THE PROGRESS OF MYTHIC SCIENCE
Many are the hypotheses and systems advanced to account for the origin
and existence of myth. It will greatly assist our comprehension of
these and our ability to discern those most worthy of consideration if
we examine them chronologically as well as critically. If we begin our
review with the gropings of the first far-off thinkers who attempted
an analysis of myth, and put to themselves the question "What is myth,
its origin and its meaning?" and advance through the centuries until
we encounter present-day theories, then we should be well equipped to
pursue our course without fear of the pitfalls encountered by early
writers on tradition, or, let us hope, of falling into the grave errors
inevitable when mythological data were less plentiful than at the
present time.
It must be clearly understood that this sketch does not deal with
the _makers_ or restorers of myth, but with the views and notions of
critics who have sought to discover its nature and meaning. Again, we
would remind the reader that we are not dealing with religious science,
but with such mythological notions as have come down to us from early
times to the present.[1]
The first critic of myth was Xenophanes of Colophon (_fl._ 540-500
B.C.), an Ionian exile in Sicily, afterward living at Elea, in
Southern Italy. He supported himself by travelling from place to
place and reciting his own poems. The important part of his writings
for us is that in which he attacks the polytheism prevalent in his
day. Xenophanes did not accept the mythical idea of man-like deities
then current. "There is one God, greatest among gods and men," he
writes, "neither in shape nor in thought like unto mortals ... yet men
imagine gods to be born and to have raiment and voice and body, like
themselves.... Even so oxen, lions, and horses, if they had hands to
grave images, would fashion gods after their own shapes and make them
bodies like to their own." Again he says: "The rainbow, which men call
Iris,[2] is a cloud." Xenophanes appears by his writings to have taken
up the position of a theologian protesting not against polytheism,
but against the idea that the gods possessed human appearance and
attributes. Besides the one great god he seems to have recognized a
plurality of minor divinities who govern portions of the universe. He
stigmatized anthropomorphic myths as "the fables of men of old."
Theagenes of Rhegium was the founder of a very popular system of
mythology. He pleaded for an allegorical rather than a literal reading
of myth. For example, as we have already mentioned, he considered the
battle of the gods 'unbecoming,' and attempted to show that in reality
it was an allegorical rendering of the war of the elements. According
to his view, Hephæstus and Apollo personified fire; Hera, wife of Zeus,
was air; Poseidon, the sea-god, represented water; Artemis was the
moon, and so on. Other gods, he attempted to show by an examination of
their names, were personifications of moral or intellectual qualities.
Pherecydes of Syros (_fl_. sixth century B.C.) wrote a treatise, in
which myth, allegory, and science were blended, on nature and the gods.
He contended that the elements of fire, air, and water sprang from
Cronus, the principle of time, and that from these elements later gods
emerged. Zeus is called the 'principle of life,' so that we have in
Pherecydes' interpretation of myth a pseudo-scientific idea that time
was the originator of the elements, from which in turn the gods had
their being--a very daring hypothesis for the sixth century B.C.!
Hecatæus of Miletus (_c_. 550-476 B.C.) was probably the first critic
to distinguish myth from historic fact Socrates (_c_. 471-399 B.C.)
attempted to show that the nature of divine beings could be discovered
by an analysis of their names. Prodicus (born _c_. 465 B.C.) is
noteworthy for the 'modern' character of his outlook. First of all,
he says, arose such great powers as benefit mankind (for example, the
Nile), then deified men, who rendered services to humanity.
Pherecydes of Leros (_fl. c_. 454 B.C.) modified the myths of Greece
in order to adjust them to popular belief, so that it is scarcely
correct to class him as a critic of myth. Ephorus (_c_. 400-330 B.C.)
treated myths as historical episodes. "By straining after this fancied
history he was prevented from searching into the genuine import of the
legends."[3]
EUHEMERUS
The system of Euhemerus (fourth century B.C.), who lived under King
Cassander of Macedonia, deserves more than passing mention. Like
Ephorus, he considered that myth is history in disguise. The gods
were men, and mists of time and later phantasy had so magnified and
distorted their figures as to make them appear divine. In short, they
were great men deified by later generations. The dead are magnified
into gods in many countries, so Euhemerus' theory possesses a good
deal of truth, but every god was not once a man, nor have all gods
been evolved from the worship of the dead. The truth is that the
myths of many gods have passed through a phase and have been coloured
by an environment in which ancestor-worship has prevailed. Graves
of gods are shown in many lands, and probably portions of legends
relating to real men have been attracted into the myths of certain
gods. Euhemerus' system of interpretation is known as 'euhemerism,'
and was adopted by Vossius, the Abbé Banier, Huet Bishop of Avranches,
Clavier, Sainte-Croix, Rochette, Hoffman, and to some extent by Herbert
Spencer. Ennius popularized his system in ancient Rome. Leclerc, one
of Euhemerus' later disciples, actually proposed the theory that Greek
mythology consisted of the diaries of old merchantmen and seamen!
Some Stoics and Platonists, such as Plutarch, endeavoured to render
myths more intelligible by explaining them 'pragmatically,' and this
system too saw in the gods of Greece kings or merely men. Another
system, the 'Psychic,' believed myth to be explanatory of the various
stages through which the soul must pass. Other Stoics, again, saw
in myths reference to natural phenomena. Thus the first school, the
'Pragmatic,' would see in the figure of Pallas Athene a transfigured
mortal queen; the second, the 'Psychic,' would explain her as the
'understanding,' and the third, the 'Stoic,' as the thicker air between
moon and earth.
Driven to the wall by Christianity, the remaining believers in
Greek myth attempted to justify it by the allegorical system of
interpretation. The early Christian fathers like St Augustine (A.D.
354-430) applauded the system of Euhemerus, in which they beheld the
abhorred mythology abandoned by one himself a pagan. Porphyry (A.D.
233-304), however, considered that there might be a moral meaning
in myth, and others thought it possible that it concealed a germ of
religious truth.
MEDIEVAL MYTHOLOGY
The Middle Ages produced no criticism of myth worthy of attention.
Popular belief in medieval times regarded the gods and goddesses of
antiquity as of diabolic origin, or at least as 'pagans' who had been
relegated to Hell on the advent of Christianity. This view was, of
course, sedulously supported by the priesthood, as may be seen in the
medieval legend of Tannhäuser. Prior to the Renaissance period, with
its revival of classical studies, the gods of Greece and Rome were
frequently confused or identified with other pagan deities and even
with religious leaders like Mohammed, as, for instance, in the phrase
'Mahound and Termagent,' which alludes to the pairing of Mohammed and
Tyr, or Tyr Magus, a Scandinavian divinity. In _The King of Tars_, an
English romance, probably of the fourteenth century, we read how the
Sultan of Damascus destroyed his idols, "with sterne strokes and with
grete, on Jovyn and Plotoun, on Astrot and sire Jovyn." Here Roman and
Semitic deities are mingled in "hideous ruin," like the wicked angels
of Milton, whose poem, by the way, encouraged a later belief that the
Arch-fiend and his associates were no other than the gods of the elder
faiths, Beelzebub, Belial, and, among others,
Osiris, Isis, Orus and their train.
