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THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL
[Illustration: The Stavka Quartermaster-General's Branch. Standing on
the pathway, from left to right (centre): Generals Denikin (Chief of
Staff), Alexeiev (Supreme C.-in-C.), Josephovitch and Markov (first and
second Quartermasters-General).]
THE RUSSIAN TURMOIL
Memoirs: Military, Social, and Political
by
GENERAL A. I. DENIKIN
With 27 Illustrations, Diagrams and Maps
London: Hutchinson & Co.
Paternoster Row
CONTENTS
PAGE
FOREWORD 11
CHAPTER I.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE OLD POWER: FAITH, THE CZAR, AND THE
MOTHER COUNTRY 13
CHAPTER II.
THE ARMY 23
CHAPTER III.
THE OLD ARMY AND THE EMPEROR 33
CHAPTER IV.
THE REVOLUTION IN PETROGRAD 40
CHAPTER V.
THE REVOLUTION AND THE IMPERIAL FAMILY 48
CHAPTER VI.
THE REVOLUTION AND THE ARMY 57
CHAPTER VII.
IMPRESSIONS OF PETROGRAD AT THE END OF MARCH, 1917 66
CHAPTER VIII.
THE STAVKA: ITS RÔLE AND POSITION 72
CHAPTER IX.
GENERAL MARKOV 79
CHAPTER X.
THE POWER--THE DUMA--THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--THE HIGH
COMMAND--THE SOVIET OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DELEGATES 84
CHAPTER XI.
THE BOLSHEVIK STRUGGLE FOR POWER--THE POWER OF THE ARMY AND
THE IDEA OF A DICTATORSHIP 96
CHAPTER XII.
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT--INTERNAL POLITICS,
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION--THE TOWN, THE VILLAGE, AND THE AGRARIAN
PROBLEM 106
CHAPTER XIII.
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT: FOOD SUPPLIES,
INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT, AND FINANCE 116
CHAPTER XIV.
THE STRATEGICAL POSITION OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT 127
CHAPTER XV.
THE QUESTION OF THE ADVANCE OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY 138
CHAPTER XVI.
MILITARY REFORMS--THE GENERALS--THE DISMISSAL FROM THE HIGH
COMMAND 146
CHAPTER XVII.
"DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY"--ADMINISTRATION, SERVICE AND
ROUTINE 153
CHAPTER XVIII.
THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER AND COMMITTEES 159
CHAPTER XIX.
THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY: THE COMMISSARS 168
CHAPTER XX.
THE DEMOCRATISATION OF THE ARMY--THE STORY OF "THE DECLARATION
OF THE RIGHTS OF THE SOLDIER" 174
CHAPTER XXI.
THE PRESS AND PROPAGANDA 189
CHAPTER XXII.
THE CONDITION OF THE ARMY AT THE JULY ADVANCE 209
CHAPTER XXIII.
OFFICERS' ORGANISATIONS 229
CHAPTER XXIV.
THE REVOLUTION AND THE COSSACKS 239
CHAPTER XXV.
NATIONAL UNITS 248
CHAPTER XXVI.
MAY AND THE BEGINNING OF JUNE IN THE SPHERE OF MILITARY
ADMINISTRATION--THE RESIGNATION OF GUTCHKOV AND GENERAL
ALEXEIEV--MY DEPARTURE FROM THE STAVKA--THE ADMINISTRATION
OF KERENSKY AND GENERAL BRUSSILOV 255
CHAPTER XXVII.
MY TERM AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ON THE WESTERN RUSSIAN FRONT 264
CHAPTER XXVIII.
THE RUSSIAN ADVANCE IN THE SUMMER OF 1917--THE DÉBÂCLE 271
CHAPTER XXIX.
THE CONFERENCE AT THE STAVKA OF MINISTERS AND COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF
ON JULY 16TH 281
CHAPTER XXX.
GENERAL KORNILOV 297
CHAPTER XXXI.
MY SERVICE AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOUTH-WESTERN FRONT--THE
MOSCOW CONFERENCE--THE FALL OF RIGA 308
CHAPTER XXXII.
