garrisons are now being withdrawn from plantations and the rural
population required to concentrate itself in the towns. The sure result
would seem to be that the industrial value of the island is fast
diminishing and that unless there is a speedy and radical change in
existing conditions it will soon disappear altogether. That value
consists very largely, of course, in its capacity to produce sugar--a
capacity already much reduced by the interruptions to tillage which
have taken place during the last two years. It is reliably asserted
that should these interruptions continue during the current year, and
practically extend, as is now threatened, to the entire sugar-producing
territory of the island, so much time and so much money will be
required to restore the land to its normal productiveness that it is
extremely doubtful if capital can be induced to even make the attempt.
The spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining country, by nature one
of the most fertile and charming on the globe, would engage the serious
attention of the Government and people of the United States in any
circumstances. In point of fact, they have a concern with it which is
by no means of a wholly sentimental or philanthropic character. It lies
so near to us as to be hardly separated from our territory. Our actual
pecuniary interest in it is second only to that of the people and
Government of Spain. It is reasonably estimated that at least from
$30,000,000 to $50,000,000 of American capital are invested in
plantations and in railroad, mining, and other business enterprises on
the island. The volume of trade between the United States and Cuba,
which in 1889 amounted to about $64,000,000, rose in 1893 to about
$103,000,000, and in 1894, the year before the present insurrection
broke out, amounted to nearly $96,000,000. Besides this large pecuniary
stake in the fortunes of Cuba, the United States finds itself
inextricably involved in the present contest in other ways, both
vexatious and costly.
Many Cubans reside in this country, and indirectly promote the
insurrection through the press, by public meetings, by the purchase and
shipment of arms, by the raising of funds, and by other means which the
spirit of our institutions and the tenor of our laws do not permit to
be made the subject of criminal prosecutions. Some of them, though
Cubans at heart and in all their feelings and interests, have taken out
papers as naturalized citizens of the United States--a proceeding
resorted to with a view to possible protection by this Government, and
not unnaturally regarded with much indignation by the country of their
origin. The insurgents are undoubtedly encouraged and supported by the
widespread sympathy the people of this country always and instinctively
feel for every struggle for better and freer government, and which, in
the case of the more adventurous and restless elements of our
population, leads in only too many instances to active and personal
participation in the contest. The result is that this Government is
constantly called upon to protect American citizens, to claim damages
for injuries to persons and property, now estimated at many millions of
dollars, and to ask explanations and apologies for the acts of Spanish
officials whose zeal for the repression of rebellion sometimes blinds
them to the immunities belonging to the unoffending citizens of a
friendly power. It follows from the same causes that the United States
is compelled to actively police a long line of seacoast against
unlawful expeditions, the escape of which the utmost vigilance will not
always suffice to prevent.
These inevitable entanglements of the United States with the rebellion
in Cuba, the large American property interests affected, and
considerations of philanthropy and humanity in general have led to a
vehement demand in various quarters for some sort of positive
intervention on the part of the United States. It was at first proposed
that belligerent rights should be accorded to the insurgents--a
proposition no longer urged because untimely and in practical operation
dearly perilous and injurious to our own interests. It has since been
and is now sometimes contended that the independence of the insurgents
should be recognized; but imperfect and restricted as the Spanish
government of the island may be, no other exists there, unless the will
of the military officer in temporary command of a particular district
can be dignified as a species of government. It is now also suggested
that the United States should buy the island--a suggestion possibly
worthy of consideration if there were any evidence of a desire or
willingness on the part of Spain to entertain such a proposal. It is
urged finally that, all other methods failing, the existing internecine
strife in Cuba should be terminated by our intervention, even at the
cost of a war between the United States and Spain--a war which its
advocates confidently prophesy could neither be large in its
proportions nor doubtful in its issue.
The correctness of this forecast need be neither affirmed nor denied.
The United States has, nevertheless, a character to maintain as a
nation, which plainly dictates that right and not might should be the
rule of its conduct. Further, though the United States is not a nation
to which peace is a necessity, it is in truth the most pacific of
powers and desires nothing so much as to live in amity with all the
world. Its own ample and diversified domains satisfy all possible
longings for territory, preclude all dreams of conquest, and prevent
any casting of covetous eyes upon neighboring regions, however
attractive. That our conduct toward Spain and her dominions has
constituted no exception to this national disposition is made manifest
by the course of our Government, not only thus far during the present
insurrection, but during the ten years that followed the rising at Yara
in 1868. No other great power, it may safely be said, under
circumstances of similar perplexity, would have manifested the same
restraint and the same patient endurance. It may also be said that this
persistent attitude of the United States toward Spain in connection
with Cuba unquestionably evinces no slight respect and regard for Spain
on the part of the American people. They in truth do not forget her
connection with the discovery of the Western Hemisphere, nor do they
underestimate the great qualities of the Spanish people nor fail to
fully recognize their splendid patriotism and their chivalrous devotion
to the national honor.
