MILITARY REFORMS--THE GENERALS--THE DISMISSAL FROM THE HIGH COMMAND.
Preparations for the advance continued alongside of the so-called
"Democratisation." These phenomena must be here recorded, as they had
a decisive effect upon the issue of the summer offensive and upon the
final destinies of the Army. Military reforms began by the dismissal
of vast numbers of Commanding Generals. In military circles this was
described, in tragic jest, as "The slaughter of the innocents." It
opened with the conversation between the War Minister, Gutchkov, and
the General on duty at the Stavka, Komzerovski. At the Minister's
request the General drew up a list of the Senior Commanding Officers,
with short notes (records of service). This list, afterwards completed
by various people who enjoyed Gutchkov's confidence, served as a basis
for the "slaughter." In the course of a few weeks 150 Senior Officers,
including seventy Commanders of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions, were
placed on the Retired List. In his speech to the Delegates of the
Front on April 29th, 1917, Gutchkov gave the following reasons for
this measure: "It has been our first task, after the beginning of the
Revolution, to make room for talent. Among our Commanding Officers
there were many honest men; but some of them were unable to grasp the
new principles of intercourse, and in a short time more changes have
been made in our commanding personnel than have ever been made before
in any army.... I realised that there could be no mercy in this case,
and I was merciless to those whom I considered incapable. Of course,
I may have been wrong. There may have been dozens of mistakes, but I
consulted knowledgeable people and took decisions only when I felt that
they were in keeping with the general opinion. At any rate, we have
promoted all those who have proved their capacity among the Commanding
Officers. I disregarded hierarchical considerations. There are men who
commanded regiments in the beginning of the War and are now commanding
armies.... We have thus attained not only an improvement, but something
different and equally important. By proclaiming the watchword 'Room for
talent' we have instilled joy into the hearts, and have induced the
officers to work with impetus and inspiration...."
What did the Army gain by such drastic changes? Did the _cadres_ of the
Commanding Officers really improve? In my opinion that object was not
attained. New men appeared on the scene, owing to the newly-introduced
right of selecting assistants, not without the interference of our old
friends--family ties, friendship and wire-pulling. Could the Revolution
give new birth to men or make them perfect? Was a mechanical change
of personnel capable of killing a system which for many years had
weakened the impulse for work and for self-improvement? It may be that
some talented individuals did come to the fore, but there were also
dozens, nay, hundreds, of men whose promotion was due to accident and
not to knowledge or energy. This accidental character of appointments
was further intensified when later Kerensky abolished for the duration
of the War all the existing qualifications, as well as the correlation
of rank and office. The qualification of knowledge and experience
was also thereby set aside. I have before me a list of the Senior
Commanding Officers of the Russian Army in the middle of May, 1917,
when Gutchkov's "slaughter" had been accomplished. The list includes
the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the Commanders-in-Chief of Fronts,
Armies and Fleets, and their Chiefs of Staff--altogether forty-five men:
OPPORTUNISTS.
------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------
The | Approving | Non-Resisters | Opponents |
Commanding | of | to | of |Total.
Personnel. |Democratisation.|Democratisation.|Democratisation.|
------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------
The Supreme | | | |
C.-in-C. | | | |
Army | | | |
Commanders| | | |
Fleet | | | |
Commanders| 9 | 5 | 7 |
Chiefs | | | |
of Staff | 6 | 6 | 7 |
------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------
| 15 | 11 | 14 | 40
------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------
I have excluded five names, as I have no data about them.
These men were the brain, the soul and the will-power of the Army. It
is difficult to estimate their military capacity according to their
last tenures of office, because strategy and military science in
1917 had almost entirely ceased to be applied and became slavishly
subservient to the soldiery, but I know the activities of these men in
regard to the struggle against democratisation--_i.e._, the disruption
of the Army, and the above table indicates the three groups into which
they were divided. Subsequently, after 1918, some of these men took
part in the struggle or kept aloof from it.
OPPORTUNISTS.
--------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------
The | Approving | Non-Resisters | Opponents |
Commanding | of | to | of |Total.
