed, and I

was designated to act in his place.

This charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. We belonged to the

brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Garland, and he had received

orders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if he

could without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion in

favor of Worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intended

should be decisive. By a movement by the left flank Garland could have

led his men beyond the range of the fire from Black Fort and advanced

towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as

could be expected. There was no undue loss of life in reaching the

lower end of Monterey, except that sustained by Garland's command.

Meanwhile Quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had

reached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of the

houses without much loss. Colonel Garland's brigade also arrived at the

suburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached

house-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the

approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily

captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. An

entrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the houses

protected our troops so long as they were inactive.

On the west General Worth had reached the Saltillo road after some

fighting but without heavy loss. He turned from his new position and

captured the forts on both heights in that quarter. This gave him

possession of the upper or west end of Monterey. Troops from both

Twiggs's and Butler's divisions were in possession of the east end of

the town, but the Black Fort to the north of the town and the plaza in

the centre were still in the possession of the enemy. Our camps at

Walnut Springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each

regiment. A regiment of Kentucky volunteers guarded the mortars and

howitzers engaged against Black Fort. Practically Monterey was invested.

There was nothing done on the 22d by the United States troops; but the

enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from Black Fort and the batteries

still in their possession at the east end of the city. During the night

they evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we held

undisputed possession of the east end of Monterey.

Twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well covered

from the fire of the enemy. But the streets leading to the plaza--all

Spanish or Spanish-American towns have near their centres a square

called a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery. The

houses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about the

plaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protected

from our fire by parapets made of sand-bags. All advances into the city

were thus attended with much danger. While moving along streets which

did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, and

from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these a

volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariably

encountered. The 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advance

nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. The loss of the 3d

infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. There were

only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers

present, and five of these officers were killed. When within a square

of the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a

halt. Placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, the

men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboring

houses. The exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our

soldiers.

We had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our

ammunition was growing low. I volunteered to go back (*2) to the point

we had started from, report our position to General Twiggs, and ask for

ammunition to be forwarded. We were at this time occupying ground off

from the street, in rear of the houses. My ride back was an exposed

one. Before starting I adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest

from the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the

saddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, I started at full

run. It was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, but

these I crossed at such a flying rate that generally I was past and

under cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. I got

out safely without a scratch.

At one place on my ride, I saw a sentry walking in front of a house, and

stopped to inquire what he was doing there. Finding that the house was

full of wounded American officers and soldiers, I dismounted and went

in. I found there Captain Williams, of the Engineer Corps, wounded in

the head, probably fatally, and Lieutenant Territt, also badly wounded

his bowels protruding from his wound. There were quite a number of

soldiers also. Promising them to report their situation, I left,

readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon with

the troops at the east end. Before ammunition could be collected, the

two regiments I had been with were seen returning, running the same

gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but with

comparatively little loss. The movement was countermanded and the

troops were withdrawn. The poor wounded officers and men I had found,

fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died.

While this was going on at the east, General Worth, with a small

division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite

end of the city. He resorted to a better expedient for getting to the

plaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. Instead of moving by the

open streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from

one to another. Without much loss of life, he got so near the plaza

during the night that before morning, Ampudia, the Mexican commander,

made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. This stopped

all further hostilities. The terms of surrender were soon agreed upon.

The prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses and

personal property with them.

My pity was aroused by the sight of the Mexican garrison of Monterey

marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling was

experienced by most of our army who witnessed it. Many of the prisoners

were cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable little

half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their

riders out of town. The men looked in but little better condition. I

thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the

war, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about."

After the surrender of the garrison of Monterey a quiet camp life was

led until midwinter. As had been the case on the Rio Grande, the people

who remained at their homes fraternized with the "Yankees" in the

pleasantest manner. In fact, under the humane policy of our commander,

I question whether the great majority of the Mexican people did not

regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. Property

and person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all

the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before.

The educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere,

abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were

in the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very small

percentage of the whole population.

CHAPTER IX.

POLITICAL INTRIGUE--BUENA VISTA--MOVEMENT AGAINST VERA CRUZ--SIEGE AND

CAPTURE OF VERA CRUZ.

The Mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting

it desired to make party capital out of it. General Scott was at the

head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional

capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost

indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by President Polk, or

Marcy, his Secretary of War. Scott was a Whig and the administration

was democratic. General Scott was also known to have political

aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil

positions as military victories. It would not do therefore to give him

command of the "army of conquest." The plans submitted by Scott for a

campaign in Mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he

replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that,

if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration,

success could not be expected. This was on the 27th of May, 1846. Four

days later General Scott was notified that he need not go to Mexico.

General Gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take

the field. Colonel Zachary Taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--was

therefore left in command. He, too, was a Whig, but was not supposed to

entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of

Monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the Whig papers

at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the

Presidency. Something had to be done to neutralize his growing

popularity. He could not be relieved from duty in the field where all

his battles had been victories: the design would have been too

transparent. It was finally decided to send General Scott to Mexico in

chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan:

that is, capture Vera Cruz and march upon the capital of the country.

It was no doubt supposed that Scott's ambition would lead him to

slaughter Taylor or destroy his chances for the Presidency, and yet it

was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure

the prize.

The administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. It

was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful

issue, or the political object would be unattained. Yet all the capable

officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man

selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a

prominent candidate for the Presidency. It was necessary to destroy his

chances promptly. The problem was to do this without the loss of

conquest and without permitting another general of the same political

party to acquire like popularity. The fact is, the administration of

Mr. Polk made every preparation to disgrace Scott, or, to speak more

correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace

himself.

General Scott had opposed conquest by the way of the Rio Grande,

Matamoras and Saltillo from the first. Now that he was in command of

all the forces in Mexico, he withdrew from Taylor most of his regular

troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the

line then in possession of the invading army. Indeed Scott did not deem

it important to hold anything beyond the Rio Grande, and authorized

Taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. General Taylor protested

against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon

Buena Vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief

in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the Rio Grande.

Scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to

capture Vera Cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two

hundred and sixty miles in the interior. He was promised all he asked

and seemed to have not only the confidence of the President, but his

sincere good wishes. The promises were all broken. Only about half the

troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was

withheld and Scott had scarcely started for Mexico before the President

undertook to supersede him by the appointment of Senator Thomas H.