They view with wonder and admiration the cheerful resolution with which
vast bodies of men are sent across thousands of miles of ocean and an
enormous debt accumulated that the costly possession of the gem of the
Antilles may still hold its place in the Spanish crown. And yet neither
the Government nor the people of the United States have shut their eyes
to the course of events in Cuba or have failed to realize the existence
of conceded grievances which have led to the present revolt from the
authority of Spain--grievances recognized by the Queen Regent and by
the Cortes, voiced by the most patriotic and enlightened of Spanish
statesmen, without regard to party, and demonstrated by reforms
proposed by the executive and approved by the legislative branch of the
Spanish Government. It is in the assumed temper and disposition of the
Spanish Government to remedy these grievances, fortified by indications
of influential public opinion in Spain, that this Government has hoped
to discover the most promising and effective means of composing the
present strife with honor and advantage to Spain and with the
achievement of all the reasonable objects of the insurrection.
It would seem that if Spain should offer to Cuba genuine autonomy--a
measure of home rule which, while preserving the sovereignty of Spain,
would satisfy all rational requirements of her Spanish subjects--there
should be no just reason why the pacification of the island might not
be effected on that basis. Such a result would appear to be in the true
interest of all concerned. It would at once stop the conflict which is
now consuming the resources of the island and making it worthless for
whichever party may ultimately prevail. It would keep intact the
possessions of Spain without touching her honor, which will be
consulted rather than impugned by the adequate redress of admitted
grievances. It would put the prosperity of the island and the fortunes
of its inhabitants within their own control without severing the
natural and ancient ties which bind them to the mother country, and
would yet enable them to test their capacity for self-government under
the most favorable conditions. It has been objected on the one side
that Spain should not promise autonomy until her insurgent subjects lay
down their arms; on the other side, that promised autonomy, however
liberal, is insufficient, because without assurance of the promise
being fulfilled.
But the reasonableness of a requirement by Spain of unconditional
surrender on the part of the insurgent Cubans before their autonomy is
conceded is not altogether apparent. It ignores important features of
the situation--the stability two years' duration has given to the
insurrection; the feasibility of its indefinite prolongation in the
nature of things, and, as shown by past experience, the utter and
imminent ruin of the island unless the present strife is speedily
composed; above all, the rank abuses which all parties in Spain, all
branches of her Government, and all her leading public men concede to
exist and profess a desire to remove. Facing such circumstances, to
withhold the proffer of needed reforms until the parties demanding them
put themselves at mercy by throwing down their arms has the appearance
of neglecting the gravest of perils and inviting suspicion as to the
sincerity of any professed willingness to grant reforms. The objection
on behalf of the insurgents that promised reforms can not be relied
upon must of course be considered, though we have no right to assume
and no reason for assuming that anything Spain undertakes to do for the
relief of Cuba will not be done according to both the spirit and the
letter of the undertaking.
Nevertheless, realizing that suspicions and precautions on the part of
the weaker of two combatants are always natural and not always
unjustifiable, being sincerely desirous in the interest of both as well
as on its own account that the Cuban problem should be solved with the
least possible delay, it was intimated by this Government to the
Government of Spain some months ago that if a satisfactory measure of
home rule were tendered the Cuban insurgents and would be accepted by
them upon a guaranty of its execution the United States would endeavor
to find a way not objectionable to Spain of furnishing such graranty.
While no definite response to this intimation has yet been received
from the Spanish Government, it is believed to be not altogether
unwelcome, while, as already suggested, no reason is perceived why it
should not be approved by the insurgents. Neither party can fail to see
the importance of early action, and both must realize that to prolong
the present state of things for even a short period will add enormously
to the time and labor and expenditure necessary to bring about the
industrial recuperation of the island. It is therefore fervently hoped
on all grounds that earnest efforts for healing the breach between
Spain and the insurgent Cubans upon the lines above indicated may be at
once inaugurated and pushed to an immediate and successful issue. The
friendly offices of the United States, either in the manner above
outlined or in any other way consistent with our Constitution and laws,
will always be at the disposal of either party.
