THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY--THE STORY OF "THE DECLARATION OF
THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER."
The ill-famed law, emanating from the Polivanov Committee and known
as the "Declaration of the Rights of the Soldier," was confirmed by
Kerensky on May 9th. I will give the main points of that law:
(1) "All soldiers of the Army enjoy full rights of citizenship."
(2) Every soldier is entitled to the membership of any political,
national, religious, economic, or professional organisation,
society or union.
(3) Every soldier off duty has the right freely and openly to
express in word, writing, or in the Press his political, religious,
social and other views.
(4) All printed matter (periodicals and other) should be delivered
to the addressees.
(5) Soldiers are not to be appointed as orderlies. Officers are
entitled to have one servant, appointed by mutual consent (of the
soldier and of the officer); wages also to be settled by mutual
consent, but there should be no more than one servant to each
officer, Army doctor, Army clerk, or Priest.
(6) Saluting is abolished for men as well as for units.
(7) No soldier is to be punished or fined without trial. At
the Front the Commanding Officer is entitled, on his own
responsibility, to take the necessary steps, including armed
force, against disobedient subordinates. Such steps are not to be
considered as disciplinary punishments. Internal administration,
punishments, and control in cases defined by Army regulations,
belong to elective Army Organisations.
This "Declaration of Rights," of which the above is but a brief
summary, gave official sanction to the malady with which the Army
was stricken, and which spread in varying degrees owing to mutinies,
violence, and "by Revolutionary methods," as the current expression
goes. It dealt a death-blow to the old Army. It introduced boundless
political discussions and social strife into the unbalanced ARMED
MASSES which had already become aware of their rough physical power.
"The Declaration" admitted and sanctioned wide propaganda by speech and
pamphlet of anti-national, immoral and anti-Social doctrines, and even
the doctrines that repudiated the State and the very existence of the
Army. Finally, it deprived Commanding Officers of disciplinary power,
which was handed over to elective bodies, and once again insulted and
degraded the Commanding Staff. In his remarks attached to the text of
the "Declaration," Kerensky says: "Let the freest Army and Navy of the
World prove that there is strength and not weakness in Liberty, let
them forge a new iron discipline of duty and raise the Armed Power of
the country."
And the "Great Silent One," as the French picturesquely describe the
Army, began to talk and to shout louder and louder still, enforcing its
demands by threats, by arms, and by shedding the blood of those who
dared to resist its folly.
At the end of April the final draft of the "Declaration" was sent by
Gutchkov to the Stavka for approval. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief and
myself returned an emphatic disapproval, in which we gave vent to all
our moral sufferings and our grief for the dark future of the Army. Our
conclusion was that the "Declaration" "was the last nail driven into
the coffin which has been prepared for the Russian Army." On May 1st
Gutchkov resigned from the War Ministry, as he did not wish "to share
the responsibility for the heavy sin which was committed against the
Mother Country," and in particular to sign the "Declaration."
* * * * *
The Stavka sent copies of the draft "Declaration" to the
Commander-in-Chief of the Fronts for reference, and they were called
by General Alexeiev to Moghilev, in order to discuss the fateful
position. This historical Conference took place on May 2nd. The
speeches, in which the collapse of the Russian Army was described,
were restrained and yet moving, as they reflected deep sorrow and
apprehension. Brussilov, in a low voice expressing sincere and unfeigned
pain, ended thus: "All this can yet be borne, and there still remains
some hope of saving the Army and leading it forward, provided the
'Declaration' is not issued. If it is, there is no salvation, and I
would not remain in office for a single day." This last sentence
provoked a warm protest from General Stcherbatchov, who argued that no
one should resign, that, however arduous and hopeless the position may
be, the leaders cannot abandon the Army.... Somebody suggested that all
the Commanders-in-Chief should immediately proceed to Petrograd,
and address to the Provisional Government a stern warning and
definite demands. The General who suggested this thought that such a
demonstration would produce a very strong impression and might arrest
the progress of destructive legislation. Others thought that it was a
dangerous expedient and our last trump card, and that, should the step
prove ineffective, the High Command would be definitely discredited. The
suggestion, however, was accepted, and, on the 4th May, a Conference took
place of all the Commanders-in-Chief (with the exception of the Caucasian
Front), the Provisional Government, and the Executive Committee of
the Soviet. I am in possession of the record of that Conference, of
which I give extensive extracts below. The condition of the Army, such
as it appeared to its leaders, in the course of events, and without,
therefore, any historical perspective, is therein described, as well as
the characteristics of the men who were then in power. The trend of the
speeches made by the Commander-in-Chief was the same as in the Stavka,
but they were less emphatic and less sincere. Brussilov smoothed
over his accusations, lost his pathos, "warmly greeted the Coalition
Ministry," and did not repeat his threat of resignation.