Benton as lieutenant-general. This being refused by Congress, the

President asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of

the same grade, with the view of appointing Benton to the rank of

major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but Congress

failed to accede to this proposition as well, and Scott remained in

command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically

opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile.

General Scott reached Brazos Santiago or Point Isabel, at the mouth of

the Rio Grande, late in December, 1846, and proceeded at once up the

river to Camargo, where he had written General Taylor to meet him.

Taylor, however, had gone to, or towards Tampico, for the purpose of

establishing a post there. He had started on this march before he was

aware of General Scott being in the country. Under these circumstances

Scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn

from Taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold

with his subordinate.

General Taylor's victory at Buena Vista, February 22d, 23d, and 24th,

1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not

been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically,

made his nomination for the Presidency by the Whigs a foregone

conclusion. He was nominated and elected in 1848. I believe that he

sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace

afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the

highest office in the gift of any people, the Presidency of the United

States.

When General Scott assumed command of the army of invasion, I was in the

division of General David Twiggs, in Taylor's command; but under the new

orders my regiment was transferred to the division of General William

Worth, in which I served to the close of the war. The troops withdrawn

from Taylor to form part of the forces to operate against Vera Cruz,

were assembled at the mouth of the Rio Grande preparatory to embarkation

for their destination. I found General Worth a different man from any I

had before served directly under. He was nervous, impatient and

restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted

him. There was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was

known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point

of our embarkation to carry the army, but General Worth moved his

division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been

going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. The length of the

marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply

of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and

sometimes short. General Worth on one occasion at least, after having

made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were

in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the

march that night which had been intended for the next day. Some

commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them

without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without

accomplishing so much. General Worth belonged to this latter class. He

enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus

attached his officers and men to him.

The army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the

mouth of the Rio Grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of

transports to carry it to its new field of operations. The transports

were all sailing vessels. The passage was a tedious one, and many of

the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at

the mouth of the Rio Grande to the time of debarkation south of Vera

Cruz. The trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. The

transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but

limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the

discomfort of all.

The transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of Anton

Lizardo, some sixteen miles south of Vera Cruz, as they arrived, and

there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition

and supplies of all kinds from the North. With the fleet there was a

little steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind I had

ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then

with the army. At that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there

were were sidewheelers. This little vessel, going through the fleet so

fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view,

attracted a great deal of attention. I recollect that Lieutenant Sidney

Smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom I happened to be standing on the

deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "Why, the

thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances."

Finally on the 7th of March, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve

thousand men, given Scott to invade a country with a population of seven

or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible

natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence

the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea.

The debarkation took place inside of the little island of Sacrificios,

some three miles south of Vera Cruz. The vessels could not get anywhere

near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or

surf-boats; General Scott had provided these before leaving the North.

The breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. The

men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to

shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions,

ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and

therefore their landing took several days. The Mexicans were very kind

to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except

an occasional shot from their nearest fort. During the debarkation one

shot took off the head of Major Albertis. No other, I believe, reached

anywhere near the same distance. On the 9th of March the troops were

landed and the investment of Vera Cruz, from the Gulf of Mexico south of

the city to the Gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected.

The landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore.

Vera Cruz, at the time of which I write and up to 1880, was a walled

city. The wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the

water again on the north. There were fortifications at intervals along

the line and at the angles. In front of the city, and on an island half

a mile out in the Gulf, stands San Juan de Ulloa, an enclosed

fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period.

Against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would

prove elements of weakness rather than strength. After the invading

army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city,

batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of

the line where the troops lay. These batteries were intrenched and the

approaches sufficiently protected. If a sortie had been made at any

time by the Mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been

quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's

main line. No serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to

drive our troops away.

The siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of

March, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall

surrounding the city. Upon this General Morales, who was Governor of

both the city and of San Juan de Ulloa, commenced a correspondence with

General Scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison.

On the 29th Vera Cruz and San Juan de Ulloa were occupied by Scott's

army. About five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of

artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into

the hands of the victorious force. The casualties on our side during

the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded.

CHAPTER X.

MARCH TO JALAPA--BATTLE OF CERRO GORDO--PEROTE--PUEBLA--SCOTT AND

TAYLOR.

General Scott had less than twelve thousand men at Vera Cruz. He had

been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed

that he had, and he was a man of veracity. Twelve thousand was a very

small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an

enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of

largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. Then, too, any line of

march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily

defended. In fact, there were at that time but two roads from Vera Cruz

to the City of Mexico that could be taken by an army; one by Jalapa and

Perote, the other by Cordova and Orizaba, the two coming together on the

great plain which extends to the City of Mexico after the range of

mountains is passed.

It was very important to get the army away from Vera Cruz as soon as

possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually

visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not

acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the North, was

arriving very slowly. It was absolutely necessary to have enough to

supply the army to Jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above

the fevers of the coast. At that point the country is fertile, and an

army of the size of General Scott's could subsist there for an

indefinite period. Not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons

for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten

thousand strong. This force was composed of three divisions, under

Generals Twiggs, Patterson, and Worth. The importance of escaping the

vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got

together to move a division the advance was commenced. On the 8th of

April, Twiggs's division started for Jalapa. He was followed very soon

by Patterson, with his division. General Worth was to bring up the rear

with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry

six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp

and garrison equipage. It was the 13th of April before this division

left Vera Cruz.

The leading division ran against the enemy at Cerro Gordo, some fifty

miles west, on the road to Jalapa, and went into camp at Plan del Rio,

about three miles from the fortifications. General Patterson reached

Plan del Rio with his division soon after Twiggs arrived. The two were

then secure against an attack from Santa Anna, who commanded the Mexican

forces. At all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements

and without molestation, until the 18th of April. General Scott had

remained at Vera Cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the

12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take

personal supervision. He at once commenced his preparations for the

capture of the position held by Santa Anna and of the troops holding it.

Cerro Gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to

fifteen miles east of Jalapa, and Santa Anna had selected this point as

the easiest to defend against an invading army. The road, said to have

been built by Cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended

at every turn by artillery. On either side were deep chasms or mountain

walls. A direct attack along the road was an impossibility. A flank

movement seemed equally impossible. After the arrival of the

commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to

find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be

reached without a front attack. These reconnoissances were made under

the supervision of Captain Robert E. Lee, assisted by Lieutenants P. G.

