Lincoln and his Cabinet--An Odd Assortment of
Officials--Misconceptions of Rights and Duties--Frictions and
Misunderstandings--The Early Cabinet Meetings--Informal
Conversational Affairs--Queer Attitude toward the War--Regarded as
a Political Affair--Proximity to Washington a Hindrance to Military
Success--Disturbances in the Cabinet--A Senate Committee Demands
Seward's Removal from the Cabinet--Lincoln's Mastery of the
Situation--Harmony Restored--Stanton becomes War Secretary--Sketch
of a Remarkable Man--Next to Lincoln, the Master-mind of the
Cabinet--Lincoln the Dominant Power.
President Lincoln's Cabinet, while containing men of marked ability and
fitness for their positions, was in some respects about as ill-assorted
and heterogeneous a body of men as were ever called to serve together as
ministers and advisers of a great government. Its selection was a
surprise to the country. Mr. John Bigelow said it "had the appearance of
being selected from a grab-bag." "Not one of the members," continues Mr.
Bigelow, "was a personal or much of a political friend of Mr. Lincoln;
not one of them had ever had any experience or training in any executive
office, except Welles of Connecticut, if he could be claimed as an
exception because of having served three years in a bureau of the Navy
in Washington. Of military administration, still less of actual war, no
member knew anything by experience. The heads of the two most important
departments, the Secretaries of State and the Treasury, were both
disappointed candidates for the chair occupied by Mr. Lincoln. It was
nothing less than Providential that the President was so happily
constituted as neither to share nor to provoke any of the jealousies or
envies of either of them, and by his absolute freedom from every selfish
impulse gradually compelled them all to look up to him as the one person
in whose singleness of eye they could all and always confide. Not
immediately, but in the course of two or three years, they got into the
habit of turning to him like quarrelling children to their mother to
settle all the questions that temporarily divided them."
These Cabinet ministers were a devoted and patriotic body of men, but
their misconceptions of their respective rights and duties were at first
grotesque. Mr. Seward, a man of far greater administrative experience
than Lincoln, assumed that he, rather than the President, was to be the
master mind of the new administration. "Premier" he at first called
himself. Mr. Stanton, the Secretary of War, thought the Navy should be a
sort of adjunct to the War Department--an error of which Secretary
Welles of the Navy Department speedily relieved him. These two men were
altogether too unlike to get on well together. The cold and somewhat
stately Welles was repelled by Stanton's impulsiveness and violence,
while Stanton was exasperated by Welles's calmness and lack of
excitability. "Lincoln's ministers had no idea that he towered above
them," says Mr. John T. Morse, Jr., "and no one of them was at all
overawed by him in those days. Presiding over them at the Cabinet,
casually meeting them, chatting with them or lounging as was his habit
in Stanton's room, Lincoln seemed only officially superior to them. One
of them had expected to be President, and another meant to be; a third
dared to be insolent and unruly; it seemed to be only by a chance of
politics that these men stood to him as junior partners to a senior, or
like a board of directors to the president of a corporation."
The unfriendly feeling existing between members of the Cabinet comes
out in many entries in Welles's Diary. "Pressing, assuming, violent,
impatient, intriguing, harsh, and arbitrary," are examples of the terms
in which Stanton is spoken of by Welles His contempt for the Committee
on the Conduct of the War is expressed in no less stinging words. The
members of this committee "are most of them narrow and prejudiced
partisans, mischievous busybodies, and a discredit to Congress. Mean and
contemptible partisanship colors all their acts." It is amusing to note
that while Secretary Welles was thus outspoken in his criticisms of
others, he himself did not escape calumny. One critic (Thurlow Weed,
who, it may be remembered, had objected to Welles's appointment to a
Cabinet position when Lincoln suggested it to him in their consultation
at Springfield before the inauguration) declared that "It is worse than
a fault, it is a crime, to keep that old imbecile at the head of the
Navy Department." And another critic expressed the uncomplimentary
opinion that "If Lincoln would send old Welles back to Hartford, it
would be better for the Navy and for the country."
