SOME CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION.
History will not soon give us a picture of the Revolution in a broad,
impartial light. Those prospects which are now opening out to our view
are sufficient only to enable us to grasp certain particular phenomena
in it and, perhaps, to reject the prejudices and misconceptions which
have sprung up around them.
The Revolution was inevitable. It is called a Revolution of the whole
people. This is correct only in so far as the Revolution was the Result
of the discontent of literally all classes of the population with the
old power. But upon the question of its achievements opinions were
divided, and deep breaches were bound to appear between classes on the
very next day after the downfall of the old Power.
The Revolution was many-faced. For the peasants--the ownership of
the land; for the workmen--the ownership of profits; for the Liberal
Bourgeoisie--changed political conditions of life in the land and
moderate social reforms; for the Revolutionary Democracy--power and the
maximum of social achievement; for the Army--absence of authority and
the cessation of the War.
With the downfall of the power of the Czar, there was left in the
country, until the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, no lawful
power, no power that had a juridical basis. This is perfectly natural
and follows from the very nature of a Revolution. But whether through
genuine misconception or deliberately perverting the truth, men have
fabricated theories, known to be false, about the "general popular
origin of the Provisional Government" or about the "full powers of the
Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates," as an organ supposed
to represent the "whole of the Russian Democracy." What an elastic
conscience one must have, if, while professing democratic principles
and protesting violently against the slightest deviation from orthodox
conditions of the lawfulness of elections, one can still ascribe full
powers, as the organ of democracy, to the Petrograd Soviet or to the
Congress of Soviets, the election of which is of an extraordinary
simplified and one-sided character. It was not without reason that
for a long time the Petrograd Soviet hesitated to publish lists of
its members. As to the supreme Power, to say nothing of its "popular
origin" from a "private meeting of the State Duma," the technique of
its construction was so imperfect that repeated crises might have put
an end to its very existence and to every trace of its continuity.
Finally, a really "popular" Government could not have remained
isolated, left by all to the will of a group of usurpers of authority.
That same Government which, in the days of March, so easily obtained
general recognition. Recognition, yes, but not practical support.
After March 3rd, and up to the Constituent Assembly, _every_
supreme authority bore the marks of self-assumed power, and _no_
power could satisfy all classes of the population, in view of the
irreconciliableness of their interests and the intemperance of their
desires.
Neither of the ruling powers (the Provisional Government and the
Soviet) enjoyed the due support of the _majority_. For this majority
(80 per cent.) said, through its representatives in the Constituent
Assembly of 1918: "We peasants make no difference between parties;
parties fight for power, while our peasant business is the land alone."
But even if, forestalling the will of the Constituent Assembly, the
Provisional Government had satisfied these desires of the majority
in full, it could not have reckoned on this majority's immediate
submission to the general interests of the State, nor on its _active_
support: engaged in the redistribution of the land, which also had
a strong attraction for the elements at the Front, the peasantry
would scarcely have given the State, voluntarily, the forces and
the means for putting it in order, _i.e._ plenty of corn and plenty
of soldiers--brave, faithful and obedient to the law. Even then the
Government would have been faced with insoluble problems: an Army which
did not fight, an unproductive industry, a transport system which was
being broken down and ... the civil war of parties.
Let us, therefore, set aside the popular and democratic origin of
the Provisional authority. Let it be self-assumed, as it has been in
the history of all revolutions and of all peoples. But the very fact
of the wide recognition of the Provisional Government gave it a vast
advantage over all the other forces which disputed its authority.
It was necessary, however, that this power should become so strong,
so absolute in its nature, so autocratic, as, having crushed all
opposition by force, perhaps by arms, to have led the country to a
Constituent Assembly, elected in surroundings which did not admit of
the falsification of the popular vote, and to have protected this
Assembly.
We are apt to abuse the words "elemental force," as an excuse for many
phenomena of the Revolution. That "molten element" which swept Kerensky
away with the greatest ease, has it not fallen into the iron grip of
Lenin-Bronstein and, for more than three years, been unable to escape
from Bolshevist duress?
