incriminating for the defendant. This was the witness Dr. Gisevius. The
defendant refuses to deal with this witness and his statement. He merely
wishes to point out that this statement is untrue in all points which
incriminate him. The conclusiveness of the witness’s statement depends
on whether he is considered to be credible or not. Dr. Nelte has agreed
to deal with this question extensively, so that, in order to avoid
reiterated statements, I shall refrain from further declarations.
Naturally, the assumption of power by the National Socialist Party met
with some resistance, and in particular the leftist parties were
anything but satisfied with the situation thus created. The opponents
were by no means weak either numerically or in the means at their
disposal. The new rulers were, therefore, apprehensive of serious danger
to their power if they allowed the opposition parties to continue their
activity without hindrance; accordingly they had to take preventive
measures against such dangers in good time. In order to stabilize their
own power and to nip in the bud any possible source of unrest, the
Defendant Göring considered it necessary for reasons of state to arrest
at one blow both leaders and officials of the Communist Party and its
organizations. The defendant himself has spoken at length explaining his
reasons for such acts. For the removal of danger and to insure the
safety of the state, the measures taken by the defendant were, for the
Government, a necessity caused by the unrest of the time. Since it was a
preventive measure, it was not requisite before a provisional arrest
that a criminal act against the Government had already been committed or
was obviously on the verge of being committed. The fact of membership in
itself and previous activity in that party was sufficient to warrant
arrest as a political act of self-protection on the part of the
Government.
Such considerations very soon after the assumption of power, led to the
establishment of concentration camps, of which there were two at the
time when the Defendant Göring was at the head of the Police. The
purpose of such camps was to hold temporarily politically unreliable
persons, who might be of danger to the new state, until they had either
adapted themselves to the new political conditions or until the power of
the state had become so great that such persons could no longer endanger
it.
The legal basis of this institution was the Reich President’s decree of
26 February 1933 for the protection of people and state. Reich President
Von Hindenburg issued this decree on the basis of Article 48, Paragraph
2, of the Reich Constitution, in order to prevent Communist armed
risings dangerous to the state; accordingly, the decree was perfectly
constitutional. The decree temporarily suspended certain constitutional
rights and declared legal, among other things, the restriction of
personal liberty.
The establishment and use of concentration camps was founded, according
to the defendant’s ideas at the time, on the revolutionary conviction
inherent in the victorious Movement that it was the sole expression of
historical truth, that it alone represented the right path, and that
therefore everything was wrong that stood in its way.
There was no political discussion of the right political concept based
on logical arguments, as in ideologically neutral liberalism; there was
only the totalitarian establishment of a popular regime based on creed
as the historically necessary truth.
Any person not caught up by this Movement but; on the contrary, opposing
it, was therefore to be removed as an enemy of the true order. Under
such conditions, the person concerned could not simply be punished for
an infringement of specific rules in the traditional course of justice;
but, according to the opinion of the National Socialist Government, he
deliberately segregated himself from the newly found community of the
people and from every foundation for any legal institution. He had
therefore to be removed. There was, accordingly, no question of
punishment but of a political purge based on ideological intolerance.
Therefore no tribunal or administrative procedure was allowed on behalf
of the persons concerned for the examination of the police proceedings.
The individual who excluded himself from the community was not entitled
to legal guarantees which the Constitution provided for his fellow
countrymen. And a fellow countryman was he only who recognized such a
community. In handling enemies of the people not only legal principles
were applied, but also the viewpoint of the necessities of state.
Since it was an act of political expediency, the Defendant Göring could
decide in some cases on his own responsibility that there was no
necessity for further confinement and could use all his influence to
procure the liberation of individuals who did not endanger the security
of the state. In that case it was not a question of an act of grace
breaking through any legal principle, neither was it tantamount to an
acknowledgement of an injustice done to the other persons concerned; it
simply was an act undertaken from the point of view of expediency, each
case being decided on its own merits.
Such principles in handling elements which fail to fit into a
totalitarian political rule are by no means specifically National
Socialist; they also dominate the policy of the victor countries toward
the conquered German population. Anyone who does not obey the newly
arising democratic order in Germany, even anyone of whom an essential
opposition to democracy can be expected because he was grounded in
National Socialism before, is now interned. Whereas—according to
Document R-129 of the Prosecution—21,000 people were in concentration
camps at the beginning of the war in Nazi Germany, more than 300,000
National Socialists and militarists are held in internment camps in the
U.S. Zone alone, according to figures published by the occupation
powers.
A recently published decree of the Länderrat in the American occupation
zone confirms the fact that such acts of political purging are not legal
but political acts. This decree removes from the authority of the
administration of justice and transfers to the authority of the general
administration of the State all workers’ camps in which are interned
Nazis who have been sentenced to forced labor on account of their Party
membership; and this decree is issued because these camps are foreign to
the administration of justice.
Those were the only considerations which influenced the Defendant Göring
when he created concentration camps in 1933 and issued laws concerning
the Secret State Police. These were intended to be, as he conceived
them, a means of cleansing and strengthening the young community of the
people. He did not aim at a definite annihilation of political enemies
but, after a certain period of education, interceded generously for
their release and discharged, at Christmas 1933, about 5,000 and in
September 1934 about 2,000 prisoners.
He vigorously counteracted inevitable abuses and errors which he openly
admitted in the book he published in 1934, intended for the British
public, _The Building of a Nation_. For example, he permitted the
Communist leader Thälmann personally to report to him about his
complaints in the concentration camp and took care to have them
remedied. He dissolved the so-called “wild” camps of Stettin and
Breslau, punished the Gauleiter of Pomerania who had organized this camp
without his knowledge and against his will, and had those responsible
for these “wild” concentration camps brought to trial for their
infringements of the regulations.
This attitude of the Defendant Göring denotes that he never intended the
actual physical annihilation of the prisoners. If the Prosecution
establishes that this was all in execution of a conspiracy which aimed
at committing Crimes against Humanity, such an interpretation has no
bearing on the actual political life during the years in question. Such
a conspiracy did not exist, nor was it the intention of the defendant to
commit crimes against the principles of humanity, nor did he commit any
such crimes. As one of the political trustees of the German Government,
he felt himself bound to safeguard it against dangerous disturbers of
the peace and thereby to guarantee the future of the National Socialist
way of life. Far from looking upon such measures as criminal, he
considered them, on the contrary, to be the inevitable means of
consolidating the political order as a basis of all law.
In 1936 the leadership of the Police, and therefore the management of
the concentration camps, passed from the defendant to the Reichsführer
SS; Heinrich Himmler. The defendant cannot be held responsible for the
subsequent development of the concentration camps nor for the fact that
they became, especially after the outbreak of the war, more and more
gruesome places of torture and death and led—partly intentionally,
partly on account of the chaotic war conditions—to the death of
countless people and finally, in the last days before the breakdown of
Germany, turned into one vast graveyard.
Certainly he knew that there still were concentration camps, also that
the number of inmates had risen because of war tension and that they
contained foreigners because of the expansion of the war machine over
all of Europe; but the terrible happenings which have been disclosed in
this Trial were unknown to him. He knew nothing of the inhuman
experiments which were being carried out on inmates in misinterpretation
of true scientific methods. The testimony of the witness Field Marshal
Milch has shown that the Luftwaffe was not interested in these
experiments and that the defendant personally did not learn anything
specific at all about this matter.
By no means did the establishment of concentration camps as such have
anything to do with the later extermination of Jews, which apparently
originated in Heydrich’s and Himmler’s brains and was kept secret in a
masterly manner until it was disclosed after the collapse as the horror
of Auschwitz and Maidanek.
This brings me to the Jewish question. The Defendant Göring has
explained in detail his views on the Jewish question during his
interrogation as witness; furthermore, he has shown in all detail the
reasons which influenced the National Socialist Party and, after the
seizure of power, the State, to take a hostile attitude toward the Jews.
The defendant is reproached for having promulgated the Nuremberg Laws in
1935, which were intended to keep the race pure, and for having, in his
capacity as Delegate for the Four Year Plan, issued decrees during the
years 1938 and 1939 which had as their aim the exclusion of Jews from
economic life. Furthermore he is blamed for a number of other laws which
meant a one-sided and serious intervention into the legal sphere of
Jews.
The legal reason for this reproach is obscure. For this deals with a
purely domestic problem, namely, the regulation of the legal status of
German subjects; according to internationally recognized legal opinion
at that time, the German Reich as a sovereign state was free to settle
such a matter. Even if these encroachments were harsh and the
limitations of citizenship rights extremely severe, they nevertheless in
no way represent an offense against humanity.
Legal provisions which limit a certain race or a certain circle of
citizens in their legal position have been made by other states without
offense being taken at such measures and without other states
considering themselves bound to intervene. Reich Marshal Göring always
rejected any illegal or violent action against Jews. This is clearly
shown by his attitude toward the action against Jews during the night of
9 to 10 November 1938, instigated by Goebbels, of which he was informed
only after the deed had been done and which he condemned most severely.
In this respect he raised serious objections with Goebbels and Hitler.
On this matter, the precise statements of the witnesses Bodenschatz and
Körner are available. The testimony of Dr. Uiberreither shows how
greatly Göring disapproved of this action. According to the former, the
defendant summoned all Gauleiter to Berlin several weeks after this
incident and in an address sharply censured this violent action, which
was not in keeping with the dignity of the nation and which caused
serious damage to German prestige abroad. That the defendant was no race
fanatic became generally known by his expression, “I decide who is a
Jew.” It has been established sufficiently that he aided many Jews.
About a biological extermination of the Jews he learned only at the end
of the war. He never would have approved such a measure and would have
opposed it with all his might. For he had too much political insight not
to recognize the tremendous and at the same time senseless dangers which
would perforce result for the German people from such a brutal and
horrible act of extermination. Göring had already made it clear in the
above-mentioned speech to the Gauleiter that he did not wish to fall
foul of the world public and world opinion because of the treatment of
the Jews. It is therefore out of the question that Göring should have
approved of such an undertaking or participated therein in any manner,
although it is natural that it should be put to the defendant that he
must have been informed about such horrible measures as the second man
in the State.
