5. Planning of reconversion of the entire economy to war needs, and
extension of the special armament industry.
6. Duties as mentioned already under II (b), (3), and (4), together with
the War Economy office in the OKW.
In addition to this, but planned to take effect only in case of
mobilization, there was collaboration with the following subordinate
ministries: a) Ministry of Economics, b) Ministry of Food, c) Ministry
of Labor, d) Ministry of Finance, for foreign exchange and purchase of
raw materials, e) Ministry of Forestry.
This necessitated, from December 1935 onward, the participation of a GBW
deputy for purposes of information in the Belch Defense Commission.
After Dr. Schacht’s retirement from the Reich Ministry of Economics, the
GBW became only fiction, because the full powers had been transferred to
the Four Year Plan, that is to say, Göring. Only when the powers of the
ministry of armament and munitions were extended in August 1943, when it
became known as the Ministry for Armament and War Production, was there
a revival of the originally planned position of the GBW entailing full
powers in time of war, but he remained subordinate as regards
organization to the Four Year Plan, with the Führer as the general
authority in reality at the top, owing to the failure of the Four Year
Plan.
III. In collaboration of the GBW with the War Economy Office in the OKW
the “Mobilization Plan for Rearmament” had been set up, with General
Thomas presiding. This “Mobilization Plan for Rearmament” acted on
behalf of the Armed Forces and the GBW who supplied particulars of the
industrial plants to be assigned from general production for
reconversion to armament production in time of war. It was to attend to:
(a) labor requirements, (b) raw material requirements, and (c)
industrial equipment (special machinery for weapons, et cetera).
The prerequisite of modern warfare is not so much the exploitation and
organization of the manpower of a country into military formations, but
it is essentially a problem of industrial capacity and of its
appropriate utilization for the production of all necessary raw
materials. This process must of necessity precede any rearmament, and
requires expenditure of money and, even more, of time.
When Germany proclaimed her equal rights as regards defense—that is,
military sovereignty—she did not possess the necessary resources for a
material rearmament, as they had been taken away in the execution and
recognition of the disarmament plan. It has been confirmed here during
the Trial by various sources that first 10, then 7 to 8 years were
allowed and anticipated for providing material equipment in the form of
hitherto prohibited modern weapons and supplies, especially including
munitions, for the peacetime Armed Forces which had been announced to
the world with the proclamation of liberty for national defense in 1935.
This becomes comprehensible if one considers that even the U.S.A. with
its unlimited means, which were not impaired by the effects of war,
required 4 to 5 years for the necessary conversion and rearmament in
this war. Thus we see that rearmament, if it is intended to exceed the
limits of defensive armament, can only be achieved gradually in the case
of nations, which—like Germany in 1934—had no armaments.
First stage: Procuring of essentials with regard to industries and raw
materials for the production of war supplies.
Second stage: Placing of orders with the armament industry for the first
equipment of the peacetime strength of the Armed Forces and
execution of these orders within the framework of the means
provided by the annual budgets.
Third stage: Procurement of the munition and weapon supplies to be stored
for the equipment of a mobile Armed Forces which would be
developed, in the case of war, from the permanent peacetime
strength in accordance with the manpower capacity of a
nation. Those supplies would include the necessary
replacements during the war.
If one considers that in 1934 Germany had no modern weapons, no
submarines, and no military aircraft at her disposal, it can well be
believed that any reasonable soldier had to assume under the given
circumstances there could be no thought of a war, let alone a war of
aggression.
Accordingly, the tasks which the Defendant Keitel assumed in his
official capacity of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Department must
be considered as purely preparatory and organizational. Keitel, of
course, bears the responsibility for General Thomas, Chief of the
Defense Economy Staff. The technical details and the extent of his
activity can be seen from Document 2353-PS, which is correct in essence
despite the fact that Thomas, in the declaration prefixed to this
historical document, now wants it to look as if he had presented his
original notes in an exaggerated way and given them a more favorable
turn to please Hitler and avoid arrest. This does not correspond to the
facts. What Thomas wrote proves, according to the Defendant Keitel’s
opinion, that a “war armament” with mobilization of the industrial
capacity and its conversion to war economy did not begin until early in
October 1939. It further proves that the statements of the defendants
who were examined here, as far as they were connected with this
rearmament, and especially those of Dr. Schacht until 1937, are in
complete agreement on the following point: At this period wars of
aggression were not avowedly desired, and that in the light of the state
of actual armament they must have appeared impossible.