An old Scots piece, entitled _Sir John Rowll's Cursings_ dating perhaps
from the last quarter of the fifteenth century, and in all probability
written by a priest of Corstorphine, near Edinburgh, contains several
interesting allusions which show the condition of mythological
knowledge at that day. It is directed against certain persons who have
rifled the priest's poultry-yard. Sir John is powerful in anathema, and
his thunders must have caused trepidation among the more superstitious
of his parishioners, but the only lines of his rhymed 'Billingsgate'
apposite here are those containing the names of demons, because these
show us how the mythic characters of antiquity were regarded in his
time. He says that the pilferers of his hen-roosts will be hanged and
given to the fiend, and continues:
... and Cerberus thair banis sall knaw
For thair dispyt of the Kirkis law,
Gog and Magog and grym Garog,
The Devill of hell the theif Harog,
Sym Skynar and St Garnega,
Julius appostata,
Prince Pluto and quene Cokatrice,
Devetinus the devill that maid the dyce,
Cokadame and Semiamis,
Fyremouth and Tutivillus,
And Browny als that can play kow[4]
Behind the claith wt mony mow.[5]
All this about the beir salbe[6]
Singand ane dolorous dergie.
Let us try to identify some of these figures. We may pass over
Cerberus, and Gog Magog, who has by this date evidently resolved
himself into two separate individuals. In Harog we probably see that
'Old Harry' who is so frequently apostrophized, perhaps a variant
of the Norse god Odin. In Sym Skynar we may have Skrymir, the Norse
giant in whose glove Thor found shelter from an earthquake, and who
sadly fooled him and his companions. Skrymir was, of course, one of
the Jötunn, or Norse Titans, and probably one of the powers of winter;
and he may have received the popular name of 'Sym' in the same manner
as we speak of 'Jack' Frost. Julius the Apostate, Pluto, and the
Cokatrice are easily identified. Semiamis is, of course, Semiramis,
and it was quite possible that the Babylonian queen bulked in the
popular imagination as an Eastern goddess, fit companion for Mahound or
Mohammed.
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY MYTHOLOGERS
The study of myth can hardly be considered scientific in our modern
sense until nearly the end of the eighteenth century. During the
seventeenth century and the early portion of the eighteenth works were
published from time to time which professed to give an outline of the
myths of Greece and Rome, but in these the critical spirit was almost
entirely absent. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) leaned to the allegorical
interpretation of myth. Thus, Narcissus was self-love, Dionysus
passion, and the Sphinx science. Natalis Comes (_d_. 1582) saw in myth
allegories of natural and moral philosophy. The first writer to strike
upon the true line of interpretation was De Brosses (1709-1777), who in
1760 published a work, _Du culte des dieux fétiches, ou parallèle de
l'ancienne religion de l'Égypte avec la religion actuelle de Nigritie_.
De Brosses showed that animal-worship in ancient Egypt was a survival
of practices such as existed among modern savages. Lafitau (in 1724)
also pointed out the savage element surviving in Greek myth, for which
he found many parallels in his experience as a Jesuit missionary among
the Indians of North America. But all writers on myth were not so
rational as these. Thus the Abbé Banier in his _La mythologie et les
fables expliquées par l'histoire_ (Paris, 1738) traced (as the title of
the book indicates) all myths to an historical basis.
Bryant (1715-1804) in 1774 published _A New System, or an Analysis of
Ancient Mythology_, in which he traced all mythologies to Biblical
sources. Thomas Taylor (1758-1835) in his translation of Pausanias
regarded all myth as allegory.
Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) was the first to see a connexion
between the formation of myth and national development. Without
possessing the orderly and logical mind so necessary to the student
of tradition, he was able to seize spasmodically upon truths or facts
which strongly buttressed his theory. Creuzer in his _Symbolik und
Mythologie_ (Leipzig, 1810-1812) laid stress on the religious character
of myth. According to his view, myth is of the nature of religious
teaching, proceeding from an original revelation, and carefully handed
down in symbolic form by priestly schools. This secret wisdom passed
from the Orient to Greece and became the kernel of all myths, which
therefore contain the wisdom of antiquity in an allegorical form. To
unriddle this is the task of the mythologist, who can only succeed in
doing so by intuition. The mythologist is, like the poet, born not
made, according to Creuzer.
Although the symbolic method is nowadays as dead as the dodo, and in
any case could only apply to very late myths which were the work of
poets or philosophers, it still holds good that the elucidation of
myth is not a matter of pure mental induction, but that it frequently
results from intuition; and who can doubt, with the brilliant examples
of Lang, Gomme, Marett, Saussaye, Hubert and Mauss, Reinach, Rendel
Harris, and Elliot Smith before them, the proud assertion that great
students of tradition _are_ "born not made"?
With K.O. Müller's (1797-1840) _Prolegomena zu einer wissenschäftlicher
Mythologie_ (1825; Eng. trans, by Leitch, 1844) the truly scientific
treatment of myth begins. He saw clearly that the true laws underlying
the confusion of mythic science as he found it were not to be
approached by one but by many ways. The explanation of a myth, he said,
must be the explanation of its origin. A knowledge of the popular life
of antiquity he regarded as indispensable, and he drew a distinction
between the actual, original myth and the myth as sophisticated by
poets and philosophers. Mythic materials, he argued, must be resolved
into their original elements. His dicta are landmarks, almost laws--if
the term 'law' may be applied to a science where at present all is
rather nebulous.
THE PHILOLOGICAL SCHOOL
The comparative study of language did much to reawaken both interest
and industry in the study of myth, and the philological method of
explaining mythic phenomena arose. This system has been called
'comparative mythology.' The appellation is scarcely correct from a
scientific standpoint, as, strictly speaking, the term 'comparative
mythology' implies the comparison of the details of one myth with those
of another, in an attempt to prove the universality of the nature of
myth, or by 'the test of recurrence' to show that widely distributed
myths are related, and that fragments found only in one 'fit' the
other. This comparative mythology implied the comparison of mythic
names in various Indo-European languages with a view to showing that
what was dark and seemingly inexplicable in one language might be made
clear by comparison with the known mythic appellations in another
language.[7]
The leader of this school, the history of which is important for the
proper comprehension of the evolution of mythic science, was Professor
Max Müller[8] (1823-1900), who, coming from Germany to Oxford at
the age of twenty-three to undertake the translation of the ancient
religious books of India on behalf of the East India Company, rapidly
made a position for himself in English scientific circles by his sound
scholarship, indefatigable energy, and wide general culture. The deep
study of comparative philology led him to apply its results to myth.
He regarded language as a necessary condition of thought, not its
arbitrary expression, and considered that words, therefore, contain the
key to thoughts. If language is determined by thought, thought is also
determined by language. Mythology, according to Müller, is properly a
form of thought so essentially determined by language that it may be
described as 'a disease of language.' Its origin must be looked for
in a stage of human development in which intuition or instinct almost
predominates, while abstract thought is unknown. Thus mythical terms
precede mythical thought, and the peculiarities of language which lead
to the formation of myth are the gender of words, polyonymy (numerous
meanings attached to one word), synonymy (the possession of similar
meanings by two or more words), poetical metaphor, and so forth. But
the entire Müllerian conception of mythic science must not be taken
as being contained only in the expression that myth is a 'disease of
language.' Myth, according to Müller, is to be comprehended principally
through language, but not through language only. By reference to
language many but not _all_ mythic phenomena may be understood. Just as
certain rash disciples of Darwin did much to stultify their leader's
evolutionary theory by their applications of it, in the same manner
some of Müller's followers so distorted and exaggerated his views on
myth as to hamper him greatly.