The accounts of the earliest Cabinet meetings, as given by Secretary
Welles, who was nearly always present, are full of interest. "Cabinet
meetings, which at that exciting period should have been daily, were
infrequent, irregular, and without system," says Mr. Welles. "The
Secretary of State notified his associates when the President desired a
meeting of the heads of Departments. It seemed unadvisable to the
Premier--as he liked to be called and considered--that the members
should meet often, and they did not. Consequently there was very little
concerted action. At the earlier meetings there was little or no
formality; the Cabinet meetings were a sort of privy council or
gathering of equals, much like a Senatorial caucus, where there was no
recognized leader and the Secretary of State put himself in advance of
the President. No seats were assigned or regularly taken. The Secretary
of State was invariably present some little time before the Cabinet
assembled, and from his former position as the chief executive of the
largest State in the Union as well as from his recent place as a
Senator, and from his admitted experience and familiarity with affairs,
assumed, and was allowed, as was proper, to take the lead in
consultations and also to give tone and direction to the manner and mode
of proceedings. The President, if he did not actually wish, readily
acquiesced in, this. Mr. Lincoln, having never had experience in
administering the Government, State or National, deferred to the
suggestions and course of those who had. Mr. Seward was not slow in
taking upon himself to prescribe action and to do most of the talking,
without much regard to the modest chief, but often to the disgust of his
associates, particularly Mr. Bates, who was himself always courteous and
respectful, and to the annoyance of Mr. Chase, who had had, like Mr.
Seward, experience as a chief magistrate. Discussions were desultory and
without order or system; but in the summing-up and conclusions the
President, who was a patient listener and learner, concentrated results,
and often determined questions adverse to the Secretary of State,
regarding him and his opinions, as he did those of his other advisers,
for what they were worth and generally no more."
It was perhaps natural, in a country so long free from wars as ours had
been, that the Civil War should be regarded as a sort of political
affair to be directed from Washington rather than by commanders in the
field. For the first year or so the feeling was quite general that
military affairs should be directed by Congress, acting through its
Committee on the Conduct of the War, and by the Secretary of War, who
complained bitterly that he was not allowed to assume control of
military movements and that his plans were thwarted by McClellan (whom
he especially hated). The President himself did not escape this
condemnation. The feeling at this time is expressed in a sentence in
Stanton's complaint, reflected through Chase, that "the President takes
counsel of none but army officers in army matters." Chase declared to
Welles, according to the latter, that the Treasury as well as other
departments "ought to be informed of the particulars of every movement."
The generals engaged in planning the campaigns and fighting the battles
of the war, and their commander-in-chief the President, could hardly
fail to find their task an uphill one when ideas so naïve and fatuous as
these prevailed. It is no wonder that General Grant recorded in his
Memoirs the opinion that the great difficulty with the Army of the
Potomac during the first year of the war was its proximity to
Washington; that the conditions made success practically impossible; and
that neither he, nor General Sherman, nor any officer known to him,
could have succeeded in General McClellan's place, under the conditions
that then existed. Gradually, and by slow and often painful experience,
a clearer conception of the meaning and methods of war prevailed. In
this, as in so many things, Lincoln's insight was first and surest. By
patience, tact, shrewdness, firmness, and diplomatic skill, he held the
Cabinet together and stimulated its members to their best efforts for
the common cause.