But rearmament in manpower also shows the same picture during this
period. The evidence has demonstrated that up to the spring of 1938 only
27 peacetime divisions were scantily equipped and that 10 or 12 reserve
divisions were in preparation; at that time the Wehrmacht had no other
supplies or armaments at its disposal. If despite this fact, and
operating without general mobilization, it succeeded by the autumn of
1938 in preparing an army of almost 40 divisions for the aggression
against Czechoslovakia, at a time when it had the poorest protection on
its western border, one can see what the maximum war potential was in
those days.
Under such circumstances, and with knowledge of the armament situation
and war potentials of neighboring countries which were mutually united
by alliances and assistance pacts, none of the generals of the old
school could ever think of bringing about a war. The fact that already
one year later, in 1939, the state of German armaments was substantially
improved, must primarily be attributed to the occupation of
Czechoslovakia. Finally it must be pointed out that during this period
there was no strategic plan for any aggression whatsoever. General Jodl
has declared on the witness stand that when in 1935 he came to the Armed
Forces Department, no plan nor anything similar was in existence, except
what was provided for in case of internal unrest. The occupation of the
demilitarized Rhineland zone was not planned, but was improvised by
Hitler. The _Initial Assembly and Combat Directives_ of June 1937 is a
general instruction for possible military conflicts.
For the sake of completeness I must also call attention to Document
EC-194. This is an order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, Von Blomberg, on the subject of aerial reconnaissance and the
observation of submarine movements during the occupation of the Rhine.
Keitel signed and forwarded this order. It is the only existent document
of that period.
The Reichswehr had a permanent force of 100,000 men, as had been laid
down by the Treaty of Versailles. It is indisputable that in view of the
size of the Reich, its unprotected borders and the way East Prussia was
cut off, this figure was absolutely inadequate for creating a feeling of
internal security and the possibility of defense in the face of an
attack from the outside world—an elementary right for any country and
nation. This state of inadequacy, which had been created by the military
clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, was the subject of reflection even
before 1933 with a view to improving it without actually making use of
soldiers for the purpose. An examination was made and it was found that
in case of mobilization a series of tasks could be taken over by the
civil ministries. Here tasks of a purely defensive nature were
concerned, which cannot be considered aggressive. They were tasks of
national defense, and principally the following: I have enumerated them
in my manuscript and, without reading them, I would like the High
Tribunal to take judicial notice of these points. As it is quite clear
these are matters for defense only.
(1) Protection of the frontiers by reinforcement of the customs
service;
(2) Postal security by Reichspost agencies (repeater offices);
(3) Railroad protection by Reichsbahn personnel;
(4) Laying of cables instead of overhead telegraph lines;
(5) Construction of railroad viaducts and elimination of level
crossings on main traffic roads;
(6) Construction of frontier fortifications in the East,
Oder-Warthe line, Pomeranian line, Oder line (terrain
expropriation);
(7) Improvement of maritime traffic with East Prussia and of
rail transit through the Corridor;
(8) Fortifications in East Prussia;
(9) Reinforcement of frontier protection in East Prussia;
(10) Preparation by the Reichsbahn of mobile loading ramps;
(11) Reinforcement of the coastal customs service;
(12) Development by the Reichspost of the radio network
(amplified transmitters and receivers);
(13) Manning of permanent army signal stations with Reichspost
personnel;
(14) Relieving the Reichswehr from the charge of detaching
soldiers for duties which can be carried out by civilian
personnel;
(15) Protection of frontier crossings by the local authorities
(Landräte);
(16) Co-ordination of motor vehicles, et cetera.
The advisory body for these tasks and their execution was, up to 1933,
the Committee of Experts. It consisted of experts coming from the
different civil ministries, who after being accepted by the Minister of
the Interior—Severing, up to the end of 1933—met for conferences at
the Reich Defense Ministry. The Reichswehr Minister charged the then
Colonel Keitel to direct these meetings. At these meetings the experts
received and discussed the desires of the Reich Defense Ministry as
regards the afore-mentioned tasks, which the individual ministers could
take over in case of a mobilization.
During Minister Severing’s time this co-operation worked without
friction with the idea of satisfying as far as possible the wishes of
the Reichswehr Minister, and it continued in the same way after 30
January 1933. The scope and content of the tasks remained the same.
