THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND THE WAR (CONTINUED).
The wooden guns--Conference with Secretary Stanton--His relations
to Lincoln--Strife between Radicalism and Conservatism--Passage of
the Homestead Law--Visit to the President--The Confiscation Act
and rebel landowners--Greeley's "prayer of twenty millions," and
Lincoln's reply--Effort to disband the Republican party--The battle
of Fredericksburg and General Burnside--The Proclamation of
Emancipation--Visit to Mr. Lincoln--General Fremont--Report of the
War Committee--Visit to Philadelphia and New York--Gerrit Smith--
The Morgan Raid.
On approaching Centreville the first object that attracted our
attention was one of the huge earthworks of the enemy, with large
logs placed in the embrasures, the ends pointing toward us, and
painted black in imitation of cannon. The earthworks seemed very
imperfectly constructed, and from this fact, and the counterfeit
guns which surmounted them, it was evident that no fight had been
seriously counted on by the absconding forces. The substantial
character of their barracks, bake-ovens, stables, and other
improvements, confirmed this view; and on reaching Manassas we
found the same cheap defenses and the same evidences of security,
while the rebel forces were much less than half as great as ours,
and within a day's march from us. What was the explanation of all
this? Why had we not long before, driven in the rebel pickets,
and given battle to the enemy, or at least ascertained the facts
as to the weakness of his position? Could the commander be loyal
who had opposed all the previous forward movements of our forces,
and only made this advance after the enemy had evacuated? These
were the questions canvassed by the members of the committee in
their passionate impatience for decisive measures, and which they
afterward earnestly pressed upon the President as a reason for
relieving General McClellan of his command. They were also greatly
moved by the fact already referred to, that General McClellan had
neglected and repeatedly refused to co-operate with the navy in
breaking up the blockade of the Potomac, which could have been done
long before according to the testimony of our commanders, while he
had disobeyed the positive order of the President respecting the
defenses of Washington by reserving only nineteen thousand imperfectly
disciplined men for that service, through which the capital had
been placed at the mercy of the enemy. Meanwhile the flame of
popular discontent had found further fuel in the threats of McClellan
to put down slave insurrections "with an iron hand," and his order
expelling the Hutchinsons from the Army of the Potomac for singing
Whittier's songs of liberty. Of course I am not dealing with the
character and capacity of General McClellan as a commander, but
simply depicting the feeling which extensively prevailed at this
time, and which justified itself by hastily accepting merely apparent
facts as conclusive evidence against him.
On the 24th day of March, Secretary Stanton sent for the committee
for the purpose of having a confidential conference as to military
affairs. He was thoroughly discouraged. He told us the President
had gone back to his first love as to General McClellan, and that
it was needless for him or for us to labor with him, although he
had finally been prevailed on to restrict McClellan's command to
the Army of the Potomac. The Secretary arraigned the General's
conduct in the severest terms, particularizing his blunders, and
branding them. He told us the President was so completely in the
power of McClellan that he had recently gone to Alexandria in person
to ask him for some troops from the Army of the Potomac for General
Fremont, which were refused. He said he believed there were traitors
among the commanders surrounding General McClellan, and if he had
had the power he would have dismissed eight commanders when the
wooden-gun discovery was made; and he fully agreed with us as to
the disgraceful fact that our generals had not long before discovered,
as they could have done, the real facts as to the rebel forces and
their defences.
It was quite evident from these facts that Stanton, with all his
force of will, did not rule the President, as the public has
generally supposed. He would frequently overawe and sometimes
browbeat others, but he was never imperious in dealing with Mr.
Lincoln. This I have from Mr. Watson, for some time Assistant
Secretary of War, and Mr. Whiting, while Solicitor of the War
Department. Lincoln, however, had the highest opinion of Stanton,
and their relations were always most kindly, as the following
anecdote bears witness: A committee of Western men, headed by
Lovejoy, procured from the President an important order looking to
the exchange and transfer of Eastern and Western soldiers with a
view to more effective work. Repairing to the office of the
Secretary, Mr. Lovejoy explained the scheme, as he had before done
to the President, but was met with a flat refusal.
"But we have the President's order, sir," said Lovejoy.
"Did Lincoln give you an order of that kind?" said Stanton.
"He did, sir."