Whatever circumstances may arise, our policy and our interests would
constrain us to object to the acquisition of the island or an
interference with its control by any other power.
It should be added that it can not be reasonably assumed that the
hitherto expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely
maintained. While we are anxious to accord all due respect to the
sovereignty of Spain, we can not view the pending conflict in all its
features and properly apprehend our inevitably close relations to it
and its possible results without considering that by the course of
events we may be drawn into such an unusual and unprecedented condition
as will fix a limit to our patient waiting for Spain to end the
contest, either alone and in her own way or with our friendly
cooperation.
When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection
has become manifest and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is
extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a
hopeless struggle for its reestablishment has degenerated into a strife
which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and
the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a
situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty
of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly
hesitate to recognize and discharge. Deferring the choice of ways and
methods until the time for action arrives, we should make them depend
upon the precise conditions then existing; and they should not be
determined upon without giving careful heed to every consideration
involving our honor and interest or the international duty we owe to
Spain. Until we face the contingencies suggested or the situation is by
other incidents imperatively changed we should continue in the line of
conduct heretofore pursued, thus in all circumstances exhibiting our
obedience to the requirements of public law and our regard for the duty
enjoined upon us by the position we occupy in the family of nations.
A contemplation of emergencies that may arise should plainly lead us to
avoid their creation, either through a careless disregard of present
duty or even an undue stimulation and ill-timed expression of feeling.
But I have deemed it not amiss to remind the Congress that a time may
arrive when a correct policy and care for our interests, as well as a
regard for the interests of other nations and their citizens, joined by
considerations of humanity and a desire to see a rich and fertile
country intimately related to us saved from complete devastation, will
constrain our Government to such action as will subserve the interests
thus involved and at the same time promise to Cuba and its inhabitants
an opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peace.
The Venezuelan boundary question has ceased to be a matter of
difference between Great Britain and the United States, their
respective Governments having agreed upon the substantial provisions of
a treaty between Great Britain and Venezuela submitting the whole
controversy to arbitration. The provisions of the treaty are so
eminently just and fair that the assent of Venezuela thereto may
confidently be anticipated.
Negotiations for a treaty of general arbitration for all differences
between Great Britain and the United States are far advanced and
promise to reach a successful consummation at an early date.
The scheme of examining applicants for certain consular positions to
test their competency and fitness, adopted under an Executive order
issued on the 20th of September, 1895, has fully demonstrated the
usefulness of this innovation. In connection with this plan of
examination promotions and transfers of deserving incumbents have been
quite extensively made, with excellent results.
During the past year 35 appointments have been made in the consular
service, 27 of which were made to fill vacancies caused by death or
resignation or to supply newly created posts, 2 to succeed incumbents
removed for cause, 2 for the purpose of displacing alien consular
officials by American citizens, and 4 merely changing the official
title of incumbent from commercial agent to consul. Twelve of these
appointments were transfers or promotions from other positions under
the Department of State, 4 of those appointed had rendered previous
service under the Department, 8 were made of persons who passed a
satisfactory examination, 7 were appointed to places not included in
the order of September 20, 1895, and 4 appointments, as above stated,
involved no change of incumbency. The inspection of consular offices
provided for by an appropriation for that purpose at the last session
of the Congress has been productive of such wholesome effects that I
hope this important work will in the future be continued. I know of
nothing that can be done with the same slight expense so improving to
the service.
I desire to repeat the recommendation contained in my last annual
message in favor of providing at public expense official residences for
our ambassadors and ministers at foreign capitals. The reasons
supporting this recommendation are strongly stated in the report of the
Secretary of State, and the subject seems of such importance that I
hope it may receive the early attention of the Congress.
We have during the last year labored faithfully and against unfavorable
conditions to secure better preservation of seal life in the Bering
Sea. Both the United States and Great Britain have lately dispatched
commissioners to these waters to study the habits and condition of the
seal herd and the causes of their rapid decrease. Upon the reports of
these commissioners, soon to be submitted, and with the exercise of
patience and good sense on the part of all interested parties, it is
earnestly hoped that hearty cooperation may be secured for the
protection against threatened extinction of seal life in the Northern
Pacific and Bering Sea.