Personnel. |Democratisation.|Democratisation.|Democratisation.|
--------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------
In Anti- | | | |
Bolshevik | | | |
Organisations| 2 | 7 | 10 | 19
With the | | | |
Bolsheviks | 6 | -- | 1 | 7
Retired from | | | |
the struggle | 7 | 4 | 3 | 14
--------------+----------------+----------------+----------------+------
Such are the results of the changes in the High Command, where men
were in the public eye and where their activities attracted the
critical attention not only of the Government, but of military and
social circles. I think that in the lower grades things were no
better. The question of the justice of this measure may be open to
discussion, but, personally, I have no doubt whatsoever about its
extreme impracticability. The dismissal _en masse_ of Army Chiefs
definitely undermined the faith in the Commanding Staffs, and afforded
an excuse for the arbitrariness and violence of the Committees and of
the men towards individual representatives of the Commanding Staff.
Constant changes and transfers removed most officers from their
units, where they may have enjoyed respect and authority acquired
by military prowess. These men were thrown into new circles strange
to them, and time was needed, as well as difficult work, in the new
and fundamentally changed atmosphere in order to regain that respect
and authority. The formation of Third Infantry Divisions was still
proceeding, and was also occasioning constant changes in the Commanding
Personnel. That chaos was bound to ensue as a result of all these
circumstances is fairly obvious. So delicate a machine as the Army was
in the days of War and Revolution could only be kept going by the
force of inertia, and could not withstand new commotions. Pernicious
elements, of course, should have been removed and the system of
appointments altered, and the path opened for those who were worthy;
beyond that the matter ought to have been allowed to follow its natural
course without laying too much stress upon it and without devising a
new system. Apart from the Commanding Officers who were thus removed,
several Generals resigned of their own accord--such as Letchitzki and
Mistchenko--who could not be reconciled to the new régime, and many
Commanders who were evicted in a Revolutionary fashion by the direct or
indirect pressure of the Committee or of the soldiery. Admiral Koltchak
was one of them. Further changes were made, prompted by varying and
sometimes self-contradictory views upon the Army Administration. These
changes were, therefore, very fitful, and prevented a definite type of
Commanding Officer from being introduced.
Alexeiev dismissed the Commander-in-Chief, Ruzsky, and the Army
Commander, Radko-Dmitriev, for their weakness and opportunism. He
visited the Northern Front, and, having gained an unfavourable
impression of the activities of these Generals, he discreetly raised
the question of their being "overworked." That is the interpretation
given by the Army and Society to these dismissals.
Brussilov dismissed Yudenitch for the same reasons. I dismissed an
Army Commander (Kvietsinski) because his will and authority were
subservient to the disorganising activities of the Committees who were
democratising the Army.
Kerensky dismissed the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the
Commanders-in-Chief, Gourko and Dragomirov, because they were
strenuously opposed to the democratisation of the Army. He also
dismissed Brussilov for the opposite motives, because Brussilov was
an Opportunist, pure and simple.
Brussilov dismissed the Commander of the Eighth Army, General
Kaledin--who later became the Ataman of the Don and was universally
respected--on the plea that he had "lost heart" and did not approve
of democratisation. This dismissal of a General with a magnificent
War record was effected in a rude and offensive manner. He was at
first offered the command of another Army, and then offered to retire.
Kaledin then wrote to me: "My record entitles me to be treated
otherwise than as a stop-gap, without taking my own views into
consideration."
General Vannovski, who was relieved of the command of an Army Corps
by the Army Commander because he refused to acknowledge the priority
of the Army Committee, was immediately appointed by the Stavka to a
Higher Command and given an Army on the South-Western Front.
General Kornilov, who had refused the Chief Command of the troops of
the Petrograd District, "because he considered it impossible to be
a witness of and a contributor to the disruption of the Army by the
Soviet," was afterwards appointed to the Supreme Command at the Front.
Kerensky removed me from the office of Chief-of-Staff of the Supreme
C.-in-C. because I did not share the views of the Government and openly
disapproved of its activities, but, at the same time, he allowed me to
assume the high office of Commander-in-Chief of our Western Front.