THE RECORD.
_General Alexeiev._--I consider it necessary to speak quite frankly. We
are all united in wishing for the good of our country. Our paths may
differ, but we have a common goal of ending the War in such a manner as
to allow Russia to come out of it unbroken, albeit tired and suffering.
Only victory can give us the desired consummation. Only then will
creative work be possible. But victory must be achieved, and that is
only possible if the orders of the Commanding Officers are obeyed. If
not, it is not an Army, but a mob. To sit in the trenches does not mean
to reach the end of the War. The enemy is transferring, in great haste,
division after division from our Front to the Franco-British Front, and
we continue to sit still. Meanwhile, the conditions are most favourable
for our victory, but we must advance in order to win it. Our Allies are
losing faith in us. We must reckon with this in the diplomatic sphere,
and I particularly in the military one. It seemed as if the Revolution
would raise our spirits, would give us impetus, and therefore victory.
In that, unfortunately, we have so far been mistaken. Not only is
there no enthusiasm or impetus, but the lowest instincts have come
to the fore, such as self-preservation. The interests of the Mother
Country and its future are not being considered.... You will ask what
has happened to the authority, to principles, or even to physical
compulsion? I am bound to state that the reforms to which the Army
has as yet failed to adapt itself have shaken it, have undermined
order and discipline. Discipline is the mainstay of the Army. If we
follow that path any further there will be a complete collapse....
The Commanders-in-Chief will give you a series of facts describing
the condition of the Armies. I will offer a conclusion and will give
expression to our desires and demands, which must be complied with.
_General Brussilov._--I must first of all describe to you the present
condition of the officers and men. Cavalry, artillery and engineering
troops have retained about 50 per cent. of their cadres. But in
the infantry, which is the mainstay of the Army, the position is
entirely different. Owing to enormous casualties in killed, wounded
and prisoners, as well as many deserters, some regiments have changed
their cadres nine or ten times, so that only from three to ten men
remain of the original formation. Reinforcements are badly trained
and their discipline is still worse. Of the regular officers from two
to four remain and in many cases they are wounded. Other officers
are youngsters commissioned after a short training and enjoying no
authority owing to their lack of experience. It is upon these new
cadres that the task has fallen to remodel the Army on a new basis, and
that task has so far proved beyond their capacity. Although we felt
that a change was necessary and that it had already come too late, the
ground was nevertheless unprepared. The uneducated soldier understood
it as a deliverance from the officers' yoke. The officers greeted the
change with enthusiasm. Had this not been so, the Revolution may not
have probably passed so smoothly. The result, however, was that freedom
was only given to the men, whereas the officers had to be content
to play the part of pariahs of liberty. The unconscious masses were
intoxicated with liberty. Everyone knows that extensive rights have
been granted, but they do not know what these rights are, and nobody
bothers about duties. The position of the officers is very difficult.
From 15 to 20 per cent. have rapidly adapted themselves to the new
conditions, because they believed that these conditions were all to
the good. Those of the officers who were trusted by the men did not
lose that trust. Some, however, became too familiar with the men, were
too lenient and even encouraged internal dissensions amongst the men.