GENERAL KORNILOV'S MOVEMENT AND ITS REPERCUSSION ON THE
SOUTH-WEST FRONT 318
CHAPTER XXXIII.
IN BERDICHEV GAOL--THE TRANSFER OF THE "BERDICHEV GROUP" OF
PRISONERS TO BYKHOV 329
CHAPTER XXXIV.
SOME CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE FIRST PERIOD OF THE REVOLUTION 338
[Illustration: The old banner]
[Illustration: And the new.]
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
THE STAVKA QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S BRANCH _Frontispiece_
THE OLD BANNER AND THE NEW Facing page 8
THE GRAND DUKE NICHOLAS DISTRIBUTES CROSSES OF ST.
GEORGE " " 14
FUNERAL OF THE FIRST VICTIMS OF THE MARCH REVOLUTION
IN PETROGRAD " " 44
GENERAL ALEXEIEV " " 72
GENERAL KORNILOV " " 72
GENERAL MARKOV " " 78
FOREIGN MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES AT THE STAVKA " " 144
THE CONFERENCE OF COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF " " 166
A GROUP OF "PRISONERS" AT BERDICHEV " " 166
THE OLD ARMY: A REVIEW. GENERAL IVANOV " " 192
THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY: A REVIEW. KERENSKY " " 192
BEFORE THE BATTLE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY: A MEETING " " 200
TYPES OF MEN IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ARMY " " 200
BEFORE THE BATTLE IN THE OLD ARMY: PRAYERS " " 208
TYPES OF SOLDIERS OF THE OLD ARMY " " 210
GENERAL ALEXEIEV'S FAREWELL " " 254
KERENSKY ADDRESSING SOLDIERS' MEETING " " 262
GENERAL KORNILOV'S ARRIVAL AT PETROGRAD " " 280
GENERAL KORNILOV IN THE TRENCHES " " 280
GENERAL KORNILOV'S WELCOME IN MOSCOW " " 316
LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND MAPS
PAGE
1. DIAGRAM OF THE COMPARATIVE FORCES OF THE GERMANS IN
DIFFERENT THEATRES OF WAR 32
2. DIAGRAM INDICATING THE POLITICAL PARTY DIVISIONS IN RUSSIA
AFTER THE REVOLUTION 90
3. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN EUROPEAN FRONT IN 1917 130
4. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN CAUCASIAN FRONT IN 1917 131
5. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT IN JUNE AND JULY, 1917 298
6. MAP OF THE RUSSIAN FRONT TILL AUGUST 19TH AND AFTER 299
FOREWORD
In the midst of the turmoil and bloodshed in Russia people perish and
the real outlines of historical events are obliterated. It is for this
reason that I have decided to publish these memoirs, in spite of the
difficulties of work in my present condition of a refugee, unable to
refer to any archives or documents and deprived of the possibility of
discussing events with those who have taken part in them.
The first part of my book deals chiefly with the Russian Army, with
which my life has been closely linked up. Political, social and
economic questions are discussed only in so far as I have found it
necessary to describe their influence upon the course of events.
In 1917 the Army played a decisive part in the fate of Russia. Its
participation in the progress of the Revolution, its life, degradation
and collapse should serve as a great warning and a lesson to the new
builders of Russian life. This applies not only to the struggle against
the present tyrants. When Bolshevism is defeated, the Russian people
will have to undertake the tremendous task of reviving its moral and
material forces, as well as that of preserving its sovereign existence.
Never in history has this task been as arduous as it is now, because
there are many outside Russia's borders waiting eagerly for her end.
They are waiting in vain. The Russian people will rise in strength
and wisdom from the deathbed of blood, horror and poverty, moral and
physical.
The Russian Turmoil
CHAPTER I.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE OLD POWER: FAITH, THE CZAR AND THE MOTHER
COUNTRY.
The inevitable historical process which culminated in the Revolution
of March, 1917, has resulted in the collapse of the Russian State.