When, on 4 April 1933, a Reich Defense Council was established by a
resolution of Hitler’s new Reich Government, the committee was retained
and only its name was changed: The Committee of Experts became the Reich
Defense Committee. However, it did not change its field of action and
was not given any new jurisdiction. It only grew in size as it went on
developing, especially after the introduction of compulsory military
service. Now, as before, the Reich Defense Committee was a body which
had to give advice about those tasks of national defense concerning the
civilian sector which had to be prepared and also partly taken over by
the civil ministries. For this Count of the Indictment it must be made
quite clear that after 4 April 1933 Keitel’s position did not change
either, and especially that he was not a member of the Reich Defense
Council.
The Reich Defense Council, which has taken up a lot of space in the
statements of the Prosecution, may be considered as virtually
nonexistent in the light of the evidence produced—later on I will come
back to the time after 1938. In any case the Prosecution could not prove
that there was any session of the Reich Defense Council during this
period. The minutes submitted dealt without exception with the sessions
of the Reich Defense Committee, and the members of this committee
reported to their competent ministries, who in turn had an opportunity,
within the framework of the cabinet, to translate into concrete form the
suggestions and proposals discussed in the Reich Defense Committee. Thus
there were never any sessions of the Reich Defense Council whose
existence was merely formal, so that witnesses could rightly say that
the Reich Defense Council existed only on paper.
Keitel, up to 30 September 1933, as colonel and section chief in the
Reich Defense Ministry, and later from October 1935 as major general and
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry,
was a member of the Reich Defense Committee. Therefore, from 30
September 1933 to 30 September 1935 he was not in the War Ministry, and
thus had no function connected with this Count of the Indictment.
Neither did he during this time participate in sessions of the Reich
Defense Committee, the minutes of which have been presented by the
Prosecution as having special probative value. The session of 22 May
1933, described as the second session of the working Committee of
Experts, was the last session in which Keitel participated before being
transferred to serve with the troops. The first session after his
transfer to the Reich War Ministry was held on 6 September 1935. It is
put down as the 11th session of the Reich Defense Committee. Although in
the examination of Keitel’s responsibility one has to exclude the work
done by the Reich Defense Committee during the two years between
sessions 3 and 10, I will nevertheless make it the subject of my
statements, as it is from these very minutes that one can see what the
Reich Defense Committee was doing.
Only the knowledge of these minutes makes it clear why an institution,
which in this or some other form exists in every country and which
serves the purpose of national defense as deemed legitimate by every
country, has now been presented as an important factor in submitting
evidence on plans and preparations for aggression.
The minutes of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee in 1933,
1934, and 1935 reveal the character of the work as that of preparations
for the event of war. But it is likewise evident that it is a question
of preparations intended to bring about a more perfect degree of
readiness in national defense in case of mobilization. If the “political
situation” is twice mentioned, these allusions indicate the fear of
military sanctions from neighboring states. (Reference is made to the
case of Abyssinia, which led to sanctions against Italy.) Everything is
rooted in the thought of overcoming that state of military impotency
which made it impossible to safeguard the open frontiers of the Reich.
The recurring idea of obligation to secrecy can only be attributed to
fear arising from the situation at the time lest the revelation of
measures, however defensive, might produce preventive measures on the
part of the victorious powers.
That these suspicions were well-founded is shown by the intransigent
attitude of certain states after the complete disarmament of Germany,
and this question is important for Keitel’s attitude, for he affirms
that the conclusion drawn from the obligation to secrecy, namely, that
secrecy is a proof of bad conscience, and bad conscience is a proof of
knowledge of illegality, is erroneous.
The Reich Defense Committee never passed resolutions; it was an advisory
body on matters of national defense insofar as the civilian sector was
concerned with mobilization. At no time did it ever indulge in
deliberations concerning rearmament as regards manpower or material, or
concerning plans of aggression. The Prosecution has tried in one
instance to show that the Reich Defense Committee was involved in plans
for aggression.
I do not wish to read the next few sentences. Here we deal with the
well-known event of freeing the River Rhine for traffic, a question
which was designated as the technical liberation of the Rhine River.
This came up in Göring’s testimony.