"The he is a d----d fool," said the irate secretary.
"Do you mean to say the President is a d----d fool?" asked Lovejoy,
in amazement.
"Yes, sir, if he gave you such an order as that."
The bewildered Illinoisan betook himself at once to the President,
and related the result of his conference.
"Did Stanton say I was a d----d fool?" asked Lincoln at the close
of the recital.
"He did, sir, and repeated it."
After a moment's pause, and looking up, the President said, "If
Stanton said I was a d----d fool, then I must be one, for he is
nearly always right, and generally says what he means. I will step
over and see him."
Whether this anecdote is literally true or not, it illustrates the
character of the two men.
On Sunday, the thirteenth of April, we were again summoned to meet
Secretary Stanton, and he had also invited Thaddeus Stevens, of
the House Ways and Means Committee, Mr. Fessenden, of the Senate
Finance Committee, and Mr. Wilson and Colonel Blair, of the Senate
and House Military Committees. The business of this conference
was to consider the necessity of immediate measures for raising
thirty million dollars to pay the troops unwisely accepted by the
President in excess of the number called for by Congress, and the
proper action to be taken relative to the sale of Austrian guns by
a house in New York for shipment to the enemy. The Secretary was
this time in fine spirits, and I was much interested in the free
talk which occurred. Mr. Stevens indulged in his customary bluntness
of speech, including a little spice of profanity by way of emphasis
and embellishment. He declared that not a man in the Cabinet, the
present company excepted, was fit for his business. Mr. Fessenden
said he fully endorsed this, while sly glances were made to Colonel
Blair, whose brother was thus palpably hit. Mr. Stevens said he
was tired of hearing d----d Republican cowards talk about the
Constitution; that there _was_ no Constitution any longer so far
as the prosecution of the war was concerned; and that we should
strip the rebels of all their rights, and given them a reconstruction
on such terms as would end treason forever. Secretary Stanton
agreed to every word of this, and said it had been his policy from
the beginning. Fessenden denounced slave-catching in our army,
and referred to a recent case in which fugitives came to our lines
with most valuable information as to rebel movements, and were
ordered out of camp into the clutches of their hunters. Stanton
said that ten days before McClellan marched toward Manassas,
contrabands had come to him with the information that the rebels
were preparing to retreat, but that McClellan said he could not
trust them. Wade was now roused, and declared that he had heard
McClellan say he had uniformly found the statements of these people
reliable, and had got valuable information from them. But McClellan
was still king, and the country was a long way yet from that vigorous
war policy which alone could save it.
In the meantime the strife between the radical and conservative
elements in the Republican party found expression in other directions.
Secretary Seward, in his letter to Mr. Dayton, of the 22d of April,
declared that "the rights of the States and the condition of every
human being in them will remain subject to exactly the same laws
and forms of administration, whether the revolution shall succeed
of whether it shall fail." Secretary Smith had previously declared,
in a public speech, that "this is not a war upon the institution
of slavery, but a war for the restoration of the Union," and that
"there could not be found in South Carolina a man more anxious,
religiously and scrupulously, to observe all the features of the
Constitution, than Abraham Lincoln." He also opposed the arming
of the negroes, declaring that "it would be a disgrace to the people
of the free States to call upon four millions of blacks to aid in
putting down eight millions of whites." Similar avowals were made
by other members of the Cabinet. This persistent purpose of the
Administration to save the Union and save slavery with it, naturally
provoked criticism, and angered the anti-slavery feeling of the
loyal States. The business of slave-catching in the army continued
the order of the day, till the pressure of public opinion finally
compelled Congress to prohibit it by a new article of war, which
was approved by the President on the 13th of March. The repressive
power of the Administration, however, was very formidable, and
although the House of Representatives, as early as the 20th of
December, 1861, had adopted a resolution offered by myself,
instructing the Judiciary Committee to report a bill so amending
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 as to forbid the return of fugitives
without proof first made of the loyalty of the claimant, yet on
the 26th of May, 1862, the House, then overwhelmingly Republican,
voted down a bill declaring free the slaves of armed rebels, and
making proof of loyalty by the claimant of a fugitive necessary to
his recovery. This vote sorely disappointed the anti-slavery
sentiment of the country. On this measure I addressed the House
in a brief speech, the spirit of which was heartily responded to
by my constituents and the people of the loyal States generally.