Philosophers, historians and sociologists, in studying the course
of Russian life, may have foreseen the impending catastrophe. But
nobody could foresee that the people, rising like a tidal wave,
would so rapidly and so easily sweep away all the foundations of
their existence: the Supreme Power and the Governing classes which
disappeared without a struggle; the intelligencia, gifted but weak,
isolated and lacking will-power, which at first, in the midst of a
deadly struggle, had only words as a weapon, later submissively bent
their necks under the knife of the victors; and last, but not least, an
army of ten million, powerful and imbued with historic traditions. That
army was destroyed in three or four months.
This last event--the collapse of the army--was not, however, quite
unexpected, as the epilogue of the Manchurian war and the subsequent
events in Moscow, Kronstadt and Sevastopol were a terrible warning.
At the end of November, 1905, I lived for a fortnight in Harbin, and
travelled on the Siberian Railway for thirty-one days in December,
1907, through a series of "republics" from Harbin to Petrograd. I thus
gained a clear indication of what might be expected from a licentious
mob of soldiers utterly devoid of restraining principles. All the
meetings, resolutions, soviets--in a word, all the manifestations of
a mutiny of the military--were repeated in 1917 with photographic
accuracy, but with greater impetus and on a much larger scale.
It should be noted that the possibility of such a rapid psychological
transformation was not characteristic of the Russian Army alone. There
can be no doubt that war-weariness after three years of bloodshed
played an important part in these events, as the armies of the whole
world were affected by it and were rendered more accessible to the
disintegrating influences of extreme Socialist doctrines. In the
autumn of 1918 the German Army Corps that occupied the region of the
Don and Little Russia were demoralised in one week, and they repeated
to a certain extent the process which we had already lived through of
meetings, soviets, committees, of doing away with Commanding Officers,
and in some units of the sale of military stores, horses and arms.
It was not till then that the Germans understood the tragedy of
the Russian officers. More than once our volunteers saw the German
officers, formerly so haughty and so frigid, weeping bitterly over
their degradation.
"You have done the same to us; you have done it with your own hands,"
we said.
"Not we; it was our Government," was their reply.
In the winter of 1918, as Commander-in-Chief of the Volunteer Army, I
received an offer from a group of German officers to join our army as
volunteers in the ranks.
The collapse of the army cannot be explained away as the psychological
result of defeats and disasters. Even the victors experienced
disturbances in the army. There was a certain amount of disaffection
among the French troops occupying, in the beginning of 1918, the
region of Odessa and Roumania, in the French fleet cruising in the
Black Sea, among the British troops in the region of Constantinople
and Transcaucasia. The troops did not always obey the orders of their
Commanding Officers. Rapid demobilisation and the arrival of fresh,
partly volunteer elements, altered the situation.
[Illustration: The Grand Duke Nicholas distributes Crosses of St.
George.]
What was the condition of the Russian Army at the outbreak of the
Revolution? From time immemorial the entire ideology of our soldiers
was contained in the well-known formula: "For God, for the Czar and
for the Mother Country." Generation after generation was born and bred
on that formula. These ideas, however, did not penetrate deeply enough
into the masses of the people and of the army. For many centuries
the Russian people had been deeply religious, but their faith was
somewhat shaken in the beginning of the Twentieth Century. The Russian
people, as the Russian saying goes, was "the bearer of Christ"--a
people inwardly disposed towards Universal Brotherhood, great in its
simplicity, truthfulness, humility and forgiveness. That people,
Christian in the fullest sense of the word, was gradually changing as
it came under the influence of material interests, and learnt or was
taught to see in the gratifying of those interests the sole purpose
of life. The link between the people and its spiritual leaders was
gradually weakening as these leaders were detached from the people,
entered into the service of the Governing powers, and shared the
latter's deficiencies. The development of this moral transformation
of the Russian people is too deep and too complex to fall within the
scope of these memoirs. It is undeniable that the youngsters who
joined the ranks treated questions of the Faith and of the Church with
indifference. In barracks they lost the habits of their homes, and
were forcibly removed from a more wholesome and settled atmosphere,
with all its creeds and superstitions. They received no spiritual or
moral education, which in barracks was considered a matter of minor
importance, completely overshadowed by practical and material cares
and requirements. A proper spirit could not be created in barracks,
where Christian morals, religious discourses, and even the rites of
the Church bore an official and sometimes even compulsory character.