If such a power, harsh, but inspired by reason and by a true desire for
popular rule, had assumed authority and, having crushed the _licence_
into which _freedom_ had been transmuted, had led this authority to
a Constituent Assembly, the Russian people would have blessed, not
condemned it. In such a position will every provisional authority find
itself which accepts the heritage of Bolshevism; and Russia will judge
it, not by the juridical marks of its origin, but by its works.
Why is the overthrow of the incompetent authority of the old Government
to be an achievement, to the memory of which the Provisional Government
proposed erecting a monument in the Capital, while the attempt to
overthrow the incompetent authority of Kerensky, made by Kornilov,
after exhausting all lawful means and after provocation on the part of
the Minister-President, is to be counted rebellion?
But the need for a powerful authority is far from being exhausted by
the period preceding the Constituent Assembly. Did not the Assembly
of 1918 call in vain on the country, not for submission, but simply
for protection from physical outrage on the part of the turbulent
sailor horde? Yet not a hand was raised in its defence. Let us grant
that _that_ Assembly, born in an atmosphere of mutiny and violence,
did not express the will of the Russian people and that the future
Assembly will reflect that will more perfectly. I think, however,
that even those who have the most exalted faith in the infallibility
of the democratic principle do not close their eyes to the unbounded
possibilities of the future which will be the heritage of such a
physical and psychological transformation in the people as is unknown
to history and has never yet been investigated by anyone.
Who knows whether it may not be necessary to confirm the democratic
principle, the authority itself of the Constituent Assembly, and its
commands, by iron and fresh bloodshed....
Be that as it may, the _outward_ recognition of the Provisional
Government took place. It would be difficult and useless to separate,
in the work of the Government, that which proceeded from its free will
and sincere convictions from what bears the stamp of the forcible
influence of the Soviet. If Tzeretelli was entitled to declare that
"there has never yet been a case when, in important questions, the
Provisional Government has not been ready to come to an agreement," so
have we the right to identify their work and their responsibility.
All this activity, _volens nolens_, bore the character of destruction,
not creation. The Government repealed, abolished, disbanded,
permitted.... In this lay the centre of gravity of its work. I picture
to myself the Russia of that period as a very old house, in need of
capital reconstruction. In the absence of means and while waiting for
the building season (the Constituent Assembly), the builders began
extracting the decayed girders, some of which they did not replace at
all, others they replaced with light, temporary props, and others again
they reinforced with new baulks without fastenings--the latter means
turning out to be the worst. And the house crashed down. The causes
of such a method of building were first: the absence of a complete
and symmetrical plan among the Russian political parties, the whole
energy, mental and will tension of which were directed mainly towards
the destruction of the former order. For we cannot give the name of
practical plans to the abstract outlines of the party programmes; they
are rather lawful or unlawful diplomas for the right of building.
Secondly--that the new ruling classes did not possess the most
elementary technical knowledge of the art of ruling, as the result
of a systematic, age-long setting them aside from these functions.
Thirdly--the non-forestalling of the will of the Constituent Assembly,
which, in any case, called for heroic measures for its summoning,
and therewith no less heroic measures for securing real freedom of
election. Fourthly--the odiousness of all that bore the stamp of
the old order, even though it were sound at bottom. Fifthly--the
self-conceit of the political parties, each of which individually
represented the "will of the whole people" and was distinguished by
extreme irreconciliableness towards its antagonists.
I might probably continue this list for a long time, but I shall pause
on one fact which has a significance which is far from being confined
to the past. The Revolution was expected, it was prepared, but _no
one_, not a single one of the political groups _had prepared itself
for it_. And the Revolution came by night, finding everyone, like the
foolish virgins in the Gospel, with lamps unlit. One cannot explain and
excuse everything by elemental forces alone. No one had troubled to
construct beforehand a general plan of the canals and sluices necessary
to prevent the inundation from becoming a flood. Not one of the leading
parties possessed a programme for the interregnum in the life of the
country, a programme which, in its character and scale, could not
correspond with normal plans of construction, either in the system of
administration or in the sphere of economic and social relations. It
would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the only assets in the
possession of the progressive and Socialist blocks on March 27th, 1917,
were: for the former--the choice for the post of Minister-President of
Prince Lvov, for the latter--the Soviets and Order No. 1. After this
began the convulsive, unsystematic vacillation of the Government and of
the Soviet.