Müller was not the first to apply the methods of comparative philology
to myth, but he was by far the most distinguished exponent of the
system. Before him G. Herman and others attempted to explain myths by
etymology, but they restricted their efforts to the Greek language
only. It was not until the researches of Franz Bopp[9] (1791-1867) and
others laid the foundations of the science of comparative philology
that the way was clear for the study of myth on a linguistic basis.
These studies succeeded in establishing the relationship of the
'Indo-Germanic' languages, and, working with these proven facts behind
him, Müller boldly applied them to mythic phenomena. For example, he
brought forward a comparative formula of the name of Zeus or Jupiter
which he stated thus:
Diaush-Pitar = Zeus Pater = Jupiter = Tyr.
Thus, according to him, the name Diaush-Pitar in Sanskrit was
equivalent to Zeus Pater in Greek, Jupiter in Latin, and Tyr in old
Teutonic.[10] This etymological result is sufficiently scientific in
character for acceptance by even a severe critic of the system. But
scarcely had Müller's method acquired vogue--and its recognition was
of the widest--than a small army of critics arose whose determined
opposition had to be reckoned with. Many of their objections, it is now
clear, were due to misunderstandings. Wherever they lit upon a paradox
or were enabled to confuse the issue by any ambiguity or slackness in
Müller's phraseology, they too often took more than a full advantage
of the chance to score. Indeed, so unsparing was the criticism to
which his conclusions were subjected, and so great was his irritation
thereat, that at length he accused certain of his adversaries of an
attempt to traduce his moral character by charging him with mendacity.
MÜLLER'S CONTEMPORARY CRITICS
But if his critics were unfair, they had legitimate grounds for a
certain opposition to his system. Many of his propositions, as well as
those of his followers, were doubtful; the method was often pushed to
extremes which just escaped being ludicrous; and the somewhat ponderous
erudition behind it seemed only to heighten the absurdity of some of
its conclusions, although the charm and usual clarity of Müller's
literary style were not to be denied. The combat waxed fierce, and
both sides brought up all their forces. Linguistic science, it was
said, is an uncertain medium for determining the substance and nature
of thought. The linguistic and etymological methods had been discarded
by philosophy, only to make an unwelcome reappearance in mythology.
The original meaning of a word is often totally at variance with its
later use. Again, similar mythic conceptions are found with totally
different names, and divergent ones with the same names. These were
serious objections, but they do not destroy the strictly verifiable
conclusions of the philological school. At present the school is in
the deepest discredit; indeed, it may be said to possess scarcely a
single follower; but that its methods are applicable to certain classes
of mythic phenomena no mythologist of experience would deny.
MÜLLERIAN INTERPRETATIONS
Examples which illustrate the Müllerian interpretation or
misinterpretation of myth are his treatment of the tale of Cephalus,
Aurora (Eos), and Procris. Cephalus was the sun, the son of Herse,
the dew; therefore he represented the sun rising over dewy fields.
Eos, as the word implies, is the dawn. Procris comes from a Sanskrit
root _park_, meaning to sprinkle, and is also the dew; therefore it
is the equivalent of Herse, the meaning of which may be found in a
Sanskrit root _vrish_, 'to sprinkle.' The myth is then interpreted:
Cephalus loves Procris--that is, the sun kisses the morning dew; Eos
loves Cephalus--that is, the dawn loves the sun. Procris is faithless,
but her new lover turns out to be the sun in another guise--that is,
the dewdrops reflect the sun in manifold colours. Procris is slain
by Cephalus--that is, the dew is absorbed by the sun. Thus natural
phenomena lurk behind the names of gods and heroes.
The philological school had its internal divisions also. Its arbitrary
interpretations made for schism, and there was considerable diversity
of opinion regarding myths and mythic personages. Two sub-schools
arose, the solar and the meteorological. The first, headed by Müller
himself, "saw sun-gods everywhere," in myth, folklore, and legend.
Perhaps its most zealous disciple was the Rev. Sir George William Cox
(1827-1902), author of _The Mythology of the Aryan Nations_ (1870) and
_An Introduction to Mythology and Folklore_ (1881), two works of great
erudition and charm, powerfully advocating the universality of the
sun myth and based upon a truly scientific investigation of a large
number of myths and tales. Cox did not insist upon the philological
interpretation of myths so much as on their solar character, and he is
"fully aware of the dangers involved in attempts to explain Teutonic,
or Greek, or Latin, or Scandinavian myths solely from Aryan sources."
He also admits the existence of nature myths other than solar, but to
his mind most of those which are not solar are stellar or nebular.
The founders of the meteorological school saw in all myths the
phenomena of the thunder and lightning. Dragons and similar monsters
guard treasures and fair maidens in a celestial stronghold till the
arrival of the hero-god, who slays the monsters and rescues the maiden.
Thus, said they, the dark and threatening thunder-clouds imprison the
light of heaven until the coming of the god, who dissipates them. The
chief supporters of this theory were Kuhn (1812-1881) and Darmesteter
(1849-1894). Laestrin too attempted to interpret myths from nebular
phenomena which he had observed on the Alps.[11]
Few perfectly certain results were achieved by the philological
school. Of convincing certainty at the first blush, a more searching
examination reveals difficulties, and shows that the theories do not
fit the myth with any degree of exactitude; but philology has rendered
and will render real service to mythology, and this young mythologists
would do well to bear in mind.[12]
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL SCHOOL
But the final blow to the pretensions of the philological method as a
'universal solvent' of mythic problems was dealt by the anthropological
school of mythologists. This school accounts for the "wild and
senseless" element in myth by replying that such "wild and senseless"
conceptions can occur only in a savage and primitive state of society,
and that therefore when such elements are found in the myths of
civilized and cultured peoples they must necessarily be a legacy from
a savage past--survivals of savage belief. But ere we proceed further
in our investigation of the work of the anthropological school, let
us see by what arguments it finally divested the philologists of all
authority in the sphere of mythology.