But the majority of the officers, about 75 per cent., were unable to
adapt themselves. They were offended, retired to the background and
do not know what to do now. We are trying to bring them into contact
with the soldiers once more, because we need the officers for continued
fighting, and we have no other cadres. Many of the officers have no
political training, do not know how to make speeches--and this, of
course, handicaps the work of mutual understanding. It is necessary to
explain and to instil into the masses the idea that freedom has been
granted to _everyone_. I have known our soldiers for forty-five years,
I love them and I will do my best to bring them into close touch with
the officers, but the Provisional Government, the Duma and particularly
the Soviet should also make every effort in order to assist in that
work which must be done as soon as possible in the interests of the
country. It is also necessary, owing to the peculiar fashion in
which the illiterate masses have understood the watchword "without
annexations and indemnities." One of the regiments has declared that
not only would it refuse to advance, but desired to leave the front and
to go home. The Committees opposed this tendency, but were told that
they would be dismissed. I had a lengthy argument with the regiment,
and when I asked the men whether they agreed with me, they begged leave
to give me a written answer. A few minutes later they presented to me
a poster: "Peace at any price and down with the War." In the course of
a subsequent talk I had with one of the men, he said to me: "If there
are to be no annexations, why do we want that hill top?" My reply
was: "I also do not want the hill top, but we must beat the enemy who
is occupying it." Finally, the men promised to hold on, but refused
to advance, arguing that "the enemy is good to us and has informed
us that he will not advance provided we do not move. It is important
that we should go home to enjoy freedom and the land. Why should we
allow ourselves to be maimed?" Is it to be an offensive or a defensive
campaign? Success can be only obtained by an offensive. If we conduct
a passive defence the front is bound to be broken. If discipline is
strong a break-through may yet be remedied. But we must not forget that
we have no well-disciplined troops, that they are badly trained and
that the officers have no authority. In these circumstances an enemy
success may easily become a catastrophe. The masses must, therefore, be
persuaded that we must advance instead of remaining on the defensive.
We thus have many shortcomings, but numerical superiority is still
on our side. If the enemy succeeds in breaking the French and the
British, he will throw his entire weight upon us and we will then be
lost. We need a strong government upon which we could rely, and we
whole-heartedly greet the coalition government. The power of the State
can only be strong when it leans upon the Army, which represents the
armed forces of the nation.
_General Dragomirov._--The prevailing spirit in the Army is the
desire of peace. Anyone might be popular in the Army who would preach
peace without annexations and would advocate self-determination. The
illiterate masses have understood the idea of "no annexations" in a
peculiar fashion. They do not understand the conditions of different
peoples, and they repeatedly ask the question: "Why do not the Allied
democracies join in our declarations?" The desire for peace is so
strong that reinforcements refuse to accept equipment and arms and say:
"They are no good to us as we do not intend to fight." Work has come to
a standstill and it is even necessary to see to it that trenches are
not dismantled and that roads are mended. In one of the best regiments
we found, on the sector which it had occupied, a red banner inscribed:
"Peace at all costs." The officer who tore that banner had to flee for
his life. During the night men from that regiment were searching for
the officer at Dvinsk, as he had been concealed by the Headquarters
Staff. The dreadful expression "Adherents of the old régime" caused
the best officers to be cast out of the Army. We all wanted a change,
and yet many excellent officers, the pride of the Army, had to join
the Reserve simply because they tried to prevent the disruption of the
Army, but failed to adapt themselves to the new conditions. What is
much more fatal is the growth of slackness and of a lingering spirit.
Egoism is reaching terrible proportions, and each unit thinks only of
its own welfare; endless deputations come to us daily, demanding to
be relieved, to remove Commanding Officers, to be re-equipped, etc.
All these deputations have to be addressed, and this hinders our work.
Orders that used to be implicitly obeyed now demand lengthy arguments;
if a battery is moved to a different sector, there is immediate
discontent, and the men say: "You are weakening us--you are traitors."
Owing to the weakness of the Baltic Fleet, we found it necessary to
send an Army Corps to the rear to meet the eventual landing of an enemy
force, but we were unable to do so, because the men said: "Our line
is long enough as it is and if we lengthen it still more we will be
unable to hold the enemy." Formerly we had no difficulty whatsoever
in regrouping the troops. In September, 1915, eleven Army Corps were
removed from the Western front, and this saved us from a defeat which
might have decided the fate of the War. At present such a thing would
be impossible, as every unit raises objections to the slightest move.
It is very difficult to compel the men to do anything in the interests
of the Mother Country. Regiments refuse to relieve their comrades
in the firing line under various excuses--such as bad weather, or
the fact that not all their men had had their baths. On one occasion
a unit refused to go to the front on the plea that it had already
been in the firing line at Easter time. We are compelled to ask the
Committees of various regiments to argue the matter out. Only a small
minority of officers is behaving in an undignified manner, trying to
make themselves popular by bowing to the instincts of the men. The
system of elections has not been introduced in its entirety, but many
unpopular officers have been summarily dismissed as they were accused
of being adherents to the old régime; other Commanding Officers, who
had been considered incompetent and liable to dismissal, have been made
to stay. It was quite impossible not to grant the demands for their
retention. With regard to excesses there have been individual cases of
shootings of officers.... Things cannot continue on these lines. We
want strong power. We have fought for the country. You have taken the
ground from under our feet. Will you kindly restore it? Our obligations
are colossal, and we must have the power in order to be able to lead to
victory the millions of soldiers who are entrusted to our care.