They pointed out Document Number EC-405, the minutes of the Committee
for Reich Defense, session of 26 June 1934, in which there is mention of
“participation in preparing mobilization.” In these minutes under (c)
can be found: “Preparation for the liberation of the Rhine.” From this
the prosecuting authorities have drawn the conclusion that already on 26
June 1934 the Reich Defense Committee was contemplating the “liberation
of the Rhine.” The witness Reich Marshal Göring has stated during his
hearing that, given the unequivocal wording of the German text, it is a
question here of the technical freeing of the river Rhine, but not of
any strategic or political matter. I am mentioning this manifest error
by the prosecuting authorities, which can only have occurred through a
gross mistake in translation, because it has led to an erroneous
conception of the prosecution as to the competence of the Reich Defense
Committee, and because it is the only case which has come up in
connection with this complex.
The true nature of the Reich Defense Committee’s activities is set out
quite simply and clearly in the _Manual of Mobilization for the Civilian
Administration_; Documents 1639-PS and 1639a-PS. It refers to the result
of discussions between all the experts of the Reich Defense Committee,
and is an appendix to the mobilization plan of the Armed Forces as well
as to that of armaments.
These three mobilization plans all taken together form the basis of your
decision. You may see from them whether the Prosecution is right in its
assumption of a total planning for aggressive war, or whether the
Defendant Keitel was right when he stated during his hearing:
“What has been discussed and planned here is what every country
is entitled to do and what the responsible agencies are bound to
do, if they do not wish to violate their most sacred duty,
namely the safeguarding of the security of their country.”
The decision of 4 February 1938 was fateful for General Keitel as well
as for the German Wehrmacht: for Keitel who could not yet form an
opinion on the newly-created office of the “High Command of the Armed
Forces” (OKW) for the Armed Forces which on that day lost its relative
independence.
Hitler broke down the last barriers between himself and the Armed
Forces—the nation in arms—by removing both the Commander-in-Chief of
the Armed Forces and the constitutionally responsible Reich War
Minister. This truly portentous decision was fatal for Keitel and the
German nation, though at the time of its occurrence this was not
realized by the participants. That they must be blamed for not realizing
it is easy to say now, in retrospect.
At the time everybody who was not an inveterate skeptic or pessimist had
to base his judgment on the development of things in general and on the
strength of the personalities involved. Neither the one nor the other
could be clearly appreciated on 4 February 1938.
It was not a personal decision of the Defendant Keitel who did not know
Hitler personally in these days and who met him for the first time man
to man in the preliminary discussions. Hitler assigned him to the
newly-created office of Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and
Keitel accepted it. Even if we disregard entirely the human emotions
connected with such a brilliant promotion there was no reasonable ground
for the then Chief of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich War
Ministry to decline the offer, since Von Blomberg himself had
recommended him. Hitler’s ideas about this office could not be discerned
by Keitel. I shall pass to the next page...
The decree gave Keitel a wonderfully impressive office name as “Chief of
the High Command of the Armed Forces.” The historical foundation is the
elimination of the commanding authority over the entire Armed Forces,
which up to 4 February 1938 was in the hands of Field Marshal Von
Blomberg, and on that day was taken over by Hitler himself. Hitler
created at the same time the responsible Ministry of War, which up to
that time had also been administrated by Field Marshal Von Blomberg. Dr.
Lammers says the following about the origin of the Führer’s Decree of 4
February 1938: (Morning Session of 8 April 1946; Volume XI, Page 29.)
“The Führer informed me that the Reich Minister of War, Von
Blomberg, is resigning his office and that he avails himself of
this opportunity to make some other changes in the Reich
Government, particularly since the Foreign Minister, Von
Neurath, is going to retire, which will make a change; there is
also a change in the High Command of the Army. In this
connection the Führer gave orders for a decree to be worked out
regarding the Command of the Armed Forces. It was to be merged
with the Ministry of War. As a directive the Führer gave me the
following instruction:
“In the future I shall not have any War Minister; neither will I
have in the future a Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces to
stand between me, as the Supreme Commander, and the other
commanders-in-chief within the Armed Forces.
“In accordance with this instruction the decree was formulated,
by which the High Command of the Armed Forces was established as
an Army Staff directly subordinate to the command of the Führer.
The Führer did not want any independent office in this function,
inserted between himself and the commanders-in-chief of the
Armed Forces branches. In consequence, General Keitel, now
appointed Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, had no
independent commanding authority over the different branches of
the Armed Forces. Such authority would not have been considered
for other reasons as well.”
Field Marshal Von Blomberg declares in the affidavit I have submitted:
To Question 24:
“At our last discussion Hitler pointed out that he presumably
would not fill my position again, and that he would thereby
become himself the real Supreme Commander of the German Army...