T. Beauregard, Isaac I. Stevens, Z. B. Tower, G. W. Smith, George B.

McClellan, and J. G. Foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who

attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict

for the preservation of the unity of the nation. The reconnoissance was

completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of

the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. This was accomplished

without the knowledge of Santa Anna or his army, and over ground where

he supposed it impossible. On the same day General Scott issued his

order for the attack on the 18th.

The attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of

the Mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an

engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took

place. Under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened

over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could

barely climb them. Animals could not. These had been opened under

cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. The

engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops

followed. Artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men

engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns

down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on

top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course

of the piece. In like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the

opposite slopes. In this way Scott's troops reached their assigned

position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved.

The attack was made, the Mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty

retreat, and those occupying them surrendered. On the left General

Pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a

part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. I am not

pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the

portion that I saw. There were troops engaged on both sides at other

points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here

narrated.

The surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some

three thousand prisoners fell into Scott's hands, also a large amount of

ordnance and ordnance stores. The prisoners were paroled, the artillery

parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. The battle of Buena

Vista was probably very important to the success of General Scott at

Cerro Gordo and in his entire campaign from Vera Cruz to the great

plains reaching to the City of Mexico. The only army Santa Anna had to

protect his capital and the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz, was the

one he had with him confronting General Taylor. It is not likely that he

would have gone as far north as Monterey to attack the United States

troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further

south. When Taylor moved to Saltillo and then advanced on to Buena

Vista, Santa Anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army,

hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet General Scott

in the mountain passes west of Vera Cruz. His attack on Taylor was

disastrous to the Mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched

his army to Cerro Gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles

by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before

Scott got there. If he had been successful at Buena Vista his troops

would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at Cerro Gordo. Had

the battle of Buena Vista not been fought Santa Anna would have had time

to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not

demoralized nor depleted by defeat.

After the battle the victorious army moved on to Jalapa, where it was in

a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the

coast. Jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there

and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. It

was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between

the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the

mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify

in our front. Worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this

result. The division marched to Perote on the great plain, not far from

where the road debouches from the mountains. There is a low, strong

fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the Castle of Perote.

This, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its

armament.

General Scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of Vera

Cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire,

a long delay was the consequence. The troops were in a healthy climate,

and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line

back to Vera Cruz should be cut off. It being ascertained that the men

whose time would expire before the City of Mexico could possibly fall

into the hands of the American army, would not remain beyond the term

for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to

discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time

would have compelled them to pass through Vera Cruz during the season of

the vomito. This reduced Scott's force in the field to about five

thousand men.

Early in May, Worth, with his division, left Perote and marched on to

Puebla. The roads were wide and the country open except through one

pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the

road runs. Notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two

bodies, moving a day apart. Nothing occurred on the march of special

note, except that while lying at the town of Amozoque--an easy day's

march east of Puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three

thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. A

battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against

them and they soon disappeared. On the 15th of May we entered the city

of Puebla.

General Worth was in command at Puebla until the latter end of May, when

General Scott arrived. Here, as well as on the march up, his

restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself.

During his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city,

in vastly superior numbers to his own. The brigade to which I was

attached changed quarters three different times in about a week,

occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city;

then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. On one occasion

General Worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three

days' cooked rations in their haversacks. He galloped from one command

to another proclaiming the near proximity of Santa Anna with an army

vastly superior to his own. General Scott arrived upon the scene the

latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of Santa Anna and

his myriads. There were, of course, bodies of mounted Mexicans hovering

around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies

of troops, if they ventured too far out. These always withdrew on the

approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. After the arrival

of General Scott I was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of

wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. We had less

than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. We procured

full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily

have furnished as much more.

There had been great delay in obtaining the authority of Congress for

the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. A bill was

before the National Legislature from early in the session of 1846-7,

authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be

attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of February before

it became a law. Appointments of commissioned officers had then to be

made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole

transported to Mexico. It was August before General Scott received

reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. His moving column, not

even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded

by Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow and Quitman. There was also a cavalry

corps under General Harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and

3d dragoons. The advance commenced on the 7th of August with Twiggs's

division in front. The remaining three divisions followed, with an

interval of a day between. The marches were short, to make

concentration easier in case of attack.

I had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting

armies in a foreign land. The contrast between the two was very marked.

General Taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for

comfort. He moved about the field in which he was operating to see

through his own eyes the situation. Often he would be without staff

officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed

order in which they followed. He was very much given to sit his horse

side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield.

General Scott was the reverse in all these particulars. He always wore

all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his

lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in

advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be

expected. This was done so that all the army might be under arms to

salute their chief as he passed. On these occasions he wore his dress

uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. His staff proper,

besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors,

quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform

and in prescribed order. Orders were prepared with great care and

evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed.

In their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted

quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. General Scott was

precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of

his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third

person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about

without the least embarrassment. Taylor was not a conversationalist,

but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no

mistaking it. He knew how to express what he wanted to say in the

fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the

construction of high-sounding sentences. But with their opposite

characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true,

patriotic and upright in all their dealings. Both were pleasant to

serve under--Taylor was pleasant to serve with. Scott saw more through

the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. His plans were

deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. Taylor saw for

himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how

they would read in history.

CHAPTER XI.

ADVANCE ON THE CITY OF MEXICO--BATTLE OF CONTRERAS--ASSAULT AT

CHURUBUSCO--NEGOTIATIONS FOR PEACE--BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY--STORMING

OF CHAPULTEPEC--SAN COSME--EVACUATION OF THE CITY--HALLS OF THE

MONTEZUMAS.

The route followed by the army from Puebla to the City of Mexico was

over Rio Frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest

point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. The pass through

this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the

advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving Puebla.

The City of Mexico lies west of Rio Frio mountain, on a plain backed by

another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the

north and south. Between the western base of Rio Frio and the City of

Mexico there are three lakes, Chalco and Xochimilco on the left and

Texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the City of Mexico.

Chalco and Texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the

direct road to the city runs. Xochimilco is also to the left of the

road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with

Lake Chalco by a narrow channel. There is a high rocky mound, called El

Penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground

dividing the lakes. This mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its

base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable.