_General Stcherbatchov._--The illiteracy of the soldiery is the main
reason of all these phenomena. It is not, of course, the fault of our
people that it is illiterate. For this the old régime is entirely
responsible, as it looked upon education from the point of view of the
Ministry of the Interior. Nevertheless, we have to reckon with the fact
that the masses do not understand the gravity of our position, and that
they misinterpret even such ideas as may be considered reasonable....
If we do not wish Russia to collapse, we must continue the struggle
and we must advance. Otherwise we shall witness a grotesque sight.
The representatives of oppressed Russia fought heroically; but having
overthrown the government that was striving for peace with dishonour,
the citizens of free Russia are refusing to fight and to safeguard
their liberties. This is grotesque, strange, incomprehensible. But it
is so. The reason is that discipline has gone and there is no faith
in the Commanding Officers. Mother Country, to most men, is an empty
sound. These conditions are most painful, but they are particularly
painful on the Roumanian front, where one has to reckon not only with
military surroundings of specific difficulty, but also with a very
complex political atmosphere. Our people are used to plains, and the
mountainous nature of the theatre of war has a depressing effect upon
the troops. We often hear the complaint: "Do not keep us in these
cursed mountains." We have only one railway line to rely upon for
supplies, and have great difficulty in feeding the troops. This, of
course, enhances discontent. The fact that we are fighting on Roumanian
territory is interpreted as a fight "for Roumania," which is also an
unpopular idea. The attitude of the local population is not always
friendly, and the men come to the conclusion that they are being
refused assistance by those on whose behalf they are fighting. Friction
thus arises and deepens, because some of the Roumanians blame us for
the defeats which they have themselves suffered and owing to which
they have lost most of their territory and of their belongings. The
Roumanian Government and the Allied representatives are well aware of
the ferment in our Army, and their attitude towards us is changing.
I personally noticed that a shadow has fallen between us, and that
the former respect and faith in the prowess of the Russian Army have
vanished. I still enjoy great authority, but if the disruption of the
Army continues not only shall we lose our Allies but make enemies of
them, and there would then be a danger of peace being made at our
expense. In 1914 we advanced across the whole of Galicia. In 1915, in
our retreat, we took at the South-Western front 100,000 prisoners.
You may judge what that retreat was like and what was the spirit of
the troops. In the summer of 1916 we saved Italy from disaster. Is
it possible that we may now abandon the Allied cause and be false to
our obligations? The Army is in a state of disruption, but that can
be remedied. Should we succeed, within a month and a half our brave
officers and men would advance again. History will wonder at the
inadequate means with which we achieved brilliant results in 1916. If
you wish to raise the Russian Army and to convert it into a strong
organised body which will dictate the terms of peace, you must help us.
All is not lost yet, but only on condition that the Commanding Officers
will regain prestige and confidence. We hope that full powers in the
Army will once again be vested in the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, who
alone can manage the troops. We will obey the will of the Provisional
Government, but you must give us strong support.
_General Gourko._--If you wish to continue the War till the desired
end, you must restore the power of the Army. We have received the draft
of the "Declaration" (of the rights of the soldier). Gutchkov would
not sign it and has resigned. I am bound to say that if a civilian
has resigned and refused to sign that declaration--to us, the Army
Chiefs, it is inacceptable. It simply completely destroys everything
that is left. I will recount to you an episode which occurred while I
was temporarily holding the office of Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme
C.-in-C.
On February 13th I had a long talk with the late Czar, trying to
persuade him to grant a responsible ministry. As a last trump card, I
alluded to our international position, to the attitude of our Allies
and to the probable consequences of this measure. But my card was
already beaten. I will now endeavour to describe our international
position. We have no direct indication of the attitude of our Allies
towards our intentions to give up the struggle. We cannot, of course,
force them to express their innermost thoughts. As in time of war, one
is often compelled to come to a decision "for the enemy," I will now
try to argue "for the Allies."
It was easy to begin the Revolution, but we have been submerged by its
tidal wave. I trust that common sense will help us to survive this. If
not, if the Allies realise our impotence, the principles of practical
policy will force upon them the only issue--a separate peace. That
would not be on their part a breach of obligations, because we had
promised to fight together and have now come to a standstill. If one
of the parties is fighting and the other is sitting in the trenches,
like a Chinese dragon, waiting for the result of the fight--you must
agree that the fighting side may begin to think of making separate
peace. Such a peace would, of course, be concluded at our expense.