It is to be regretted that this difference, which constitutes a
marked distinction between two periods--the provisional and the
constructive--two systems, two programmes, has not yet become
sufficiently clear in public consciousness.
The whole period of the active struggle with Bolshevism passed under
the sign of the mingling of these two systems, of divergent views and
of incapacity to construct a provisional form of authority. It would
seem that now, too, the anti-Bolshevist forces, while increasing the
divergence of their views and building plans for the future, are not
preparing for the process of assuming the power after the downfall
of Bolshevism, and will again approach the task with naked hands
and wavering mind. Only now the process will be immeasurably more
difficult. For the second excuse--after "elemental forces"--for the
failure of the Revolution, or rather of its leading men--"the heritage
of the Czarist régime"--has paled very much on the background of the
sanguinary Bolshevist mist which has enveloped the land of Russia.
* * * * *
The new power (the Provisional Government) was faced by a question of
the first importance--the War. On its decision rested the fate of the
country. The decision in favour of continuing the alliance and the
War rested on ethical motives, which at that time did not rouse any
doubts, and on practical motives, which were in some degree disputable.
Now, even the former have been shaken, since both the Allies and the
enemy have treated the fate of Russia with cruel, cynical egotism.
Nevertheless, I have no doubt of the correctness of the decision then
taken to continue the War. Many suppositions might be made as to the
possibilities of a separate peace--whether that of Brest-Litovsk or one
less grievous for the State and for our national self-love. But it is
to be thought that such a peace in the spring of 1917 would have led
either to the dismemberment of Russia and her economic _débâcle_ (a
general peace at the expense of Russia), or to the complete victory
of the Central Powers over our Allies, which would have produced
incomparably deeper convulsions in their countries than those which
the German people are now experiencing. Both in the one case and in
the other, no objective data would be present for any change for the
better in the political, social and economic conditions of Russian life
and any turning of the Russian Revolution into other channels. Only,
besides Bolshevism, Russia would have added to her liabilities the
hatred of the defeated for many years.
Having decided to fight, it was necessary to preserve the Army by
admitting a certain conservatism into it. Such a conservatism serves
as a guarantee for the stability of the Army and of that authority
which seeks support in it. If the participation of the Army in
historical cataclysms cannot be avoided, neither can it be turned into
an arena for political struggle, creating, instead of the principle
of service--_pretorians or opritchniks_, whether of the Czar, of the
Revolutionary Democracy, or of any party is a matter of indifference.
The Army was broken up.
On those principles which the Revolutionary Democracy took as a basis
for the existence of the Army, the latter could neither build nor live.
It was no mere chance that all the later attempts at armed conflict
with Bolshevism began with the organisation of an Army on the normal
principles of military administration, to which the Soviet command as
well sought to pass gradually. No elemental circumstances, no errors
on the part of military dictatorships and of the powers co-operating
with or opposing them which led to the failure of the struggle (of this
some truths will be spoken later) are able to cast this undeniable fact
into the shade. Nor is it a mere chance that the leading circles of
the Revolutionary Democracy could create no armed forces, except that
pitiful parody on them--the "National Army" on the so-called "front of
the Constituent Assembly." It was just this circumstance that led the
Russian Socialist emigrants to the theory of non-resistance, of the
negation of armed struggle, to the concentration of all their hopes
on the inner degeneration of Bolshevism and its overthrow by some
immaterial "forces of the people themselves," which, however, could
not express themselves otherwise than by blood and iron: "the great,
bloodless" Revolution is drowned in blood from its beginning to its end.
To refuse to consider that vast question--the re-creation of a National
Army on firm principles--is not to solve it.