Commanding Officers know how difficult it was to find a solution of the
vexed question of attendance at Church services.
War introduced two new elements into the spiritual life of the army. On
the one hand, there was a certain moral coarseness and cruelty; on the
other, it seemed as if faith had been deepened by constant danger. I do
not wish to accuse the orthodox military clergy as a body. Many of its
representatives proved their high valour, courage and self-sacrifice.
It must, however, be admitted that the clergy failed to produce a
religious revival among the troops. It is not their fault, because the
world-war into which Russia was drawn was due to intricate political
and economic causes, and there was no room for religious fervour.
The clergy, however, likewise failed to establish closer connection
with the troops. After the outbreak of the Revolution the officers
continued for a long time to struggle to keep their waning power and
authority, but the voice of the priests was silenced almost at once,
and they ceased to play any part whatsoever in the life of the troops.
I recall an episode typical of the mental attitude of military circles
in those days. One of the regiments of the Fourth Rifle Division had
built a camp Church quite close to its lines, and had built it with
great care and very artistically. The Revolution came. A demagogue
captain decided that his company had inadequate quarters and that a
Church was a superstition. On his own authority he converted the Church
into quarters for his company, and dug a hole where the altar stood
for purposes which it is better not to mention. I am not surprised
that such a scoundrel was found in the regiment or that the Higher
Command was terrorised and silent. But why did two or three thousand
orthodox Russians, bred in the mystic rites of their faith, remain
indifferent to such a sacrilege? Be that as it may, there can hardly be
any doubt that religion ceased to be one of the moral impulses which
upheld the spirit of the Russian Army and prompted it to deeds of
valour or protected it later from the development of bestial instincts.
The orthodox clergy, generally speaking, was thrown overboard
during the storm. Some of the high dignitaries of the Church--the
Metropolitans--Pitirim and Makarius--the Archbishop Varnava and others,
unfortunately were closely connected with the Governing bureaucracy
of the Rasputin period of Petrograd history. The lower grades of
the clergy, on the other hand, were in close touch with the Russian
intellectuals.
I cannot take it upon myself to judge of the extent to which the
Russian Church remained an active force after it came under the yoke of
the Bolsheviks. An impenetrable veil hangs over the life of the Russian
Church in Soviet Russia, but there can be no doubt that spiritual
renaissance is progressing and spreading, that the martyrdom of
hundreds, nay, thousands, of priests is waking the dormant conscience
of the people and is becoming a legend in their minds.
THE CZAR.
It is hardly necessary to prove that the enormous majority of the
Commanding Officers were thoroughly loyal to the Monarchist idea and
to the Czar himself. The subsequent behaviour of the higher Commanding
Officers who had been Monarchists was due partly to motives of
self-seeking, partly to pusillanimity and to the desire to conceal
their real feelings in order to remain in power and to carry out their
own plans. Cases in which a change of front was the result of the
collapse of ideals, of a new outlook, or was prompted by motives of
practical statesmanship, were rare. For example, it would have been
childish to have believed General Brussilov when he asserted that from
the days of his youth he had been "a Socialist and a Republican." He
was bred in the traditions of the Old Guards, was closely connected
with circles of the Court, and permeated with their outlook. His
habits, tastes, sympathies and surroundings were those of a _barin_.[1]
No man can be a lifelong liar to himself and to others. The majority
of the officers of the Regular Russian Army had Monarchist principles
and were undoubtedly loyal. After the Japanese war, as a result of the
first Revolution, the Officers' Corps was, nevertheless, placed, for
reasons which are not sufficiently clear, under the special supervision
of the Police Department, and regimental Commanding Officers received
from time to time "black lists." The tragedy of it was that it was
almost useless to argue against the verdict of "unreliability," while,
at the same time, it was forbidden to conduct one's own investigation,
even in secret. This system of spying introduced an unwholesome
spirit into the army. Not content with this system, the War Minister,
General Sukhomlinov, introduced his own branch of counter-spies, which
was headed unofficially by Colonel Miassoyedov, who was afterwards
shot as a German spy. At every military District Headquarters an
organ was instituted, headed by an officer of the Gendarmerie
dressed up in G.H.Q. uniform. Officially, he was supposed to deal
with foreign espionage, but General Dukhonin (who was killed by the
Bolsheviks), when Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Kiev G.H.Q.