Scott's army was rapidly concentrated about Ayotla and other points near

the eastern end of Lake Chalco. Reconnoissances were made up to within

gun-shot of El Penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south

side of Lake Chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south

and south-west. A way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of

August troops were in St. Augustin Tlalpam, a town about eleven miles

due south from the plaza of the capital. Between St. Augustin Tlalpam

and the city lie the hacienda of San Antonio and the village of

Churubusco, and south-west of them is Contreras. All these points,

except St. Augustin Tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned.

Contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where

volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to San

Antonio. This made the approach to the city from the south very

difficult.

The brigade to which I was attached--Garland's, of Worth's division--was

sent to confront San Antonio, two or three miles from St. Augustin

Tlalpam, on the road to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. The ground

on which San Antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface

of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except

to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. To

the south-west is the Pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over

which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make

but poor progress if confronted by an enemy. From the position occupied

by Garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the

defences of San Antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway,

over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the

enemy's artillery and infantry. If Contreras, some three miles west and

south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the

right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the

city. Under these circumstances General Scott directed the holding of

the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders.

On the 18th of August, the day of reaching San Augustin Tlalpam,

Garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced

intrenchments of San Antonio, but where his troops were protected by an

artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose

than defense. General Scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the

works about Contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get

troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force

occupying that place. The Pedregal on the north and north-east, and the

mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's

defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural

bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th,

and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy.

This affair, like that of Cerro Gordo, was an engagement in which the

officers of the engineer corps won special distinction. In fact, in

both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier

for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an

ordinary field. The very strength of each of these positions was, by

the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting

parties while securing their positions for final attack. All the troops

with General Scott in the valley of Mexico, except a part of the

division of General Quitman at San Augustin Tlalpam and the brigade of

Garland (Worth's division) at San Antonio, were engaged at the battle of

Contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their

chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. The assault was made on the

morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the

advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large

quantities of ordnance and other stores. The brigade commanded by

General Riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final

assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars.

From the point occupied by Garland's brigade we could see the progress

made at Contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear

of the enemy opposing us. The Mexicans all the way back to the city

could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did

not enjoy the sight. We moved out at once, and found them gone from our

immediate front. Clarke's brigade of Worth's division now moved west

over the point of the Pedregal, and after having passed to the north

sufficiently to clear San Antonio, turned east and got on the causeway

leading to Churubusco and the City of Mexico. When he approached

Churubusco his left, under Colonel Hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at

that place and brought on an engagement. About an hour after, Garland

was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time

to take part in the engagement. San Antonio was found evacuated, the

evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing

the stars and stripes waving over Contreras.

The troops that had been engaged at Contreras, and even then on their

way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel

to the one by way of San Antonio and Churubusco. It was expected by the

commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far

to flank the enemy out of his position at Churubusco, before turning

east to reach the San Antonio road, but they did not succeed in this,

and Churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the

valley of Mexico. General Scott coming upon the battle-field about this

juncture, ordered two brigades, under Shields, to move north and turn

the right of the enemy. This Shields did, but not without hard fighting

and heavy loss. The enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands

prisoners, artillery and small arms. The balance of the causeway held

by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. I

recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their

ground, were deserters from General Taylor's army on the Rio Grande.

Both the strategy and tactics displayed by General Scott in these

various engagements of the 20th of August, 1847, were faultless as I

look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. As before stated,

the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led

the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the

chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all

the precision he could use on an ordinary march. I mean, up to the

points from which the attack was to commence. After that point is

reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before

contemplated. The enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite

three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of

defeats this day, that the City of Mexico could have been entered

without much further bloodshed. In fact, Captain Philip Kearney

--afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron

of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have

entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded,

as were several of his officers. He had not heard the call for a halt.

General Franklin Pierce had joined the army in Mexico, at Puebla, a

short time before the advance upon the capital commenced. He had

consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the

battle of Contreras. By an unfortunate fall of his horse on the

afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. The next day, when his

brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered

against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of

the road from San Augustin Tlalpam to the city, General Pierce attempted

to accompany them. He was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and

fainted. This circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust

criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the Presidency.

Whatever General Pierce's qualifications may have been for the

Presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. I was not a

supporter of him politically, but I knew him more intimately than I did

any other of the volunteer generals.

General Scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because Mr.

Nicholas P. Trist, the commissioner on the part of the United States to

negotiate a treaty of peace with Mexico, was with the army, and either

he or General Scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would

be more possible while the Mexican government was in possession of the

capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an

invader. Be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. The army

took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city,

as far west as Tacubaya. Negotiations were at once entered into with

Santa Anna, who was then practically THE GOVERNMENT and the immediate

commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. A truce

was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its

position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the

armistices, but authorized General Scott to draw supplies for his army

from the city in the meantime.

Negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between

Mr. Trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of Mexico, until

the 2d of September. At that time Mr. Trist handed in his ultimatum.

Texas was to be given up absolutely by Mexico, and New Mexico and

California ceded to the United States for a stipulated sum to be

afterwards determined. I do not suppose Mr. Trist had any discretion

whatever in regard to boundaries. The war was one of conquest, in the

interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private

instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new

States might be carved. At all events the Mexicans felt so outraged at

the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without

giving notice of the termination of the armistice. The terms of the

truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city

to bring out supplies for the army. The first train entering the city

was very severely threatened by a mob. This, however, was apologized for

by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter,

to avoid exciting the Mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their

escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the

citizens in bed. The circumstance was overlooked and negotiations

continued. As soon as the news reached General Scott of the second

violation of the armistice, about the 4th of September, he wrote a

vigorous note to President Santa Anna, calling his attention to it, and,

receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end.

General Scott, with Worth's division, was now occupying Tacubaya, a

village some four miles south-west of the City of Mexico, and extending

from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile.

More than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands Molino

del Rey. The mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several

hundred feet in length. At the period of which I speak General Scott

supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting

of guns. This, however, proved to be a mistake. It was valuable to the

Mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. The building is

flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the

top quite a formidable defence for infantry. Chapultepec is a mound

springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred

feet, and almost in a direct line between Molino del Rey and the western

part of the city. It was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and

precipitous sides.