The Austrians and the Germans can get nothing from our Allies: their
finance is in a state of collapse and they have no natural riches.
Our finances are also in a state of collapse, but we have immense
untouched natural resources. Our Allies would, of course, come to such
a decision only as a last resort, because it would be not peace, but a
lengthy armistice. Bred as they are upon the ideals of the nineteenth
century, the Germans, having enriched themselves at our expense, would
once again fall upon us and upon our late Allies. You may say that if
this is possible why should we not conclude a separate peace first.
Here I will mention first of all the moral aspect of the question. The
obligation was undertaken by Russia, not merely by the late autocrat.
I was aware--long before you had heard of it--of the duplicity of the
Czar, who had concluded soon after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 an
alliance with the Emperor William, while the Franco-Russian Alliance
was still in existence. The free Russian people, responsible for its
acts, cannot renounce its obligations. But setting aside the moral
aspect, there remains the material problem. If we open negotiations
they cannot remain secret, and our Allies would hear of it within
two or three days. They would also enter into a parley, and a kind
of auction sale would begin. The Allies are, of course, richer than
ourselves, but on their side the struggle has not yet ended; besides,
our enemies could get much more at our expense. It is precisely from
the international point of view that we must prove our capacity for
a continued struggle. I will not continue to revolutionise the Army,
because if I should we might find ourselves powerless not only to
advance but even to remain on the defensive. The latter is infinitely
more difficult. In 1915 we retreated and orders were obeyed. You
were entitled to expect this, because we had trained the Army. The
position has now been altered; you have created something new and have
deprived us of power. You can no longer hold us responsible, and the
responsibility must fall heavily upon your heads. You say that the
Revolution is still proceeding. Listen to us. We are better acquainted
with the psychology of the troops, we have gone with them through
thick and thin. Stop the Revolution and give us, the military Chiefs,
a chance to do our duty and to bring Russia to such a condition in
which you may continue your work. Otherwise, we will hand over to you
not Russia, but a field in which our enemies will sow and reap, and
Democracy itself will curse you. It will be Democracy that will suffer
if the Germans win. Democracy will be starving--while the peasants will
always manage to feed themselves on their own land. It was said of
the old régime that it "played into the hands of William." Will it be
possible to level the same accusation against you? William is fortunate
indeed, as both Monarchs and Democracies are playing into his hands.
The Army is on the eve of disruption. Our Mother Country is in danger
and is nearing a collapse. You must help. It is easy to destroy, and if
you know how to destroy--you should also know how to rebuild.
_General Alexeiev._--The main points have been stated, and they are
true. The Army is on the brink of the abyss. Another step and it will
fall into the abyss and will drag along Russia and all her liberties,
and there will be no return. Everyone is guilty, and the guilt lies
heavily upon all that has been done in that direction for the last
two and a half months. We have made every effort and are now devoting
all our strength to the task of restoring the Army. We trust that Mr.
Kerensky will apply all his qualities of mind and character and all
his influence to that consummation, and will help us. But that is
not enough. Those who have been disrupting the Army must also help.
Those who have issued the Order No. 1 must issue a series of orders
and comments. If the "Declaration" is published, as Gutchkov said,
the last flimsy foundations will fall into dust and the last hope
will be dashed. Be patient, there is time still. That which has been
granted in the last two and a half months has not as yet taken root.
We have regulations defining rights and duties. All the regulations
that are issued nowadays only mention rights. You must do away with
the idea that peace will come by itself. Those who say "down with the
War" are traitors, and those who say "there should be no advance"
are cowards. We still have men with sincere convictions. Let them
come to us not as passing stars, but let them live with us and dispel
the misunderstandings that have arisen. You have the Press. May it
encourage patriotism and demand that everyone do his duty.
_Prince Lvov._--We have heard the Commanders-in-Chief, we understand
all they have said and will do our duty to our country till the end.
_Tzeretelli._--There is no one here who has contributed to the
disruption of the Army and played into the hands of William. I have
heard the accusation that the Soviet has contributed to the disruption
of the Army. And yet everyone agrees that the Soviet is the only
institution that enjoys authority at present. What would happen were
there no Soviet? Fortunately, Democracy has come to the rescue and
we still have hope in salvation. What can you do? There are only two
paths for you to follow. One is to reject the policy of the Soviets.