What then? On the day that Bolshevism falls will peace and good-will
immediately show forth in a land corrupted by a slavery worse than
that of the Tartar yoke, saturated with dissension, revenge, hatred,
and ... an enormous quantity of arms? Or, from that day forward, will
the self-interested desires of many foreign Governments disappear, or
will they grow stronger when the menace of the moral infection of the
Soviet has vanished? Finally, even should the whole of old Europe,
morally regenerated, beat out its swords into ploughshares, is it
impossible for a new Tchingiz-Khan to come out of the depths of that
Asia which has accounts age-long and huge beyond measure, against
Europe?
The Army will be regenerated. Of that there can be no doubt.
Shaken in its historical foundations and traditions, like the heroes
of the Russian legends, it will stand for no short time at the
cross-roads, gazing anxiously into the misty distances, still wrapped
in the gloom before the dawn, and listening intently to the vague
sounds of the voices calling to it. And among the delusive calls it
will seek, straining its hearing to the utmost, for the real voice ...
the voice of its own people.
PRINTED BY THE FIELD PRESS LTD., WINDSOR HOUSE,
BREAM'S BUILDINGS, LONDON, E.C. 4.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _Barin_ is the Russian word for master. It also means gentleman,
and was used by the peasants and by servants in addressing their
superiors.
[2] The French Deputy, Louis Martin, estimates the losses of the
Armies in killed alone as follows:--(In millions) Russia 2½, Germany
2, Austria 1½, France 1.4, Great Britain 0.8, Italy 0.6, etc. Russia's
share of the martyrdom of all the Allied forces is 40 per cent.
[3] President of the Duma.
[4] The Grand Duke here refers to the manifesto drafted by Witte,
granting various liberties and decreeing the convocation of the Duma.
[5] Miliukov: _History of the Second Russian Revolution_.
[6] Minister of War.
[7] Chessin: _La Révolution Russe_.
[8] Quartermaster-General of the Commander-in-Chief of All Fronts.
[9] Chief of Staff of the Northern Front (Com.-in-Ch., General Ruzsky).
[10] Count Fredericks, Narishkine, Ruzsky, Gutchkov, Shulgin.
[11] Shulgin's narrative.
[12] Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, Nekrassov, Teresvtchenko, Godnev,
Lvov, Gutchkov, and Rodzianko.
[13] Miliukov: _History of the Second Russian Revolution_.
[14] The murder took place on the night of July 16th, 1918.
[15] Much time, pains and labour were devoted to the task of collecting
information about the murdered Imperial family by General Dietrichs.
[16] The term _Soviet_ for brevity will be used in the course of the
narrative instead of _Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates_.
[17] The word _Defensists_ is used as a translation of the newly-coined
Russian word _oboronetz_, which means "He who is in favour of a
defensive war."
[18] A "poud" is equal to 40 pounds.
[19] Gustave Le-Bon, _The Psychology of Socialism_.
[20] The restoration of Poland in her _ethnographic_ frontiers was
intended by Russia also.
[21] _Mes Souvenirs de Guerre._
[22] These lists contained the names of those suspected of relations
with the enemy Governments.
[23] Among the members of the Committee were, for instance, Zourabov
and Perzitch, who had served under Parvus.
[24] It is curious that Bronstein (Trotsky)--a person sufficiently
competent in the matter of secret communications with the Staffs of our
antagonists--said in the _Izvestia_ for July 8th, 1917: "In the paper
_Nashe Slovo_ I have exposed and pilloried Skoropis-Yoltoukhovsky,
Potok and Melenevsky as agents of the Austrian General Staff."
[25] V. chap. IV.--Of course articles 7 and 8 did not meet with the
approval of public opinion.
[26] Generally speaking, the special services, and especially the
artillery, retained their likeness to human beings, as well as a
certain amount of discipline, much longer than the infantry.
[27] Leonid Andreiev's article: "_To thee, Oh soldier!_"
[28] The greatest part was played by Lieutenant-Colonels of the General
Staff, Lebedev (afterwards Chief-of-Staff to Admiral Koltchak) and
Pronin.
[29] The President was Colonel Novosiltsev, a member of the Fourth
State Douma, a Cadet (Constitutional Democrat).
