FOUGHT APRIL 16^{TH}, 1746

As soon as certain intelligence was brought that the Duke of Cumberland

had begun his march from Aberdeen northwards, the Prince sent orders to

Ross, Sutherland, Lochaber, and Badenoch, that all the detachments of

his army, in these places, should join him immediately at Inverness.

The Duke of Cumberland passed the Spey on the 13th, and on the 14th

encamped at Nairn, about 10 miles from Culloden. On this the Prince

assembled his men in and about Inverness, and marched at their head to

Culloden-house, where he lay that night, and the troops encamped in the

Parks.

Early next morning, the Prince drew up his army in line of battle,

upon Drummossie muir, south of the house and parks of Culloden, as he

expected that the Duke of Cumberland would have attacked him that day,

being his birth-day.

About noon, when we were informed that he had not moved, it was

proposed to the Prince to make a night attack upon him, in his camp

at Nairn. Various were the reasons for and against this proposal. And

after considering them fully, the Prince approved of the project, as

the most probable chance he had of beating the enemy; provided they

could be surprised by one o’clock of the morning.

We must here observe, that the Duke of Cumberland’s army was double the

number of ours, plentifully provided with money and provisions of all

kinds; having a squadron of ships, loaded with stores, that coasted

along, from Aberdeen to Inverness, in sight of his army, to supply him

with whatever was necessary. Whereas our military chest was spent; the

men had not received pay for some time, had got no provisions this day

but a single bisket each, and were much fatigued by severe duty.

In this situation the Prince could not propose to keep his army

together. He was obliged either to fight or starve. And altho above

3000 men, under the command of the Earl of Cromarty, Macdonald of

Barisdale, Macgregor of Glengyle, Cluny Macpherson, and others, who

were expected every hour, had not yet joined, he resolved to risk the

event of an engagement.

The night attack being therefore agreed to, was to have been executed

thus. One third of the army, commanded by Lord George Murray, were to

have passed the water of Nairn, two miles below Culraick, and two from

Nairn, to have attacked the enemy on the south east near to the sea;

whilst the other two thirds, under the command of the Duke of Perth

and his brother Lord John Drummond, were to have attacked them on the

plain, from the north east and all the way to the sea, so as to have

joined those who were to have attacked on the other side.

That our design might not be discovered by the enemy, the march began

about eight o’clock at night. Lord George Murray led the van. He had

along with him, besides several gentlemen volunteers and officers, 30

men of the Mackintoshes, who lived in that very country, as guides.

They conducted him the moor road, that he might not fall in with the

enemy’s patrolls; and small parties were stationed at proper distances

to prevent the enemy from receiving any intelligence.

As the highlanders had often marched more than two miles in an hour, it

was hoped that they could have reached Nairn before two o’clock. But

before Lord George had marched a mile, he received a message that the

half of the line was at a considerable distance, and orders to halt,

or march slower, till the line should join. He received many messages

by aides-de-camps and other officers, sent for the same purpose, by

the time he had reached six miles. Altho he did not halt, he marched

always slower, hoping that would do: For he knew that a halt in the

van occasions a greater one in the rear, when the march begins again;

whereas by marching slow, the rear might have joined without that

inconveniency.

It was already near two o’clock in the morning, and the van near

four miles from the enemy. Most of the officers of distinction were

now come up to the front; particularly the Duke of Perth, Lord John

Drummond, Lochiel and his brother, and M. oSulivan. The Duke of Perth

told Lord George Murray that unless he made a halt the center and rear

columns could not join. We halted. Here the officers began to examine

their present situation. They were of opinion, that by the time the

line had joined, and the army advanced two miles farther, it would be

day light, and consequently the enemy would have time to point their

canon, draw up their men, and place their horse so as to act in the

most advantagious manner. Besides, a great number of our men had left

their ranks and lain down in the wood of Culraick, which must have

proceeded from faintness for want of food, and not from the fatigue

of a six miles march. In these circumstances the attack was judged

impracticable. To get back to Culloden, so as the men could have some

hours refreshment, in case they should be obliged to fight that day,

was what they agreed to.

As the Prince was about a mile behind in the rear, and the road through

the wood very difficult to pass, they thought it would consume too much

time to send back for orders, Lord George Murray therefore ordered

the retreat. The Duke of Perth went back to acquaint the Prince with

this resolution. At first he seemed much surprised, on which the Duke

offered to march back the men; but after some reflection, he saw it was

then too late.