But you would then have no source of power wherewith to hold the Army
and to lead it for the salvation of Russia. Your other path is the
true path, which we have tried; the path of unity with the desires
and expectations of the people. If the Commanding Officers have
failed to make it quite clear that the whole strength of the Army
for the defence of the country lay in the advance, there is no magic
wand capable of doing it. It is alleged that the watchword "Without
annexations or indemnities" has demoralised the Army and the masses.
It is quite likely that it has been misunderstood, but it should have
been explained that this was the ultimate aim; we cannot renounce that
watchword. We are aware that Russia is in danger, but her defence is
a matter for the people as a whole. The Power must be united and must
enjoy the confidence of the people, but this can only be achieved
if the old policy is completely discarded. Unity can only be based
on confidence, which cannot be bought. The ideals of the Soviet are
not those of separate and small groups--they are the ideals of the
country. To renounce them is to renounce the country. You might,
perhaps, understand Order No. 1 if you knew the conditions in which it
was issued. We were confronted with an unorganised mob and we had to
organise it. The masses of the soldiery do not wish to go on with the
War. They are wrong, and I cannot believe that they are prompted by
cowardice. It is the result of distrust. Discipline should remain. But
if the soldiers realise that you are not fighting against Democracy,
they will trust you. By this means the Army may yet be saved. By this
means the authority of the Soviet will be strengthened. There is only
one way of salvation, the way of confidence and of the Democratisation
of the country and of the Army. It is by accepting those principles
that the Soviet has gained the confidence of the people and is now in
a position to carry out its ideas. As long as that is so, not all is
lost. You must try to enhance the confidence in the Soviet.
_Skobelev._--We have not come here to listen to reproaches. We know
what is going on in the Army. The conditions which you have described
are undoubtedly ominous. It will depend upon the spirit of the Russian
people whether the ultimate goal will be reached and whether we shall
come out of the present difficulty with honour. I consider it necessary
to explain the circumstances in which Order No. 1 was issued. In the
troops which had overthrown the old régime, the Commanding Officers
had not joined the mutineers; we were compelled to issue that Order so
as to deprive these officers of authority. We were anxious about the
attitude of the front towards the Revolution and about the instructions
that were being given. We have proved to-day that our misgivings were
not unfounded. Let us speak the truth: the activities of the Commanding
Staff have prevented the Army, in these two and a half months, from
understanding the Revolution. We quite realise the difficulties of
your position. But when you say that the Revolution must be stayed, we
are bound to reply that the Revolution cannot begin or end to order.
Revolution may take its normal course when the mental process of the
Revolution spreads all over the country, when it is understood by the
70 per cent. of illiterate people.
Far be it from us to demand that all Commanding Officers be elected. We
agree with you that we have power and have succeeded in attaining it.
When you will understand the aims of the Revolution and will help the
people to understand our watchword, you will also acquire the necessary
power. The people must know what they are fighting for. You are leading
the Army for the defeat of the enemy, and you must explain that a
strategical advance is necessary in order that the watchwords that
have been proclaimed may be vindicated. We trust the new War Minister
and hope that a revolutionary Minister will continue our work and will
hasten the mental process of the Revolution in the heads of those who
think too slowly.
_The War Minister--Kerensky._--As Minister and Member of the
Government, I must say that we are trying to save the country and to
restore the fighting capacity and activities of the Russian Army. _We
assume responsibility, but we also assume the right to lead the Army_
and to show it the path of future development. Nobody has been uttering
reproaches here. Everyone has described what he has lived through and
has tried to define the causes of events, but our aims and desires are
the same. The Provisional Government recognises that the Soviet has
played a prominent part and admits its work of organisation--otherwise
I would not be War Minister. No one can level accusations at the
Soviet. But no one can accuse the Commanding Staffs either, because the
officers have borne the brunt of the Revolution quite as much as the
rest of the Russian people. Everyone understands the position. Now that
my comrades are joining the Government, it will be easier to attain our
common aims. There is but one thing for us to do--to save our freedom.
I will ask you to proceed to your commands and to remember that the
whole of Russia stands behind you and behind the Army. It is our aim to
give our country complete freedom. But this cannot be done unless we
show the world at large that we are strong in spirit.