[30] The last Charter to the Cossacks of the Don was granted on January
24, 1906, by the Emperor Nicholas II., and contained the following
words: "... We confirm all the rights and privileges granted to it (the
Cossack Army), affirming by Our Imperial word both the indefeasibility
of its present form of service, which has earned the Army of the Don
historic glory and the inviolability of all its estates and lands,
gained by the labours, merits and blood of its ancestors...."
[31] Such was the name given to the non-Cossack immigrant element in
the territory.
[32] With artillery to correspond.
[33] In the territory of the Don the peasants formed 48 per cent. of
the population and the Cossacks 46 per cent.
[34] In places, the Territorial Council of "outsiders."
[35] In the principal territories--on the Don and on the Kouban--the
Cossacks formed about one-half of the population.
[36] Of these phenomena I shall speak later in more detail.
[37] The Don, the Kouban, the Terek, Astrakhan, and the mountaineers of
the Northern Caucasus. I shall speak of this later.
[38] The third cavalry corps, in Kornilov's advance against Kerensky.
[39] The third cavalry corps with Kerensky against the Bolsheviks.
[40] The Ural Cossacks, until their tragic fall in the end of 1919,
knew not Bolshevism.
[41] General Alexeiev ordered its disbandment, but Kerensky permitted
it to remain.
[42] They were disbanded.
[43] A Socialist-Revolutionary emigrant and an active worker in his
party. He was appointed to this post by Kerensky, at the desire of the
Kiev Council of Soldiers' Delegates.
[44] Oberoutchev. _In the Days of the Revolution._
[45] Among others, my former 4th Rifle Division was subjected to
Ukrainisation.
[46] The Ukrainian Hetman Skoropadsky was one of his ancestors.
[47] Formerly Commander of the 38th Army Corps.
[48] The proposal of abdication made to the Emperor Nicholas II.
[49] Gutchkov's official letter to the President of the Government.
[50] Colonels: Baranovsky, Yakoubovitch, Prince Toumanov, and later
Verkhovsky.
[51] 9th July--Reply to the greeting of the Moghilev Soviet.
[52] See his evidence before the Commission of Inquiry.
[53] Conversation by telegraph with Colonel Bazanovsky.
[54] Savinkov: _The Kornilov Affair_. Savinkov's expostulations
prevailed. Kornilov even consented to remove Zavoiko from the limits of
the Front, but soon recalled him.
[55] Chief of Staff of the Army.
[56] Free Thought. (Transl. note).
[57] Former Editor of the _Sovremenny Mir_ (Contemporary World),
and Social-Democrat of the _Yedinstvo_ Group. In 1921 he edited the
Bolshevist newspaper in Helsingfors.
[58] Undoubtedly better than the Committee of the Western Front.
[59] Held on August 14th, 1917.
[60] In August the balance of forces in the Soviet altered rapidly in
favour of the Bolsheviks, giving them a majority.
[61] General Parsky now occupies an important post in the Soviet Army,
while General Boldyrev was subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the
Anti-Bolshevist "Front of the Constituent Assembly" on the Volga.
[62] 21st August.
[63] From the Chief Committee of the Union of Officers, the Military
League, the Council of the Union of Cossack Troops, the Union of the
Knights of St. George, the Conference of Public Men, etc.
[64] Until August 27th, _i.e._, until the rupture with Kornilov,
Kerensky could not bring himself to sign the draft laws embodying the
"programme."
[65] The 3rd Cavalry Corps was summoned to Petrograd by the Provisional
Government.
[66] From the report of the inquiry it is seen that Savinkov, in
charge of the Ministry of War, and the head of Kerensky's secretariat,
Colonel Baranovsky, despatched to the Stavka, themselves admitted the
possibility of simultaneous action by the Soviet of Workmen's and
Soldiers' Delegates and the Bolsheviks, the former under the influence
of the publication of the "Kornilov programme," and the necessity for
ruthlessly suppressing this. (Protocol Appendix XIII. to Kornilov's
deposition.)
[67] As we shall see later, Savinkov stated in his evidence that
he "suggested no political combinations in the name of the
Minister-President."
[68] The "Kornilov programme" is meant here.