Furthermore it is no wonder that the statements of the defendant that he
knew nothing of these atrocities should meet with a certain amount of
distrust. Despite such doubts, however, the defendant insists that no
information about such acts ever reached him.
This ignorance of the defendant, which can be completely understood only
by one familiar with German conditions, may be explained from the
fact—and this is the sole solution of the riddle—that Himmler, as was
also emphasized by General Jodl during his interrogation, knew truly
masterfully how to keep his actions secret, to obliterate all traces of
his atrocities, and to deceive the surrounding world and even his and
Hitler’s closer entourage. In this connection I also refer to the
testimony of the witness Hoess, who confirms Himmler’s instruction
concerning absolute secrecy toward everyone.
The question may come up here: Did not a legal obligation exist for the
defendant to make investigations about this matter and to get reliable
information as to the true whereabouts of supposedly evacuated Jews and
as to their fate? And what legal consequence results if he negligently
refrained from investigating and by such negligence violated his legal
obligation to act, incumbent on him by virtue of his position? The
decision of this extremely complicated question of law and fact may be
considered a moot question, because Göring, even as the second man in
the State, did not have the power to prevent such measures if they were
carried out by Himmler and were ordered, or at any rate approved, by
Hitler.
Mr. President, yesterday I already stated that I still wished to deal
with the Katyn case; and I intend to do so now, before I go on with my
conclusion. I am sorry I was not able to get any translations because
the testimony was only given a few days ago. However, this matter is not
very long. The interpreters have a copy. I shall begin with this report
now.
A detailed opinion has still to be given on the Katyn case, in which the
taking of evidence was concluded only a few days back. The Russian
Prosecution based their indictment on the findings of an investigation
which is set down in Document USSR-54. The following conclusion is drawn
from the entire evidential material as presented:
(1) Polish prisoners of war, who were in three camps west of Smolensk,
were still there in these three camps when the Germans came into
Smolensk, up to and including September 1941.
(2) In the Katyn forest German occupation troops undertook the mass
shootings of the prisoners of war from the aforesaid camps in the autumn
of 1941.
(3) The mass shooting of the Polish prisoners of war in the Katyn woods
was carried out by the German military authorities who had camouflaged
themselves under the code name “Staff of Construction Battalion 537” at
whose head was Lieutenant Colonel Ahrens, together with his
collaborators First Lieutenant Rex and Lieutenant Hodt.
The question is, did the Prosecution prove this accusation? This
question must be answered in the negative. No confirmation of guilt can
be found from the contents of this document. The accusation is made
against a definite military unit and names specific officers. The time
mentioned for the perpetration of this deed is September of 1941. The
Katyn forest is given as the scene of the crime. In view of the scanty
facts, which considerably restricted the accusation, it was merely the
task of the Defense to prove that this assertion would not bear
examination.
First of all, let us consider the persons involved. Colonel Ahrens, who
is obviously the Lieutenant Colonel Ahrens mentioned, is eliminated as
the perpetrator because this deed is said to have been committed in
September 1941, while Ahrens did not take command of Regiment 537 until
the end of November 1941. He arrived only at that time at Katyn and had
never before been in the eastern theater of war. Before Ahrens, Colonel
Bedenck was in command of the regiment and he joined the regimental
staff in August 1941. Before Bedenck, First Lieutenant Hodt took
lodgings in the little Dnieper castle in July 1941, immediately after
the capture of Smolensk. He came with an advance unit of the 537th
Regiment and remained there until the arrival of the regimental staff,
to which he was not yet attached at that time. He was transferred to the
regimental staff only in September 1941, and from that time on he lived
permanently in the little castle.
Special facts which would incriminate Hodt or Bedenck cannot be derived
from the document which has been submitted, and such facts have not been
presented here. Therefore, it is not proved that Bedenck and Hodt could
be considered as perpetrators.
The following circumstances contradict the theory that Unit 537 or any
other military unit had participated in this act. The Polish prisoners
allegedly fell into the hands of the Germans in the three camps west of
Smolensk. Thereby they would have become German prisoners of war. The
fact that they had been captured would have had to have been reported to
Army Group Center. Such a report was not made, as testified by the
witness Eichborn. Considering the tremendous number of prisoners, it is
quite out of the question that anyone could inadvertently have failed to
make a report of that nature. Apart from that, the capture of 11,000
Polish officers could under no circumstances have been concealed from
the Army Group. As results from the testimony of General Oberhäuser, the
Army Group never had any knowledge of this.
From the statements of the two witnesses, Eichborn and Oberhäuser, it
can be concluded that at the time of the capture of Smolensk by the
Germans there could not have been any Polish officers present in these
camps. Moreover, no eye witnesses who saw the officers after that date
were interrogated by the Russian commission. The railroad employee who
was interrogated on this subject knows nothing from his own observation.
Now, allegedly these 11,000 prisoners were taken from the camps to
Katyn. The transport of so many Polish prisoners could not have been
concealed from the Russian population even if the transport had been
carried out most unobtrusively and secretly, nor could shootings on such
a large scale have taken place without the Russian population taking
notice of them.
Even though this little wood was blocked off, at a distance of about 200
meters there was a public highway open to traffic, and this highway was
used daily and to a great extent by the Russian civilian population.
Anything that took place in the little wood of Katyn could be seen from
this highway.
In the direct vicinity of the Dnieper castle there were isolated
homesteads which remained occupied by the owners during the whole time
of the German occupation, and there was constant contact with the
regimental staff. There are no reliable statements and testimony dealing
with either transport or the observation of shootings. The Germans would
hardly have chosen the site on which the graves were found for such a
mass execution. Owing to its situation between the main road and the
regimental quarters, this site was quite unsuitable for such a misdeed.
As I have already stated, there was lively traffic not only on the
nearby road, but also in the direct vicinity of the graves which were
near a small road connecting the regimental headquarters with the main
road. The executions could also have been observed by soldiers who had
nothing to do with it. Even the unit selected to carry out the deed
would have been very unsuitable. A technical unit, such as a signal
corps unit, is the least suitable for such a task.
The witnesses Eichborn and Oberhäuser did not move into these quarters
near the site of the deed until 20 September 1941, and they can only
testify as to what they themselves observed from that date on. But from
the end of July there was an advance unit near the castle and from
August, a regimental staff. It is, however, quite out of the question
that in this span of time or perhaps 6 weeks this act could have been
perpetrated. The few people who were available were so overburdened with
military tasks that in this short time it would have been quite
impossible for them not only to kill 11,000 prisoners, but also to
remove the bodies.
According to the statement of the Prosecution, Russian prisoners of war
allegedly helped to remove the bodies. That has not been proved. None of
the Russian population had ever seen such prisoners. In no case could
all traces of the deed be effaced so quickly and the scene so speedily
cleared that the witnesses Oberhäuser and Eichborn on their frequent
trips to the Dnieper castle would not have noticed some suspicious
signs.
The testimony of the witness who was heard here is not sufficient. He
merely heard a story of such shootings from a certain Menschagin who
cannot be found now. This witness did not make any personal
observations. He himself did not see any Poles. He was told by students
that they had seen Poles but they did not know the number of Poles or
where they were being kept. Testimony which is so scanty in every
respect is worthless, and the testimony given by the two doctors heard
as witnesses is not adequate for use in the sense of the Indictment.
Within the scope of the evidence admitted by the Tribunal, it would not
have been possible to clarify completely all the medical questions which
were decisive for the experts in the facts you have established.
Therefore, the Defense has also refrained from calling a medical expert
to exonerate the defendant.
There is one thing, however, which must not be overlooked in this
connection. The expert opinion obtained by the German Government was
given by 12 members of a commission of leading representatives of legal
medicine from European universities, while the expert opinion referred
to by the Prosecution was deposed by a group of Russian experts only.
The first expert opinion should be given preference since it was
compiled by experts who were completely nonpolitical.
Now, the Witness Professor Markov in his examination went back on the
opinion contained in the report of 30 April 1943. He claims that already
at that time, due to his findings upon making an autopsy on the bodies,
he failed to agree with the report that the shooting took place in the
months of March and April 1940. However, this testimony must be met with
considerable misgivings. The witness could give no plausible explanation
why, in view of his opinion, he did not lodge an immediate protest
against the version of the report of 30 April 1943 or refuse his
signature, nor why, at least, he later...
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] Dr. Stahmer, you realize, of course,
that you have not offered in evidence the report of this German
commission. You expressly refrained, as I understand it, from offering
the report of the German commission. And you...
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, that is a mistake. I did not refrain from
doing so. I was not permitted to submit the _White Book_, but I was
permitted to submit the report of 30 April 1943. However, I could not
submit it immediately, for it was contained in the _White Book_ and I
was to have copies made. These copies were made and submitted. I used
some of the passages from the protocol, with the express approval of the
High Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: I know you did, and of course if you want to offer it
there will be no objection to your offering it; but certainly I
understood that you were only offering in evidence the parts which you
read to the witness. That, I think, was put to you at the time you were
cross-examining the witnesses on behalf of the Prosecution.
That is what I understood, but if you say that your interpretation was
different and that you want to offer the whole of the report, then the
matter will be considered by the Tribunal, if the Tribunal has not
already considered it.
Are you saying that the Tribunal has already allowed the whole of that
report to be offered in evidence?
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, unfortunately the book...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, what you are desiring to offer in evidence
is the conclusion of the report or the protocol or whatever it is
called, is that right? That, I take it, is not a very long document, is
it?
DR. STAHMER: No, Mr. President. May I explain again. I am sorry but I
have not received the transcript of the session. Therefore, I do not
know just what is contained in this protocol; but I do recall—and one
of my colleagues confirmed this to me just now—that at the time I was
permitted to submit the entire so-called report of the commission, and I
quoted certain passages not only from the conclusion but from the whole
report, and with the permission of the High Tribunal I proposed to
submit the entire report later.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I do not know what you mean by the whole report or
what you mean by the protocol.