The Secretary of the Treasury reports that during the fiscal year ended
June 30, 1896, the receipts of the Government from all sources amounted
to $409,475,408.78. During the same period its expenditures were
$434,678,654.48, the excess of expenditures over receipts thus
amounting to $25,203,245.70. The ordinary expenditures during the year
were $4,015,852.21 less than during the preceding fiscal year. Of the
receipts mentioned there was derived from customs the sum of
$160,021,751.67 and from internal revenue $146,830,615.66. The receipts
from customs show an increase of $7,863,134.22 over those from the same
source for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1895, and the receipts from
internal revenue an increase of $3,584,537.91.
The value of our imported dutiable merchandise during the last fiscal
year was $369,757,470 and the value of free goods imported
$409,967,470, being an increase of $6,523,675 in the value of dutiable
goods and $41,231,034 in the value of free goods over the preceding
year. Our exports of merchandise, foreign and domestic, amounted in
value to $882,606,938, being an increase over the preceding year of
$75,068,773. The average ad valorem duty paid on dutiable goods
imported during the year was 39.94 per cent and on free and dutiable
goods taken together 20.55 per cent.
The cost of collecting our internal revenue was 2.78 per cent, as
against 2.81 per cent for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1895. The
total production of distilled spirits, exclusive of fruit brandies, was
86,588,703 taxable gallons, being an increase of 6,639,108 gallons over
the preceding year. There was also an increase of 1,443,676 gallons of
spirits produced from fruit as compared with the preceding year. The
number of barrels of beer produced was 35,859,250, as against
33,589,784 produced in the preceding fiscal year, being all increase of
2,269,466 barrels.
The total amount of gold exported during the last fiscal year was
$112,409,947 and of silver $60,541,670, being an increase of
$45,941,466 of gold and $13,246,384 of silver over the exportations of
the preceding fiscal year. The imports of gold were $33,525,065 and of
silver $28,777,186, being $2,859,695 less of gold and $8,566,007 more
of silver than during the preceding year.
The total stock of metallic money in the United States at the close of
the last fiscal year, ended on the 30th day of June, 1896, was
$1,228,326,035, of which $599,597,964 was in gold and $628,728,071 in
silver.
On the 1st day of November, 1896, the total stock of money of all kinds
in the country was $2,285,410,590, and the amount in circulation, not
including that in the Treasury holdings, was $1,627,055,641, being
$22.63 per capita upon an estimated population of 71,902,000.
The production of the precious metals in the United States during the
calendar year 1895 is estimated to have been 2,254,760 fine ounces of
gold, of the value of $46,610,000, and 55,727,000 fine ounces of
silver, of the commercial value of $36,445,000 and the coinage value of
$72,051,000. The estimated production of these metals throughout the
world during the same period was 9,688,821 fine ounces of gold,
amounting to $200,285,700 in value, and 169,189,249 fine ounces of
silver, of the commercial value of $110,654,000 and of the coinage
value of $218,738,100 according to our ratio.
The coinage of these metals in the various countries of the world
during the same calendar year amounted to $232,701,438 in gold and
$121,996,219 in silver.
The total coinage at the mints of the United States during the fiscal
year ended June 30, 1896, amounted to $71,188,468.52, of which
$58,878,490 was in gold coins and $12,309,978.52 in standard silver
dollars, subsidiary coins, and minor coins
The number of national banks organized from the time the law
authorizing their creation was passed up to October 31, 1896, was
5,051, and of this number 3,679 were at the date last mentioned in
active operation, having authorized capital stock of $650,014,895, held
by 288,902 shareholders, and circulating notes amounting to
$211,412,620.
The total outstanding circulating notes of all national banks on the
31st day of October, 1896, amounted to $234,553,807, including
unredeemed but fully secured notes of banks insolvent and in process of
liquidation. The increase in national-bank circulation during the year
ending on that day was $21,099,429. On October 6, 1896, when the
condition of national banks was last reported, the total resources of
the 3,679 active institutions were $3,263,685,313.83, which included
$1,893,268,839.31 in loans and discounts and $362,165,733.85 in money
of all kinds on hand. Of their liabilities $1,597,891,058.03 was due to
individual depositors and $209,944,019 consisted of outstanding
circulating notes.
There were organized during the year preceding the date last mentioned
28 national banks, located in 15 States, of which 12 were organized in
the Eastern States, with a capital of $1,180,000, 6 in the Western
States, with a capital of $875,000, and 10 in the Southern States, with
a capital of $1,190,000. During the year, however, 37 banks voluntarily
abandoned their franchises under the national law, and in the case of
27 others it was found necessary to appoint receivers. Therefore, as
compared with the year preceding, there was a decrease of 36 in the
number of active banks.