They believed in a vigorous prosecution of the war, and were sick
of "the never-ending gabble about the sacredness of the Constitution."
"It will not be forgotten," I said, "that the red-handed murderers
and thieves who set this rebellion on foot went out of the Union
yelping for the Constitution which they had conspired to overthrow
by the blackest perjury and treason that ever confronted the
Almighty." This speech was the key-note of my approaching
Congressional canvass, and I was one of the very few men of decided
anti-slavery convictions who were able to stem the conservative
tide which swept over the Northern States during this dark and
dismal year. I had against me the general drift of events; the
intense hostility of Governor Morton and his friends throughout
the State; nearly all the politicians in the District, and nine of
its twelve Republican newspapers, and the desperate energy and
cunning of trained leaders in both political parties, who had
pursued me like vultures for a dozen years. My triumph had no
taint of compromise in it, and nothing saved me but perfect courage
and absolute defiance of my foes.
One of the great compensations of the war was the passage of the
Homestead Act of the 20th of May. It finally passed the House and
Senate by overwhelming majorities. Among the last acts of Mr.
Buchanan's administration was the veto of a similar measure, at
the bidding of his Southern masters; and the friends of the policy
had learned in the struggle of a dozen years that its success was
not possible while slavery ruled the government. The beneficent
operation of this great and far-reaching measure, however, was
seriously crippled by some unfortunate facts. In the first place,
it provided no safeguards against speculation in the public domain,
which had so long scourged the Western States and Territories, and
was still extending its ravages. Our pioneer settlers were offered
homes of one hundred and sixty acres each on condition of occupancy
and improvement, but the speculator could throw himself across
their track by buying up large bodies of choice land to be held
back from settlement and tillage for a rise in price, and thus
force them further into the frontier, and on to less desirable
lands.
In the next place, under the new and unguarded land-grant policy,
which was simultaneously inaugurated, millions of acres fell into
the clutches of monopolists, and are held by them to-day, which
would have gone to actual settlers under the Homestead law, and
the moderate land grant policy originated by Senator Douglas in
1850. This was not foreseen or intended. The nation was then
engaged in a struggle for its existence, and thus exposed to the
evils of hasty legislation. The value of the lands given away was
not then understood as it has been since, while the belief was
universal that the lands granted would be restored to the public
domain on failure to comply with the conditions of the grants.
The need of great highways to the Pacific was then regarded as
imperative, and unattainable without large grants of the public
lands. These are extenuating facts; but the mischiefs of this ill-
starred legislation are none the less to be deplored.
In the third place, under our new Indian treaty policy, invented
about the same time, large bodies of land, when released by our
Indian tribes, were sold at low rates to individual speculators
and monopolists, or to railway corporations, instead of being
conveyed, as before, to the United States, and thus subjected to
general disposition, as other public land. These evils are now
remedied, but for nearly ten years they were unchecked. The title
to Indian lands was secured through treaties concocted by a ring
of speculators and monopolists outside of the Senate, and frequently
ratified by that body near the close of a long session, when less
than half a dozen members were in their seats, and the entire
business was supervised by a single Western senator acting as the
agent of his employers and the sharer in their plunder. These
fatal mistakes in our legislation have made the Homestead law a
half-way measure, instead of that complete reform in our land policy
which was demanded, and they furnish a remarkable commentary upon
the boasted friendship of the Republican party for the landless
poor.
The conservative war-policy of the Administration continued to
assert itself. The action of the President in promptly revoking
the order of General Hunter, of the ninth of May, declaring free
the slaves of the States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina,
aggravated the growing impatience of the people. On the ninth day
of June I submitted a resolution instructing the judiciary committee
to report a bill repealing the Fugitive Slave Act, which was laid
on the table by a vote of sixty-six to fifty-one, sixteen Republicans
voting in the affirmative. On the second of July I called to see
the President, and had a familiar talk about the war. He looked
thin and haggard, but seemed cheerful. Although our forces were
then engaged in a terrific conflict with the enemy near Richmond,
and everybody was anxious as to the result, he was quite as placid
as usual, and could not resist his "ruling passion" for anecdotes.