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, may I describe it once more.
This was a rather comprehensive protocol which described the findings of
the investigations. It contained the entire facts of the case and it
concluded with a joint expert opinion. It is composed, as I have stated,
of facts and reasons. It contains, first of all, a very comprehensive
statement in which the facts as they appeared to the experts are
described individually. For instance, that they interrogated the Russian
population on the spot, checked over the site of the graves, held a post
mortem—all of these things were presented by me from the record with
the permission of the High Tribunal.
Mr. President, may I be permitted to make another remark to clarify
these matters? I remember this incident quite particularly because you,
Mr. President, first mentioned it and asked whether I had another copy
of this protocol. I answered, “No, I have only the _White Book_.” Then
that was submitted to the witness, whereupon I suggested that the other
witness be called so that in the meantime I could have a copy made of
this protocol. Then you, Mr. President, thought it had better not be so
but that I should take the book and then submit a copy afterward.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal will look at the record to see exactly
what happened.
DR. STAHMER: As I said, I did not see the transcript myself. If it was
not taken down like that, then the record is not complete. However, I do
remember quite clearly that that is what took place.
THE PRESIDENT: We will continue then.
DR. STAHMER: The statement of the witness is subject to considerable
doubt. The witness could give no plausible explanation as to why, in
view of his attitude concerning the form of the protocol of 30 April
1943, he did not lodge an immediate protest and refuse to sign it or why
he did not at a later date at least acquaint the other experts who
participated with his true scientific conviction.
Through this testimony the German experts’ opinion cannot lose its
weight and become weakened, especially since the other 11 experts
obviously endorsed the statements set forth in this report.
Considering this state of affairs it will not be necessary to set forth
the individual reasons which speak for the correctness of the statements
contained in the German _White Book_ of 30 April 1943.
The time given by the Russian experts for the shooting, that is, the
autumn of 1941, is determined arbitrarily; and it cannot be true in any
case for the corpses wore winter clothing, as the witness Markov noticed
on the corpse upon which he performed an autopsy. The fact that
ammunition for pistols of German make was found in the graves does not
permit the conclusion that this shooting was necessarily carried out by
Germans. In the German _White Book_ it has already been pointed out that
the German factory which produced this ammunition delivered a great deal
to other countries, especially to the East.
In conclusion, it can be said that the task of this proceeding is solely
to determine whether the 11,000 Polish officers were shot after the
capture of Smolensk by the Germans, in other words, that this deed could
have been committed by Germans. The Prosecution have not succeeded in
proving this fact and therefore this accusation will have to be struck
from the Indictment.
Mr. President, I come now to my closing sentences, my conclusion. I
imagine it will take me roughly a little more than 10 minutes and think
it would be best to give this conclusion in unbroken continuity. Either
I will have to speak until after one o’clock; or, if I may be permitted
to make a suggestion, the Tribunal might recess now.
Shall I continue now?
THE PRESIDENT: If you can finish in 10 minutes we will go on until you
finish, Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: I will not quite have finished in 10 minutes, and I should
like to point out particularly that I would not like to have to
interrupt my concluding remarks.
THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps if it would be more convenient to you—we will do
whichever you like; we will recess now, if you like. It is a very hot
day and we will recess now if you prefer.
DR. STAHMER: I would prefer to have the recess now. I do feel the heat a
little today, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]
_Afternoon Session_
DR. STAHMER: I come now to the summary.
In reviewing the personality and life of the Defendant Göring, the
following points must be considered for the appreciation of his actions:
Provided at home with a good educational background and training in
character, he was moulded decisively as a young officer and combat
airman during the first World War, in which he proved his outstanding
worth, receiving the highest award for bravery, the decoration _Pour le
Mérite_. He experienced the collapse of the German war effort as a
consequence of, as he saw it, German treachery from within.
After the rule of the Kaiser had been overthrown, the German people
wanted to give themselves a new constitution on a democratic basis and
then hoped to be able to work their way up again by industry and
perseverance. In this, the confidence in the far-sightedness of the
victor powers of that time, and especially in the 14 points of Wilson,
played a great part. But when the Treaty of Versailles utterly
frustrated these hopes, the Weimar democracy fell into a serious crisis
from which it was not to recover. This, together with the subsequent
world economic crisis, formed the undeniable prerequisite for the fact
that Hitler was able to seize power.
First, the “fight against Versailles” made his rise as a Party leader
possible. Göring, as a witness, described how he agreed with Hitler at
their first meeting that nothing could be achieved by written protests.
The powerlessness of the German democracy had by then become apparent to
the entire world. Göring like Hitler was convinced that Germany
inevitably must become a victim of Bolshevism unless it was possible to
muster against it sufficient defensive strength by the re-establishment
of German self-confidence at home. That Germany was also forced to take
a firm stand against the Versailles powers was a matter of course. In
this Hitler unquestioningly seized upon the fact that Germany belonged
to the West—culturally, economically, and also politically. He believed
that the Bolshevist danger, which in the first place was directed
against Germany, would ultimately also threaten the Western countries.
Therefore he was of the opinion that he would be able gradually to gain
their recognition and support if he took up the ideological struggle
against the East.
From this basic attitude alone is it possible to explain his entire
policy until the actual collapse. One may rightly condemn it today as
having been a failure from the outset, but one cannot ignore the fact
that initially certain things in the development clearly seemed to
justify it. And this explains how Hitler succeeded in making an
ever-increasing part of the Germans his followers.
Göring firmly believed that salvation could come only through Hitler. He
recognized in him the born national leader who knew how to influence and
to guide the masses and whose hypnotic willpower shrank before no
obstacle. He realized that under a democratic constitution only such a
man of demoniacal demagogic talent was able to prevail. And therefore he
joined him.
Because Göring was a true and honest German, inspired only by love for
the fatherland, he did not even think of using Hitler only as a tool for
his own advancement. On the contrary, he took it upon himself from the
beginning to recognize in him the man who alone decides, in other words,
the Führer, and to be satisfied with a subordinate role. Therefore the
famous Air Force captain and holder of the order _Pour le Mérite_ did
not hesitate to swear the oath of allegiance to the then still unknown
Hitler, an oath which was to hold good for the rest of his life and
actually did so. It is tragic that a struggle such as that led by Göring
and Hitler could be so completely misunderstood as to be considered from
the very outset as a conspiracy for the purpose of committing crimes.
His aim was at first directed towards freeing Germany from the shackles
of the Treaty of Versailles. It is true that the Weimar Government had
made repeated attempts to be released from the most onerous obligations
of this treaty. However, Germany was not successful in her endeavors for
a revision. No progress was made by negotiating. Did not international
law appear to be only an instrument in the hands of the victors of
Versailles to keep Germany down permanently? Was it not still true in
the world that might came before right and that the Germans would
achieve something only if they had the courage to shake their fists?
Such considerations appear absolutely understandable from the situation
of that time. To construe from them a proof for the conspiracy alleged
by the Prosecution would mean a complete misunderstanding of the facts.
Actually, the development after 1933 seemed at first to prove Hitler
completely right. He easily achieved with his methods much more than—if
given voluntarily—would have kept the Weimar Government in power.
From the willingness of the foreign countries not only to conclude
treaties with Hitler—such as the Naval Agreement of 1935 and the Munich
Pact of September 1938—but also to participate to the end in the Party
rallies, the German people could only conclude that Hitler had chosen
the correct road for reaching international understanding. This
impression and this judgment were absolutely correct until the fall of
1938. Had Hitler afterwards observed loyally the Munich Agreement, then
he would probably have stayed the arguments for the “stop” policy which
was initiated against him. Not only would peace have been maintained,
but Hitler could also have harvested the fruits of his domestic and
foreign policy pursued until then and recognized by all powers.
Basically, the argument today centers only on the question of whether
the developments since then and their catastrophic consequences should
be charged solely to him or to others. All Germans who followed Hitler
at any time and in any way are accused. For the prosecutors
maintain—above all those who put no trust in him from the outset and
who denied the legitimacy of his government from the beginning—“It was
to be foreseen that he would end as he did!” Therefore, everyone who
supported him at any time and in any way also shares in the guilt.
To this accusation it must be objected that retrospectively it invests
the sad results with an inevitability which would destroy all belief not
only in freedom, but also in the wisdom of man. Of course Hitler himself
did not desire the end as it came. He often enough announced at the
beginning that he was not out for the laurels of war but that he would
like to devote the rest of his life to peaceful constructive work. From
a truly objective point of view, one can reproach him only for not
having limited his aims when he could no longer believe in their
achievement by peaceful and humane means.
If by such means only those are to be understood which renounce force of
any kind, then there would have been no need for him to go his own way
and seek a new solution. A certain play with force, as long as it did
not get out of hand, will, therefore, have to be conceded to him. Where
it got out of hand can only be determined, for lack of other proof, by
the results which he actually caused with his policy. He certainly did
not foresee and intend the bad results. However, it must be considered
his fault that he did not accept the lesson of his failures but allowed
himself to be goaded to still greater extremes. But how much of this
guilt can and may be charged also to his followers?
Whoever did not reject Hitler’s methods, and thereby him personally,
from the very beginning as illegitimate, found it difficult to recognize
where the political aims set by Hitler ceased to provide justified
reasons for his measures, and where beyond that the policy became a
crime. The dividing line in this respect was from the standpoint of the
purely German legal conception probably considerably different from that
of other nations or even the world. For the latter, for example, were
hardly interested in the maintenance of the Weimar constitution and the
basic rights granted by it to the individual German. Its violation,
therefore, up to the second World War has never caused other states to
intervene with the German Government. On the other hand, once the war
had broken out, the Germans were forced to put German interests above
their sympathy for members of other, especially enemy, states. Each
believed himself to be doing enough if he took care in his sphere to see
that unnecessary harshness was avoided. To revolt against orders from
the highest German authority would not only have been completely
senseless and hopeless, but, until shortly before the bitter end, it
would also have been a violation of German legality and thereby a
punishable offense. Reproaches for failure to revolt can, therefore, be
made only if the breach of formal legality, without consideration of the
immediate practical effect and only for the sake of the principle—which
is the attitude of a revolutionary—could be defined as a legal
obligation.