before the War, bitterly complained to me of the painful atmosphere
created by this new organ, which was officially subordinate to the
Quartermaster-General, but in reality looked on him with suspicion, and
was spying not only upon the Staff, but upon its own chiefs.
Life itself seemed to induce the officers to utter some kind of protest
against the existing order. Of all the classes that served the State,
there had been for a long time no element so downtrodden and forlorn
or so ill-provided for as the officers of the Regular Russian Army.
They lived in abject poverty. Their rights and their self-esteem were
constantly ignored by the Senior Officers. The utmost the rank and
file could hope for as the crowning of their career was the rank of
Colonel and an old age spent in sickness and semi-starvation. From the
middle of the nineteenth century the Officers' Corps had completely
lost its character as a class and a caste. Since universal compulsory
service was introduced and the nobility ceased to be prosperous the
gates of military schools were opened wide to people of low extraction
and to young men belonging to the lower strata of the people, but with
a diploma from the civil schools. They formed a majority in the Army.
Mobilisations, on the other hand, reinforced the Officers' Corps by the
infusion of a great many men of the liberal professions, who introduced
new ideas and a new outlook. Finally, the tremendous losses suffered
by the Regular Officers' Corps compelled the High Command to relax to
a certain extent the regulations concerning military training and
education, and to introduce on a broad scale promotions from the ranks
for deeds of valour, and to give rankers a short training in elementary
schools to fit them to be temporary officers.
These circumstances, characteristic of all armies formed from the
masses, undoubtedly reduced the fighting capacity of the Officers'
Corps, and brought about a certain change in its political outlook,
bringing it nearer to that of the average Russian intellectual and to
democracy. This the leaders of the Revolutionary democracy did not,
or, to be more accurate, would not, understand in the first days of
the Revolution. In the course of my narrative I will differentiate
between the "Revolutionary Democracy"--an agglomeration of socialist
parties--and the true Russian Democracy, to which the middle-class
intelligencia and the Civil Service elements undoubtedly belong.
The spirit of the Regular Officers was, however, gradually changing.
The Japanese War, which disclosed the grave shortcomings of the country
and of the Army, the Duma and the Press, which had gained a certain
liberty after 1905, played an important part in the political education
of the officers. The mystic adoration of the Monarch began gradually to
vanish. Among the junior generals and other officers there appeared men
in increasing numbers capable of differentiating between the idea of
the Monarchy and personalities, between the welfare of the country and
the form of government. In officer circles opportunities occurred for
criticism, analysis, and sometimes for severe condemnation.
It is to be wondered that in these circumstances our officers remained
steadfast and stoutly resisted the extremist, destructive currents of
political thought. The percentage of men who reached the depths and
were unmasked by the authorities was insignificant. With regard to the
throne, generally speaking, there was a tendency among the officers to
separate the person of the Emperor from the miasma with which he was
surrounded, from the political errors and misdeeds of the Government,
which was leading the country steadily to ruin and the Army to defeat.
They wanted to forgive the Emperor, and tried to make excuses for him.
In spite of the accepted view, the monarchical idea had no deep, mystic
roots among the rank and file, and, of course, the semi-cultured masses
entirely failed to realise the meaning of other forms of Government
preached by Socialists of all shades of opinion. Owing to a certain
innate Conservatism, to habits dating from time immemorial, and to
the teaching of the Church, the existing régime was considered as
something quite natural and inevitable. In the mind and in the heart
of the soldier the idea of a monarch was, if I may so express it, "in
a potential state," rising sometimes to a point of high exaltation
when the monarch was personally approached (at reviews, parades and
casual meetings), and sometimes falling to indifference. At any rate,
the Army was in a disposition sufficiently favourable to the idea of
a monarchy and to the dynasty, and that disposition could have easily
been maintained. But a sticky cobweb of licentiousness and crime was
being woven at Petrograd and Czarskoe Selo. The truth, intermingled
with falsehood, penetrated into the remotest corners of the country
and into the Army, and evoked painful regrets and sometimes malicious
rejoicings. The members of the House of Romanov did not preserve the
"idea" which the orthodox monarchists wished to surround with a halo of
greatness, nobility and reverence. I recall the impression of a sitting
of the Duma which I happened to attend. For the first time, Gutchkov
uttered a word of warning from the Tribune of the Duma about Rasputin.
