(No. 1.)
If Painting and Sculpture delight us like other works of ingenuity,
merely from the difficulties they surmount; like an 'egg in a
bottle,' a tree made out of stone, or a face made of pigment; and the
pleasure we receive, is our wonder at the achievement; then, to such
as so believe, this treatise is not written. But if, as the writer
conceives, works of Fine Art delight us by the interest the objects
they depict excite in the beholder, just as those objects in nature
would excite his interest; if by any association of ideas in the one
case, by the same in the other, without reference to the
representations being other than the objects they represent:--then,
to such as so believe, the following upon 'SUBJECT' is addressed.
Whilst, at the same time, it is not disallowed that a subsequent
pleasure may and does result, upon reflecting that the objects
contemplated were the work of human ingenuity.
Now the subject to be treated, is the 'subject' of Painter and
Sculptor; what ought to be the nature of that 'subject,' how far that
subject may be drawn from past or present time with advantage, how
far the subject may tend to confer upon its embodiment the title,
'High Art,' how far the subject may tend to confer upon its
embodiment the title 'Low Art;' what is 'High Art,' what is 'Low
Art'?
To begin then (at the end) with 'High Art.' However we may differ as
to facts, the principle will be readily granted, that 'High Art,'
_i.e._ Art, par excellence, Art, in its most exalted character,
addresses pre-eminently the highest attributes of man, viz.: his
mental and his moral faculties.
'Low Art,' or Art in its less exalted character, is that which
addresses the less exalted attributes of man, viz.: his mere sensory
faculties, without affecting the mind or heart, excepting through the
volitional agency of the observer.
These definitions are too general and simple to be disputed; but
before we endeavour to define more particularly, let us analyze the
subject, and see what it will yield.
All the works which remain to us of the Ancients, and this appears
somewhat remarkable, are, with the exception of those by incompetent
artists, universally admitted to be 'High Art.' Now do we afford them
this high title, because all remnants of the antique world, by
tempting a comparison between what was, and is, will set the mental
faculties at work, and thus address the highest attributes of man?
Or, as this is owing to the agency of the observer, and not to the
subject represented, are we to seek for the cause in the subjects
themselves!
Let us examine the subjects. They are mostly in sculpture; but this
cannot be the cause, unless all modern sculpture be considered 'High
Art.' This is leaving out of the question in both ages, all works
badly executed, and obviously incorrect, of which there are numerous
examples both ancient and modern.
The subjects we find in sculpture are, in "the round," mostly men or
women in thoughtful or impassioned action: sometimes they are indeed
acting physically; but then, as in the Jason adjusting his Sandal,
acting by mechanical impulse, and thinking or looking in another
direction. In relievo we have an historical combat, such as that
between the Centaurs and Lapithae; sometimes a group in conversation,
sometimes a recitation of verses to the Lyre; a dance, or religious
procession.
As to the first class in "the round," as they seem to appeal to the
intellectual, and often to the moral faculties, they are naturally,
and according to the broad definition, works of 'High Art.' Of the
relievo, the historical combat appeals to the passions; and, being
historical, probably to the intellect. The like may be said of the
conversational groups, and lyrical recitation which follow. The dance
appeals to the passions and the intellect; since the intellect
recognises therein an order and design, her own planning; while the
solemn, modest demeanour in the religious procession speaks to the
heart and the mind. The same remarks will apply to the few ancient
paintings we possess, always excluding such merely decorative works
as are not fine art at all.
Thus it appears that all these works of the ancients _might_
rationally have been denominated works of 'High Art;' and here we
remark the difference between the hypothetical or rational, and the
historical account of facts; for though here is _reason_ enough why
ancient art _might_ have been denominated 'High Art,' that it _was_
so denominated on this account, is a position not capable of proof:
whereas, in all probability, the true account of the matter runs
thus--The works of antiquity awe us by their time-hallowed presence;
the mind is sent into a serious contemplation of things; and, the
subject itself in nowise contravening, we attribute all this potent
effect to the agency of the subject before us, and 'High Art,' it
becomes _then_ and _for ever_, with all such as "follow its cut." But
then as this was so named, not from the abstract cause, but from a
result and effect; when a _new_ work is produced in a similar spirit,
but clothed in a dissimilar matter, and the critics have to settle to
what class of art it belongs,--then is the new work dragged up to
fight with the old one, like the poor beggar Irus in front of
Ulysses; then are they turned over and applied, each to each, like
the two triangles in Euclid; and then, if they square, fit and tally
in every quarter--with the nude to the draped in the one, as the nude
to the draped in the other--with the standing to the sitting in the
one, as the standing to the sitting in the other--with the fat to the
lean in the one, as the fat to the lean in the other--with the young
to the old in the one, as the young to the old in the other--with
head to body, as head to body; and nose to knee, as nose to knee, &c.