But the personal frictions and dissensions in the Cabinet, and the more
or less meddlesome attitude of leaders in the Senate and the House, at
times sorely tried the strength and patience of the harassed President,
compelling him to act the part of peacemaker, and sometimes of judge and
arbiter as well. At one time Secretary Stanton threatened to resign; and
Chase declared that in that case he should go with him. Stanton and
Welles were in frequent antagonism, Welles stating in his Diary that
Stanton assumed, or tried to assume, that the Navy should be subject to
the direction of the War Department. Seward was "meddlesome" toward
other departments; "runs to the President two or three times a day;
wants to be Premier," etc., says Welles. "Between Seward and Chase there
was perpetual rivalry and mutual but courtly distrust; they entered the
Cabinet as rivals, and in cold courtesy so continued." The most serious
of these Cabinet embroglios occurred late in December of 1862, while
Lincoln was well-nigh overwhelmed by Burnside's dreadful repulse at
Fredericksburg. The gist of the affair, as given by Mr. Welles, is that
the opposition to Seward in the Senate grew to such a point that a
committee was appointed to wait on the President and request Seward's
removal from the office of Secretary of State. The President, Mr. Welles
tells us, was "shocked and grieved" at this demonstration. He asked all
the members of his Cabinet to meet the Senate committee with him. All
the members of the Cabinet were present except Seward, who had already
sent the President his resignation. The meeting was attended also by
Senators Collamer, Fessenden, Harris, Trumbull, Grimes, Howard, Sumner,
and Pomeroy. The President, says Mr. Welles, opened the subject for
which the meeting was called, taking a conciliatory tone toward the
Senators, and requesting from each in turn an expression of opinion as
to the wisdom of dropping Seward from the Cabinet. Most of them were
strongly of the opinion that Seward ought to go. The President presented
his own views, which were, in effect, that it would be a mistake to let
Seward leave the Cabinet at that particular time. "He managed his own
case," says Mr. Welles, "speaking freely, and showing great tact,
shrewdness, and ability." The meeting continued until nearly midnight,
and the matter was left still in the President's hands. The next morning
Mr. Welles called early at the White House and found Lincoln practically
decided not to accept Seward's resignation, saying that it would never
do to take the course prescribed by the Senators; that "the Government
would cave in; it could not stand--would not hold water; the bottom
would be out," etc. He requested Welles to go at once to Seward and ask
him not to press his resignation. Lincoln's intuitional mind seemed at
once to connect Secretary Chase with the attack on Seward. Before Welles
left the room, the President rang a bell and directed that a message be
sent to Chase requesting him to come at once to the White House. When
Welles returned from his interview with Seward, who readily promised to
withdraw his resignation at the President's request, he found both Chase
and Seward waiting for the President. The latter soon came in, and his
first words were to ask Welles if he "had seen the man," to which Welles
answered that he had, and that he assented to what had been asked of
him. The dramatic scene that followed is thus described by Mr. Welles in
his Diary: "The President turned to Chase and said, 'I sent for you, for
this matter is giving me great trouble.' Chase said he had been
painfully affected by the meeting last evening, which was a total
surprise to him; and, after some not very explicit remarks as to how he
was affected, informed the President he had prepared his resignation of
the office of Secretary of the Treasury. 'Where is it?' said the
President quickly, his eye lighting up in a moment. 'I brought it with
me,' said Chase, taking the paper from his pocket; 'I wrote it this
morning.' 'Let me have it,' said the President, reaching his long arm
and fingers toward Chase, who held on, seemingly reluctant to part with
the letter, which was sealed, and which he apparently hesitated to
surrender. Something further he wished to say; but the President was
eager and did not perceive it, and took and hastily opened the letter.
'This,' said he, looking toward me with a triumphant air, 'cuts the
Gordian Knot. I can now dispose of this subject without difficulty, I
see my way clear.' Chase sat by Stanton, fronting the fire; the
President beside the fire, his face toward them, Stanton nearest him. I
was on the sofa, near the east window. 'Mr. President,' said Stanton,
with solemnity, 'I informed you day before yesterday that I was ready to
tender you my resignation. I wish you, sir, to consider my resignation
at this time in your possession.' 'You may go to your department,' said
the President; 'I don't want yours. This,' holding out Chase's letter,
'is all I want; this relieves me; my way is clear; the trouble is ended.
I will detain neither of you longer.' We all rose to leave," concludes
Mr. Welles. "Chase and myself came downstairs together. He was moody and
taciturn. Someone stopped him on the lower stairs, and I passed on."
A few days later, the President requested both Seward and Chase to
withdraw their resignations and resume their duties. This was done, and
the trouble was ended for the time. Both Secretaries had got their
lessons, and profited by them. By the exercise of tact and patience,
with firmness and decision when required, the President had let it be
known that he was the head and chief of the Administration.