If I had judged him by appearances I should have pronounced him
incapable of any deep earnestness of feeling; but his manner was
so kindly, and so free from the ordinary crookedness of the politician
and the vanity and self-importance of official position, that
nothing but good-will was inspired by his presence. He was still
holding fast his faith in General McClellan, and this was steadily
widening the breach between him and Congress, and periling the
success of the war. The general gloom in Washington increased till
the adjournment, but Mr. Sumner still had faith in the President,
and prophesied good things as to his final action.
The Confiscation Act of this session, which was approved by the
President on the seventeenth day of July, providing that slaves of
rebels coming into our lines should be made free, and that the
property of their owners, both real and personal, should be
confiscated, would have given great and wide-spread satisfaction;
but the President refused to sign the bill without a modification
first made exempting the fee of rebel land-owners from its operation,
thus powerfully aiding them in their deadly struggle against us.
This action was inexpressibly provoking; but Congress was obliged
to make the modification required, as the only means of securing
the important advantages of other features of the measure. This
anti-republican discrimination between real and personal property
when the nation was struggling for its life against a rebellious
aristocracy founded on the monopoly of land and the ownership of
negroes, roused a popular opposition which thus far was altogether
unprecedented. The feeling in Congress, however, was far more
intense than throughout the country. No one at a distance could
have formed any adequate conception of the hostility of Republican
members toward Mr. Lincoln at the final adjournment, while it was
the belief of many that our last session of Congress had been held
in Washington. Mr. Wade said the country was going to hell, and
that the scenes witnessed in the French Revolution were nothing in
comparison with what we should see here.
Just before leaving Washington I called on the President again,
and told him I was going to take the stump, and to tell the people
that he would co-operate with Congress in vigorously carrying out
the measures we had inaugurated for the purpose of crushing the
rebellion, and that now the quickest and hardest blows were to be
dealt. He told me I was authorized to say so, but said that more
than half the popular clamor against the management of the war was
unwarranted; and when I referred to the movements of General
McClellan he made no committal in any way.
On the nineteenth of August Horace Greeley wrote his famous anti-
slavery letter to the President, entitled "The Prayer of Twenty
Millions." It was one of the most powerful appeals ever made in
behalf of justice and the rights of man. In his reply Mr. Lincoln
said: "If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I
would do it; if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would
do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others
alone, I would do that." These words served as fresh fuel to the
fires of popular discontent, and they were responded to by Mr.
Greeley with admirable vigor and earnestness. The anti-slavery
critics of the President insisted that in thus dealing with slavery
as a matter of total indifference he likened himself to Douglas,
who had declared that he didn't care whether slavery was voted up
or voted down in the Territories. They argued that as slavery was
the cause of the war and the obstacle to peace, it was the duty of
the Government to lay hold of the conscience of the quarrel, and
strike at slavery as the grand rebel. Not to do so, they contended,
now that the opportunity was offered, was to make the contest a
mere struggle for power, and thus to degrade it to the level of
the wars of the Old World, which bring with them nothing for freedom
or the race. They insisted that the failure of the Government to
give freedom to our millions in bondage would be a crime only to
be measured by that of putting them in chains if they were free.
They reminded the President of his declaration that a house divided
against itself can not stand, and that the Republic can not
permanently exist half slave and half free; and they urged that
this baptism of fire and blood would be impious if the cause which
produced it should be spared to canker the heart of the nation
anew, and repeat its diabolical deeds. A Union with slavery spared
and reinstated would not be worth the cost of saving it. To argue
that we were fighting for a political abstraction called the Union,
and not for the destruction of slavery, was to affront common sense,
since nothing but slavery had brought the Union into peril, and
nothing could make sure the fruits of the war but the removal of
its cause. It was to delude ourselves with mere phrases, and
conduct the war on false pretenses. It was to rival the folly of
the rebels, who always asservated that they were not fighting for
slavery, but only for the right of local self government, when the
whole world knew the contrary. These ideas, variously presented
and illustrated, found manifold expression in innumerable Congressional
speeches and in the newspapers of the Northern States, and a month
later brought forth the President's proclamation of the twenty-
second of September, giving the insurgents notice that on the first
day of January following he would issue his proclamation of general
emancipation, if they did not in the meantime lay down their arms.