Things also happened of an entirely different nature. The Supreme
Commander-in-Chief, General Alexeiev, made several unavailing efforts
to dismiss Admiral Maximov, who had been elected to the command of the
Baltic Fleet and was entirely in the hands of the mutinous Executive
Committee of the Baltic Fleet. It was necessary to remove that
officer, who had brought about so much evil, influenced, no doubt, by
his surroundings, because the Committee refused to release him, and
Maximov refused all summonses to come to the Stavka on the plea that
the condition of the Fleet was critical. In the beginning of June
Brussilov managed to remove him from the Fleet ... at the price of
appointing him Chief of the Naval Staff of the Supreme C.-in-C. Many
other examples might be quoted of incredible contrasts in principles of
Army Administration occasioned by the collision of two opposing forces
and two schools of thought.
* * * * *
I have already said that the entire Commanding Staff of Generals
was strictly loyal to the Provisional Government. General Kornilov,
the would-be "rebel," addressed the following speech to a Meeting
of Officers: "The old régime has collapsed. The people are building
a new structure of liberty, and it is the duty of the people's Army
wholeheartedly to support the new Government in its difficult, creative
work." The Commanding Staff may have taken some interest in questions
of general policy and in the Socialistic experiments of the Coalition
Governments, but no more than was taken by all cultured Russians,
and they did not consider themselves entitled or obliged to induce
the troops to participate in the solution of social problems. Their
only concern was to preserve the Army and the Foreign policy which
contributed to the victory. Such a connection between the Commanding
Staff and the Government, at first "a love match" and later one of
convenience, prevailed until the General Offensive in June, while
there still remained a flicker of hope that the mood of the Army would
change. That hope was destroyed by events, and, after the advance,
the attitude of the Commanding Staff was somewhat shaken. I may add
that the _entire_ Senior Commanding Staff considered as inadmissible
the democratisation of the Army which the Government was enforcing.
From the table which I have quoted it can be seen that 65 per cent. of
the Commanding Officers did not raise a sufficiently strong protest
against the disruption of the Army. The reasons were manifold and
entirely different. Some did it for tactical considerations, as they
thought that the Army was poisoned and that it should be healed by such
dangerous antidotes. Others were prompted by purely selfish motives.
I do not speak from hearsay, but because I know the _milieu_ and the
individuals, many of whom have discussed the matter with me with
perfect frankness. Cultured and experienced Generals could not frankly
and scientifically advocate such "military" views as, for example,
Klembovski's suggestion that a triumvirate should be placed at the head
of the Army, consisting of the Commander-in-Chief, a Commissar, and
an elected soldier; Kvietzinski's suggestion that the Army Committee
should be invested with special plenary power by the War Minister and
the Central Committee of the Soviet, which would entitle them to act in
the name of that Committee; or Viranovski's suggestion that the entire
Commanding Staff should be converted into "technical advisers" and
their power transferred entirely to the Commissars and the Committee.
The loyalty of the High Commanding Staff can be gauged from the
following fact: At the end of April General Alexeiev, despairing of
the possibility of personally preventing the Government from adopting
measures which tended to disrupt the Army, and before issuing the
famous Proclamation of the Rights of the Soldier, wired in cipher to
all the Commanders-in-Chief a draft of a strong and resolute collective
appeal from the Army to the Government. This appeal pointed to the
abyss into which the Army was being hurled. In the event of the draft
being approved, it was to have been signed by all Senior ranks,
including Divisional Commanders. The Fronts, however, for various
reasons, disapproved of such means of influencing the Government.
General Ragosa, the temporary C.-in-C. of the Roumanian Front, who was
afterwards Ukrainian War Minister under the Hetman, replied that the
Russian people seemed to be ordained by the Almighty to perish, and
it was therefore useless to struggle against Fate. With a sign of the
Cross, one should patiently await the dictates of Fate!... This was
literally the sense of his telegram.
Such was the attitude and the confusion in the higher ranks of the
Army. As regards the Commanders, who fought unremittingly against the
disruption of the Army, many of them struggled against the tide of
democratisation, as they considered it their duty to the people. They
did this in disregard of the success or failure of their efforts, of
the blows of Fate, or of the dark future, of which some already had a
premonition, and which was already approaching with disaster in its
train. On they went, with heads erect, misunderstood, slandered and
savagely hated, as long as life and courage permitted.