Next to the President, it was not Secretary Seward, the "Premier" as he
wished to be regarded, but the War Secretary, Stanton, who was the
master-mind of the Cabinet. He was the incarnation of energy, the
embodiment of patriotic zeal. With all his faults of temper and
disposition, he was a man of singular fitness for the responsible
position he occupied, and his services to the Government can hardly be
overestimated. He had been a Democrat, a member of Buchanan's Cabinet,
and was, says Dr. Holland, "the first one in that Cabinet to protest
against the downright treason into which it was drifting. He was a man
of indomitable energy, devoted loyalty, and thorough honesty.
Contractors could not manipulate him, traitors could not deceive him.
Impulsive, perhaps, but true; wilful, it is possible, but placable;
impatient, but persistent and efficient,--he became at once one of the
most marked and important of the members of the Cabinet." Lincoln and
Stanton together were emphatically "a strong team."
Stanton was not a member of Lincoln's first Cabinet, but came into it at
the beginning of 1862, in place of Simon Cameron, who had just been
appointed Minister to Russia. A very interesting account of Cameron's
personal relations with Lincoln, the causes that led to his retirement
from the Cabinet, and the appointment of Stanton in his place, is given
by Cameron himself. He had been the choice of the Pennsylvania
delegation for President, at the Chicago Convention in 1860, and it was
largely due to him that Lincoln received the nomination. "After the
election," said Mr. Cameron, "I made a trip to the West at Mr. Lincoln's
request. He had, by letter, tendered me the position of either Secretary
of War or Secretary of the Treasury; but when I went to see him he said
that he had concluded to make Mr. Seward Secretary of State, and he
wanted to give a place to Mr. Chase. 'Salmon P. Chase,' said he, 'is a
very ambitious man.' 'Very well,' said I, 'then the War Department is
the place for him. We are going to have an armed conflict over your
election, and the place for an ambitious man is in the War Department.
There he will have lots of room to make a reputation.' These thoughts of
mine, that we were to have war, disturbed Mr. Lincoln very much, and he
seemed to think I was entirely too certain about it. Finally, when he
came to make up his Cabinet, doubtless remembering what I had said about
the War Department, he appointed me Secretary of War."
"There has been," continues Mr. Cameron, "a great deal of misstatement
as to Mr. Stanton's appointment as my successor. Stanton had been my
attorney from the time I went into the War Department until he took my
place as Secretary. I had hardly made a move in which the legality of
any question could arise. I had taken his advice. I believed in the
vigorous prosecution of the war from the start, while Mr. Seward
believed in dallying and compromising, and Mr. Chase was constantly
agitated about the expenditure of money; therefore it was that I was
careful to have the advice of an able lawyer. When the question of
changing me from the War Department to the Russian mission came up, Mr.
Lincoln said to me, 'Whom shall I appoint in your place?' My prompt
response was, 'Edwin M. Stanton.' 'But,' said he, 'I had thought of
giving it to Holt.' 'Mr. Lincoln,' said I, 'if I am to retire in the
present situation of affairs, it seems but proper that a friend of mine,
or at least a man not unfriendly to me, should be appointed in my place.
If you give Mr. Stanton the position, you will not only accomplish this
object but will please the State of Pennsylvania and also get an
excellent officer.' 'Very well,' said Mr. Lincoln, 'you go and see him,
and if he will accept the place he shall have it.' I left the White
House and started to find Stanton, passing through the Treasury
Department on my way. As I passed Mr. Chase's office, I stepped in and
told him what had occurred between the President and myself. He said,
'Let's send for Stanton; bring him here and talk it over.' 'Very well,'
said I, and a messenger was at once sent. Stanton came immediately, and
I told him of the conference between the President and myself. He agreed
to accept. We walked to the White House, and the matter was settled.
"One of the troubles in the Cabinet which brought about this change was
that I had recommended in my annual report, in the fall of 1861, that
the negroes should be enlisted as soldiers after they left their
masters. This advanced step was regarded by most of the Cabinet with
alarm. Mr. Lincoln thought it would frighten the border States out of
the Union, and Mr. Seward and Mr. Chase thought it would never do at
all."