The consequences of such a conception are so far from the point that
they cannot be considered seriously at all, because hitherto existing
international law was primarily based on the principle of unlimited
sovereignty of the states. No country has been willing to submit vital
and decisive questions to the judgment of others, no matter to how great
a majority or to however independent a tribunal. And now every
individual citizen of such a sovereign state was to have had not only
the right but even the duty toward the other nations or humanity to
rebel against the legal system of his own country because it violated
the rights of man and humanity? Such an imposition, made retroactively,
pronounces its own sentence. It would place the autonomy of the
individual above state sovereignty. Thereby the power of the individual
person would not only be immeasurably overestimated, but this would also
necessarily lead to the breaking of the last ties of traditional order,
to anarchy.
To this way of thinking Göring virtually represents the exact opposite
pole. Just as others went to war in order to fight against war as such,
he became a revolutionary in order to restore honor to the concept of
loyalty. Thus, having once cast his lot with the Führer, he stood by him
when he had already lost the latter’s confidence, in fact, even after he
had been sentenced to death by Hitler. He remained loyal until today, in
spite of everything, by excusing Hitler again and again. To many this
may appear incomprehensible, and many may see in it a sign more of
weakness than of strength. But this loyalty reveals his whole
personality. Göring has occasionally been described as a late
Renaissance type; and there is something in that. Although of high
intelligence, he allowed himself to be guided in his actions less by
reason than by the dictates of his warm heart.
Such a man expresses himself of necessity in a way that is primarily
subjective. He does not look upon the people surrounding him and upon
others impassionately as factors to be reckoned with; but he feels,
above all, what effect they have on him and how they challenge his
approval or disapproval so that he finally makes his personal reaction
to them the basis for his over-all judgment.
But still, as can be seen from the statements of Generaloberstabsrichter
Dr. Lehmann, he always endeavored to be just and to lend an ear to
sensible arguments. He always kept himself free from doctrinal
prejudices. As a soldier, he always endeavored to do the right thing in
each case. His decisions on points of law as well as his social
interest, which General Bodenschatz testified to among other things,
show his earnest moral sense of responsibility. His attitude toward all
criminal acts directed against the honor of women are proof of his
chivalry. But in all this he is not guided by a dogma but by his
spontaneous common sense, _ergo_ not by intellect, but by life. From
actual life he derives his ideas and the values which determine his
actions.
Therefore the Führer and the oath of loyalty he had taken to him meant
everything to him and were the substance of his life. Ambassador
Henderson had judged Göring correctly, when he wrote about him:
“He was the perfect servant of his master, and I have never seen
greater loyalty and devotion than he maintains toward Hitler. He
was recognized as the second power in the country, and always
gave me to understand that he was Hitler’s natural successor as
leader. Men in secondary places often tend to emphasize their
own importance. In all the open discussions in which I engaged
with Göring, he never spoke of himself or the great part which
he had played in the Nazi revolution; Hitler had done
everything, all confidence was confidence in Hitler, every
decision was Hitler’s and he himself was nothing.”
This judgment still applies today. But his loyalty became his disaster.
For him a world had gone to rack and ruin. He certainly recognized many
a mistake of the past, but he did not show the repentance which many
would have liked to see in him. He thereby remains loyal to himself as
well. And this completes the picture of his character.
In a period still threatened by chaos, in which men are again searching
for a firm foundation for life, the positive value of such loyalty
should not be ignored.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I understand that you have not had your speech
translated into any of the languages. Is that so?
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I told the General Secretary yesterday the
reasons which made it impossible to have the speech translated. However,
I have given the Language Division the text in German; and I was told
that the German text would be a big help in carrying out the translation
as quickly and as accurately as possible.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal has already pointed out to you, many
days ago, that it is very inconvenient to them not to have a copy of the
speech before them. If you propose to make a speech, they will do the
best they can to appreciate it. It makes it very much more difficult and
very much more inconvenient not to have the speech translated.
DR. SEIDL: I shall see to it that the translation is made as quickly as
possible for the case of the Defendant Frank.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well; go on.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, when in 1918 the
German Army, after more than 4 years of heroic struggle, laid down arms,
this was done in confidence of the assurances repeatedly given by
President Wilson in 1918. In his speech before Congress on 8 January
1918, the President of the United States of America, in 14 points, had
demanded among other things...
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal has already
intimated, as you must know, that the question of the 14 points and the
question of the justice of the Treaty of Versailles is irrelevant. They
do not propose to listen to it. You have been told that before, and many
documents have been rejected which dealt with this subject.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I do not intend to comment on the question of
whether the Versailles Treaty is just or not. The point is this: The
Prosecution have submitted the Versailles Treaty in evidence. They made
the Versailles Treaty the main point of the Indictment especially as
concerns Count One of the Indictment.
My investigation aims at the following: First, was the Versailles Treaty
formed legally? Second...
THE PRESIDENT: I spoke only of the injustice of the Versailles Treaty.
But it is even more irrelevant to question whether the Versailles Treaty
is a legal document or not. We do not propose to listen to your
contending that the Versailles Treaty is not a legal document. There are
plenty of matters which are of material moment for your client which you
have to discuss before us, but that is not one of them.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I cannot leave the Tribunal ignorant of the
fact that the Versailles Treaty and its consequences, especially the
causal relationship with the seizure of power by National Socialism,
form a considerable part of my speech and it will be...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, I have told you that the Tribunal will not
listen to your contending either that the Versailles Treaty was not a
legal document or that it was in any way unjust. On those topics we do
not propose to hear you.
DR. SEIDL: Then I must construe the attitude of the Tribunal to mean
that I will not be permitted to speak of the consequences of the
Versailles Treaty, and particularly about the connection which these
consequences had with the rise of the National Socialist Party and with
the seizure of power by Adolf Hitler and the co-defendants.
THE PRESIDENT: Look. The Versailles Treaty is, of course, a historical
fact; and the Tribunal cannot prevent you from referring to it as a
historical fact. But as to its justice or as to its being a legal
treaty, the treaty which Germany signed, you will not be heard.
As you have not laid your speech before us, we do not know what you are
going to say. But we will not listen to that sort of argument.
DR. SEIDL: Then I shall begin on Page 6 of the German manuscript, with
the second paragraph.
Thus the struggle for the revision of the peace “Dictate” of Versailles
began at the moment when it was signed. In the program of the National
Socialist Labor Party of Adolf Hitler, this struggle against the
Versailles peace “Dictate” and for its revision assumed a place far
surpassing all other demands and considerations. It was the leading
thought by which the whole inner-political activity of the Party was
guided and which, after the seizure of power, was to form the basis for
all foreign political considerations and decisions.
One of the first fellow-fighters of Adolf Hitler was the Defendant
Rudolf Hess. Like Hitler, he was also a front-line soldier in the first
World War. As a volunteer he joined at the outbreak of the war, and he
had risen to the rank of infantry lieutenant when he was wounded in
Romania. Incapacitated for the infantry through this wound, he enlisted
in the Air Corps.
After the armistice, he fought with various volunteer corps. But in
1919, after the conclusion of the Versailles Peace Treaty, he had to
recognize that the victors did not really desire a peace based on
justice and a corresponding adjustment of interests. As could be
expected, the terms of the Peace Treaty of Versailles, and especially
the burden of the reparations on the already seriously affected German
economy, had to have...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, it may be difficult for you to cut out of your
speech the various references to the topics which I have referred to;
but you must kindly try to do it. For if you continue to refer to the
topics to which I have referred, namely the justice or the legality of
the Treaty of Versailles, the Tribunal will have to stop your speech and
go on with some of the other defendants.
DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, the subject I was just dealing with was not a
question of justice or legality but a question of the consequences and
referred to the investigation of the causal connection. If the
Prosecution, in weeks of presenting evidence, showed how the rise of the
National Socialist Party came about and how the numbers of its mandates
increased...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, those are all facts which the Prosecution is
perfectly entitled to prove. What you are now referring to is an
argument that certain clauses of the Versailles Treaty were unjust. And
that is an argument which the Tribunal is not prepared to listen to. It
is not a statement of fact; it is an argument.
DR. SEIDL: Of course, it is an argument...
THE PRESIDENT: I have said that it is an argument we are not going to
listen to. If you do not understand what I mean, you will have to stop
continuing your speech. Do you understand that?
DR. SEIDL: Page 8, then, if you please.
When in 1925 the Party was founded anew, Rudolf Hess was once more one
of the first...
It is impossible, Mr. President, to continue my speech, because all the
following statements are concerned with the question: What did the
Defendant Hess do up to the seizure of power? And I must say and have
said that the mainspring of his activity within the Party and the German
people consisted in achieving a revision of the Versailles Treaty and
its most unbearable terms. This is the very question of the whole
National Socialist movement up to 1933.
THE PRESIDENT: If you confine yourself to statements of fact as to what
the Defendant Hess did, there will be no objection to it at all. But as
I said, if you make arguments that the Treaty of Versailles is illegal
or unjust, the Tribunal will not hear you.
DR. SEIDL: I shall continue, and I ask you, Mr. President, since I do
not know the exact limits which I may not transgress, to interrupt me if
I should again touch upon a subject which in the opinion of the Tribunal
refers to the justice of the Versailles Treaty and...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you know perfectly well the limits which have
been laid down by the Tribunal many weeks ago as to the question of the
justice or the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles. There has been a
great number of documents rejected on the ground that they dealt with
the justice or the injustice of the Treaty of Versailles, and you must
have known that perfectly well.