“He asked for a suggestion for the assignment of a _Chef du
Bureau_ who would direct and carry out current tasks under him
and thus under Hitler’s responsibility.
“I named Keitel, who, under me, had administered this office
very capably.”
In answer to Question 27:
“I proposed Keitel as _Chef du Bureau_, believing that I had put
him in the right job.”
In such a position he would not be a military adviser to Hitler. Whether
and in how far Hitler ever asked for his advice, I do not know. Even so,
Keitel’s responsibility, in my opinion, would not thereby be
established.
Question 29:
“Was it not Hitler’s intention to create a tool for himself in
the person of Keitel, whose capacity for organization and hard
work seemed to him valuable, as an executive organ for his
decisions and orders?
“Answer: This question is emphatically confirmed by me. Hitler’s
original intention at that time was most certainly to have at
his disposal a trustworthy subordinate organ, and in no way an
adviser endowed with any responsibility.”
The decree of 4 February 1938 regarding leadership in the Armed Forces
is known to the Tribunal. Therefore, I do not need to read it to you.
One sees from this and from the hearing of witnesses regarding the
position of the Defendant Keitel and questions of his competence and
responsibility, that:
(1) Hitler did not want either a responsible War Ministry or any other
person but himself to exercise the commanding authority over the entire
Armed Forces. He united in his own person both these institutions by
declaring that, in regard to the commanding authority, he would from now
on exercise this directly and personally, as well as the functions of
the Reich War Ministry which were to be administered by Keitel under his
instructions.
(2) Hitler thus created a military staff for a military-technical
program. He designated it the High Command of the Armed Forces. This
“Oberkommando der Wehrmacht” was therefore nothing more—and, I may add,
no less—than the military chancellery of the Führer and Supreme
Commander. Such chancelleries already existed as Reich Chancellery,
Presidential Chancellery, and Party Chancellery. The Defendant Keitel
was assigned to the post of chief of the military chancellery with the
title of Chief of Staff of the High Command of the Armed Forces (for
short, Chief OKW).
(3) Hence it follows that the OKW was not intended to be an intermediary
agency between the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the three
Armed Forces’ sections. The assumption to the contrary held by the
Prosecution, which is based on a graphic representation, is founded upon
an erroneous opinion.
An independent intermediary level between the Supreme Commander and the
three Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force such as
existed before 4 February 1938 no longer existed. The OKW, in which the
Defendant Keitel was the Chief of Staff, was no independent military
agency or authority, but exclusively Hitler’s military-technical staff
and his War Ministry office. The OKW had no independent authority
whatsoever, neither the power to issue orders nor the command authority.
Therefore, the OKW could not issue its own orders. On the contrary, all
instructions, decrees, general directions, or orders issued by the OKW
were the expression of the desires of the Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces. The Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches were
always aware of the fact that no intermediary level existed between them
and the Supreme Commander, and they never considered or recognized the
OKW as such. This is confirmed by the affidavits of the Codefendants
Admiral Dönitz and Admiral Raeder, as well as by the testimony of Reich
Marshal Göring and Dr. Lammers.
The idea that the OKW, or the Defendant Keitel as Chief of the OKW,
would have had authority to issue instructions or orders independently
is therefore erroneous. All official business, oral or in writing, which
went beyond an exchange of ideas with other military agencies or
authorities, was subject to the exclusive decision of the Supreme
Commander himself. The OKW was merely the executive staff of the Supreme
Commander.
(4) Therefore, when documents issued by the Supreme Commander or by the
OKW show signatures or initials of the Defendant Keitel, or of a chief
of office or section chief, one must not draw the conclusion that the
persons concerned had authority to issue orders independently. In each
instance it was merely a case of noting, forwarding, or transmitting the
orders of the Supreme Commander himself. Because of the demands made on
Hitler’s time in his positions as head of State, Reich Chancellor, Party
Leader, and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, it was not always
possible to obtain his personal signature, unless it concerned
fundamental matters of unusual significance. It must be noted that in
all cases Hitler’s personal decision or approval had to be obtained.
Such being the state of affairs, we cannot accept the Prosecution’s
argument that because the Defendant Keitel signed or initialed documents
he is co-responsible for their actual contents. It would be arbitrary to
infer the responsibility of the Defendant Keitel as chief of the
military chancellery because he forwarded or signed orders,
instructions, and so on, a responsibility which in my opinion can be
charged only to the person who promulgates the order by virtue of his
authority.