Just before the retirement of Mr. Cameron, a number of influential
Senators waited upon the President and represented to him that inasmuch
as the Cabinet had not been chosen with reference to the war and had
more or less lost the confidence of the country, and since the President
had decided to select a new war minister, they thought the occasion was
opportune to change the whole seven Cabinet ministers. They therefore
earnestly advised him to make a clean sweep, select seven new men, and
so restore the waning confidence of the country. The President listened
with patient courtesy, and when the Senators had concluded, he said,
with a characteristic gleam of humor in his eye: "Gentlemen, your
request for a change of the whole Cabinet because I have made one
change, reminds me of a story I once heard in Illinois of a farmer who
was much troubled by skunks. They annoyed his household at night, and
his wife insisted that he should take measures to get rid of them. One
moonlight night he loaded his old shot-gun and stationed himself in the
yard to watch for the intruders, his wife remaining in the house
anxiously awaiting the result. After some time she heard the shotgun go
off, and in a few minutes the farmer entered the house. 'What luck had
you?' said she. 'I hid myself behind the woodpile,' said the old man,
'with the shot-gun pointed toward the hen-roost, and before long there
appeared, not one skunk, but _seven_. I took aim, blazed away, and
killed one--and he raised such a fearful smell I concluded it was best
to let the other six alone.'" The Senators retired, and nothing more was
heard from them about Cabinet reconstruction.
Of the character and abilities of Secretary Stanton, and the relations
between him and the President, General Grant has admirably said: "I had
the fullest support of the President and Secretary of War. No General
could want better backing; for the President was a man of great wisdom
and moderation, the Secretary a man of enormous character and will. Very
often where Lincoln would want to say _Yes_, his Secretary would make
him say _No_; and more frequently, when the Secretary was driving on in
a violent course, the President would check him. United, Lincoln and
Stanton made about as perfect a combination as I believe could, by any
possibility, govern a great nation in time of war.... The two men were
the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that
each possessed great ability. Mr. Lincoln gained influence over men by
making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve them. He preferred
yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon
having his own way. It distressed him to disappoint others. In matters
of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least
offensive way. Mr. Stanton never questioned his own authority to
command, unless resisted. He cared nothing for the feeling of others."
In a further comparison of the two men, General Grant said: "Lincoln was
not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and
executing plans. The Secretary [Stanton] was very timid, and it was
impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the
capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against
the army guarding the Confederate capital. He could see our weakness,
but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. The enemy would not
have been in danger if Mr. Stanton had been in the field."
With all his force of character, and his overbearing disposition,
Stanton did not undertake to rule the President--though this has
sometimes been asserted. He would frequently overawe and browbeat
others, but he was never imperious in dealing with Lincoln. Mr. Watson,
for some time Assistant Secretary of War, and Mr. Whiting, Solicitor of
the War Department, with many others in a position to know, have borne
positive testimony to this fact. Hon. George W. Julian, a member of the
House Committee on the Conduct of the War, says: "On the 24th of March,
1862, Secretary Stanton sent for the Committee for the purpose of having
a confidential conference as to military affairs. Stanton was thoroughly
discouraged. He told us the President had gone back to his first love,
General McClellan, and that it was needless for him or for us to labor
with him." This language clearly shows that Lincoln, not Stanton, was
the dominant mind.
Wherever it was possible, Lincoln gave Stanton his own way, and did not
oppose him. But there were occasions when, in a phrase used by Lincoln
long before, it was "necessary to _put the foot down firmly_." Such an
occasion is described by General J.B. Fry, Provost Marshal of the United
States during the war. An enlistment agent had applied to the President
to have certain credits of troops made to his county, and the President
promised him it should be done. The agent then went to Secretary
Stanton, who flatly refused to allow the credits as described. The agent
returned to the President, who reiterated the order, but again without
effect. Lincoln then went in person to Stanton's office. General Fry was
called in by Stanton to state the facts in the case. After he concluded,
Stanton remarked that Lincoln must see, in view of such facts, that his
order could not be executed. What followed is thus related by General
Fry: "Lincoln sat upon a sofa, with his legs crossed, and did not say a
word until the Secretary's last remark. Then he said, in a somewhat
positive tone, 'Mr. Secretary, I reckon you'll have to execute the
order.' Stanton replied, with asperity, 'Mr. President, I cannot do it.