The City of Mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on

strong stone arches. One of these aqueducts draws its supply of water

from a mountain stream coming into it at or near Molino del Rey, and

runs north close to the west base of Chapultepec; thence along the

centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the

city by the Garita San Cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road

both run east to the city. The second aqueduct starts from the east

base of Chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to

the city. This aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad

road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. The arches supporting the

aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those

engaged defensively. At points on the San Cosme road parapets were

thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in

each. At the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles

from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by

one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the San

Cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to

Chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of

sandbags. The roads leading to garitas (the gates) San Cosme and Belen,

by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched.

Deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads.

Such were the defences of the City of Mexico in September, 1847, on the

routes over which General Scott entered.

Prior to the Mexican war General Scott had been very partial to General

Worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for

some reason, Worth had become estranged from his chief. Scott evidently

took this coldness somewhat to heart. He did not retaliate, however,

but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate.

It was understood at the time that he gave Worth authority to plan and

execute the battle of Molino del Rey without dictation or interference

from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations.

The effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and

indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile.

The battle of Molino del Rey was fought on the 8th of September. The

night of the 7th, Worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders,

with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for

the morrow. These orders contemplated a movement up to within striking

distance of the Mills before daylight. The engineers had reconnoitred

the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information

necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack.

By daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at

Molino were all at the places designated. The ground in front of the

Mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of

Chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge

was made, and soon all was over. Worth's troops entered the Mills by

every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to Chapultepec. Had

this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt Americans and Mexicans

would have gone over the defences of Chapultepec so near together that

the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. The

defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering

their own men. This was not done, and five days later more valuable

lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our

possession on the 8th. I do not criticise the failure to capture

Chapultepec at this time. The result that followed the first assault

could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected

advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given

the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept

on without orders. It is always, however, in order to follow a

retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. The loss on our

side at Molino del Rey was severe for the numbers engaged. It was

especially so among commissioned officers.

I was with the earliest of the troops to enter the Mills. In passing

through to the north side, looking towards Chapultepec, I happened to

notice that there were armed Mexicans still on top of the building, only

a few feet from many of our men. Not seeing any stairway or ladder

reaching to the top of the building, I took a few soldiers, and had a

cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the

shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could

not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three

or four feet of the top. By this I climbed to the roof of the building,

followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by

some other way. There were still quite a number of Mexicans on the

roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who

had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the

building. They still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned

was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had SURROUNDED, all by

himself. I halted the sentinel, received the swords from the

commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the

soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against

the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below.

Molino del Rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the

exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and

property, were marched back to their quarters in Tacubaya. The

engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were

numerous for the number of troops engaged.

During the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play

upon the fortifications of Chapultepec. The bombardment commenced early

on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during

this day than that of the artillery. General Scott assigned the capture

of Chapultepec to General Pillow, but did not leave the details to his

judgment. Two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each,

composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. They were

commanded by Captains McKinzie and Casey respectively. The assault was

successful, but bloody.

In later years, if not at the time, the battles of Molino del Rey and

Chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. When the

assaults upon the garitas of San Cosme and Belen were determined upon,

the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily,

without an engagement, by moving along south of the Mills until west of

them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above

mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer

together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the

aqueduct road out of range of the guns from Chapultepec. In like

manner, the troops designated to act against Belen could have kept east

of Chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of

range of Chapultepec. Molino del Rey and Chapultepec would both have

been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they

would have been turned.

General Quitman, a volunteer from the State of Mississippi, who stood

well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column

acting against Belen. General Worth commanded the column against San

Cosme. When Chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two

aqueduct roads. I was on the road to San Cosme, and witnessed most that

took place on that route. When opposition was encountered our troops

sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the

aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. We encountered no serious

obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on

intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct

turns at a right angle. I have described the defences of this position

before. There were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that

I can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was

reached. One of these officers was a Lieutenant Semmes, of the Marine

Corps. I think Captain Gore, and Lieutenant Judah, of the 4th infantry,

were the others. Our progress was stopped for the time by the single

piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying

the house-tops back from it.

West of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the

south-west angle made by the San Cosme road and the road we were moving

upon. A stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a

considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a

yard about the house. I watched my opportunity and skipped across the

road and behind the south wall. Proceeding cautiously to the west

corner of the enclosure, I peeped around and seeing nobody, continued,

still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. I

then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. All that were

close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services.

Commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, I watched our

opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall

beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. Our men under cover of the

arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and

the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the

parapets they would fire at it. Our crossing was thus made practicable

without loss.

When we reached a safe position I instructed my little command again to

carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were

ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the San Cosme

road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the

gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. When we

reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, I saw

some United States troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by,

who had come up since my reconnaissance. This was the company of

Captain Horace Brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. I

explained to Brooks briefly what I had discovered and what I was about

to do. He said, as I knew the ground and he did not, I might go on and

he would follow. As soon as we got on the road leading to the city the

troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the

house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close

pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second

line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita,

was carried. No reinforcements had yet come up except Brooks's company,

and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a

force. It was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss.

Worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. Later

in the day in reconnoitring I found a church off to the south of the

road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back

of the garita San Cosme. I got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a

mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. The road being in

possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach

the church. This took us over several ditches breast deep in water and

grown up with water plants. These ditches, however, were not over eight

or ten feet in width. The howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by

the men to its destination. When I knocked for admission a priest came

to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. With the

little Spanish then at my command, I explained to him that he might save

property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from

becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, I intended to go

in whether he consented or not. He began to see his duty in the same

light that I did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it

gave him special pleasure to do so. The gun was carried to the belfry

and put together. We were not more than two or three hundred yards from

San Cosme. The shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and

created great confusion. Why they did not send out a small party and

capture us, I do not know. We had no infantry or other defences besides

our one gun.

The effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so

marked that General Worth saw it from his position. (*3) He was so

pleased that he sent a staff officer, Lieutenant Pemberton--later

Lieutenant-General commanding the defences of Vicksburg--to bring me to

him. He expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the

church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and

ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to

be placed along with the one already rendering so much service. I could

not tell the General that there was not room enough in the steeple for

another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement

as a contradiction from a second lieutenant. I took the captain with

me, but did not use his gun.