[69] The Commanders-in-Chief of the other Fronts sent the Provisional
Government telegrams of a completely loyal nature on August 28th. Their
tenor is seen from the following extracts: "Northern Front--General
Klembovsky: Consider change in Supreme Command extremely dangerous
when the threat of an external enemy to the integrity of our native
land and our freedom demands the speedy adoption of measures for the
strengthening of the discipline and fighting value of our Army."
"Western Front--General Baluev: The present situation of Russia demands
the immediate adoption of exceptional measures, and the retention of
General Kornilov at the head of the Army is an imperative necessity,
no matter what the political situation." "Roumanian Front--General
Scherbachev: The dismissal of General Kornilov will infallibly have a
fatal effect on the Army and the defence of the Motherland. I appeal to
your patriotism in the name of the salvation of our native land." All
the Commanders-in-Chief mentioned the necessity for the introduction of
the measures demanded by Kornilov.
[70] This telegram was not received at Headquarters. Kerensky gives the
episode with Lvov thus: "On August 26th General Kornilov sent to me Vv.
N. Lvov, member of the State Duma, with a demand that the Provisional
Government should cede all its military and civil authority, leaving
him to form a Government for the country in accordance with his own
personal views."
[71] On the morning of the 29th a telegram from the Quartermaster-General
at the Stavka somehow reached us, in which again hopes of a peaceful
settlement were held out.
[72] He went through the Kouban campaigns with the Volunteer Army and
served in it to the day of his death, from spotted typhus, in 1920.
[73] Official communication.
[74] The members of the Commission were: Col. Raupach and Col.
Oukraintsev, military jurists; Kolokolov, examining magistrate; and
Lieber and Krochmal, members of the Executive Committee of the Soviet
of Workmen's and Soldiers' delegates.
[75] Shablovsky, Kolokolov, Raupach and Oukraintsev.
[76] Shablovsky's interview in the "Retch."
[77] On that same morning we had been taken without any escort, with
only one guard accompanying us, to the bath, about two-thirds of a mile
from the guard-house, without attracting any attention.
[78] This gallant officer was afterwards one of the first Volunteers,
was wounded again in Kornilov's first Kouban campaign in 1918, and died
in the spring of 1919 of spotted typhus.
[79] The Kornilov case.
* * * * * *
Transcriber's note:
Every effort has been made to replicate this text as faithfully as
possible.
Soviet Order Number 1 is referred to as "Order No. 1." and "Order
No. I." in the printed text: this has been standardised to "Order
No. 1."
The original contained several unmatched double quotation marks.
It was not possible to determine where the matching double
quotation marks belonged, and none were added.
The reference to the footnote "Miliukov: _History of the Second
Russian Revolution_" on page 54 was missing in the original.
The following is a list of changes made to the original.
The first line is the original line, the second the corrected one.
Shulguin and Miliukov delivered their historical speeches, was
Shulgin and Miliukov delivered their historical speeches, was
upon which the Czarist Government could reply. Everybody considered
upon which the Czarist Government could rely. Everybody considered
the villages. Government servants of all kinds were impoverishd
the villages. Government servants of all kinds were impoverished
the proletariat, the troops, the bourgoisie, even the nobility ...
the proletariat, the troops, the bourgeoisie, even the nobility ...
terrorist crimes, military mutinies and aggrarian offences, etc.
terrorist crimes, military mutinies and agrarian offences, etc.
At Pskov, on the evening of March 1st, the Czar saw General Rusky,
At Pskov, on the evening of March 1st, the Czar saw General Ruzsky,
On the South-Western Front Ukranian units were being formed.
On the South-Western Front Ukrainian units were being formed.
Socialistic Dumas, closely reminiscent of semi-Boshevik Soviets.
Socialistic Dumas, closely reminiscent of semi-Bolshevik Soviets.
Administration, on the same basis as that in the munipalities.
Administration, on the same basis as that in the municipalities.
of agriculture, and of the economic stablity of the State.
of agriculture, and of the economic stability of the State.