"All is not well with our land."
The House, which had been rather noisy, was silent, and every word,
spoken in a low voice, was distinctly audible in remote corners. A
mysterious cloud, pregnant with catastrophe, seemed to hang over the
normal course of Russian history. I will not dwell on the corrupt
influences prevailing in Ministerial dwellings and Imperial palaces
to which the filthy and cynical impostor found access, who swayed
ministers and rulers.
The Grand Duke Nicholas is supposed to have threatened to hang
Rasputin should he venture to appear at G.H.Q. General Alexeiev also
disapproved strongly of the man. That the influence of Rasputin did
not spread to the old Army is due entirely to the attitude of the
above-named generals. All sorts of stories about Rasputin's influence
was circulated at the front, and the Censor collected an enormous
amount of material on the subject, even from soldiers' letters from the
front; but the gravest impression was produced by the word "TREASON"
with reference to the Empress. In the Army, openly and everywhere,
conversations were heard about the Empress' persistent demands for a
separate peace and of her treachery towards Lord Kitchener, of whose
journey she was supposed to have informed the Germans. As I recall the
past, and the impression produced in the Army by the _rumour_ of the
Empress' treason, I consider that this circumstance had a very great
influence upon the attitude of the Army towards the dynasty and the
revolution. In the spring of 1917 I questioned General Alexeiev on
this painful subject. His answer, reluctantly given, was vague. He
said: "When the Empress' papers were examined she was found to be in
possession of a map indicating in detail the disposition of the troops
along the entire front. Only two copies were prepared of this map, one
for the Emperor and one for myself. I was very painfully impressed. God
knows who may have made use of this map."
History will undoubtedly throw light on the fateful influence exercised
by the Empress Alexandra upon the Russian Government in the period
preceding the Revolution. As regards the question of treason, this
disastrous rumour has not been confirmed by a single fact, and was
afterwards contradicted by the investigations of a Commission specially
appointed by the Provisional Government, on which representatives of
the Soviet of workmen and soldiers served.
We now come to the third foundation--the _Mother Country_. Deafened
as we were, alas! by the thunder and rattle of conventional patriotic
phrases, endlessly repeated along the whole length and breadth of
Russia, we failed to detect the fundamental, innate defect of the
Russian people--its lack of patriotism. It is no longer necessary to
force an open door by proving this statement. The Brest-Litovsk Treaty
provoked no outburst of popular wrath. Russian society was indifferent
to the separation of the Border States, even those that were Russian
in spirit and in blood. What is more, Russian society approved of this
dismemberment. We know of the agreement between Poland and Petlura,
between Poland and the Soviet. We know that Russian territorial and
material riches were sold for a song to international, political
usurers. Need we adduce further proofs?
There can be no doubt that the collapse of Russian Statehood as
manifested in "self-determination" was in several instances caused by
the desire to find a temporary safeguard against the Bedlam of the
Soviet Republic. Life, however, unfortunately does not stop at the
practical application of this peculiar "sanitary cordon," but strikes
at the very idea of Statehood. This occurred even in such stable
districts as the Cossack provinces, not, however, among the masses,
but among the leaders themselves. Thus at Ekaterinodar in 1920, at the
"High Krug" (Assembly) of the three Cossack armies, the mention of
Russia was omitted after a heated discussion from the proposed formula
of the oath....
Is Crucified Russia unworthy of our love?
