In this instance, Homer does (as it were) deride those who are ashamed
of their lameness or blindness, as not thinking any thing a disgrace
that is not in itself disgraceful, nor any person liable to a reproach
for that which is not imputable to himself but to Fortune. These two
great advantages may be made by those who frequently study poets;—the
learning moderation, to keep them from unseasonable and foolish
reproaching others with their misfortunes, when they themselves enjoy a
constant current of prosperity; and magnanimity, that under variety of
accidents they be not dejected nor disturbed, but meekly bear the being
scoffed at, reproached, and drolled upon. Especially, let them have
that saying of Philemon ready at hand in such cases:
That spirit’s well in tune, whose sweet repose
No railer’s tongue can ever discompose.
And yet, if one that so rails do himself deserve reprehension, thou
mayst take occasion to retort upon him his own vices and inordinate
passions; as when Adrastus in the tragedy is assaulted thus by Alcmaeon.
Thy sister’s one that did her husband kill,
he returns him this answer,
But thou thyself thy mother’s blood did spill.
For as they who scourge a man’s garments do not touch the body, so
those that turn other men’s evil fortunes or mean births to matter
of reproach do only with vanity and folly enough lash their external
circumstances, but touch not their internal part, the soul, nor those
things which truly need correction and reproof.
14. Moreover, as we have above taught you to abate and lessen the
credit of evil and hurtful poems by setting in opposition to them
the famous speeches and sentences of such worthy men as have managed
public affairs, so will it be useful to us, where we find any things
in them of civil and profitable import, to improve and strengthen
them by testimonies and proofs taken from philosophers, withal giving
these the credit of being the first inventors of them. For this is
both just and profitable to be done, seeing by this means such sayings
receive an additional strength and esteem, when it appears that what
is spoken on the stage or sung to the harp or occurs in a scholar’s
lesson is agreeable to the doctrines of Pythagoras and Plato, and that
the sentences of Chilo and Bias tend to the same issue with those
that are found in the authors which children read. Therefore must we
industriously show them that these poetical sentences,
Not these, O daughter, are thy proper cares,
Thee milder arts befit, and softer wars;
Sweet smiles are thine, and kind endearing charms;
To Mars and Pallas leave the deeds of arms;
Jove’s angry with thee, when thy unmanaged rage
With those that overmatch thee doth engage;[93]
differ not in substance but bear plainly the same sense with that
philosophical sentence, Know thyself. And these,
Fools, who by wrong seek to augment their store,
And know not how much half than all is more;
Of counsel giv’n to mischievous intents,
The man that gives it most of all repents;[94]
are of near kin to what we find in the determination of Plato, in his
books entitled Gorgias and Concerning the Commonwealth, to wit, that it
is worse to do than to suffer injury, and that a man more endamageth
himself, when he hurts another, than he would be damnified if he were
the sufferer. And that of Aeschylus,
Cheer up, friend; sorrows, when they highest climb,
What they exceed in measure want in time,
we must inform them, is but the same famous sentence which is so much
admired in Epicurus, that great griefs are but short, and those that
are of long continuance are but small. The former clause whereof is
that which Aeschylus here saith expressly, and the latter but the
consequent of that. For if a great and intense sorrow do not last, then
that which doth last is not great nor hard to be borne. And those words
of Thespis,
Seest not how Jove,—because he cannot lie
Nor vaunt nor laugh at impious drollery,
And pleasure’s charms are things to him unknown,—
Among the Gods wears the imperial crown?
wherein differ they from what Plato says, that the divine nature is
seated far from both joy and grief? And that saying of Bacchylides,
Virtue alone doth lasting honor gain,
But men of wretched souls oft wealth attain;
and those of Euripides much of the same import.
Hence temperance in my esteem excels,
Because it constantly with good men dwells;
How much soe’er to honor thou aspire,
And strive by riches virtue to acquire,
Still shall thy lot to good men wretched seem;
do they not evidently confirm to us what the philosophers say of riches
and other external good things, that without virtue they are fruitless
and unprofitable enjoyments?
Now thus to accommodate and reconcile poetry to the doctrines of
philosophy strips it of its fabulous and personated parts, and makes
those things which it delivers usefully to acquire also the reputation
of gravity; and over and above, it inclines the soul of a young man to
receive the impressions of philosophical precepts. For he will hereby
be enabled to come to them not altogether destitute of some sort of
relish of them, not as to things that he has heard nothing of before,
nor with an head confusedly full of the false notions which he hath
sucked in from the daily tattle of his mother and nurse,—yea, sometimes
too of his father and pedant,—who have been wont to speak of rich men
as the happy men and mention them always with honor, and to express
themselves concerning death and pain with horror, and to look on virtue
without riches and glory as a thing of nought and not to be desired.
Whence it comes to pass, that when such youths first do hear things of
a quite contrary nature from philosophers, they are surprised with a
kind of amazement, trouble, and stupid astonishment, which makes them
afraid to entertain or endure them, except they be dealt with as those
who come out of very great darkness into the light of the bright sun,
that is, be first accustomed for a while to behold those doctrines
in fabulous authors, as in a kind of false light, which hath but a
moderate brightness and is easy to be looked on and borne without
disturbance to the weak sight. For having before heard or read from
poets such things as these are,—
Mourn at one’s birth, as th’ inlet t’ all that grieves;
But joy at death, as that which man relieves;
Of worldly things a mortal needs but twain;
The spring supplies his drink, the earth his grain:
O tyranny, to barbarous nations dear!
This in all human happiness is chief,
To know as little as we can of grief;[95]
they are the less disturbed and offended when they hear from
philosophers that no man ought to be much concerned about death; that
the riches of nature are defined and limited; that the happiness of
man’s life doth not consist in the abundance of wealth or vastness
of employments or height of authority and power, but in freedom from
sorrow, in moderation of passions, and in such a temper of mind as
measures all things by the use of Nature.
Wherefore, upon all these accounts, as well as for all the reasons
before mentioned, youth stands in need of good government to manage
it in the reading of poetry, that being free from all prejudicate
opinions, and rather instructed beforehand in conformity thereunto, it
may with more calmness, friendliness, and familiarity pass from thence
to the study of philosophy.