DR. SEIDL: Then I ask the Tribunal to tell me whether I am permitted to
make statements to the effect that the economic deterioration,
especially the great unemployment, resulted from the reparations clauses
of the Versailles Treaty and the refusal of the victorious powers of
1919 to change this reparations policy.
THE PRESIDENT: You may certainly state what the condition of Germany
was. That is a matter of fact.
DR. SEIDL: Then I shall again begin on Page 8.
When in 1925 the Party was founded anew...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, the Tribunal is perfectly familiar with this
type of argument; I mean, we are not going to lose sight of the
argument. We know all about the argument; we do not want to hear it. We
think it is entirely irrelevant.
Can’t you go on to other passages of your speech which are important for
the Defendant Hess? As I have said, there are a great many matters of
which evidence has been given by the Prosecution and which have been
answered by the Defense; and upon those matters we desire to hear you.
DR. SEIDL: I shall then begin on Page 10, with the second paragraph.
If, therefore, the National Socialist Party achieved a great victory in
the Reichstag elections of 14 September 1930, and entered the new
Reichstag with no less than 107 delegates, then that is at least due to
the economic crisis of the time, to the great unemployment and so
directly to the reparations stipulations, contrary to all economic
reason, of the Versailles Treaty and the refusal of the victorious
powers, in spite of urgent warnings, to agree to a revision. It is
true...
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] Dr. Seidl, you know that is again an
argumentative statement, that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair and
that the victorious powers had failed to recognize the essential justice
of Germany’s case or something of that sort. If you can’t adjust your
speech to what I have laid down, we shall have to ask you to recast the
whole speech.
DR. SEIDL: Then I shall turn to Page 11, second paragraph. No, I shall
turn to Page 12.
When the German people, in compliance with the Peace Treaty of
Versailles, had disarmed, it had a right to expect that the victorious
powers would also...
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] One moment, Dr. Seidl, as you don’t
appear to be capable of recasting your speech as you go along to accord
to the Tribunal’s ruling, the Tribunal will not hear you further at this
stage. It will go on with the next defendant’s case. You will then have
the opportunity of recasting your speech, and you will submit your
speech for translation before it is presented, and I would explain that
this is the reason why the Tribunal does not propose to hear you upon
these matters. They are irrelevant to the issues that the Tribunal has
to try. If they were in any way relevant to the charges which are made
against the defendants in the Indictment, the Tribunal would of course
hear them; but they are, in the considered opinion of the Tribunal, in
no way relevant to the charges upon which the defendants are being tried
and therefore the Tribunal do not propose to hear them. The justice of
the Treaty of Versailles has nothing to do with whether or not the war
which was made by Germany was aggressive. It has nothing to do with the
war crimes with which the defendants are charged, and therefore, it is
irrelevant and for that reason we don’t propose to hear it. Now, as I
say, as you are unable apparently to recast your speech, you will be
given an opportunity of recasting it in private; and you will then
submit it for translation and you can then deliver it. And now we will
go on with the case against the Defendant Ribbentrop. Dr. Horn, you are
ready to go on, are you?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have just heard that the translations are
being brought up. Perhaps I may wait until the translation gets here?
THE PRESIDENT: I think you might go on. We can hear what you say and
take it down.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, Gentlemen of the Tribunal: “All great upheavals
in the history of the world, and especially of modern Europe, have at
the same time been wars and revolutions.”[A]
-----
[A] Halévy
-----
We are in the midst of such an upheaval. It is by no means concluded as
yet. To select isolated events in order to submit them to a judicial
appraisal is not only almost impossible but entails the danger of a
premature judgment. Let us make no mistake about it; we are not judging
here a local crisis the causes of which are limited to a certain part of
Europe. We have to form a judgment about a catastrophe which touches
upon the deepest roots of our civilization.
The Prosecution has laid down strict measures in judging certain
national and international events. Germany is greatly interested in the
development of law and justice if its general application leads to an
improvement of international morals. This Tribunal has the high task not
only of passing judgment on certain defendants, disclosing the causes of
the present catastrophe, but at the same time of creating norms which
are expected to be adopted universally. No law should be created that is
only applied to the weak. Otherwise we would foster the danger that
again all national efforts would be directed to develop more fully the
power of resistance and thereby make war still more merciless than the
one on which judgment is to be rendered here.
In taking these thoughts as a basis I beg to present to the Tribunal the
case which I represent.
Herr Von Ribbentrop is being considered among the conspirators as the
man mainly responsible for the foreign political and diplomatic side of
an alleged conspiracy, which is supposed to have had as its goal the
preparation and execution of aggressive wars. It is my primary task to
determine, on the basis of the results of the evidence, when a case
constitutes an attack in the meaning of international law and in which
cases aggressive wars were waged.
The concept “aggressive war” is not exhausted in the proposed formal
judicial definition by the American and British prosecutors but has,
above all, a material basis.
Only the knowledge of these premises permits the adoption of an attitude
which can serve as a basis for the decision of the Tribunal. I am,
therefore, deferring the discussion of the problematic aspects of
aggression and aggressive wars until, after having described the German
foreign policy and Herr Von Ribbentrop’s role therein, I shall have
submitted to the Tribunal the evidence for consideration.
As the Tribunal intends to consider the matter in the light of criminal
law, I shall especially examine to what extent Herr Von Ribbentrop
hindered or furthered the foreign political decisions during the time of
his official activity.
Herr Von Ribbentrop’s first step into international politics and his
first move in the international game of power was successfully
accomplished when he concluded the Naval Agreement between Germany and
England in 1935. The circumstances under which this treaty came into
existence are as significant for the political problems of those years
as they are characteristic for judging the personality of Von Ribbentrop
and his further political development. This treaty—as is known in
informed quarters—came about under exclusion of the official German
diplomacy. The then German Ambassador in London, Von Hoesch, and the
Wilhelmstrasse were very skeptical toward this project. Neither Hoesch
nor the Wilhelmstrasse believed that England was inclined toward
concluding such a treaty, which contradicted the terms of Part V of the
Versailles Treaty as well as her previous attitude as displayed at the
different disarmament conferences. Furthermore they did not believe that
such an agreement could materialize a few weeks after the Council of the
League of Nations had declared the restoration of German military
sovereignty to be a breach of German obligations; and England, France,
and Italy had met at Stresa in order to counteract this German step. And
much less did they believe that a successful conclusion of such a
far-reaching treaty, with its fundamental significance, could be
achieved by an outsider like Herr Von Ribbentrop.
The consequences resulting from the conclusion of this treaty were as
significant as they were far-reaching. Herr Von Ribbentrop, who came
from the Party, rose greatly in Hitler’s esteem. In turn, however, the
relationship between Herr Von Ribbentrop and the conservative diplomatic
corps became more and more difficult. This nominal ambassador who had
managed to acquire Hitler’s confidence was distrusted because his
activity could not be controlled by the Foreign Office.
From the conclusion of the Naval Agreement onwards, Hitler began to see
in Herr Von Ribbentrop the man who could help him in the fulfillment of
his pet wish—and also, we may say, of that of the German people—to
achieve a general political alliance with England. The inclination to
realize these intentions had practical as well as ideal motives.
The practical motives can be condensed into the short statement that it
is the misfortune of our nation and of all Europe that Germany and
England were never able to understand each other, in spite of earnest
attempts on the part of both countries during the last 50 years. The
ideal motives were grounded in Hitler’s indisputable preference for many
approved internal institutions of the British Empire.
Politically the Naval Agreement represented the first important break
with the Versailles policy as sanctioned by England with the final
approval by France. And thus the first actual and practical armament
limitations were put in effect after many years of fruitless
negotiations.
Simultaneously with all these factors a generally favorable political
atmosphere was created. The Naval Agreement and its effects may also
have been the reason for Hitler to appoint Herr Von Ribbentrop
Ambassador to the Court of St. James the following year, after the death
of Hoesch.
However surprisingly fast Herr Von Ribbentrop succeeded in concluding
the Naval Agreement, in offering a general alliance to England he had
not the slightest success. Was it the fault of Herr Von Ribbentrop’s
diplomacy or the basic difference of interests?
Whoever is familiar with Anglo-Saxon psychology knows that it is not
advisable to pester these people at once with proposals and requests.
Germans, at first sight, may recognize many common traits in the
British, but upon closer observation profound differences will be noted.
Both nations have their roots in a different soil. Their spiritual
heritages have different sources. The deeper the Germans and the British
penetrate, the greater will appear the difference in their faith and
their mentality. The deeper the British and the French penetrate into
one another’s nature, the more they will find in common with each other.
These harmonies between the British and the French were still further
enhanced in the past 50 years through the affiliation of their political
interests.
In the course of modern history England has always had the desire to
ally herself with a continental military power and has sought and found
the fulfillment of this interest, depending on the direction of British
aims, sometimes in Vienna, sometimes in Berlin, and from the beginning
of the 20th century in Paris. England’s interests, at the time of Herr
Von Ribbentrop’s activity as Ambassador, did not demand a departure from
this line. This was supported by the basic British attitude that Great
Britain did not wish to commit herself on the continent. From the Thames
the complications which lay dormant beneath the surface on the continent
were clearly seen. Added to this was the fact that authoritative men in
the Foreign Office were still thinking too much in terms of a policy
conducted at the turn of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.
This thinking was still, now as then, directed towards an alignment with
France.
The voices of those who advocated closer contact with Germany were
negligible, their political weight succumbed to that of the opposition.
To this were added the difficulties which resulted for Herr Von
Ribbentrop from Germany’s participation in the Non-Intervention
Committee, which at that time met in London in order to keep the powers
out of the Spanish civil war.
The Prosecution raised the question of how Herr Von Ribbentrop regarded
German-British relations on his departure from London as Ambassador. The
answer to this will best be furnished by Document TC-75, which contains
the views of Herr Von Ribbentrop on the then prevailing foreign
political situation of Germany and on the future possibilities of
German-British relations.