A real responsibility for this could be laid upon the Defendant Keitel
only in case it were proved that he willfully participated in drawing up
these orders, instructions, et cetera.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, would that be a convenient time to break off?
[_A recess was taken._]
M. CHARLES DUBOST (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic):
Gentlemen, Counsel for the Defense have presented a request to the
French Prosecution to have certain documents communicated to them. This
request is divided into two parts.
The first part concerns the Scapini incident, which arose from the
publication of a document in the course of my own statement. I am able
to communicate to the Defense the answer which the French Government has
made to its request.
The French Government has found in the archives left behind by the
German authorities the answer which was made to the protest raised at
the time of the massacre of French prisoners. It is, by the way, a
purely dilatory answer. The German authorities replied that the
Armistice Commission was not competent; that the request must be made by
the Scapini Embassy. I have handed this document to the Defense and I
think that the incident is closed.
The second part of defense counsel’s request concerns a statement made
by my colleague, M. Edgar Faure, who at the beginning of his speech
announced to the Tribunal that he had examined approximately 2,500
documents, of which he had retained only 200. I can, of course, not
answer on behalf of M. Edgar Faure. I only know that the French
Delegation has only a total of 800 documents in its archives, and has
submitted them all to the Tribunal and to the Defense. I therefore think
that it is merely oratorical hyperbole and that my colleague wished to
allude to covering letters which were of no importance. In any case, I
had previously informed defense counsel Dr. Nelte that all the documents
of our delegation were open for him to see and that he would be able to
verify that we had no other documents than those which we had published.
On the other hand, the requests which we forwarded to Paris to have
complementary documents which might have been forgotten sent to us have
all been in vain. We therefore conclude that we have here all the
documents which we could make use of in this Trial.
DR. NELTE: Mr. President, I am grateful to the French Delegation for the
explanation given now regarding the complaint I made this morning. If I
had had that explanation a few days earlier, what happened this morning
would not have occurred. I regret it very much indeed.
I continue on Page 64 to the effect that Keitel co-operated in drawing
up orders. In order to clarify this as much as possible I would like
furthermore to point out the following:
The “instructions,” which were of fundamental significance for the
planning of military operations, are operational orders issued to the
Commanders-in-Chief of the three Armed Forces’ branches by the Supreme
Commander in this capacity. Before these instructions were drawn up
Hitler discussed the military-technical aspect of each order with the
competent OKW experts and also with the Defendant Keitel. The
instructions, aside from opinions manifested by the individual experts,
were exclusively the expression of the Supreme Commander’s wishes, and
they were not directed to the OKW but to the Commanders-in-Chief of the
three Armed Forces’ branches, to whom they were forwarded through the
OKW. The three Armed Forces’ branches on their part ordered, on the
basis of the general instructions, the details incident to their
execution. Therefore, I shall not refer in this connection to the
statement of the Charter according to which the carrying-out of orders
is not accepted as a ground for exemption from punishment. For the
transmission of the order was not an order issued by the OKW to the
Armed Forces’ branches, but the forwarding of the expression of the
wishes of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. The order directed
to the OKW, if you will, referred in all cases to the elaboration of
some desire expressed by the Supreme Commander and to the purely
external act of transmitting the finished idea without having authority
of expressing an opinion thereon. It must be assumed that the
Prosecution, perhaps influenced by the defendant’s rank of Field
Marshal, did not appreciate correctly this position of the Defendant
Keitel. This rank had no relationship to the real authority of the
defendant to issue military orders. One is inclined to imagine that a
Field Marshal is a military commander. However, as we have seen, the
Defendant Keitel had no command authority whatsoever.
Field Marshal Von Blomberg, whose testimony has been submitted to the
Tribunal by the Prosecution, defines the position of the Defendant
Keitel as _Chef du Bureau_. This definition is materially correct. A
_Chef du Bureau_ has to see to it that the bureau which he directs
operates properly; that the affairs are correctly and promptly attended
to by the competent officials. But he does not participate in the final
decisions deemed correct by his superior, in this case the Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces. If this principle holds true in general,
it is especially true here. It is known that Hitler did not accept any
advice from Keitel concerning military decisions. This has been proved
by the evidence, particularly by the testimony of General Jodl.