The course of events and the pressure of opinion were at last
forcing him to see that the nation was wrestling with slavery in
arms; that its destruction was not a debatable and distant alternative,
but a pressing and absolute necessity; and that his Border State
policy, through which he had so long tried to pet and please the
power that held the nation by the throat, was a cruel and fatal
mistake. This power, however, had so completely woven itself into
the whole fabric of American society and institutions, and had so
long fed upon the virtue of our public men, that the Administration
was not yet prepared to divorce itself entirely from the madness
that still enthralled the conservative element of the Republican
party.
It was during this year that a formidable effort was made by the
old Whig element in the Republican party to disband the organization
and form a new one, called the "Union party." They were disposed
to blame the Abolitionists for the halting march of events, and to
run away from the real issues of the conflict. They were believers
in the Border State policy, and favored the colonization of the
negroes, while deprecating "radical and extreme measures." They
forgot that the Republican principle was as true in the midst of
war as in seasons of peace, and that instead of putting it in
abeyance when the storm came, we should cling to it with redoubled
energy and purpose. They forgot that the contest of 1860 was not
only a struggle between slavery and freedom, but a struggle of life
and death, inasmuch as the exclusion of slavery from all federal
territory would not only put the nation's brand upon it in the
States of the South, and condemn it as a public enemy, but virtually
sentence it to death. They forgot that the charge of "abolitionism,"
which was incessantly hurled at the Republican party, was thus by
no means wanting in essential truth, and that when the slaveholders
were vanquished in the election of Mr. Lincoln, their appeal from
the ballot to the bullet was the logical result of their insane
devotion to slavery, and their conviction that nothing could save
it but the dismemberment of the Republic. They forgot that the
Rebellion was simply an advanced stage of slaveholding rapacity,
and that instead of tempting us to cower before it and surrender
our principles, it furnished an overwhelming argument for standing
by them to the death. This movement was fruitful of great mischief
throughout the loyal States, and on my return to Washington in the
fall of this year I was glad to find this fact generally admitted,
and my earnest opposition to it fully justified by the judgment of
Republican members of Congress.
Immediately after the battle of Fredericksburg, on the 13th of
December, the Committee on the Conduct of the War visited that
place for the purpose of inquiring into the facts respecting that
fearful disaster. The country was greatly shocked and excited,
and eager to know who was to blame. We examined Burnside, Hooker,
Sumner, and Woodbury; but prior to this, in a personal interview
with General Burnside, he frankly told me that _he_ was responsible
for the attack. He seemed to be loaded down with a mountain of
trouble and anxiety, and I could see that he felt just as a patriotic
man naturally would, after sacrificing thousands of men by a mistaken
movement. He said he had no military ambition, and frankly confessed
his incapacity to command a large army, as he had done to the
President and Secretary of War, when they urged him to assume this
great responsibility; and that he was very sorry he had ever
consented to accept it. His conversation disarmed all criticism,
while his evident honesty decidedly pleased me. It was a sad
thought, while standing on the banks of the Rappahannock, that here
were more than a hundred thousand men on either side of a narrow
river, brethren and kindred, and naturally owing each other nothing
but good will, who were driven by negro slavery into the wholesale
slaughter of each other. But General Burnside told me our men did
not feel toward the rebels as they felt toward us, and he assured
me that this was the grand obstacle to our success. Our soldiers,
he said, were not sufficiently fired by resentment, and he exhorted
me, if I could, to breathe into our people at home the same spirit
toward our enemies which inspired them toward us. As I approached
one of the principal hospitals here, I was startled by a pile of
arms and legs of wounded soldiers, and on entering the building I
found scores of men in the last stages of life, stretched on the
floor with nothing under them but a thin covering of hay, and
nothing over them but a coarse blanket or quilt, and without a
spark of fire to warm them, though the weather was extremely cold
and they were literally freezing to death. Some of them were too
far gone to speak, and looked at me so pleadingly that I can never
forget the impression it made. Arrangements were made for their
comfort as soon as it was possible.
On New Year's day I joined the immense throng of callers at the
White House, but did not enjoy the delay of the President in issuing
his Proclamation of Emancipation. It came late in the day, and
brought relief to multitudes of anxious people. Perhaps no subject
has ever been more widely misunderstood than the legal effect of
this famous document, and the circumstances under which it was
issued. Mr. Lincoln was himself opposed to the measure, and when
he very reluctantly issued his preliminary proclamation in September,
he wished it distinctly understood that the deportation of the
slaves was, in his mind, inseparably connected with the policy.