In this, Herr Von Ribbentrop presupposes that Germany does not want to
bind herself to the _status quo_ in Central Europe. It is his conviction
that the implementation of such foreign political aims will necessarily
force Germany and England “into different camps.” For this reason he
advises the formation of alliances, loose at first, with powers having
similar interests (Italy and Japan). Through this policy he hopes to
engage England at the danger points of her Empire and still to keep the
door open for an understanding with Germany.
Herr Von Ribbentrop then deals with the question of Austria and the
Sudetenland. According to his conviction at that time, England will not
in either of these questions give her consent to a modification of the
_status quo_, although she might be forced through the power of
circumstances to tolerate a solution of these questions.
A change through collision with vital French interests of the _status
quo_ in the East will, however, always cause England to become an
opponent of Germany in a conflict of such nature. Herr Von Ribbentrop
held this conviction not only in 1938 when this document was penned;
but, contrary to the assertions of the Prosecution, warned Hitler of
this danger even before and at the outbreak of the second World War.
From this document it follows also that Herr Von Ribbentrop did not, as
was asserted here, depict the British to Hitler as a degenerate nation,
for he says in this document quite clearly that England would become a
hard and keen opponent to the pursuance of German interests in the
Mediterranean.
This conception of Germany’s foreign political situation at that time,
as expressed in Document TC-75, evidently agreed with Hitler’s ideas
inasmuch as in the course of the Fritsch crisis Herr Von Ribbentrop took
over the Foreign Ministry in place of the resigning Herr Von Neurath.
According to Herr Von Ribbentrop’s testimony, Hitler asked him upon
entering his office to assist him in solving four problems. These were
the Austrian, the Sudeten German, the Memel, and the Danzig and Corridor
questions. As shown by the evidence this was not a secret understanding
which was arrived at by the two statesmen.
The Party program contains, in Point 3, the demand for revision of the
peace treaties of 1919. In a number of speeches Hitler repeatedly
pointed out the necessity of fulfilling these German demands. Reich
Marshal Göring testified here that in November 1937 he explained to Lord
Halifax the necessity of solving these questions and said that they were
an integral part of German foreign politics. He also clearly expounded
these goals to the French Minister Bonnet. Herr Von Ribbentrop therefore
put his energy into the attainment of goals which were known and which
beyond that resulted, of necessity, from the dynamic situation at that
time prevailing in Central Europe due to the strengthening of the Reich.
How much or how little freedom of action Herr Von Ribbentrop had as a
minister in the solution of these questions, I shall explain in
connection with my statement on the participation in the conspiracy of
which the defendant is accused. Only this much may be said here: That,
as was proven by evidence, with the dismissal of Herr Von Neurath, the
decisive authority in the field of foreign politics was also
concentrated in Hitler’s hands. Herr von Neurath was the last Foreign
Minister who under the regime of National Socialism at first retained a
decisive influence on foreign politics as a Foreign Minister, which
influence, however, due to the increasing power of the regime, he had to
surrender more and more to Hitler’s aspirations towards totality.
In the selection of Herr Von Ribbentrop, a man of Hitler’s own liking
became Foreign Minister. Outside of all formalities of state law and
jurisdiction, every government without a doubt has a strong component in
the purely personal relations among the rulers themselves. Seen from
this point of view, it is necessary for the understanding of certain
actions and of recent history to look into the relations between Hitler
and Herr Von Ribbentrop.
Herr Von Ribbentrop, a well-to-do man of nationalist leanings, saw that
Hitler and his Party strove for goals which corresponded with his own
ideas and feelings. Herr Von Ribbentrop’s ideas about the foreign
countries visited by him aroused Hitler’s interest. Hitler’s personality
and political convictions developed in Herr Von Ribbentrop a form of
loyalty, the final explanation of which one can perhaps find in the
effects of the power of suggestion and hypnosis.
Let us not be oblivious to the fact that not only Herr Von Ribbentrop
but also countless people within and beyond Germany’s borders fell
victims to this power. What in this courtroom is to be considered by the
standards of law, after all finds its final explanation only from the
point of view of mass suggestion and psychology, to say nothing of the
pathological forms of these phenomena. This task may be left to the
sciences concerned.
As an attorney—and only as such do I have to evaluate the results of
the evidence—I shall, with the permission of the Tribunal, after
clarifying this aspect, present the role of Herr Von Ribbentrop within
the alleged conspiracy for the plotting of wars and acts of aggression
in violation of treaties.
Herr Von Ribbentrop had not been Foreign Minister for 10 days when he
was called upon by Hitler to participate in the conference with the
Austrian Chancellor and his Foreign Minister on 12 and 13 February 1938
in Berchtesgaden. Evidence presented in court has confirmed the fact
that questions involving Austria especially were exclusively Hitler’s
own concern. The then Ambassador Von Papen reported directly to the head
of the State. Herr Von Ribbentrop had no influence whatever upon the
activities of the Party in Austria nor in the Southeastern territory. My
client alleges to have been informed only very rarely and not officially
about its activities there.
The former Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Guido Schmidt, testified here
that Herr Von Ribbentrop did not participate in the decisive conference
between Hitler and Schuschnigg. During the other conferences he did not
conduct himself in the Hitlerian “style” and created the impression on
the witness of not being informed, which in a certain measure was due to
his late activity in London and his only recent appointment as Foreign
Minister. From this inoffensive conduct of Herr Von Ribbentrop the
Prosecution have drawn the conclusion that it was a maneuver agreed upon
between Hitler and himself. They insist upon seeing in Herr Von
Ribbentrop’s conduct a typical sign of what they characterize as “double
talk.” Must not the indisputable dates and facts with regard to Herr Von
Ribbentrop, the impression of the witness Schmidt resulting therefrom,
my portrayal of Ribbentrop’s position as Minister, his lack of
information on the long-planned preparations with respect to Norway and
Denmark, and other undeniably proven facts give cause to raise the
question whether Herr Von Ribbentrop did not participate in decisions of
foreign policy to a far lesser degree than is contended by the
Prosecution?
In the question of the Anschluss, at any rate, he did not, as the
evidence proves conclusively, play a decisive part. To him Austria was a
country, mutilated by the Treaty of St. Germain, which on sound
principles could hardly subsist and which once shared a common destiny
in history with a greater Germany. The National Socialists were not the
first to awaken Austria to the thought of a union with Germany. This
thought had ripened in the German element of the Hapsburg monarchy since
the revolution of 1848, which aimed at a democratic Greater Germany.
After the downfall of the monarchy the Social Democrats continued to
fight for it for ideological and material reasons. In fact, they saw in
the Weimar state their spiritual offspring. The economic distress
resulting from the destruction of the Danube area as an economic entity
nurtured the thought of a union with the Reich, which was in a better
economic position.
In this fertile soil the National Socialists were able to cultivate the
Anschluss idea. In any event the prerequisites for an Anschluss with
Germany were created when support for Austria by Italy ceased, due to
the rapprochement of the latter toward Germany on account of the
Abyssinian conflict. The further reasons that contributed to the
Anschluss and its justification will be fully presented by my colleague
Dr. Steinbauer.
Reich Marshal Göring testified here that the Anschluss in its close
form, as laid down in the Law of 13 March 1938,
Wiedervereinigungsgesetz, which was signed also by Herr Von Ribbentrop,
did not originally even correspond with Hitler’s intentions, but was put
through by him.
As a further violation of treaties with regard to the Austrian question
the Prosecution quote the violation of Article 80 of the Treaty of
Versailles and the corresponding article of the Treaty of St. Germain,
as well as the violation of the treaty between Austria and Germany of 11
July 1936.
THE PRESIDENT: The translation came through to me, I think, as though
you had said, “...the union did not even correspond with the intentions
of Hitler, but was put through”—it should have been “by Göring
himself.”
DR. HORN: Yes, I forgot that.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on.
DR. HORN: In justification of these violations one could point out that
the articles concerned constituted a violation of the right of
self-determination, on which the peace treaties were based. The outcome
of the vote after the annexation at any rate clearly confirms the
Austrian attitude of that time.
The _clausula rebus sic stantibus_ could be considered as a further
justification for the violation. One could refer to the statement of
Under Secretary of State Butler in the House of Commons who, in reply to
a question after the Anschluss, stated that England had given no special
guarantee for the independence of Austria as laid down in the Treaty of
St. Germain.
These legal evaluations would hardly do justice to the facts. Statute
law always lags behind the ideal of justice. That does not only apply to
domestic law but also to international law. Events show that if treaties
fail to make provision for changes, time and events pass them by in
order to rebuild them upon a new base. The question of whether the
participation in such events can be legally evaluated must definitely be
disputed. I shall refer later on to the general aspects of the adaption
of the law to the strength of bare facts.
An Englishman once asserted the following: “We have to face the stubborn
fact that Central Europe is populated by an almost solid block of 80
million people who are highly gifted, highly organized, and who are
conscious of these achievements in the highest degree. The majority of
these people have the strong and evidently incredible desire to be
united in one state.”
The Anschluss of Austria and the nationalist theories of National
Socialism had set in motion this artificially split-up block created by
the peace treaties of 1919. No attentive observer could fail to notice
the effect of the Anschluss upon the neighboring states.
It is not my intention to take up the time of the Tribunal with the
particulars of the subsequent efforts by the various groups of Germans
in the neighboring states for incorporation into the Reich. The facts
which have now become history are only too well known. My task here is
to examine whether these events are the results of a premeditated plan
of one person or a group of persons, or whether not rather a long and
artificially suppressed force was instrumental in accomplishing the
objectives which were assigned to Herr Von Ribbentrop by Hitler at the
time of his appointment.
The Anschluss of Austria was the signal for the Sudeten German Party to
force the issue of an Anschluss now on their part too.