&c., (and the critics have done a great deal)--then is the work
oracularly pronounced one of 'High Art;' and the obsequious artist is
pleased to consider it is.
But if, per contra, as in the former case, the works are not to be
literally reconciled, though wrought in the self-same spirit; then
this unfortunate creature of genius is degraded into a lower rank of
art; and the artist, if he have faith in the learned, despairs; or,
if he have none, he _swears_. But listen, an artist speaks: "If I
have genius to produce a work in the true spirit of high art, and yet
am so ignorant of its principles, that I scarce know whereon the
success of the work depends, and scarcely whether I have succeeded or
no; with this ignorance and this power, what needs your knowledge or
your reasoning, seeing that nature is all-sufficient, and produces a
painter as she produces a plant?" To the artist (the last of his
race), who spoke thus, it is answered, that science is not meant for
him, if he like it not, seeing he can do without it, and seeing,
moreover, that with it _alone_ he can never do. Science here does not
make; it unmakes, wonderingly to find the making of what God has
made--of what God has made through the poet, leading him blindly by a
path which he has not known; this path science follows slowly and in
wonder. But though science is not to make the artist, there is no
reason in nature that the artist reject it. Still, science is
properly the birthright of the critic; 'tis his all in all. It shows
him poets, painters, sculptors, his fellow men, often his inferiors
in their want of it, his superiors in the ability to do what he
cannot do; it teaches him to love them as angels bringing him food
which _he_ cannot attain, and to venerate their works as a gift from
the Creator.
But to return to the critical errors relating to 'High Art.' While
the constituents of high art were unknown, whilst its abstract
principles were unsought, and whilst it was only recognized in the
concrete, the critics, certainly guilty of the most unpardonable
blindness, blundered up to the masses of 'High Art,' left by
antiquity, saying, "there let us fix our observatory," and here came
out perspective glass, and callipers and compasses; and here they
made squares and triangles, and circles, and ellipses, for, said
they, "this is 'High Art,' and this hath certain proportions;" then
in the logic of their hearts, they continued, "all these proportions
we know by admeasurement, whatsoever hath these is 'High Art,'
whatsoever hath not, is 'Low Art.'" This was as certain as the fact
that the sun is a globe of glowing charcoal, because forsooth
they both yield light and heat. Now if the phantom of a then
embryon-electrician had arisen and told them that their "high art
marbles possessed an electric influence, which, acting in the
brain of the observer, would awake in him emotions of so exalted
a character, that he forthwith, inevitably nodding at them,
must utter the tremendous syllables 'High Art;'" he, the then
embryon-electrician, from that age withheld to bless and irradiate
the physiology of ours, would have done something more to the purpose
than all the critics and the compasses.
Thus then we see, that the antique, however successfully it may have
wrought, is not our model; for, according to that faith demanded at
setting out, fine art delights us from its being the semblance of
what in nature delights. Now, as the artist does not work by the
instrumentality of rule and science, but mainly by an instinctive
impulse; if he copy the antique, unable as he is to segregate the
merely delectable matter, he must needs copy the whole, and thereby
multiply models, which the casting-man can do equally well; whereas
if he copy nature, with a like inability to distinguish that
delectable attribute which allures him to copy her, and under the
same necessity of copying the whole, to make sure of this "tenant of
nowhere;" we then have the artist, the instructed of nature,
fulfilling his natural capacity, while his works we have as manifold
yet various as nature's own thoughts for her children.
But reverting to the subject, it was stated at the beginning that
'Fine Art' delights, by presenting us with objects, which in nature
delight us; and 'High Art' was defined, that which addresses the
intellect; and hence it might appear, as delight is an emotion of the
mind, that 'Low Art,' which addresses the senses, is not Fine Art at
all. But then it must be remembered, that it was neither stated of
'Fine Art,' nor of 'High Art,' that it always delights; and again,
that delight is not entirely mental. To point out the confines of
high and low art, where the one terminates and the other commences,
would be difficult, if not impracticable without sub-defining or
circumscribing the import of the terms, pain, pleasure, delight,
sensory, mental, psychical, intellectual, objective, subjective, &c.