The night of the 13th of September was spent by the troops under General

Worth in the houses near San Cosme, and in line confronting the general

line of the enemy across to Belen. The troops that I was with were in

the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged

during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another

towards the town. During the night Santa Anna, with his army--except

the deserters--left the city. He liberated all the convicts confined in

the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury

before daylight; but several hours after Santa Anna was out of the way,

the city authorities sent a delegation to General Scott to ask--if not

demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens

and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal

affairs. General Scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but

gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be

protected so long as they behaved themselves properly.

General Quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the

13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at

Belen that Worth's troops did about San Cosme. After the interview above

related between General Scott and the city council, orders were issued

for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. The troops under

Worth were to stop at the Alameda, a park near the west end of the city.

Quitman was to go directly to the Plaza, and take possession of the

Palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which Congress has its

sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all

located, the President resides, and much room is left for museums,

receptions, etc. This is the building generally designated as the

"Halls of the Montezumas."

CHAPTER XII.

PROMOTION TO FIRST LIEUTENANT--CAPTURE OF THE CITY OF MEXICO--THE ARMY

--MEXICAN SOLDIERS--PEACE NEGOTIATIONS.

On entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released

convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. The streets

were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of the

dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops,

windows, and around corners. In this firing the lieutenant-colonel of

my regiment, Garland, was badly wounded, Lieutenant Sidney Smith, of the

4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. He died a few days after, and

by his death I was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4) I had

gone into the battle of Palo Alto in May, 1846, a second lieutenant, and

I entered the city of Mexico sixteen months later with the same rank,

after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in

a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had

present at any one engagement. My regiment lost four commissioned

officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the Mexican

war. The Mexicans were not so discriminating. They sometimes picked

off my juniors.

General Scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state. I

wonder that he was not fired upon, but I believe he was not; at all

events he was not hurt. He took quarters at first in the "Halls of the

Montezumas," and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the

government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of

liberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respect

of all who study them. Lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the City of

Mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. The people began

to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders.

Shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the

villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south

and south-west.

Whether General Scott approved of the Mexican war and the manner in

which it was brought about, I have no means of knowing. His orders to

troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard

for the perpetuation of his own fame. On the other hand, General

Taylor's, I think, indicate that he considered the administration

accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself

further than for the faithful performance of his duties. Both generals

deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the

grateful memory of this people to the latest generation.

Earlier in this narrative I have stated that the plain, reached after

passing the mountains east of Perote, extends to the cities of Puebla

and Mexico. The route travelled by the army before reaching Puebla,

goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. This

pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force.

Again, the highest point of the road-bed between Vera Cruz and the City

of Mexico is over Rio Frio mountain, which also might have been

successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force. But by

moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of Puebla,

both of these passes would have been avoided. The road from Perote to

the City of Mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in

our West. Arriving due north from Puebla, troops could have been

detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with

the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before

reaching the City of Mexico. It is true this road would have brought

troops in by Guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountain

about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name

--and at this point Lake Texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was

fortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could have

passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the

north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the

south.

It has always seemed to me that this northern route to the City of

Mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. But my later

experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen

plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident

critics are generally those who know the least about the matter

criticised. I know just enough about the Mexican war to approve

heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it.

It is natural that an important city like Puebla should not have been

passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it

should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation

insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy

in intricate mountain defiles. In this same way the City of Mexico

could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in

the open field.

But General Scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. He invaded

a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the

interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to

him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on

the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and

conquered the government. Credit is due to the troops engaged, it is

true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's.

I had now made marches and been in battle under both General Scott and

General Taylor. The former divided his force of 10,500 men into four

columns, starting a day apart, in moving from Puebla to the capital of

the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as

his own stood ready to resist his coming. The road was broad and the

country open except in crossing the Rio Frio mountain. General Taylor

pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. He moved even in

smaller bodies. I never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility

of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. I

supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed

over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary

trains. Later I found the fallacy of this belief. The rebellion, which

followed as a sequence to the Mexican war, never could have been

suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same

time than was the custom under Scott and Taylor.

The victories in Mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior

numbers. There were two reasons for this. Both General Scott and

General Taylor had such armies as are not often got together. At the

battles of Palo Alto and Resaca-de-la-Palma, General Taylor had a small

army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best

of drill and discipline. Every officer, from the highest to the lowest,

was educated in his profession, not at West Point necessarily, but in

the camp, in garrison, and many of them in Indian wars. The rank and

file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army,

to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war;

but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all

there was in them. A better army, man for man, probably never faced an

enemy than the one commanded by General Taylor in the earliest two

engagements of the Mexican war. The volunteers who followed were of

better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. They

were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated

officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence

they would not have felt otherwise. They became soldiers themselves

almost at once. All these conditions we would enjoy again in case of

war.

The Mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. The private

soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when

wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and

seldom paid. He was turned adrift when no longer wanted. The officers

of the lower grades were but little superior to the men. With all this

I have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as I have ever

seen made by soldiers. Now Mexico has a standing army larger than that

of the United States. They have a military school modelled after West

Point. Their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. The

Mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation.

The Mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would

imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. They celebrate the

anniversaries of Chapultepec and Molino del Rey as of very great

victories. The anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. At

these two battles, while the United States troops were victorious, it

was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the Mexicans

suffered. The Mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as

any troops ever did. The trouble seemed to be the lack of experience

among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit,

without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough.

Their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme

when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum

of money they forced us to pay in the end. With us, now twenty years

after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers

--who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that the

Union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed

around from Donelson to Vicksburg and to Chattanooga; and in the East

from Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from

sheer exhaustion. There is no difference in the amount of romance in

the two stories.

I would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor

those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer;

but I would like to see truthful history written. Such history will do

full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the

American citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from,

or in what ranks he fought. The justice of the cause which in the end

prevailed, will, I doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen

of the land, in time. For the present, and so long as there are living

witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will

not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy.

As time passes, people, even of the South, will begin to wonder how it

was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified

institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man.

After the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of

Mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for

a long time might be necessary. General Scott at once began the

preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency.

He contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the

occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the

people. His plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and

collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports. From

the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for

the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation. This

policy was to be pursued. There were not troops enough in the valley of

Mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army

of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the Rio

Grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time,

all by way of Vera Cruz. Military possession was taken of Cuernavaca,

fifty miles south of the City of Mexico; of Toluca, nearly as far west,

and of Pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to

the north-east. Vera Cruz, Jalapa, Orizaba, and Puebla were already in

our possession.

Meanwhile the Mexican government had departed in the person of Santa

Anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the United States

commissioner, Mr. Trist, would find anybody to negotiate with. A

temporary government, however, was soon established at Queretaro, and

Trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. Before terms were

finally agreed upon he was ordered back to Washington, but General Scott

prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly

reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in

making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. The

treaty was finally signed the 2d of February, 1848, and accepted by the

government at Washington. It is that known as the "Treaty of Guadalupe

Hidalgo," and secured to the United States the Rio Grande as the

boundary of Texas, and the whole territory then included in New Mexico

and Upper California, for the sum of $15,000,000.

Soon after entering the city of Mexico, the opposition of Generals

Pillow, Worth and Colonel Duncan to General Scott became very marked.

Scott claimed that they had demanded of the President his removal. I do

not know whether this is so or not, but I do know of their unconcealed

hostility to their chief. At last he placed them in arrest, and

preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect. This

act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding. He had

asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him;

that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the

President himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor

to procure the appointment of Benton: and the administration now gave

open evidence of its enmity. About the middle of February orders came

convening a court of inquiry, composed of Brevet Brigadier-General

Towson, the paymaster-general of the army, Brigadier-General Cushing and

Colonel Belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the

accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from Washington,

relieving Scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning

Major-General William O. Butler of Kentucky to the place. This order

also released Pillow, Worth and Duncan from arrest.

If a change was to be made the selection of General Butler was agreeable

to every one concerned, so far as I remember to have heard expressions

on the subject. There were many who regarded the treatment of General

Scott as harsh and unjust. It is quite possible that the vanity of the

General had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible

pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had

wanted to do from the start. The court tried the accuser quite as much

as the accused. It was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet

in Frederick, Maryland. General Scott left the country, and never after

had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861. He

certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in

high places.

The efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made

them both candidates for the Presidency. General Taylor was nominated

in 1848, and was elected. Four years later General Scott received the

nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with

his defeat.(*5)

CHAPTER XIII.

TREATY OF PEACE--MEXICAN BULL FIGHTS--REGIMENTAL QUARTERMASTER--TRIP TO

POPOCATAPETL--TRIP TO THE CAVES OF MEXICO.

The treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the

commissioners of each side early in February, 1848. It took a

considerable time for it to reach Washington, receive the approval of

the administration, and be finally ratified by the Senate. It was

naturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, and

officers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing there

must be delay they contented themselves as best they could. Every

Sunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would pay

their fifty cents. I attended one of them--just one--not wishing to

leave the country without having witnessed the national sport. The

sight to me was sickening. I could not see how human beings could enjoy

the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on

these occasions.

At these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed.

The audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition is

given, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front,

so that every one can get a full view of the sport. When all is ready a

bull is turned into the ring. Three or four men come in, mounted on the

merest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they

could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of falling

down. The men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as a

needle. Other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags and

explosives about the size of a musket cartridge. To each of these

explosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose of

attaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin. Before

the animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached to

him. The pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is

exasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the

animal becomes frantic. As he makes a lunge towards one horseman,

another runs a spear into him. He turns towards his last tormentor when

a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and is

allowed to take it on his horns. The flag drops and covers the eyes of

the animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him and

the torment is renewed. When the animal is worked into an

uncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores

--literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or

eighteen inches long, and sharp. The trick is to dodge an attack from

the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. If these efforts fail

the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knife

blade into the spinal column just back of the horns. He is then dragged

out by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the same

performance is renewed.

On the occasion when I was present one of the bulls was not turned aside

by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc.,

etc., but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of a

horse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force. The horse

was killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead. The bull was then

lassoed and killed in the manner above described. Men came in and

carried the dead man off in a litter. When the slaughtered bull and

horse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring.

Conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on

a litter but a few minutes before. He was only dead so far as that

performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not forego

the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren who

might not be so fortunate. There was a feeling of disgust manifested by

the audience to find that he had come to life again. I confess that I

felt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. I did not stay

for the conclusion of the performance; but while I did stay, there was

not a bull killed in the prescribed way.

Bull fights are now prohibited in the Federal District--embracing a

territory around the City of Mexico, somewhat larger than the District

of Columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country.

During one of my recent visits to Mexico, bull fights were got up in my

honor at Puebla and at Pachuca. I was not notified in advance so as to

be able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases I

civilly declined to attend.

Another amusement of the people of Mexico of that day, and one which

nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest and

layman, was Monte playing. Regular feast weeks were held every year at

what was then known as St. Augustin Tlalpam, eleven miles out of town.

There were dealers to suit every class and condition of people. In many

of the booths clackos--the copper coin of the country, four of them

making six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in great

quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could not

bet more than a few pennies at a time. In other booths silver formed

the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed

if there should be a run of luck against the bank. In some there was no

coin except gold. Here the rich were said to bet away their entire

estates in a single day. All this is stopped now.

For myself, I was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8. My

regiment was stationed in Tacubaya. I was regimental quartermaster and

commissary. General Scott had been unable to get clothing for the

troops from the North. The men were becoming--well, they needed

clothing. Material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, and

people employed to make it up into "Yankee uniforms." A quartermaster

in the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing

was so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. A regiment

was glad to get a dozen suits at a time. I had to look after this

matter for the 4th infantry. Then our regimental fund had run down and

some of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for a

number of months.

The regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from the

government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. There was

authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians. So

many could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the various

grades, and the remainder the pay of privates. This would not secure a

band leader, nor good players on certain instruments. In garrison there

are various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give

extra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys,

subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. The

best device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers

instead of flour. The ration used to be eighteen ounces per day of

either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make one

hundred and forty pounds of bread. This saving was purchased by the

commissary for the benefit of the fund. In the emergency the 4th

infantry was laboring under, I rented a bakery in the city, hired

bakers--Mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and I also got

a contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a large

amount of hard bread. In two months I made more money for the fund than

my pay amounted to during the entire war. While stationed at Monterey I

had relieved the post fund in the same way. There, however, was no

profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread.