It held, then, that Max Müller's system was a result of the discovery
of the basic unity of the Aryan languages, and was founded on an
analysis of these languages, but it showed that precisely similar myths
exist among Eskimos, Red Indians, South Sea Islanders, Maoris, Bushmen,
and other savage races. "The facts being identical, an identical
explanation should be sought; and as the languages in which the myths
exist are essentially different, an explanation founded upon the Aryan
language is likely to prove too narrow."[13] Again, although we may
discover the original meaning of a god's name, it does not assist us
to understand the myths connected with him, for a striking figure in
myth collects around it many age-old stories and mythic incidents which
have originally no connexion whatsoever with it, just as barnacles are
collected by a vessel in harbour. "Therefore, though we may ascertain
that Zeus means 'sky,' and Agni 'fire,' we cannot assert with Max
Müller that all the myths about Agni and Zeus were originally told of
fire and sky. When these gods became popular they would inevitably
inherit any current exploits of earlier heroes or gods."[14] So that
if these were credited to them it would be erroneously. Names derived
from natural phenomena too, such as sky, clouds, dawn, and sun, are
habitually assigned by savage peoples to living persons. Thus a tale
told of a real man or woman bearing one of these names might easily
become mingled or confused with myths about the real sky, cloud,
sun, dawn, etc. For such reasons the philological analysis of names
is bound to be uncertain in its results. Moreover, when primitive or
savage people think of natural phenomena and celestial bodies, they
have no such ideas in their minds concerning them as have civilized
people. They usually think of them as human beings with like passions
to themselves--in fact, in an 'animistic' way. Müller held that it was
gender-terminations that led later ages to the belief that natural
phenomena possessed personalities, whereas the anthropological school
retorted that _au contraire_ "gender-terminations were survivals from
an early stage of thought in which personal characteristics, including
sex, had been attributed to all phenomena." This stage of thought is
to be observed among savages and young children, who habitually regard
inanimate objects as alive.
MANNHARDT
The defection of Mannhardt, who had long been a pillar of the
philological school, was a further blow to its failing prestige. In a
work published shortly before his death (_Antike Wald- und Feldkulte_,
1877) he explains the growth of his views, and states that "the assured
gains" of the philological school "shrink into very few divine names
such as Dyaus = Zeus = Tuis; Parjany = Perkunas; Bhaga = Bug; Varuna =
Uranus, etc." Many of the other equations of divine names he regards as
mere _jeux d'esprit_. "To the principle of Max Müller," he says, "I can
only assign a very limited value, if any value at all" (_op. cit_., p.
20). And again: "Taken all in all, I consider the greater part of the
results hitherto obtained in the field of Indo-Germanic comparative
mythology to be, as yet, a failure, premature or incomplete, my own
efforts in _German Myths_ (1858) included." In an essay on Demeter
published somewhat later he further insisted upon the weakness of the
philological method. Moreover, he disapproved of finding celestial
phenomena in myths of terrestrial happenings. To this standpoint he was
brought by his own experience of how easy (and fatal) it is to become
the victim of a 'mythological habit'--that is, the interpretation of
myths by one method and by that alone. Writing to his friend Müllenhoff
in 1876, he said that he had become uneasy "at the extent which sun
myths threaten to assume in my comparisons." Mannhardt was a wise man
and an honest one. He saw clearly that there is no universal solvent
for myth, no single philosopher's stone by which it may be made to
yield its secrets, no royal road to its elucidation.
At the same time he adhered to the truth that "a portion of
the older myths arose from nature poetry which is no longer
directly intelligible to us, but has to be interpreted by means of
analogies.... Of these nature myths, some have reference to the life
and circumstances of the sun." As Lang has said of him:[15] "Like
every sensible person, he knew that there are numerous real, obvious,
confessed solar myths _not_ derived from a disease of language. These
arise from (1) the impulse to account for the doings of the sun by
telling a story about him as if he were a person; (2) from the natural
poetry of the human mind. What we think they are _not_ shown to arise
from is forgetfulness of meanings of old words, which, _ex hypothesi,_
have become proper names." And again: "It is a popular delusion that
the anthropological mythologists deny the existence of solar myths, or
of nature myths in general. These are extremely common. What we demur
to is the explanation of divine and heroic myths at large as solar
or elemental, when the original sense has been lost by the ancient
narrators, and when the elemental explanation rests on conjectural
and conflicting etymologies and interpretations of old proper
names--Athene, Hera, Artemis, and the rest."
Mannhardt's method was more that of the folklorist than the
philologist. He closely examined peasant custom and rite in the hope
of discovering survivals of paganism. Indeed, his work may be said to
be the foundation upon which Sir James George Frazer (whose work will
be fully reviewed later) built his imposing edifices of research, _The
Golden Bough_ and other works.
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL POSITION
The anthropological creed might, broadly, be stated as follows, with,
of course, small divergences caused by internal division:
(1) The savage and irrational element in 'civilized' myth is composed
of primitive survivals in more civilized times.
(2) The comparison of civilized with savage myth--that is, of later
with earlier myth--frequently throws light upon the character of the
latter.
(3) The comparison of similar myths among widely divergent peoples
frequently illuminates their primitive character and meaning.
Broadly speaking, too, the anthropological school accepts such views
as have been laid down in the introductory chapter concerning animism,
fetishism, and totemism; and when we come to deal with authorities who
diverge in any way from these views we shall show how they differ.
SIR E. B. TYLOR
Sir E. B. Tylor, the virtual founder of the anthropological school,
in his _Researches into the Early History of Mankind_ (1865) and
_Primitive Culture_ (1871), first laid down the anthropological
position with clearness and accuracy.
In a statement which appeared in his epoch-making work, _Primitive
Culture_, Tylor briefly reviews the conceptions of the early
commentators regarding myth, and shows how necessary breadth of
knowledge and handling is for mythological work. The scientific
interpretation of myth is strengthened and assisted by the comparison
of examples. There are groups of myths, and the greater the number
which can be grouped together, the more evidence is provided for the
formation of a true science of mythology. Few and simple are the
principles which underlie a solid system of interpretation. "The
treatment of similar myths from different regions, by arranging them
in large compared groups, makes it possible to trace in mythology
the operation of imaginative processes recurring with the evident
regularity of mental law; and thus stories of which a single instance
would have been a mere isolated curiosity take their place among
well-marked and consistent structures of the human mind. Evidence like
this will again and again drive us to admit that even as 'truth is
stranger than fiction,' so myth may be more uniform than history."[16]
The work is limited to the consideration of well-authenticated mythic
ideas of almost universal occurrence. "The general thesis maintained is
that myth arose in the savage condition prevalent in remote ages among
the whole human race, that it remains comparatively unchanged among
the modern rude tribes who have departed least from these primitive
conditions, while even higher and later grades of civilisation, partly
by retaining its actual principles, and partly by carrying on its
inherited results in the form of ancestral tradition, have continued it
not merely in toleration but in honour."[17]
IMPORTANCE OF SAVAGE MYTH
The evolutionary character of myth necessitates that its study should
be commenced among races of low culture. "If savage races, as the
nearest modern representatives of primeval culture, show in the most
distinct and unchanged state the rudimentary mythic conceptions
thence to be traced onward in the course of civilisation, then it is
reasonable for students to begin, so far as may be, at the beginning.