The Defendant Keitel has clearly outlined in Affidavit Number 8, called
“Coordination in the State and in the Armed Forces,” his activity and
that of the OKW. The affidavit gives an idea of the difficult and
thankless work of the Defendant Keitel. It consisted mainly of a
co-ordination of the desires and needs of the Armed Forces’ branches. It
consisted, furthermore, in reconciling, divergencies as they arose and
in the struggle against Hitler’s negative attitude toward any proper
procedure, that is to say, through the competent departments.
In every branch of the Armed Forces there exist interests which differ
from the interests of other branches and which cannot be entirely
satisfied; sometimes they even oppose each other. This is true
especially for the replacement of personnel, but also for the supply of
everything that is required for special warfare.
The point of intersection of all these factual and personal differences
of opinion was the OKW.
If one desires to estimate properly the incontestable fact that the
Defendant Keitel was shown hostility and was personally judged
unfavorably by nearly all sides, one must note that this fact occurred
as a necessary result of the overlapping of factually opposing interests
and personal differences of opinion, which Keitel tried to settle by
means of co-ordination or mediation, that is, in nearly all cases by
means of compromise. No particular personal experience is needed in
order to know that the objective mediator will always incur the
ingratitude of both parties. The same picture becomes evident in the
relationship to the numerous offices which were endowed with special
official authorities or which had Hitler’s favor and special confidence
for personal, mostly Party political, reasons. One must realize these
differences and overlapping interests to appreciate the heavy burden
involved in Keitel’s position and, I might add, in order to judge
correctly the significance of his position.
It is difficult to realize the special relationship between the
leadership of the Armed Forces and the political sector because the
functions of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, of Reich War
Minister and of head of State were from 4 February 1938 all embodied in
the person of Hitler.
Therefore, since 4 February 1938, complete accord existed between the
political leadership and the highest leadership of the Armed Forces
since both powers resided in one and the same person.
The assumption of the Prosecution that the chief of Hitler’s military
staff was closely connected with his superior Hitler and must therefore
also be held responsible for political questions, if not as the
perpetrator, then in some form as provided in Article 6 of the Charter,
is erroneous.
In this connection there is no need to enter into the hierarchy of the
Führer State and the binding character of the Führer order. The military
hierarchy is older than the National Socialist ideology; moreover it
must be stated and taken into consideration that the introduction of the
absolute Leadership Principle into the Armed Forces signifies the final
elimination of all efforts which could perhaps be regarded as democratic
in a certain sense, or in any case as a restraint on the dictatorial
appetite of Hitler. In this connection I refer to the affidavit of
Keitel, Document Book 2, Number 9, “The OKW and the General Staff.” The
rigid application of the Leadership Principle, judged retrospectively,
gradually adulterated the healthy military principle of obedience into
immoderate militarism. This found its expression, among other things, in
the prohibition of all criticism, from the highest authorities to the
lowest. I refer you to the speech made, by Hitler in the Kroll Opera
House in 1937 or 1936, also to the critical marginal note—statement of
General Winter—in the decree prohibiting applications for release on
the part of the generals in 1938, and finally to the removal of the
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and the War Minister.
It cannot and shall not be denied that the Defendant Keitel was
absolutely in favor of the Leadership Principle in the leadership of the
Armed Forces and that the essay “Foundations of the Organization of the
German Armed Forces” (L-211) can be regarded as a contribution to the
conduct of a future war—not, however, that an actual war was
anticipated at that time or that it was the reason for this essay.
What does this mean in regard to the Defendant Keitel? Anyone
recognizing the Leadership Principle as being militarily correct must
act accordingly. Professor Jahrreiss has stated that the Leadership
Principle, like every other political system, is not absolutely good or
bad, but that everything depends on the manner and methods used in
applying it.
Keitel has a military background and favors the Leadership Principle for
the field he knows. According to this principle the responsibility lies
completely with the one who has authority to command. While the
Leadership Principle in fact hardly underwent any change in the civilian
areas where it was also applied, though superficially, this principle
necessarily made itself felt much more strongly in the military sphere,
particularly in the relationship between the commanders-in-chief and
their chiefs of the General Staff.
Formerly the chiefs of the General Staff had been the really responsible
commanders, now they became the operational assistants to the
commanders-in-chief. In the formulation of orders they were
“collaborating advisers” in the field of strategic operations, for which
these officers had been especially trained. Keitel was neither a
commander-in-chief nor a chief of the General Staff; he was the chief of
the military chancellery under Hitler, a soldier and an administrator of
war-ministerial duties, therefore a “minister,” claims the Prosecution.