Herr Von Ribbentrop has been accused by the Prosecution of having, in
his capacity as Foreign Minister, engaged in creating difficulties in
collaboration with the Sudeten German Henlein. They further accuse him
of having induced the Sudeten German Party to increase their demands
step by step rather than enter the Czechoslovak Government and of thus
having prevented a solution of the whole problem without making it
appear that the German Government was setting the pace.
Document 3060-PS submitted by the Prosecution shows just the contrary.
It is true that Herr Von Ribbentrop knew that the Anschluss efforts of
the Sudeten Germans were encouraged by the Party. But he had no
influence on this Party policy nor any thorough knowledge of it. Due to
the difficulties which had arisen with the Czech Government on account
of the separation efforts of the Sudeten Germans and their partly
uncontrollable policy, Herr Von Ribbentrop considered it necessary to
see to it that the realization of the Sudeten German aims was carried
out within the limits of a responsible policy.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, wouldn’t that be a convenient time to break
off?
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. HORN: The Munich Agreement brought a temporary calm in the situation
with reference to foreign policy. The situation was again complicated
only by Hitler’s invitation to Hacha to come to Berlin and by the events
resulting from this visit. This step with its far-reaching importance
came as a complete surprise to Herr Von Ribbentrop. Reich Marshal Göring
has testified that after the Slovakian question had been settled Hitler
had, in spite of all warnings, decided upon setting up the Protectorate
of Bohemia and Moravia. On the basis of the available material it will
be difficult to ascertain the final reasons for Hitler’s step. According
to the testimony of the Defendant Göring they sprang from Hitler’s
constant fear that through connections of the Czech officer corps with
Russia another complication of the situation in the southeastern area
might develop. This assumption and the resulting strategical and
historical reasons may have induced Hitler to take this step of 13 March
1939, which came as a surprise to Herr Von Ribbentrop, too.
This step, which is only understandable by Hitler’s tendency towards
surprise decisions, completely changed the German situation as to
foreign policy. Herr Von Ribbentrop had warned Hitler at that time of
the reaction by the Western Powers, and especially by England, which had
to be expected as a result of this step.
And the consequences became immediately apparent in the Danzig and
Corridor question which had been under discussion since October 1938.
Whereas up to that time the Poles, by reason of the German policy since
1934 and due to the return of the Olsa territory to Poland, had not
refused discussions about this problem, a reaction to the setting up of
the Protectorate became apparent immediately at the end of March.
England regarded the establishing of the Protectorate as a violation of
the Munich Agreement and began consultations with a number of countries.
At the same time Minister Beck, instead of coming to Berlin again, went
to London and returned from there with the assurance that England would
resist any change of the _status quo_ in the East. This declaration was
also made in the House of Commons after previous consultation with the
French Government.
On 26 March 1939 the Polish Ambassador Lipski called at the
Wilhelmstrasse and stated to Herr Von Ribbentrop that any continuation
of the revision policy toward Poland, especially as far as a return of
Danzig to the Reich was concerned, would mean war.
Thereby the Polish question had become a European question. Herr Von
Ribbentrop told the Polish Ambassador at that time that Germany could
not acquiesce to this decision. Only the reincorporation of Danzig and
an extraterritorial corridor to East Prussia could bring a final
solution.
I have submitted to the Tribunal, in the form of documentary evidence, a
review of the Polish crisis which then developed. I can therefore assume
that the actual course of events is known, including the incorporation
of the Memelland which returned to the Reich through an agreement with
Lithuania.
In order not to take up the time of the Tribunal unnecessarily, I shall
confine myself to stating those facts which are apt to clarify the role
of Herr Von Ribbentrop.
The Prosecution accuses Herr Von Ribbentrop of mollifying Poland by
pretending friendly feelings toward her during the Sudeten crisis and
the setting up of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. May I, in
refutation of this assertion, point out that the relations between
Germany and Poland since the agreement of 1934 were good and even
friendly and that this attitude became, of course, even more favorable
through the fact that Poland was indebted to German foreign policy for
the acquisition of the Olsa territory.
She had, therefore, every reason to entertain friendly feelings toward
Germany without it being necessary to be deceived by Herr Von
Ribbentrop’s behavior. As the evidence has shown, Herr Von Ribbentrop
continued this friendly policy towards Poland even after the dissolution
of Czechoslovakia, since there was no reason to deviate from this
attitude.
The Prosecution further accuses Herr Von Ribbentrop of having known that
Hitler as early as the spring of 1939 was determined to wage war against
Poland and that Danzig served only as pretext for this conflict. They
deduce this from Documents USA-27 and USA-30. These are Hitler’s
well-known speeches of 23 May and 22 August 1939. First of all I wish to
point out that Herr Von Ribbentrop was not present at these conferences
intended only for the military leaders.
A number of key documents have been discussed in detail here. I only
wish to name the best known, such as the Hossbach Document, the two
Schmundt Files, and the afore-mentioned speeches. Quite a number of
statements about these documents have been submitted in evidence. People
who knew Hitler well stated that they had become accustomed to his
extravagant ideas expounded in sudden speeches, in which he often
repeated himself, and that they did not take them seriously in view of
his singularity.
It is possible to counter these documents with quite a number of
speeches in which Hitler has asserted the contrary. Here, conversely, it
might be pointed out that Hitler pursued some definite purpose with his
utterances. That may be quite true. But it is just as true that even the
few key documents which were submitted as proof of aggressive war
contain so many contradictions, with regard to the aggressive intentions
deduced from them, that at best a critic judging retrospectively could
recognize such intentions. Besides, the contents of these documents, in
accordance with the strict regulations for secrecy, became known only to
those who took part in the conferences. This might explain why Herr Von
Ribbentrop learned about them only here in the courtroom.
The guiding principles as to foreign policy which Hitler laid down for
him at that time covered merely the reincorporation of Danzig and the
establishment of an extraterritorial road through the Corridor, in order
to open a direct land route to East Prussia.
As the Tribunal will remember, Hitler had told Herr Von Ribbentrop
already at the time of his appointment as Foreign Minister that it was
desirable to achieve these aims. This demand was just as much
historically justified as some solution in the case of earlier
incorporations of areas inhabited by Germans, which had become
inevitable.
The statute of the purely German city of Danzig, which was created by
the Treaty of Versailles in the course of the establishment of a Polish
state, had always been the cause of friction between Germany and Poland.
Poland had achieved this solution at Versailles through the argument
that it needed an outlet to the sea. For the same reason the Corridor
was established against all ethnological needs. Clemenceau in his
memorandum already referred to this artificial creation as a source of
danger, especially due to the fact that the peoples living in this area
had been separated through long years of bitter enmity. It was not
difficult to foresee that as a result of this fact the League of Nations
and the International Court at The Hague were constantly going to be
occupied with complaints about Polish violations of the agreement on
minorities. The same cause gave rise to the large-scale confiscation of
up to a million hectares of German estates and the expulsion of far more
than a million Germans in the course of 20 years. Not without reason did
Lord d’Abernon speak of the Danzig-Corridor problem as the “powder
magazine of Europe.” When finally a solution of this question was sought
under recognition of the Polish claim to the preservation of an outlet
to the sea, such an endeavor appeared both sensible and historically
justified.
The evidence has produced nothing to support the claim that this
question served merely as a pretext, which Herr Von Ribbentrop could not
but have known. It has produced no proof that Herr Von Ribbentrop was
acquainted with those of Hitler’s aims which went far beyond these
demands. Nor has it been proved that Herr Von Ribbentrop, as has been
asserted by the Prosecution, before 1 September 1939, did all he
possibly could to prevent peace with Poland, although he knew that a war
with Poland would draw Great Britain and France into the conflict. The
Prosecution base this statement on Document TC-73. This is a report by
the Polish Ambassador to Berlin, Lipski, to his Foreign Minister. The
document contains nothing whatsoever to substantiate this assertion.
Moreover, I do not believe that, according to the result of the
evidence, Lipski can be valued as a particularly reliable witness. May I
recall that it was Lipski who, during the decisive stage of the
negotiations before the outbreak of the war, remarked that he had not
the least cause to be interested in notes or propositions from the
German side and that he knew the situation in Germany quite well after a
period of 5½ years as Ambassador. He was convinced that in case of war
riots would break out in Germany and that the Polish Army would march
victoriously into Berlin.
According to the testimony of the witness Dahlerus it was none other
than Lipski who, during the decisive discussion at the Polish Embassy,
created the impression among the Swedes that Poland was sabotaging every
possibility for negotiations.
Further results of the evidence also speak against the above allegations
presented by the Prosecution, as for instance the fact that Herr Von
Ribbentrop, after he had learned that the Polish-English guarantee pact
had been signed, intervened with Hitler to cancel the order for the
Armed Forces to march because a conflict with Poland would also, in his
opinion, have drawn in the Western Powers. This opinion coincides with
the conclusions to which Herr Von Ribbentrop had come in his review of
the European situation and laid down in Document TC-75, which has
already been mentioned.
Minister Schmidt has testified here that it was Herr Von Ribbentrop who,
on 25 August 1939, after the Hitler-Henderson meeting, sent him to Sir
Nevile Henderson with the verbal communiqué, presented as TC-72/69, in
which the contents of Hitler’s proposals were summarized. At the same
time Herr Von Ribbentrop adjured Henderson to submit Hitler’s proposals
personally to the British Government for favorable consideration.
According to the _British Blue Book_, Sir Nevile Henderson could not
refrain from calling these and subsequent proposals exceptionally
reasonable and sincere. They were not the customary Hitler proposals,
but pure “League of Nations” proposals.
No one studying the negotiations of the subsequent fateful days can deny
that everything was done on the German side at least to get negotiations
under way on a workable basis. The opposite side did not let it come to
that, because they were determined to take action this time. The good
services of England ended with the breaking-off of all mediation without
having been able to bring Poland to the conference table.