As life was destroying allusions, and the implacable law
As life was destroying illusions, and the implacable law
new Revolutionary régime is much more expensive that the old one.
new Revolutionary régime is much more expensive than the old one.
the Baltic Fleet was actally in a state of complete insubordination.
the Baltic Fleet was actually in a state of complete insubordination.
and Avaresco's Army on my flank. I thus gained a
and Averesco's Army on my flank. I thus gained a
South-Western Front, in the direction from Kamemetz-Podolsk to Lvov,
South-Western Front, in the direction from Kamenetz-Podolsk to Lvov,
and afforded an excuse for the abitrariness and violence
and afforded an excuse for the arbitrariness and violence
Senior Commanding Staff considered as inadmissable the democratisation
Senior Commanding Staff considered as inadmissible the democratisation
Gutchov, his Assistants, and officers of the General Staff.
Gutchkov, his Assistants, and officers of the General Staff.
demanded that the Regimetal Committees should be empowered
demanded that the Regimental Committees should be empowered
of their registration in the International Control List.
of their registration in the International Control List."
in the Secret Police and director of the pre-Revolutionary _Pravdo_
in the Secret Police and director of the pre-Revolutionary _Pravda_
(the organ of the Bolshevik Social Domocrats) broke them down.
(the organ of the Bolshevik Social Democrats) broke them down.
issuing medical certicates even to the "thoroughly fit."
issuing medical certificates even to the "thoroughly fit."
he had sent in a request that morning for two poods of bread.
he had sent in a request that morning for two pouds of bread.
force every citizen to do his duty honestly by the Motherland?"
force every citizen to do his duty honestly by the Motherland?
factories, in the villages, among the Liberal _intelligentcia_,
factories, in the villages, among the Liberal _intelligencia_,
The Don, the Kouban, the Terex, Astrakhan, and the mountaineers
The Don, the Kouban, the Terek, Astrakhan, and the mountaineers
As soon as I give an order to some reserve regiment or other
As soon as I gave an order to some reserve regiment or other
that "discipline of duty" should be introduced from the top."
that "discipline of duty" should be introduced from the top.
broke our front and moved swiftly towards Kaminetz-Podolsk,
broke our front and moved swiftly towards Kamenetz-Podolsk,
On July 9th the Austro-Germans had aready reached Mikulinze,
On July 9th the Austro-Germans had already reached Mikulinze,
in the eyes of many people he bacame a national hero
in the eyes of many people he became a national hero
his Chief-of-Staff General Lukomsky, Generals Alexeiev and Russky,
his Chief-of-Staff General Lukomsky, Generals Alexeiev and Ruzsky,
manifested itself in a series of dismissal of Senior Commanders,
manifested itself in a series of dismissals of Senior Commanders,
A silence ensued, which I intrepreted as a permission to continue.
A silence ensued, which I interpreted as a permission to continue.
had already taken place on the 8th of July, at Kamenets-Podolsk.
had already taken place on the 8th of July, at Kamenetz-Podolsk.
was subordinated, not to the Stavka, but to the Minister of War,
was subordinated, not to the Stavka, but to the Minister of War.
the Petrograd garrison, the depôt ballations of which it was proposed
the Petrograd garrison, the depôt battalions of which it was proposed
Honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, politicans, soldiers
Honest and dishonest, sincere and insincere, politicians, soldiers
Even when the Plekhanov, the old leader of the Social-Democrats,
Even when Plekhanov, the old leader of the Social-Democrats,
Kornilov, Loukomsky, Romanovsky, and others were taken off
Kornilov, Lukomsky, Romanovsky, and others were taken off
isolation of the frontal region wtih respect to Kiev and Zhitomir.
isolation of the frontal region with respect to Kiev and Zhitomir.
in the shortest possible time, and by Revolutionary Court-Martial."
in the shortest possible time, and by Revolutionary Court-Martial.
through its representatives in the Consituent Assembly of 1918:
through its representatives in the Constituent Assembly of 1918:
[12] Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, Nekrasso, Teresvtchenko,
[12] Prince Lvov, Miliukov, Kerensky, Nekrassov, Teresvtchenko,
[57] Former Editor of the _Souvremenny Mir_ (Contemporary World),
[57] Former Editor of the _Sovremenny Mir_ (Contemporary World),