1. And does not justice rule the affairs of mortals,—nor impartiality,
nor moderation, nor decorum? But was it of Fortune and long of Fortune
that Aristides remained obstinate in his poverty, although he could
have made himself master of much wealth? And that Scipio, when he had
taken Carthage, neither received nor so much as saw any part of the
booty? Was it of Fortune and long of Fortune that Philocrates, having
received a sum of gold of King Philip, laid it out in whores and fish?
And that Lasthenes and Euthycrates, by measuring their happiness by
their bellies and the most abject of follies, lost Olynthus? Was it
of Fortune that Alexander son of Philip refrained from the captive
women himself, and punished those that offered them any indignity;
while Alexander, son of Priam, long of an evil Daemon and Fortune,
first vitiated his host’s wife and then took her away with him, and
filled both the continents with war and calamities? And if such things
as these can come by Fortune, what hinders but that we may as well
plead that cats, goats, and monkeys are constrained by Fortune to be
ravenous, lustful, and ridiculous?
2. But if there be such things to be found as moderation, justice, and
fortitude, how can it stand with reason there should not be such a
thing as wisdom also? And if there be wisdom, how can it be but there
must be good counsel? For moderation is (as they are used to say) a
certain sort of wisdom; and justice cannot subsist without wisdom.
Certainly we call that good counsel and wisdom that render us manful
in pleasures continence and moderation; in dangers and hardships,
endurance and resolution; and in communities and public business,
equality and justice. And therefore if we will needs have it that
the effects of conduct belong to Fortune, let then both the effects
of justice and moderation belong to Fortune also. Nay, by Jove, let
stealing be ascribed to Fortune too, and cutting of purses, and a
lustful lewd life; and let us quit our reasoning quite, and turn
ourselves loose to Fortune, to be carried and driven, like filth and
dust, before an impetuous wind. If there be no such thing as conduct,
it must of necessity follow, that there should be no such thing as
advising about our affairs, nor any consultation or enquiry about
utility; and that Sophocles did talk idly when he said:
Whate’er is sought,
It may be caught;
But what we shun
Will from us run;[225]
and when elsewhere he made this distribution of things:
I learn what’s to be taught,
I seek what’s to be sought;
I beg the rest of Heaven.
For what is to be sought or what is to be learned by mortals, if all
things go by Fortune? And what senate of a republic is not overthrown,
or what council of a prince is not dissolved, if all things are subject
to Fortune?—which we use to upbraid with blindness because we blindly
fall into it. And indeed how can we otherwise choose, when we first
pluck good counsel like our eyes out of our heads, and then take us a
blind guide of our lives?