&c.; and then, as little or nothing would be gained mainly pertinent
to the subject, it must be content to receive no better definitions
than those broad ones already laid down, with their latitude somewhat
corrected by practical examples. Yet before proceeding to give these
examples, it might be remarked of 'High Art,' that it always might,
if it do not always excite some portion of delight, irrespective of
that subsequent delight consequent upon the examination of a
curiosity; that its function is sometimes, with this portion of
delight, to commingle grief or distress, and that it may, (though
this is _not_ its function,) excite mental anguish, and by a reflex
action, actual body pain. Now then to particularize, by example; let
us suppose a perfect and correct painting of a stone, a common stone
such as we walk over. Now although this subject might to a religious
man, suggest a text of scripture; and to the geologist a theory of
scientific interest; yet its general effect upon the average number
of observers will be readily allowed to be more that of wonder or
admiration at a triumph over the apparently impossible (to make a
round stone upon a flat piece of canvass) than at aught else the
subject possesses. Now a subject such as this belongs to such very
low art, that it narrowly illudes precipitation over the confines of
Fine Art; yet, that it is Fine Art is indisputable, since no mere
mechanic artisan, or other than one specially gifted by nature, could
produce it. This then shall introduce us to "Subject." This subject
then, standing where fine art gradually confines with mechanic art,
and almost midway between them; of no use nor beauty; but to be
wondered at as a curiosity; is a subject of scandalous import to the
artist, to the artist thus gifted by nature with a talent to
reproduce her fleeting and wondrous forms. But if, as the writer
doubts, nature could afford a monster so qualified for a poet, yet
destitute of poetical genius; then the scandal attaches if he attempt
a step in advance, or neglect to join himself to those, a most useful
class of mechanic artists, who illustrate the sciences by drawing and
diagram.
But as the subject supposed is one never treated in painting; only
instanced, in fact, to exemplify an extreme; let us consider the
merits of a subject really practical, such as 'dead game,' or 'a
basket of fruit;' and the first general idea such a subject will
excite is simply that of _food_, 'something to eat.' For though fruit
on the tree, or a pheasant in the air, is a portion of nature and
properly belongs to the section, 'Landscape,' a division of art
intellectual enough; yet gather the fruit or bring down the pheasant,
and you presently bring down the poetry with it; and although Sterne
could sentimentalize upon a dead ass; and though a dead pheasant in
the larder, or a dead sheep at a butcher's, may excite feelings akin
to anything but good living; and though they may _there_ be the
excitive causes of poetical, nay, or moral reflexion; yet, see them
on the canvass, and the first and uppermost idea will be that of
'_Food_,' and how, in the name of decency, they ever came there. It
will be vain to argue that gathered fruit is only nature under a
certain phase, and that a dead sheep or a dead pheasant is only a
dead animal like a dead ass--it will be pitiably vain and miserable
sophistry, since we know that the dead pheasant in a picture will
always be as _food_, while the same at he poulterer's will be but a
dead pheasant.
For we have not one only, but numerous general ideas annexed to every
object in nature. Thus one of the series may be that that object is
matter, one that it is individual matter, one that it is animal
matter, one that it is a bird, one that it is a pheasant, one that it
is a dead pheasant, and one that it is food. Now, our general ideas
or notions are not evoked in this order as each new object addresses
the mind; but that general idea is _first_ elicited which accords
with the first or principle destination of the object: thus the first
general idea of a cowry, to the Indian, is that of money, not of a
shell; and our first general idea of a dead pheasant is that of food,
whereas to a zoologist it might have a different effect: but this is
the exception. But it was said, that a dead pheasant in a picture
would always be as food, while the same at the poulterer's would be
but a dead pheasant: what then becomes of the first general idea? It
seems to be disposed of thus: at the first sight of the shop, the
idea is that of food, and next (if you are not hungry, and poets
never are), the mind will be attracted to the species of animal,
and (unless hunger presses) you may be led on to moralize like
Sterne: but, amongst pictures, where there is nothing else to
excite the general ideas of food, this, whenever adverted to,
must over re-excite that idea; and hence it appears that these
_esculent_ subjects might be poetical enough if exhibited all
together, _i.e._, they must be surrounded with eatables, like
a possibly-poetical-pheasant in a poulterer's shop.
Longer stress has been laid upon this subject, "Still Life," than
would seem justified by its insignificance, but as this is a branch
of art which has never aspired to be 'High Art,' it contains
something definite in its character which makes it better worth the
analysis than might appear at first sight; but still, as a latitude
has been taken in the investigation which is ever unavoidable in the
handling of such mercurial matter as poetry (where one must spread
out a broad definition to catch it wherever it runs), and as this is
ever incomprehensible to such as are unaccustomed to abstract
thinking, from the difficulty of educing a rule amidst an infinite
array of exceptions, and of recognising a principle shrouded in the
obscurity of conflicting details; it appears expedient, before
pursuing the question, to reinforce the first broad elementary
principles with what definite modification they may have acquired in
their progress to this point in the argument, together with the
additional data which may have resulted from analytic reference to
other correlative matter.