One should not refer in this Trial to formal distinctions when the real
functions give another picture. This is particularly important in the
case of Keitel. It should be determined what he actually was and how he
acted in reality.
The dual position created by the decree of 4 February 1938 has led to an
erroneous conception of Keitel’s functions. We assume that Hitler
dissolved the Reich War Ministry because he no longer wished to have a
War Minister; in spite of the fact that on 4 February 1938 a
considerable number of functions up to then handled by the Reich War
Ministry had been assigned to the individual Armed Forces’ branches,
there were a number of functions which had to be retained and
administered in the OKW.
But taking into account the idea of an intended strict concentration of
functions pertaining to the conduct of the war, Keitel was unable to
deal even with those on the basis of complete authority and according to
his own judgment, but had to present the demands of the Armed Forces and
co-ordinate the Armed Forces’ affairs with the tasks of the other
ministries.
It cannot and will not be denied that this concentration of duties in
the person of Hitler was impracticable. Thus, a huge amount of
preparatory and executive work rested with Hitler’s military staff,
whose Chief of Staff was Keitel. Hence, it was also responsible,
although not with reference to important questions, especially those of
a fundamental nature. It was, of course, a matter of judgment to what
extent the Defendant Keitel considered matters essential and fundamental
and submitted them. But the evidence showed that when in doubt about
matters, after conscientious examination, Keitel was inclined to present
them rather than to make his own decision about them.
The sources from which Hitler obtained his news, through Himmler,
Bormann or some other way, were so intricate that Keitel had no way of
knowing whether Hitler had the information that seemed to him to be
important. To avoid the unavoidable discussions afterward with Hitler
who, being distrustful of everyone, always took it for granted that
people would intentionally conceal things from him, Keitel was anxious
not to leave himself open to the reproach of having omitted anything. A
characteristic example is the case of the mass escape of 80 R. A. F.
officers from the POW Camp Sagan.
Here the point is simply to show that Keitel in his capacity as guardian
of the actual war functions which still remained in the OKW, held no
position as a minister. Here, too, he was the _Chef du Bureau_, the head
of the military chancellery, a position which is also held by the chief
of a ministerial office, or even a state secretary. I wish to refer
again in this connection to Dr. Lammers’ statement, and to the
affidavits of Admirals Raeder and Dönitz, which I have already mentioned
repeatedly.
The text of the Führer decree of 4 February 1938 shows that Hitler also
wished to make this clear. If Hitler had not had the definite desire to
exclude everyone else from a responsible, and perhaps for him
uncomfortable function in the highest military sector, he might have
given Keitel at least the authority to take part in Cabinet meetings. In
the Führer decree in which the Commanders-in-Chief of the Army and Navy
as well as Keitel had been given the “rank” of a Reich minister, it was
explicitly ordered that both commanders-in-chief should be entitled to
take part in Cabinet meetings. The fact that this was decreed
simultaneously is a convincing _argumentum e contrario_. It proves that
Hitler did not wish to give his Chief of Staff of the OKW an opportunity
to present his own opinions and possible doubts before the Cabinet.
Hitler gave the Defendant Keitel the “rank” of a Reich minister for the
purpose of enabling him to carry on direct negotiations with the
departmental ministers. Had Keitel not had the rank of a Reich minister,
he would have been limited to conferences with state secretaries and the
like, and thus be very much handicapped in carrying out the Führer’s
orders and his tasks.
It is in error, therefore, that the Prosecution has classified Keitel as
a Reich minister “without portfolio.” He was not a minister, nor a
member of the Reich Government. State Secretary Stuckart in a document
submitted to the Prosecution has listed all members of the
Reichsregierung. Keitel is not among them; he is mentioned in this
document only as the holder of one of the highest offices.
Now, the Prosecution has not limited the term Reichsregierung to
membership in the Reich Cabinet, but considered other committees as part
of the Reichsregierung, too. It would seem, therefore, as if the
Prosecution looked upon the legal structure based on German law as
irrelevant. Pursuant to Appendix B to the general bill of Indictment,
the Reichsregierung in the sense of the Indictment is composed of:
1. Members of the regular Cabinet after 30 January 1933, the day Hitler
became Chancellor of the German Republic. The expression “regular
Cabinet” used here includes: Reich ministers, that is, heads of
departments of the Central Government; Reich ministers without
portfolio, ministers of State with the function of Reich ministers, and
other officials entitled to participate in the Cabinet meetings.