Savage mythology may be taken as a basis, and then the myths of more
civilised races may be displayed as compositions sprung from like
origin, though more advanced in art. This mode of treatment proves
satisfactory through almost all the branches of the enquiry, and
eminently so in investigating those most beautiful of poetic fictions
to which may be given the title of Nature Myths."[18]
The nature of personalism in myth is debated, as is the share of
language in its formation, and here it will be seen that Tylor has not
the extreme hostility of certain of his followers to the Müllerian
doctrine. He says: "Language, no doubt, has had a great share in the
formation of myth. The mere fact of its individualising in words such
notions as winter and summer, cold and heat, war and peace, vice and
virtue, gives the myth-maker the means of imagining these thoughts
as personal beings. Language not only acts in thorough unison with
the imagination whose product it expresses, but it goes on producing
of itself, and thus, by the side of the mythic conceptions in which
language has followed imagination, we have others in which language
has led, and imagination has followed in the track. These two actions
coincide too closely for their effects to be thoroughly separated,
but they should be distinguished as far as possible. For myself, I
am disposed to think (differing here in some measure from Professor
Max Müller's view of the subject) that the mythology of the lower
races rests especially on a basis of real and sensible analogy, and
that the great expansion of verbal metaphor into myth belongs to more
advanced periods of civilisation. In a word, I take material myth to
be the primary, and verbal myth to be the secondary, formation. But
whether this opinion be historically sound or not, the difference
in nature between myth founded on fact and myth founded on word is
sufficiently manifest. The want of reality in verbal metaphor cannot
be effectually hidden by the utmost stretch of imagination. In spite
of this essential weakness, however, the habit of realising everything
that words can describe is one which has grown and flourished in the
world. Descriptive names become personal, the notion of personality
stretches to take in even the most abstract notions to which a name
may be applied, and realised name, epithet, and metaphor pass into
interminable mythic growths by the process which Max Müller has so
aptly characterised as 'a disease of language.' It would be difficult
indeed to define the exact thought lying at the root of every mythic
conception, but in easy cases the course of formation can be quite well
followed."[19]
The student of myth must possess the ability to transport himself into
the imaginative atmosphere of the untutored mind. The inspection of
'nature mythology' helps to show that much myth is related to natural
phenomena. "In interpreting heroic legend as based on nature-myth,"
says Tylor, "circumstantial analogy must be very cautiously appealed
to, and at any rate, there is need of evidence more cogent than
vague likenesses between human and cosmic life. Now such evidence is
forthcoming at its strongest in a crowd of myths, whose open meaning
it would be wanton incredulity to doubt, so little do they disguise,
in name or sense, the familiar aspects of nature which they figure as
scenes of personal life. Even where the tellers of legend may have
altered or forgotten its earlier mythic meaning, there are often
sufficient grounds for an attempt to restore it. In spite of change
and corruption, myths are slow to lose all consciousness of their
first origin."[20] And "the etymology of names, moreover, is at once
the guide and safeguard of the mythologist [p. 321]. There was no
disputing the obvious fact that Helios (Sol) was the sun, and Selene
the moon." He examines groups of myths "produced from that craving to
know causes and reasons which ever besets mankind" (p. 392). Allegory
is then treated of. It "cannot maintain the large place often claimed
for it [p. 408], yet it cannot be passed over by the mythologist. A
number of fanciful myths are of the nature of allegory, as that of
Pandora in Hesiod, or Herakles choosing between the paths of pleasure
and virtue." In concluding his chapters on myth, Tylor remarks in a
passage of profound insight: "The investigation of these intricate and
devious operations has brought ever more and more broadly into view
two principles of mythologie science. The first is that legend, when
classified on a sufficient scale, displays a regularity of development
which the notion of motiveless fancy quite fails to account for, and
which must be attributed to laws of formation whereby every story, old
and new, has arisen from its definite origin and sufficient cause. So
uniform indeed is such development that it becomes possible to treat
myth as an organic product of mankind at large, in which individual,
national, and even racial distinctions stand subordinate to universal
qualities of the human mind. The second principle concerns the relation
of myth to history. It is true that the search for mutilated and
mystified traditions of real events, which formed so main a part of
old mythological researches, seems to grow more hopeless the further
the study of legend extends.... Yet unconsciously, and as it were in
spite of themselves, the shapers and transmitters of poetic legend have
preserved for us masses of sound historical evidence."[21]
TYLOR'S ANIMISTIC THEORY
The widely accepted theory of animism which has already been described
(p. 22) was promulgated by Tylor in this work. Man, he thinks, first
attained to the idea of spirit by reflection on various experiences
such as sleep, dreams, trances, shadows, hallucinations, breath, and
death, and by degrees extended the conception of soul or ghost until
he peopled all nature with spirits. From among these spirits one is
finally supreme, if the process of evolution is continued. This theory
discounts the early connexion between religion and ethics, and Tylor
believed that primitive man had no notion of religion or ethics.
JOHN FERGUSON McLENNAN
John Ferguson McLennan (1827-1881), author of _Primitive Marriage_
(1865) and _Studies in Ancient History_ (1876), threw much light upon
the origin and rise of the family and, incidentally, of totemism.
Although he treats the subject from a sociological point of view, his
work is of great value to students of myth because of its illustrations
of totemism. His principal writings on totemism first appeared in the
_Fortnightly Review_ of 1869-1870.
HERBERT SPENCER
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) explained his system of mythology in
_Principles of Sociology_. The mental condition of man when he animates
and personifies all phenomena is accounted for by degeneration, as
in Spencer's view it is not primary but the result of misconception.
Language is only one cause of this misconception: statements which had
originally a different significance are, he thinks, misinterpreted, as
are names of human beings, so that primitive races are gradually led
to a belief in personalized phenomena. The defect in early speech, the
"lack of words free from implication of vitality," is one of the causes
which favour personalization. But in making this statement he appears
to overlook the circumstance that such words as "imply vitality" do
so because they reflect the thought of the men who use them before
misconception can arise through their prolonged use. In any case, the
misconstructions of language which he believes to have brought about
the idea of personality are in his system "different in kind" from
those of the philological school, "and the erroneous course of thought
is opposite in direction." He believes the names of human beings in
early society to be derived from incidents of the moment, the period
of the day, or the condition of the weather. In certain tribes we
discover persons named Dawn, Dark Cloud, Sun, etc. Spencer thinks that
if a story exists concerning people so named, in process of time it
will be transferred to the object or event, which will thereby become
personalized. It is clear, however, that few such stories could be
apposite, and that their occurrence would be rare.
Traditions of persons coming from the neighbourhood of some mountain
or river may grow into belief in actual birth from it. For example,
should tradition state that a man's parents came "from the rising
sun," he will believe himself a descendant of the luminary, which thus
becomes personalized. Holding as he does that ancestor-worship is the
first form of religion, and that persons with such names as Sun, Wind,
or Cloud may be thus worshipped, Spencer believed that nature myths
are a kind of worship of ancestors. Implicit belief in the statements
of forefathers is a further cause of personalizing. He explains the
idea of descent from beast ancestors by the ancestor of the stock or
tribe possessing an animal name, such as Wolf, Tiger, and so forth,
and being confounded by his descendants with a real wolf or tiger.
Spencer never saw that ancestral memory in savages is extremely short
and rarely survives more than three generations. Nor is the savage at
a loss to understand the custom of bestowing animal or nature names
upon persons. He calls his own child Dawn or Wolf, and therefore he
is not tempted to believe that his ancestor was really a tiger or the
dawn. The animal descent almost invariably comes through the female
line, and the mother's totem-kin name is adopted, yet savages do not
worship their ancestresses. The theory, as Lang has said, requires "as
a necessary condition a singular amount of memory on the one hand and
of forgetfulness on the other."