_General Gourko_ (replying to Skobelev and Tzeretelli).--We are
discussing the matter from different angles. Discipline is the
fundamental condition of the existence of the Army. The percentage of
losses which a unit may suffer without losing its fighting capacity
is the measure of its endurance. I have spent eight months in the
South African Republics and have seen regiments of two different
kinds: (1) Small, disciplined and (2) Volunteer, undisciplined. The
former continued to fight and did not lose their fighting power when
their losses amounted to 50 per cent. The latter, although they were
volunteers who knew what they were fighting for, left the ranks and
fled from the battlefield after losing 10 per cent. No force on earth
could induce them to fight. That is the difference between disciplined
and undisciplined troops. We demand discipline. We do all we can to
persuade. But your authoritative voice must be heard. We must remember
that if the enemy advances, we shall fall to pieces like a pack of
cards. If you will not cease to revolutionise the Army--you must assume
power yourselves.
_Prince Lvov._--Our ends are the same and everyone will do his duty. I
thank you for your visit and for giving us your views.
* * * * *
The Conference came to a close. The Commanders-in-Chief rejoined their
fronts, fully conscious that the last card had been beaten. At the same
time, the Soviet orators and the Press started a campaign of abuse
against Generals Alexeiev, Gourko and Dragomirov, which rendered their
resignations imperative. On the 9th of May, as I already mentioned,
Kerensky confirmed the "Declaration" while issuing an Order of the Day
on the inadmissibility of senior Commanding Officers relinquishing
their posts "in order to shirk responsibility." What was the impression
produced by that fateful Order?
Kerensky _afterwards_ tried to adduce the excuse that the regulation
was drafted before he had assumed office and was approved of by the
Executive Committee as well as by "military authorities," and that he
had no reason to refuse to confirm it; in a word, that he was compelled
to do so. But I recall more than one of Kerensky's speeches in which,
believing his course to be the right one, he prided himself on his
courage in issuing a Declaration "which Gutchkov had not dared to sign,
and which had evoked the protests of all the Commanding Officers."
On May 13th the Executive Committee of the Soviets responded to the
Declaration by an enthusiastic proclamation which dwelt mainly upon the
question of saluting. Poor, indeed, was the mind that inspired this
verbiage: "Two months we have waited for this day.... Now the soldier
is by law a citizen.... Henceforward the citizen soldier is free from
the servile saluting, and will greet anyone he chooses as an equal and
free man.... In the Revolutionary Army discipline will live through
popular enthusiasm ... and not by means of compulsory saluting...."
Such were the men who undertook to reorganise the Army.
As a matter of fact, the majority of the Revolutionary Democracy of
the Soviets were not satisfied with the Declaration. They described
it as "a new enslavement of the soldier," and a campaign was opened
for further widening of these rights. Members of the Defencist
coalition demanded that the Regimental Committees should be empowered
to challenge the appointments of the Commanding Officers and to give
them attestations, as well as that freedom of speech should be granted
on service. Their chief demand, however, was for the exclusion of
Paragraph 14 of the Declaration entitling the Commanding Officer to use
arms in the firing line against insubordination. I need hardly mention
the disapproval of the Left, "Defeatist" Section of the Soviet.
The Liberal Press utterly failed to appraise the importance of the
Declaration and never treated it seriously. The official organ of the
Constitutional Democratic Party (_Retch_, May 11th) had an article
which expressed great satisfaction that the Declaration "afforded
every soldier the chance of taking part in the political life of the
country, definitely freed him from the shackles of the old régime and
led him from the stale atmosphere of the old barracks into the fresh
air of liberty." It also said that "throughout the world all other
armies are remote from politics, whilst the Russian Army will be the
first to enjoy the fullness of political rights." Even the Conservative
paper (_Novoc Vremia_) said in a leading article: "It is a memorable
day; to-day the great Army of mighty Russia becomes truly the Army
of the Revolution.... Intercourse between warriors of all ranks will
henceforward be placed upon the common foundation of a sense of duty
binding on every citizen, irrespective of rank. And the Revolutionary
Army of regenerated Russia will go forward to the great ordeal of blood
with faith in victory and in peace." Difficult, indeed, was the task
of the Commanding Officers who were endeavouring to preserve the Army
when they found that the fundamental principles upon which the very
existence of the Army depended were misunderstood so grossly, even in
circles which had heretofore been considered as the mainstay of Russian
statesmanship.
The Commanding Officers were still more disheartened, and the Army fell
into the abyss with ever-increasing rapidity.