We marched back the shortest way, as we had not the same reason for

shuning houses in returning as we had in advancing.

The van had only got to the Church of Cray, that is two miles from

where the halt was made, when it was broad day light. This showed that

the enemy could not have been surprised as was intended. However, had

the center and rear marched as quick as the van, it might certainly

have been done.

Between 5 and 6 o’clock, all the army reached Culloden: But many, as

well officers as soldiers went to Inverness and places adjacent, in

quest of provisions, which were difficult to find.

The Prince had scarcely reposed himself an hour, when accounts were

brought, that the enemy was in full march to attack him. He immediately

sent aid-de-camps to bring up the men, who were at Inverness. In

the mean time he marched up the troops that were about Culloden to

Drummossie muir; but half a mile nearer than where they were formed the

preceeding day.

This was our order of battle. The right wing, commanded by Lord George

Murray, consisted of his own regiment of Athol, Camerons of Lochiel,

Stuarts of Appin, one battallion of the Frazers of Lovat, and the

Mackintoshes. The left wing, commanded by the Duke of Perth, consisted

of the Macdonalds of Glengary, Keppoch and Clanranald, two companies

of Macleans, two companies of Macleods, and the Farquharsons. The 2^d

line, commanded by Lord John Drummond and Major General Stappleton,

consisted of the Irish piquets, the regiments of Lord Ogilvy, Lord

Lewis Gordon, Duke of Perth, and Lord John Drummond. On the right wing,

behind the 2^d line, was a troop of Fitz-james’s horse; and on the left

the horse guards, Perth-shire squadron and Hussards. The regiments of

the Earl of Kilmarnock’s foot guards, and Colonel John Roy Stuart, with

such of our men as had no guns formed a sort of reserve.

The whole did not exceed 6000 foot and 150 horse. We had six pieces of

canon, two placed on the right, two on the left, and two in the center

of the front line. Our front was to the east.

The Duke of Cumberland drew up his army in three lines. The first,

commanded by Lieutenant-General the Earl of Albemarle, consisted of

the regiments of Barrel, Monro, Scot’s Fusileers, Price, Cholmondley

and Sinclair. The 2^d, commanded by Major General Huske, consisted of

the regiments of Wolfe, Ligonier, Sempil, Bligh, and Flemming. The

3^d line, commanded by Brigadier Mordant, consisted of the regiments

of Blackeney, Battereau, Pulteney and Howard. On the right wing were

placed Cobham’s dragoons, and the half of Kingston’s horse, with the

Campbells of Argyle.

Had these regiments been all compleat, they should have amounted to

15000 men, but as they were they surely amounted to near 12000 foot

and 1200 horse. Ten pieces of canon were placed in the first line, two

between each regiment; and six pieces in the 2^d line.

The enemy formed at a considerable distance, and marched in order of

battle. About two o’clock afternoon the canonading began.

The Prince, after riding along the lines to animate the men, placed

himself about the center, that he might the more conveniently give his

orders. The enemy’s canon galled us much. One of the Prince’s servants,

who led a sumpter horse, was killed at his side.

We were greatly out-lined both on right and left. Some alterations

were made in our disposition in order to remedy this. Our right was

covered by some old park walls, that led towards the water of Nairn.

The Campbells got behind these walls, pulled them down, and placed a

battery of canon, which did great execution on our right.

The Prince ordered to begin the attack. Our men attacked with all the

fury imaginable, and made several impressions on the enemys line;

particularly the Athol-men broke entirely the regiments of Barret

and Monro, and took possession of two pieces of canon. But the enemy

keeping a close hedge fire, overpowering us with numbers, and attacking

us on both flanks, threw our lines into great confusion, and at last

obliged us to quit the field. The Duke of Cumberland was likewise

assisted by a great storm of hail and rain that blew in our faces.

The Prince did all he could to rally his men, but to no purpose. He was

therefore obliged to retire. He crossed the water of Nairn at the ford

on the high way between Inverness and Corryburgh, and then went to Lord

Lovats. The greatest part of the army went to Ruthven in Badennoch.

As we had not afterwards an opportunity of reviewing our men, we cannot

exactly say what loss we sustained in the action. By the enemy’s

account we lost 2000 men, and they 300. But there is reason to think,

that on the one side they magnify, and on the other diminish the

numbers.

‘Cum rectè factorum sibi quisque gratiam trahat, unius invidiâ ab

omnibus peccatur.’ Tac. Ann. 1. 3 c. 53.

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