In the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visit

Popocatapetl, the highest volcano in America, and to take an escort. I

went with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuous

positions before the country. Of those who "went south," and attained

high rank, there was Lieutenant Richard Anderson, who commanded a corps

at Spottsylvania; Captain Sibley, a major-general, and, after the war,

for a number of years in the employ of the Khedive of Egypt; Captain

George Crittenden, a rebel general; S. B. Buckner, who surrendered Fort

Donelson; and Mansfield Lovell, who commanded at New Orleans before that

city fell into the hands of the National troops. Of those who remained

on our side there were Captain Andrew Porter, Lieutenant C. P. Stone and

Lieutenant Z. B. Tower. There were quite a number of other officers,

whose names I cannot recollect.

At a little village (Ozumba) near the base of Popocatapetl, where we

purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules

with forage for our horses. High up on the mountain there was a

deserted house of one room, called the Vaqueria, which had been occupied

years before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain. The

pasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were still

some cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now

become wild. It was possible to go on horseback as far as the Vaqueria,

though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. Sometimes it was very

narrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to a

roaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on the

other side. At one of these places one of our mules loaded with two

sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was,

struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the

bottom. The descent was steep but not perpendicular. The mule rolled

over and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of course

the poor animal was dashed to pieces. What was our surprise, not long

after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and owner

coming up the ascent. The load had protected the animal from serious

injury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to the

path leading up to the hut where we were to stay.

The night at the Vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant I ever knew.

It was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. A little higher up the

rain ceased and snow began. The wind blew with great velocity. The

log-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on the

other it was hardly better then a sieve. There was little or no sleep

that night. As soon as it was light the next morning, we started to

make the ascent to the summit. The wind continued to blow with violence

and the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow.

The clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us,

except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear space

between them. The wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sides

in such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it.

We labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not be

reached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to

return. The descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got

below the snow line. At the cabin we mounted our horses, and by night

were at Ozumba.

The fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove us

to bed early. Our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with a

blanket under us. Soon all were asleep; but long before morning first

one and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciating

pain in the eyes. Not one escaped it. By morning the eyes of half the

party were so swollen that they were entirely closed. The others

suffered pain equally. The feeling was about what might be expected

from the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. We remained in

quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. This

relieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left. The

swelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had their

eyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those who

could see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all.

We moved back to the village of Ameca Ameca, some six miles, and stopped

again for the night. The next morning all were entirely well and free

from pain. The weather was clear and Popocatapetl stood out in all its

beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us to

return. About half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, and

concluded to do so. The remainder--I was with the remainder--concluded

that we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountain

climbing, and that we would visit the great caves of Mexico, some ninety

miles from where we then were, on the road to Acapulco.

The party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded in

reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor they

encountered in their first attempt. Three of them--Anderson, Stone and

Buckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at the

time. I made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about it

since, but it seems to me that I can see the whole of it as vividly as

if it were but yesterday. I have been back at Ameca Ameca, and the

village beyond, twice in the last five years. The scene had not changed

materially from my recollection of it.

The party which I was with moved south down the valley to the town of

Cuantla, some forty miles from Ameca Ameca. The latter stands on the

plain at the foot of Popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eight

thousand feet above tide water. The slope down is gradual as the

traveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going to

Cuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change in

the climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case. In the

morning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits are

those common to the United States, we halted in the evening in a

tropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and the

sugar-cane were flourishing. We had been travelling, apparently,

on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water.

Soon after the capture of the City of Mexico an armistice had been

agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respective

armies were not to go during its continuance. Our party knew nothing

about these limits. As we approached Cuantla bugles sounded the

assembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of the

town towards us. Our party halted, and I tied a white pocket

handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on

to the town. Captains Sibley and Porter followed a few hundred yards

behind. I was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be

dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorized

that I should be conducted to him. I had been with the general but a

few minutes when the two officers following announced themselves. The

Mexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for us

to be there. However, as we had no special authority from our own

commanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce,

we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the

night, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to Cuernavaca

the next morning.

Cuernavaca is a town west of Cuantla. The country through which we

passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productions

and rich in scenery. At one point, about half-way between the two

places, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there is

a very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearly

all full-blooded Indians. Very few of them even spoke Spanish. The

houses were built of stone and generally only one story high. The

streets were narrow, and had probably been paved before Cortez visited

the country. They had not been graded, but the paving had been done on

the natural surface. We had with us one vehicle, a cart, which was

probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through that

town.

On a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; and

it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly,

as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it.

We ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed no

particular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced

civilization. The next day we went into Cuernavaca.

After a day's rest at Cuernavaca our party set out again on the journey

to the great caves of Mexico. We had proceeded but a few miles when we

were stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of the

existing armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction.

Upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers

desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which

we expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda near

by, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of that

department could be communicated with and his decision obtained as to

whether we should be permitted to pursue our journey. The guard

promised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night. At

night there was no response from the commanding general, but the captain

of the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning. Again in the

morning there was no reply. The second evening the same thing happened,

and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger

to the department commander. We determined therefore to go on unless

stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience.

After a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to the

one at Cuantia occurred. The commanding officer sent a guide to conduct

our party around the village and to put us upon our road again. This

was the last interruption: that night we rested at a large coffee

plantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit.

It must have been a Saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and

spent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings.

Their coin was principally copper, and I do not believe there was a man

among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money. They

were as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands. I

recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last clacko, pulled off his

shirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of a

card. Monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near the

window of the room occupied by the officers of our party.

The next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour,

provided with guides, candles and rockets. We explored to a distance of

about three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambers

of great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets.

Stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. Some of the

former were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor;

some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but the

formation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence these

stalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. The

stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled with

water. The water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--often

the drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineral

matter. Evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind. This

in time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in

weight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. I

recollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such

huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either side

of it. Some of our party became satisfied with their explorations

before we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed to

take explorers, and started back without guides. Coming to the large

column spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commenced

retracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without being

aware of the fact. When the rest of us had completed our explorations,

we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw the

torches of an approaching party. We could not conceive who these could

be, for all of us had come in together, and there were none but

ourselves at the entrance when we started in. Very soon we found it was

our friends. It took them some time to conceive how they had got where

they were. They were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth of

the cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it.