The order is an improper one, and I cannot execute it.' Lincoln fixed
his eye upon Stanton, and in a firm voice and with an accent that
clearly showed his determination, he said, 'Mr. Secretary, _it will have
to be done_.' Stanton then realized that he was overmatched. He had made
a square issue with the President, and had been defeated. Upon an
intimation from him, I withdrew, and did not witness his surrender. A
few minutes after I reached my office I received instructions from the
Secretary to carry out the President's order."
Vice-President Wheeler relates a characteristic incident illustrating
the relations between Lincoln and Stanton. The President had promised
Mr. Wheeler an appointment for an old friend as army paymaster, stating
that the Secretary of War would instruct the gentleman to report for
duty. Hearing nothing further from the matter, Mr. Wheeler at length
called upon the Secretary and reminded him of the appointment. Mr.
Stanton denied all knowledge of the matter, but stated, in his brusque
manner, that the name would be sent in, with hundreds of others, to the
Senate for its consideration. Mr. Wheeler argued that his friend had
been appointed by the Commander-in-chief of the Army, and that it was
unjust to ask him to wait for the tardy action of the Senate upon the
nomination, and that he was entitled to be mustered in at once. But all
in vain; the only reply that could be got from the iron Secretary was,
"You have my answer; no argument." Mr. Wheeler went to the chief clerk
of the department, and asked for the President's letter directing the
appointment. Receiving it, he proceeded to the White House, although it
was after executive hours. "I can see Mr. Lincoln now," says Mr.
Wheeler, "as he looked when I entered the room. He wore a long calico
dressing-gown, reaching to his heels; his feet were encased in a pair of
old-fashioned leathern slippers, such as we used to find in the old-time
country hotels, and which had evidently seen much service in
Springfield. Above these appeared the home-made blue woollen stockings
which he wore at all seasons of the year. He was sitting in a splint
rocking-chair, with his legs elevated and stretched across his office
table. He greeted me warmly. Apologizing for my intrusion at that
unofficial hour, I told him I had called simply to ascertain which was
the paramount power in the Government, he or the Secretary of War.
Letting down his legs and straightening himself up in his chair, he
answered, 'Well, it is generally supposed _I am_. What's the matter?' I
then briefly recalled the facts attending Sabin's appointment, when,
without comment, he said, 'Give me my letter.' Then, taking his pen, he
indorsed upon it:
Let the within named J.A. Sabin be mustered AT ONCE. It is due to
him and to Mr. W., under the circumstances.
A. LINCOLN."
Armed with this peremptory order, Mr. Wheeler called on Stanton the next
morning. The Secretary was furious. He charged Mr. Wheeler with
interfering with his prerogatives. Mr. Wheeler remarked that he would
call the next morning for the order to muster in. He called accordingly,
and, handing him the order, in a rage, Stanton said, "I hope I shall
never hear of this matter again."
It is related by Hon. George W. Julian, already quoted, that on a
certain occasion a committee of Western men, headed by Mr. Lovejoy,
procured from the President an important order looking to the exchange
and transfer of Eastern and Western soldiers, with a view to more
effective work. "Repairing to the office of the Secretary, Mr. Lovejoy
explained the scheme, as he had before done to the President, but was
met with a flat refusal. 'But we have the President's order, sir,' said
Lovejoy. 'Did Lincoln give you an order of that kind?' said Stanton. 'He
did, sir.' 'Then he is a d----d fool,' said the irate Secretary. 'Do you
mean to say the President is a d----d fool?' asked Lovejoy, in
amazement. 'Yes, sir, if he gave you such an order as that.' The
bewildered Illinoisan betook himself at once to the President, and
related the result of his conference. 'Did Stanton say I was a d----d
fool?' asked Lincoln, at the close of the recital. 'He did, sir, and
repeated it.' After a moment's pause, and looking up, the President
said, 'If Stanton said I was a d----d fool, then _I must be one_, for he
is nearly always right, and generally says what he means. _I will step
over and see him_.'" The two men met, and the matter was easily
adjusted. It was this rare combination of good-humor and firmness with
an understanding of the other's trials and appreciation of his good
qualities, that reduced the friction of official life and enabled
Lincoln and Stanton to work together, in the main harmoniously and
efficiently, in their great task of prosecuting the war and maintaining
the integrity of the Union.