WILLIAM ROBERTSON SMITH
One of the first and most remarkable upholders of the anthropological
school was William Robertson Smith (1846-1894) a professor of Hebrew
in the Free Church College, Aberdeen. The heterodox character of an
encyclopædia article on the Bible led to his prosecution for heresy,
of which charge, however, he was acquitted. But a further article upon
"Hebrew Language and Literature" in the _Encyclopædia Britannica_
(1880) led to his removal from the professoriate of the college.
In 1881 he assisted Professor Baynes in editing the _Encyclopædia
Britannica_, and in 1887 succeeded him as editor-in-chief. He was
appointed Lord Almoner's Professor of Arabic at Cambridge in 1883, and
Adams Professor of Arabic in 1889.
Robertson Smith's most remarkable work--that to which every modern
student of comparative religion owes so much--is his celebrated
_Religion of the Semites_, originally delivered as a series of lectures
at Aberdeen in the three years from October 1888 to October 1891.
It is of course only this author's views on mythology that we have here
to take into account.
Robertson Smith points out that in all ancient religious systems
mythology takes the place of dogma. The sacred lore of a race assumes
the form of stories about the gods, and these tales offer the sole
explanation of religious precept and ritual act, but as myth had
no sacred sanction and no binding force on the worshippers, it was
not an essential part of religion. Myths "connected with individual
sanctuaries and ceremonies were merely part of the apparatus of the
worship; they served to excite the fancy and sustain the interest of
the worshipper; but he was often offered a choice of several accounts
of the same thing, and, provided that he fulfilled the ritual with
accuracy, no one cared what he believed about its origin. Belief in
a certain series of myths was neither obligatory as a part of true
religion, nor was it supposed that, by believing, a man acquired
religious merit and conciliated the favour of the gods. What was
obligatory or meritorious was the exact performance of certain sacred
acts prescribed by religious tradition. This being so, it follows that
mythology ought not to take the prominent place that is too often
assigned to it in the scientific study of ancient faiths."
Robertson Smith thought that in almost every case the myth was derived
from the ritual, not the ritual from the myth. Ritual was fixed, and
myth was variable. The one was obligatory, the other at the discretion
of the worshipper. "Now by far the largest part of the myths of antique
religions is connected with the ritual of particular shrines, or with
the religious observances of particular tribes and districts. In all
such cases it is probable, in most cases it is certain, that the myth
is merely the explanation of a religious usage; and ordinarily it is
such an explanation as could not have arisen till the original sense
of the usage had more or less fallen into oblivion. As a rule the myth
is no explanation of the origin of the ritual to any one who does not
believe it to be a narrative of real occurrences, and the boldest
mythologist will not believe that. But if it be not true, the myth
itself requires to be explained, and every principle of philosophy and
common sense demands that the explanation be sought, not in arbitrary
allegorical theories, but in the actual facts of ritual or religious
custom to which the myth attaches. The conclusion is that in the study
of ancient religions we must begin, not with myth, but with ritual and
traditional usage."
Myths which do not merely explain traditional practices, but "exhibit
the beginnings of larger religious speculation," Robertson Smith also
regards as secondary in character. They may be primitive philosophy
or political attempts to unite religious groups, originally distinct,
or perhaps due to the play of epic imagination. In the later stages
of ancient religions mythology became increasingly important. "Myth
interpreted by the aid of allegory became the favourite means of
infusing a new significance into ancient forms. But the theories thus
developed are the falsest of false guides as to the original meaning
of the old religions. On the other hand, the ancient myths, taken in
their natural sense, without allegorical gloss, are plainly of great
importance as testimonies to the views of the nature of the gods that
were prevalent when they were formed."
In the third lecture or chapter the author propounds the theory of
animism in much the same terms as Tylor, and, speaking generally, the
remainder of the work is occupied with considerations regarding the
religious life of the Semitic peoples, their holy places, their ritual
and sacrifice.
THEOBIOGRAPHY
Robertson Smith is undoubtedly correct in his statement that myth takes
the place of dogma in primitive religion--that "the sacred lore of
priests and people ... assumes the form of stories about the gods." But
having thus connected theobiography[22] with religion and the religious
spirit, it is difficult to discover why he denies a religious character
to myth. "These stories," he says (p. 17), "afford the only explanation
that is offered of the precepts of religion and the prescribed rules of
ritual." If that be the case, surely the group of myths which detail
the deeds of the chief deities is of prime importance to religion.
The 'story' of a religion is its most precious asset. It is from the
'story' of their faith that the majority of people receive their ideas
concerning it. What would Mohammedanism be without the story of the
Prophet? What Buddhism without the tale of Gautama? What Christianity
without the life of Christ? And if the argument applies to the higher
forms of religion, it may surely be applied, and more so, to primitive
faiths. Among savage or barbarous peoples the myth, the body of tales
which circles round the gods, is universal tribal property. It takes
the place of written scripture, it infuses all poetry and epic, it is
represented in sacred drama, it is recited by the neophytes for the
priesthood, it underlies the most sacred mysteries. The contention
that myth was "no essential part of ancient religion" is based upon a
fundamental misconception of the spoken or written story of the gods.
In the present writer's view myth is a most important element of
primitive religion; for whereas ritual often impresses an alien people
as magical and therefore inimical, and is not so readily borrowed,
the wide transmission of myth proves that it not only impresses the
imagination of the races among whom it has origin, but that it is able
to take hold of neighbouring and even distant peoples as well.
Akin to the first error is Robertson Smith's further fallacy that
ritual is prior in origin to myth in primitive religion. "It may be
affirmed with confidence," he says, "that the myth was derived from the
ritual, not the ritual from the myth." Therefore the savage sacrifices
with much involved ceremonial to something concerning which he knows
and has invented nothing!
THE CONSERVATISM OF CHILDHOOD
That myth is sacred may be seen, if our conclusions are correct, in a
fact already employed to explain the fixed and unchangeable character
of the folk-tale. Children, it is observed, listening to a traditional
story do not approve of any alteration in its plot or circumstances. Is
this dislike--one might almost say horror--of alteration in folk-tale
a legacy of the religious dread of any attempt to tamper with the
tales of the gods? If so, such a sentiment would only be likely to
arise in an environment where the idea of the sacred had already made
considerable headway.
This argument does not claim an ethical character for myth, nor for
ritual or the other elements of religion, which did not originally know
of or possess any ethical spirit, but had to acquire it painfully. The
argument that belief in myth was not "obligatory as a part of true
religion" is futile. It was not obligatory because it was natural and
general. That one could not acquire religious merit by knowing it is
also untrue. Intimate acquaintance with the religious story is in many
civilized modern communities (Mohammedans, Hindus, British rural folk)
the measure of piety, and among savages and the peoples of antiquity
(Egyptians, Greeks, Australians, etc.) the religious story is the
nucleus of the most sacred mysteries of the faith.
CORNELIUS PETRUS TIELE
Cornelius Petrus Tiele (1830-1902), a professor of the history of
religions at Leyden, although claimed as an ally by Max Müller, was
much more inclined toward fellowship with the anthropological school.