What, then, was the effect of the Mother Country idea upon the
conscience of the old Army? The upper strata of the Russian
intellectuals were well aware of the reasons for the world
conflagration, of the conflict of the Powers for political and
economic supremacy, for free routes, for markets and colonies--a
conflict in which Russia's part was merely one of self-defence. On
the other hand, the average number of the Russian _intelligencia_,
as well as officers, were often satisfied merely with the immediate
and more obvious and easily comprehensible causes. Nobody wanted the
war, except, perhaps, the impressionable young officers yearning for
exploits. It was believed that the powers-that-be would take every
precaution in order to avoid a rupture. Gradually, however, the fatal
inevitability of war was understood. There was no question on our part
of aggressiveness or self-interest. To sympathise sincerely with the
weak and the oppressed was in keeping with the traditional attitude of
Russia. Also, we did not draw the sword--the sword was drawn against
us. That is why, when the war began, the voices were silenced of those
who feared that, owing to the low level of her culture and economic
development, Russia would be unable to win in the contest with a strong
and cultured enemy. War was accepted in a patriotic spirit, which was
at times akin to enthusiasm. Like the majority of the intellectuals,
the officers did not take much interest in the question of war aims.
The war began; defeat would have led to immeasurable disaster to
our country in every sphere of its life, to territorial losses,
political decadence and economic slavery. Victory was, therefore,
a necessity. All other questions were relegated to the background.
There was plenty of time for their discussion, for new decisions and
for changes. This simplified attitude towards the war, coupled with
a profound understanding and with a national self-consciousness, was
not understood by the left wing of the Russian politicians, who were
driven to Zimmerwald and Kienthal. No wonder, therefore, that when
the anonymous and the Russian leaders of the Revolutionary democracy
were confronted in February, 1917, before the Army was deliberately
destroyed, with the dilemma: "Are we to save the country or the
Revolution?" they chose the latter.
Still less did the illiterate masses of the people understand the idea
of national self-preservation. The people went to war submissively,
but without enthusiasm and without any clear perception of the
necessity for a great sacrifice. Their psychology did not rise to the
understanding of abstract national principles. "The people-in-arms,"
for that was what the Army really was, were elated by victory and
downhearted when defeated. They did not fully understand the necessity
for crossing the Carpathians, and had, perhaps, a clearer idea of
the meaning of the struggle on the Styr and the Pripet. And yet it
found solace in the thought: "We are from Tambov; the Germans will
not reach us." It is necessary to repeat this stale saying, because
it expresses the deep-rooted psychology of the average Russian. As a
result of this predominance of material interests in the outlook of
"the people-in-arms," they grasped more easily the simple arguments
based on realities in favour of a stubborn fight and of victory, as
well as the impossibility of admitting defeat. These arguments were:
A foreign German domination, the ruin of the country and of the home,
the weight of the taxes which would inevitably be levied after defeat,
the fall in the price of grain, which would have to go through foreign
channels, etc. In addition, there was some feeling of confidence that
the Government was doing the right thing, the more so as the nearest
representatives of that power, the officers, were going forward
with the troops and were dying in the same spirit of readiness and
submission as the men, either because they had been ordered to do
so, or else because they thought it their duty. The rank and file,
therefore, bravely faced death. Afterwards when confidence was shaken,
the masses of the Army were completely perplexed. The formulas,
"without annexations and indemnities," "the self-determination of
peoples," etc., proved more abstract and less intelligible than the
old repudiated and rusty idea of the Mother Country, which still
persisted underneath them. In order to keep the men at the front, the
well-known arguments of a materialistic nature, such as the threat of
German domination, the ruin of the home, the weight of taxes, were
expounded from platforms decorated with red flags. They were taught by
Socialists, who favoured a war of defence.
Thus the three principles which formed the foundations of the Army were
undermined. In describing the anomalies and spiritual shortcomings
of the Russian Army, far be it from me to place it below the level
of armies of other countries. These shortcomings are inherent in all
armies formed from the masses, which are almost akin to a militia, but
this did not prevent these armies or our own from gaining victories
and continuing the war. It is necessary, however, to draw a complete
picture of the spirit of the Army in order to understand its subsequent
destiny.