Like Mr. Clay and other prominent leaders of the old Whig party,
he believed in colonization, and that the separation of the two
races was necessary to the welfare of both. He was at that time
pressing upon the attention of Congress a scheme of colonization
in Chiriqui in Central America, which Senator Pomeroy espoused with
great zeal, and in which he had the favor of a majority of the
Cabinet, including Secretary Smith, who warmly endorsed the project.
Subsequent development, however, proved that it was simply an
organization for land-stealing and plunder, and it was abandoned;
but it is by no means certain that if the President had foreseen
this fact, his preliminary notice to the rebels would have been
given. There are strong reasons for saying that he doubted his
right to emancipate under the war power, and that he meant what he
said when he compared an executive order to that effect to the
"Pope's Bull against the Comet."
But he saw no way of escape. The demand for such an edict was wide-
spread and rapidly extending in the Republican party. The power
to issue it was taken for granted. All doubts on the subject were
consumed in the burning desire of the people, or forgotten in the
travail of war. The anti-slavery element was becoming more and
more impatient and impetuous. Opposition to that element now
involved more serious consequences than offending the Border States.
Mr. Lincoln feared that enlistments would cease, and that Congress
would even refuse the necessary supplies to carry on the war, if
he declined any longer to place it on a clearly defined anti-slavery
basis. It was in yielding to this pressure that he finally became
the liberator of the slaves through the triumph of our arms which
it ensured.
The authority to emancipate under the war power is well settled,
but it could only be asserted over territory occupied by our armies.
Each Commanding General, as fast as our flag advanced, could have
offered freedom to the slaves, as could the President himself.
This was the view of Secretary Chase. A paper proclamation of
freedom, as to States in the power of the enemy, could have no more
validity than a paper blockade of their coast. Mr. Lincoln's
proclamation did not apply to the Border States, which were loyal,
and in which slavery was of course untouched. It did not pretend
to operate upon the slaves in other large districts, in which it
would have been effective at once, but studiously excluded them,
while it applied mainly to States and parts of States within the
military occupation of the enemy, where it was necessarily void.
But even if the proclamation could have given freedom to the slaves
according to its scope, their permanent enfranchisement would not
have been secured, because the _status_ of slavery, as it existed
under the local laws of the States prior to the war, would have
remained after the re-establishment of peace. All emancipated
slaves found in those States, or returning to them, would have been
subject to slavery as before, for the simple reason that no military
proclamation could operate to abolish their municipal laws. Nothing
short of a Constitutional amendment could at once give freedom to
our black millions and make their re-enslavement impossible; and
"this," as Mr. Lincoln declared in earnestly urging its adoption,
"is a king's cure for all evils. It winds the whole thing up."
All this is now attested by high authorities on International and
Constitutional law, and while it takes nothing from the honor so
universally accorded to Mr. Lincoln as the great Emancipator, it
shows how wisely he employed a grand popular delusion in the salvation
of his country. His proclamation had no present legal effect within
territory not under the control of our arms; but as an expression
of the spirit of the people and the policy of the Administration,
it had become both a moral and a military necessity.
During this month I called with the Indiana delegation to see the
President respecting the appointment of Judge Otto, of Indiana, as
Assistant Secretary of the Interior. He was afterward appointed,
but Mr. Lincoln then only responded to our application by treating
us to four anecdotes. Senator Lane told me that when the President
heard a story that pleased him he took a memorandum of it and filed
it away among his papers. This was probably true. At any rate,
by some method or other, his supply seemed inexhaustible, and always
aptly available. Early in February General Burnside came before
the War Committee, and gave the most startling testimony as to the
demoralization of the Army of the Potomac, the bickerings and
jealousies of the commanding generals, and the vexations of the
President in dealing with the situation. On the 18th of March I
called on Mr. Lincoln respecting the appointments I had recommended
under the conscription law, and took occasion to refer to the
failure of General Fremont to obtain a command. He said he did
not know where to place him, and that it reminded him of the old
man who advised his son to take a wife, to which the young man
responded, "Whose wife should I take?" The President proceeded to
point out the practical difficulties in the way by referring to a
number of important commands which might suit Fremont, but which
could only be reached by removals he did not wish to make. I
remarked that I was very sorry if this was true, and that it was
unfortunate for our cause, as I believed his restoration to duty
would stir the country as no other appointment could. He said,
"it would stir the country on one side, and stir it the other way
on the other. It would please Fremont's friends, and displease
the conservatives; and that is all I can see in the _stirring_
argument." "My proclamation," he added, "was to stir the country;
but it has done about as much harm as good." These observations
were characteristic, and showed how reluctant he was to turn away
from the conservative counsels he had so long heeded.