In his _Revue de l'Histoire des Religions_ (1876, trans. 1878, xii,
250) he says: "I am an ally, much more than an adversary, of the new
school, whether styled ethnological or anthropological. It is true that
all the ideas advanced by its partisans are not so new as they seem.
Some of us--I mean among those who, without being vassals of the old
school, were formed by it--had not only remarked already the defects
of the reigning method, but had perceived the direction in which
researches should be made; they had even begun to say so. This does
not prevent the young school from enjoying the great merit of having
first formulated with precision, and with the energy of conviction,
that which had hitherto been but imperfectly pointed out. If henceforth
mythological science marches with a firmer foot, and loses much of its
hypothetical character, it will in part owe this to the stimulus of the
new school."
Again he says (_op. cit_., p. 253): "If I were reduced to choose
between this method and that of comparative philology, I would prefer
the former without the slightest hesitation. This method alone
enables us to explain the fact, such a frequent cause of surprise,
that the Greeks, like the Germans, ... could attribute to their gods
all manner of cruel, cowardly, and dissolute actions. This method
alone reveals the cause of all the strange metamorphoses of gods into
animals, plants, and even stones.... In fact, this method teaches
us to recognize in all these oddities the survivals of an age of
barbarism long over-past, but lingering into later times, under the
form of religious legends, the most persistent of all traditions.
... This method, then, can alone help us to account for the genesis
of myths, because it devotes itself to studying them in their rudest
and most primitive shape." At the same time, Tiele thought that the
anthropological method "cannot answer all the questions which the
science of mythology must solve, or at least must study." He also
states that the anthropological school is "not entirely wrong" in
claiming him as an ally, and goes on to say: "But I must protest in the
name of mythological science, and of the exactness as necessary to her
as to any of the other sciences, against a method which only glides
over questions of the first importance and which to most questions can
only reply, with a smile, _C'est chercher raison où il n'y en a pas_."
Tiele also considered the anthropological school "too exclusive," and
thought that it might have ignorant camp-followers. In the latter fear
he was justified, as writers who saw totems and fetishes everywhere
were at that time rife; and there are not wanting popular writers of
the present day just as extravagant, who, while highly enthusiastic
over the achievements of the school, only dimly appreciate the
anthropological standpoint.
ANDREW LANG
Perhaps the greatest binding force, and certainly the greatest
popularity, was given to the anthropological school by Andrew Lang
(1844-1913), whose works _Myth, Ritual, and Religion_ (1887), _Modern
Mythology_ (1897), and _The Making of Religion_ (1898), contain
originality, great dialectic ability, and keen insight. Waxing
autobiographical in the second work, Lang wrote concerning his own
position: "Like other inquiring under-graduates in the sixties, I read
such works on mythology as Mr Max Müller had then given to the world;
I read them with interest, but without conviction. The argument, the
logic, seemed to evade one; it was purely, with me, a question of
logic, for I was of course prepared to accept all of Mr Max Müller's
dicta on questions of etymologies. Even now I never venture to impugn
them, only, as I observe that other scholars very frequently differ,
_toto cœlo_, from him and from each other in essential questions,
I preserve a just balance of doubt; I wait till these gentlemen shall
be at one among themselves. After taking my degree in 1868, I had
leisure to read a good deal of mythology in the legends of all races,
and found my distrust of Mr Max Müller's reasoning increase upon me.
The main cause was that whereas Mr Max Müller explained Greek myths
by etymologies of words in the Aryan languages, chiefly Greek, Latin,
Slavonic, and Sanskrit, I kept finding myths very closely resembling
those of Greece among Red Indians, Kaffirs, Eskimo, Samoyeds,
Kamilaroi, Maoris, and Cahrocs. Now if Aryan myths arose from a
'disease' of Aryan languages, it certainly did seem an odd thing that
myths so similar to these abounded where non-Aryan languages alone
prevailed. Did a kind of linguistic measles affect all tongues alike,
from Sanskrit to Choctaw, and everywhere produce the same ugly scars
in religion and myth? The ugly scars were the problem! A civilised
fancy is not puzzled for a moment by a beautiful beneficent Sun-god, or
even by his beholding the daughters of men that they are fair. But a
civilised fancy _is_ puzzled when the beautiful Sun-god makes love in
the shape of a dog. To me, and indeed to Mr Max Müller, the ugly scars
were the problem."
Lang's first work on myth, _Myth, Ritual, and Religion_, after briefly
reviewing the various systems of mythic interpretation prior to and
current in his time, lays stress upon the difference between religion
and myth, in which he sees two distinct human moods, the one sacred,
the other wholly frivolous in origin. This conflict is present in all
religions. The two moods, we are told (p. 5), are conspicuous even
in Christianity, in prayers, hymns, and "the dim religious light" of
cathedrals on the one hand, and on the other in the buffoonery of
miracle plays and the uncouth blasphemies of folk-tales. Backward
peoples too make a distinction between their religion and their
mythology. The 'wild' element of mythic story is then explained as a
survival from the savage state, the mental condition of savages is
described in its bearing upon primitive fiction, and its outstanding
types are outlined, as are some of the world's chief mythic
systems--all to illustrate the anthropological standpoint of the
author. Incidentally is developed the 'All-Father' theory, which will
be dealt with later.
'ERRATIC FANCY' IN MYTH
In this work we have, perhaps, the most valuable statement of the
anthropological case extant, but in it Lang insists too much upon
a fundamental difference between myth and religion. He says (_loc.
cit_.): "For the present we can only say that the religious conception
uprises from the human intellect in one mood, that of earnest
contemplation and submission: while the mythical ideas uprise from
another mood, that of playful and erratic fancy." Absurd and unholy
stories of the gods are common, but all myths are not of this kind,
and many were and are employed as ritual by various peoples, who
recite them frequently as the histories of the gods they worship.
Again, Lang's contention that myth is not 'religious' would seem to
be defeated by his own just argument that myth containing 'wild'
elements dates from primitive times. He accounts for its 'wildness'
by its primitiveness; it was blasphemous because savage. But although
blasphemous to the civilized man, it may not be so to the uncultured
barbarian, and to him may be even religious. Elsewhere Lang cites
Australian myth to prove that one tale is told to "unimportant
persons," such as women and boys, another to the initiated.[23] The
first is of the nature of myth, the second religious in character.
We can discern a measure of truth in what he advocates, but a hard
and fast line cannot be drawn between myth and religion, as no one
can say where myth ends and religion begins. They overlap; and when
we read of the pranks of the Greek Zeus or the Chinook Blue Jay we
may say to ourselves: "Thus the gods figure in the imagination of the
savage, in whom the religious sense is faint. Once myth emerges from
the animistic, totemistic, and barbarous state it rises in character."
But--and this is important--there still cling to it the age-long tales
of the gods as savages, barbaric, bloodthirsty, absurd, in no way to be
cleansed or 'edited' or rendered 'decent,' They are regarded by men as
sacred because they are old.