Herr Von Ribbentrop has been blamed for having practically defeated the
purpose of the last decisive discussion with the British Ambassador,
Henderson, by having read the German proposals to Poland so fast,
contrary to all diplomatic custom and international courtesy, that Sir
Nevile Henderson could not understand them and, hence, could not pass
them on. The interpreter, Minister Schmidt, was present at this decisive
discussion. He has testified here under oath that this statement is not
true. One may consider Hitler’s order to acquaint Sir Nevile Henderson
only with the substance of the memorandum as unwise. The fact is that
not only did Herr Von Ribbentrop read the entire contents at a normal
speed to the British Ambassador; but he also, by having the interpreter
present, made it possible for Sir Nevile Henderson to become familiar
with the entire contents and, moreover, to have explanations given on
it. Besides, upon the initiative of Reich Marshal Göring, it was
transmitted to the British Embassy during the same night by telephone to
the Counsellor of the Embassy, Mr. Forbes. Thus the British Government
should have been able to render the good services offered for opening
negotiations based on positive proposals.
By reason of these facts here deposed, one must rightly doubt the truth
of the allegation that the defendant had done everything to prevent
peace with Poland.
At the beginning of my defense speech I stressed that legal
considerations concerning aggressive war are not possible without
knowledge of the circumstances leading to an armed conflict. Before I
proceed to the legal aspects of the conflict with Poland, may I make
some additional statements concerning the causes that led to the war.
The period between two World Wars is characterized by the conflicting
reactions of those powers which were satisfied and those which were
dissatisfied. It seems to be an inevitable law that after great war
repercussions, the victorious states tend as far as possible toward the
re-establishment of the prewar status and prewar mentality, whereas the
vanquished are forced to find a way out of the consequences of their
defeat by new means and methods. Thus after the Napoleonic wars there
came about the Holy Alliance which under Metternich’s leadership, using
legitimacy as an authorization, tried to ignore the effects of the
French Revolution.
What the Holy Alliance did not achieve, the League of Nations equally
failed to achieve.
Created in an atmosphere of fervent belief in human progress, it was
quickly transformed into a tool of the satisfied states. Every effort to
strengthen the League of Nations meant a new bulwark for the maintenance
of the _status quo_. Under cover of the elegant diction of juridical
formalities power politics continued. Besides, the obsession by the idea
of _sécurité_ soon deprived the newly-created body of any breath of
freshness and life.
In this fashion, naturally, a solution of the problems created by the
end of the first World War could never be found. In international
relations a coalition of interests of the conservative powers content
with the _status quo_ and of the revolutionary powers trying to do away
with it, became increasingly apparent. It could only be a question of
time until under those circumstances the political initiative would pass
to the dissatisfied powers. The formation of this front depended
exclusively on the force of the revolutionary spirit which was
crystallizing in opposition to the political self-complacency and
hankering after the past. In this fertile soil grew the doctrines of
National Socialism, Fascism, and Bolshevism, obscure in many parts of
their programs, elastic and incoherent in others. Their power of
attraction was based not so much on their programs but on the fact that
they admittedly offered something new and that they did not exhort their
followers to worship a political ideal that had failed in the past.
The economic crisis of the postwar period, the controversies about
reparations and the occupation of the Ruhr, the inability of democratic
governments to obtain anything for their distressed peoples from the
other democracies, unavoidably led to a test of the doctrines which had
not yet been tried out. The practical results of this revolution, as we
experienced them in Germany after 1933, could, aside from the social
program, consist only in abolishing the peace settlement of 1919, which
constitutes a classical example of failure to understand the
revolutionary character of a world crisis. For this revolution these
tasks were not legal questions but doctrines, exactly as it had long
become a doctrine of the satisfied states to maintain the _status quo_
at all costs, even at the price of a new world war.
Only he who does not shut his eyes before these facts can judge the
political crisis of the past decade.
Every revolution has but two possibilities; either it meets so little
resistance that eventually conservative tendencies develop and an
amalgamation with the old order is formed, or the antagonistic forces
are so strong that finally the revolution breaks up through
overstraining its own means and methods.
National Socialism went the second way, which began without bloodshed
and partly with a remarkable leaning upon tradition. But this method,
too, could not escape the inherent laws of history. The aims were too
high for one generation, the revolutionary essence too strong. The
initial successes were startling, but they also resulted in lack of
criticism as to the methods and aims. The process of uniting all larger
German groups in the Central European space would most probably have
succeeded, if at the end—I am referring to the setting up of the
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia and the pursuit of the
Danzig-Corridor question—the revolutionary tempo and methods had not
been overstrained by reason of previous successes. No person capable of
sober judgment will dispute the need for a solution of the
Danzig-Corridor question, delicate as it was.
The Prosecution may assert that in reality Danzig was but a pretext, but
seen from the state of affairs in 1939 this can hardly be proved. But it
is certain that the opposite side was concerned about other things than
the maintenance of the _status quo_ in the East. National Socialism, and
with it, in its newly gained strength, the German Reich, had become such
a danger in the eyes of the others that after Prague it was determined
to make any further German advance a “test case,” wherever it should
happen.
I have already said that the revolutionary protest in Central Europe was
chiefly due to economic causes brought about by Versailles where a peace
treaty was imposed on Germany of which it was well-known that its
economic provisions could not be carried out by the vanquished.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal thinks that sentence, at any rate,
is objectionable on the ground that I have already stated.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I did not mean to emphasize how the Versailles
Treaty came about; I only wanted to stress certain necessary
consequences which are generally known facts. But I have completed this
part and have nothing further to say with reference to it.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Horn.
DR. HORN: Much has been said here about the slogan Lebensraum. I am
convinced that this word would never have become a political program, if
after the first World War Germany had been given the possibility of
linking up with the world markets, instead of being strangled
economically. By systematically cutting her off from all raw material
bases of the world—all this for reasons of _sécurité_—the tendency
towards autarchy, the inevitable way out from the barring from the world
markets was fostered; and, at the same time, with the progressively
deteriorating economic situation, the cry for Lebensraum could find
receptive ears.
Thus, Stalin is right when he says:
“It would be erroneous to believe that the second World War came
about accidentally or as a result from mistakes of one or the
other of the statesmen, even though such mistakes were made
without doubt. Actually the war came about as an inevitable
result of the development of international economic and
political forces based on modern monopolistic capitalism.”[B]
-----
[B] Speech by Stalin on the eve of the Soviet elections in February
1946.
-----
Professor Jahrreiss has already fully explained, in his basic arguments
concerning the legal and the actual significance of the Kellogg Pact,
that the meaning given to this project for the prevention of war by the
Prosecution cannot be recognized by the Defense.[C]
-----
[C] Mr. Justice Jackson is trying in this connection to invoke Article 4
of the Weimar Constitution of 1919. According to this, the universally
recognized rules of international law are regarded as binding components
of German Reich law. Owing to the differing legal appreciation of the
Kellogg Pact on the part of the Great Powers the interpretation advanced
by the Prosecution cannot be looked upon as German Reich law.
Cf. _Reich Supreme Court Decisions in Litigation Procedures_, Vol. 103,
Page 276.
Anschütz: _The Constitution of the German Reich_ (_Die Verfassung des
Deutschen Reiches_); 10th ed., Page 58 et sequentes.
-----
Even though war has been previously declared an international crime,
especially at the 8th League of Nations Assembly of 1927, it became
quite clear in preliminary conversations, as has been proved by
documents already submitted to the Tribunal, that this declaration was
not meant to make war a crime in the legal sense but that it was an
expression of the wish to prevent future international catastrophes of
the scale of the first World War. Moreover, neither the United States
nor Russia participated in the League of Nations resolution of 1927.
All further plans for outlawing war during the period between the first
and second World Wars remained mere drafts, as the British Prosecutor
had to acknowledge in his significant argumentation, because practical
politics could not follow these moral postulates.
All these experiments—and they are by no means few—clearly show that
the problem of finding a definition lies in the difficulty of condensing
a political process, dependent upon a host of components, into a legal
concept which will cover all the varying cases occurring in practice.
The failure to formulate a definition which could be used in
international law has led to the fact that, instead of working out
general standards and measures applicable in each case, the designation
of the aggressor was left to the decision of an organ dominating all the
contending parties. In such a way, the question of defining the
aggressor became the question: “_Quis judicavit?_” that is, “Who shall
designate the aggressor?” From this decision follows a new difficulty,
namely, what is to be done against the aggressor?
Previous to the attempt of settling in a general way the concept of
aggression and the sanctions against the aggressor, political alliances
determined the obligations of the parties to wage war. In order to
improve this unsatisfactory and anarchic situation, the United States,
under Secretary of State Bryan...
THE PRESIDENT: [_Interposing._] Isn’t this really arguing the same
questions that Dr. Jahrreiss has already argued?
DR. HORN: Mr. President, I have tried to omit the matters set forth by
Professor Jahrreiss. Professor Jahrreiss confined his arguments chiefly
to the Kellogg Pact. I am only dealing with the questions pertaining to
the legal aspect of wars of aggression.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the Tribunal only granted the right to have an
additional counsel deal with the general questions of law on the
understanding that the other counsel were not going to deal with the
same questions of law. Of course, you are not using the words of Dr.
Jahrreiss—I should not expect you to do that—but you are arguing the
very same topics.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, it had been agreed originally, as the professor
as an expert had stated, that every counsel is entitled to take a
different attitude toward the problem argued by him. Professor Jahrreiss
concentrated chiefly on the Kellogg Pact and its consequences. I
personally am turning my attention to aggressive war, and, as you, Mr.
President, emphasized...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. What is involved, then, is that the
Tribunal is going to hear 20 arguments upon the general questions of
law; and surely it can scarcely have been thought by defendants’ counsel
that the Tribunal proposed to hear 20 arguments on the general questions
of law and also hear Dr. Jahrreiss on it. The only purpose of hearing
one counsel was to have the general questions of law dealt with by one
counsel alone, and that the others should not speak upon it.
DR. HORN: Mr. President, may I emphasize once more...
THE PRESIDENT: Just a moment. The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]