On the 3d day of April the final report of the Committee on the
Conduct of the War was completed, and the portion of it relating
to the Army of the Potomac was in the hands of the Associated Press,
and awaited by the public with a curiosity which it is not easy
now to realize. The formation of the committee, as already stated,
grew out of the popular demand for a more vigorous war policy, and
its action was thus exposed to the danger of hasty conclusions;
but the press and public opinion of the loyal States, with remarkable
unanimity, credited it with great usefulness to the country, through
its labors to rescue the control of the war from incompetent and
unworthy hands.
I returned home by way of Philadelphia and New York, and had a
delightful visit in the former place with James and Lucretia Mott,
whom I had not seen since 1850. In New York I attended the great
"Sumter meeting" of the 13th, and spoke at one of the stands with
General Fremont and Roscoe Conkling. While in the city I met Mr.
Bryant, Phebe Carey, Mr. Beecher and other notables, and on my way
home tarried two days with Gerrit Smith, at his hospitable home in
Peterboro. According to his custom he invited a number of his
neighbors and friends to breakfast, and by special invitation I
addressed the people in the evening, at the "free church" of the
town, on topics connected with the war. I could see that Mr. Smith
did not approve the severity of my language, and that this was a
source of amusement to some of his neighbors, but the course of
events afterward radically changed his views, and he admitted that
in his public addresses he was greatly aided by the imprecatory
psalms. I had several delightful rambles with him, our conversation
turning chiefly upon reformatory and theological topics, and I
found myself more than ever in love with this venerable philanthropist
whom I had only met once before, on his visit to Washington the
previous year.
On the night of the 8th of July the fire-bells of the town of
Centreville, in which I resided, roused the people, who rushed into
the streets to learn that General John Morgan, with six thousand
cavalry and four pieces of artillery, had crossed the Ohio, and
was moving upon the town of Corydon. The Governor had issued a
call for minute men for the defense of the State, and within forty-
eight hours sixty five thousand men tendered their services.
Messengers were at once dispatched to all parts of Wayne County
conveying the news of the invasion, and the next morning the people
came pouring in from all directions, while the greatest excitement
prevailed. The town had eighty muskets, belonging to its Home
Guard, and I took one of them, which I afterward exchanged for a
good French rifle; and having put on the military equipments, and
supplied myself with a blanket and canteen, I was ready for marching
orders. The volunteers who rallied at Centreville were shipped to
Indianapolis, and were about seven hours on the way. I was a member
of Company C, and the regiment to which I belonged was the One
Hundred and Sixth, and was commanded by Colonel Isaac P. Gray. Of
the force which responded to the call of the Governor, thirteen
regiments and one battalion were organized specially for the
emergency, and sent into the field in different directions, except
the One Hundred and Tenth and the One Hundred and Eleventh, which
remained at Indianapolis. The One Hundred and Sixth was shipped
by rail to Cincinnati, and but for a detention of several hours at
Indianapolis, caused by the drunkenness of an officer high in
command, it might possibly have encountered Morgan near Hamilton,
the next morning, on the way South. Our reception in Cincinnati
was not very flattering. The people there seemed to feel that Ohio
was able to take care of herself; and, in fact, nothing could have
been more unreasonable than sending a body of infantry one hundred
miles in pursuit of a cavalry force in that vicinity, where an
ample body of cavalry was in readiness, and the river well guarded
by gun-boats.
We were re-shipped to Indianapolis by rail, where we were mustered
out of service and returned to our homes after a campaign of eight
days. This was the sum of my military experience, but it afforded
me some glimpses of the life of a soldier, and supplied me with
some startling facts respecting the curse of intemperance in our
armies.