“The Plenipotentiary General for Administration, Reich Minister
of the Interior, Dr. Frick, dealt with the saving of labor in
the public administration.
“27. The task is primarily a problem of organization. As can be
seen from the surveys, which were submitted to those attending
the conference, showing how the authorities, economic and social
services are organized, there are approximately 50 different
kinds of officials in the district administration, each quite
independent of the other—an impossible state of affairs.
Formerly there were in the State two main divisions, the state
civil service and the Wehrmacht. After the seizure of power, the
Party and the permanent organizations (Reichsnährstand, _et
cetera_) were added to these, with all their machinery from top
to bottom. In this way the number of public posts and officials
was increased many times over. This makes public service more
difficult.
“28. Since the war tasks have increased enormously.”—The
context makes it clear that that is the preceding war.—“The
organizing of total war naturally requires much more labor, even
in the public administration, than in 1914. But it is an
impossibility that this system should have increased its numbers
20 to 40 fold in the lowest grade alone. For this reason, the
Reich Ministry of the Interior is striving for uniformity of
administration.”
A small conference—small commission was created. I offer Number 29 in
connection with Göring’s testimony that they ceased to function:
“Instead of further discussions before the whole assembly, the
forming of a small commission which will make definite proposals
is recommended. Extensive preparatory work has been undertaken.”
And a note by the committee that the committee had been functioning.
Point 30:
“The President requested that the commission’s proposals be
submitted. It was an important section for the preparation for
war.”
I shall pass to the large subdivision C which relates to increasing the
efficiency of the communications service, starting with the receipt of a
report from the Army General Staff.
“31. Eighteen months ago the result of the examination of the
plan for strategic concentration showed that the transport
service could not meet all the demands made on it by the Armed
Forces. The Minister of Transport confirmed this statement. The
1938 part of the Four Year Plan will presumably be completed in
August 1939.
“32. Shortly after this program was drawn up demands were made
on the Wehrmacht which had changed completely compared with the
traditional use of the Wehrmacht at the beginning of a war.
Troops had to be brought to the frontier, in the shortest
possible time, in numbers which had until then been completely
unforeseen. The Wehrmacht was able to fulfill these demands by
means of organizational measures but transport could not.
“33. In the field of transportation Germany is at the moment not
yet ready for war.”
I offer the detail which follows, in contradiction of the statements
repeatedly made by a number of witnesses that the movements of the
Wehrmacht in the Rhineland, the Anschluss, and all the rest of it, even
Czechoslovakia, were surprise movements.
“a. In the case of the three operations in 1938/1939 there was
no question of an actual strategic concentration. The troops
were transported a long time beforehand near to the area of
strategic concentration by means of camouflaged measures.
“b. This stop-gap is of no use whatever when the time limit
cannot be fixed or is not known a long time beforehand, but when
an unexpected and almost immediate military decision is
required. According to the present situation transport is not in
a position, despite all preparations, to bring up the troops.”
“a” is unimportant for my purposes, “a” on Page 18. “b” and “c”
represent steps to be taken to meet the deficiency. On Page 19 I shall
not bother to read the statements on 38, showing the preparation of
highways from east to west and from north to south.