The arguments against Lang's conception of myth as the ribald brother
of religion are as follows: (1) The majority of ancient myths are
not absurd, obscene, or blasphemous in essence, as is proved by
the circumstances of their invention. (2) Other myths which appear
blasphemous to the civilized mind do not necessarily seem so to the
savage mind. The strange sense of humour peculiar to savages is not
taken into consideration by Lang, nor that most of the absurdities and
obscenities arise from totemic sources _and are therefore necessarily
animal in their characteristics_, (3) The preservation and recital of
myths by priests proves their sacred character.[24]
Therefore, although a difference exists between myth and dogma, it
is one of degree only, not of kind. In all ages the ribald mind has
concocted scandalous stories concerning the gods, but most primitive
myth is not to be classed as 'ribald,' as a careful perusal of it will
show.
LANG'S GENERAL THESIS
Lang states his general thesis clearly on p. 8. He says: "Before going
further, it is desirable to set forth what our aim is, and to what
extent we are seeking an interpretation of mythology. It is not our
purpose to explain every detail of every ancient legend, either as a
distorted historical fact or as the result of this or that confusion of
thought caused by forgetfulness of the meanings of language, or in any
other way; nay, we must constantly protest against the excursions of
too venturesome ingenuity. Myth is so ancient, so complex, so full of
elements, that it is vain labour to seek a cause for every phenomenon.
We are chiefly occupied with the quest for an historical condition of
the human intellect to which the element in myths, regarded by us as
irrational, shall seem rational enough. If we can prove that such a
state of mind widely exists among men, and has existed, that state of
mind may be provisionally considered as the fount and _origin_ of the
myths which have always perplexed men in a reasonable modern mental
condition."
The irrational element in myth, to which we have already given some
consideration, is then discussed by Lang, and as our manner of dealing
with it is founded upon his, it is unnecessary to recapitulate his
arguments. It must be remarked, however, that he lays down (vol. i,
p. 22) the conclusion that "All interpretations of myth have been
formed in accordance with the ideas prevalent in the time of the
interpreters." He states that his theory naturally attaches itself
to the general system of evolution, and through it we are enabled
to examine myth as "a thing of gradual development and of slow and
manifold modifications." Thus we find that much of ancient myth is
a thing of great complexity, composed of the savage 'explanation,'
the civilized and poetic modification thereof, and the later popular
idea of the original tale. "A critical study of these three stages
in myth is in accordance with the recognised practice of science.
Indeed, the whole system is only an application to this particular
province, mythology, of the method by which the development either of
organisms or of human institutions is traced. As the anomalies and
apparently useless and accidental features in the human or in other
animal organisms may be explained as stunted or rudimentary survivals
of organs useful in a previous stage of life, so the anomalous and
irrational myths of civilised races may be explained as survivals of
stories which, in an earlier state of thought and knowledge, seemed
natural enough. The persistence of the myths is accounted for by the
well-known conservatism of the religious sentiment--a conservatism
noticed even by Eusebius."
DIFFUSION OF IDENTICAL MYTHS
The diffusion of identical myths, Lang argues, is due to the universal
prevalence of similar mental habits and ideas at one time or another,
but he admits that this argument may be pressed too far, and that it
will "scarcely account for the world-wide distribution of long and
intricate mythical _plots_." The diffusion of mythic fiction would, in
the judgment of the present writer, justify the opinion that in many
instances borrowing and transmission take place; but all cases should
be examined on their individual merits.
Lang proceeds to examine the mental condition of savages, in accordance
with the views in our introductory chapter, and with special reference
to totemism and magic. The animistic hypothesis is examined. His
chapters relating to cosmogony may be passed over as containing no very
original criticism. The author's 'All-Father' theory, as outlined in
our notice of his book _The Making of Religion_, is set forth, and the
remainder of that work is occupied with a description of the greater
mythological systems of the world, regarding some of which he was not
sufficiently well informed to speak with authority.[25]
"MODERN MYTHOLOGY"
In _Modern Mythology_(1897) Lang shows why the anthropological school
in England was obliged to challenge Professor Max Müller. After
pointing out the inconveniences of Müller's method in controversy,
the author proves that Tiele leans more in the direction of his
school than to that of Müller. He then reviews Mannhardt's position,
which he shows to be also anti-Müllerian. He touches upon Müller's
misunderstandings regarding totemism and reviews "the value of
anthropological evidence." He points out that the past of savages must
have been "a very long past," and insists upon the value of Tylor's
"test of undesigned coincidence in testimony" (the famous 'test of
recurrence') as a criterion of the value of myth. "The philological
method in anthropology" is discussed. Says Lang: "Given Dr Hahn's book
on Hottentot manners and religion: the anthropologist compares the
Hottentot rites, beliefs, social habits, and general ideas with those
of other races known to him, savage or civilised. A Hottentot custom,
which has a meaning among Hottentots, may exist where its meaning is
lost, among Greeks or other 'Aryans.' A story of a Hottentot god, quite
a natural sort of tale for a Hottentot to tell, may be told about a
god in Greece, where it is contrary to the Greek spirit. We infer that
the Greeks perhaps inherited it from savage ancestors, or borrowed it
from savages. This is the method, and if we can also get a scholar to
analyse the _names_ of Hottentot gods, we are all the luckier--that
is, if his processes and inferences are _logical._ May we not decide
on the _logic_ of scholars? But, just as Mr Max Müller points out
to us the dangers attending our evidence, we point out to him the
dangers attending his method. In Dr Hahn's book, the doctor analyses
the meaning of the names Tsuni-Goam and other names, discovers their
original sense, and from that sense explains the myths about Hottentot
divine beings. Here we anthropologists first ask Mr Max Müller, before
accepting Dr Hahn's etymologies, to listen to other scholars about the
perils and difficulties of the philological analysis of divine names
even in Aryan languages. I have already quoted his 'defender' Dr Tiele.
'The philological method is inadequate and misleading, when it is a
question of (1) discovering the origin of a myth, or (2) the physical
explanation of the oldest myths, or (3) of accounting for the rude and
obscene element in the divine legends of civilised races.' To the two
former purposes Dr Hahn applies the philological method in the case of
Tsuni-Goam. Other scholars agree with Dr Tiele. Mannhardt, as we said,
held that Mr Max Müller's favourite etymological 'equations' (Sarameya
= Hermeias; Saranyu = Demeter Erinnys; Kentauros = Gandharvas, and
others) would not stand criticism. 'The method in its practical working
shows a lack of the historical sense,' said Mannhardt. Curtius--a
scholar, as Mr Max Müller declares--says, 'It is especially difficult
to conjecture the meaning of proper names, and above all of local and
mythical names,' I do not see that it is easier when these names are
not Greek, but Hottentot, or Algonquin!"
Then follows a review of the contending methods of the philological
and anthropological schools in the explanation of various myths and
ritualistic customs, and the method of the latter school is clearly
vindicated.
LANG'S ANTI-ANIMISTIC HYPOTHESIS
The thesis of the first portion of Lang's _The Making of Religion_
(London, 1898) is that the abnormal phenomena believed in by savages
and later civilized peoples assisted them to evolve the idea of
godhead. Lang holds that "the savage beliefs, however erroneous,
however darkened by fraud and fancy, repose on a basis of real
observation of actual phenomena." With such a contention, however
ingenious, anthropology can scarcely concern itself, as our knowledge
of the supernatural is by no means sufficient to permit us to apply it
to anthropology.