First then, as Fine Art delights in proportion to the delectating
interest of the objects it depicts, and, as subsequently stated,
grieves or distresses in proportion as the objects are grievous or
distressing, we have this resultant: "Fine Art _excites_ in
proportion to the excitor influence of the object;" and then, that
"_fine art_ excites either the sensory or the mental faculties, in a
like proportion to the excitor properties of the objects
respectively." Thus then we have, definitely stated, the powers or
capabilities of _Fine Art_, as regulated and governed by the objects
it selects, and the objects it selects making its subject. Now the
question in hand is, "what the nature of that _subject_ should be,"
but the _subject_ must be according to what Fine Art proposes to
effect; all then must depend upon this proposition. For if you
propose that Fine Art shall excite sensual pleasure, then such
objects as excite sensual pleasure should form the _subject_ of Fine
Art; and those which excite sensual pleasure in the highest degree,
will form the _highest subject_--'High Art.' Or if you propose that
Fine Art shall excite a physical energetic activity, by addressing
the sensory organism, which is a phase of the former proposition,
(for what are popularly called sensual pleasures, are only particular
sensory excitements sought by a physical appetite, while this
sensory-organic activity is physically appetent also,) then the
subjects of art ought to be draw form such objects as excite a
general activity, such as field-sports, bull-fights, battles,
executions, court pageants, conflagrations, murders; and those which
most intensely excite this sensory-organic activity, by expressing
most of physical human power or suffering, such as battles,
executions, regality, murder, would afford the _highest subject_ of
Fine Art, and consequently these would be "_High Art_." But if you
propose (with the writer) that _Fine Art_ shall regard the general
happiness of man, but addressing those attributes which are
_peculiarly human_, by exciting the activity of his rational and
benevolent powers (and the writer would add, man's religious
aspirations, but omits it as sufficiently evolvable from the
proposition, and since some well-willing men cannot at present
recognize man as a religious animal), then the subject of Fine Art
should be drawn from objects which address and excite the activity of
man's rational and benevolent powers, such as:--acts of justice--of
mercy--good government--order--acts of intellect--men obviously
speaking or thinking abstract thoughts, as evinced by one speaking to
another, and looking at, or indicating, a flower, or a picture, or a
star, or by looking on the wall while speaking--or, if the scene be
from a _good_ play, or story, or another beneficent work, then not
only of men in abstract thought or meditation, but, it may be, in
simple conversation, or in passion--or a simple representation of a
person in a play or story, as of Jacques, Ferdinand, or Cordelia; or,
in real life, portraits of those who are honestly beautiful; or
expressive of innocence, happiness, benevolence, or intellectuality,
but not of gluttony, wantonness, anger, hatred, or malevolence,
unless in some cases of justifiable satire--of histrionic or historic
portraiture--landscape--natural phenomena--animals, not
_indiscriminately_--in some cases, grand or beautiful buildings, even
without figures--any scene on sea or land which induces
reflection--all subjects from such parts of history as are morally or
intellectually instructive or attractive--and therefore
pageants--battles--and _even_ executions--all forms of thought and
poetry, however wild, if consistent with rational benevolence--all
scenes serious or comic, domestic or historical--all religious
subjects proposing good that will not shock any reasonable number of
reasonable men--all subjects that leave the artist wiser and
happier--and none which intrinsically act otherwise--to sum all,
every thing or incident in nature which excites, or may be made to
excite, the mind and the heart of man as a mentally intelligent, not
as a brute animal, is a subject for Fine Art, at all times, in all
places, and in all ages. But as all these subjects in nature affect
our hearts or our understanding in proportion to the heart and
understanding we have to apprehend and to love them, those will
excite us most intensely which we know most of and love most. But as
we may learn to know them all and to love them all, and what is dark
to-day may be luminous to-morrow, and things, dumb to-day, to-morrow
grow voiceful, and the strange voice of to-day be plain and reproach
us to-morrow; who shall adventure to say that this or that is the
highest? And if it appear that all these subjects in nature _may_
affect us with equal intensity, and that the artist's representations
affect as the subjects affect, then it follows, with all these
subjects, Fine Art may affect us equally; but the subjects may all be
high; therefore, all Fine Art may be High Art.