THE FANTASTIC IMAGINATION

That we have in English no word corresponding to the German _Mährchen_,

drives us to use the word _Fairytale_, regardless of the fact that the

tale may have nothing to do with any sort of fairy. The old use of the

word _Fairy_, by Spenser at least, might, however, well be adduced, were

justification or excuse necessary where _need must_.

Were I asked, what is a fairytale? I should reply, _Read Undine: that

is a fairytale; then read this and that as well, and you will see what

is a fairytale_. Were I further begged to describe the _fairytale_, or

define what it is, I would make answer, that I should as soon think of

describing the abstract human face, or stating what must go to

constitute a human being. A fairytale is just a fairytale, as a face is

just a face; and of all fairytales I know, I think _Undine_ the most

beautiful.

Many a man, however, who would not attempt to define _a man_, might

venture to say something as to what a man ought to be: even so much I

will not in this place venture with regard to the fairytale, for my long

past work in that kind might but poorly instance or illustrate my now

more matured judgment. I will but say some things helpful to the

reading, in right-minded fashion, of such fairytales as I would wish to

write, or care to read.

Some thinkers would feel sorely hampered if at liberty to use no forms

but such as existed in nature, or to invent nothing save in accordance

with the laws of the world of the senses; but it must not therefore be

imagined that they desire escape from the region of law. Nothing lawless

can show the least reason why it should exist, or could at best have

more than an appearance of life.

The natural world has its laws, and no man must interfere with them in

the way of presentment any more than in the way of use; but they

themselves may suggest laws of other kinds, and man may, if he pleases,

invent a little world of his own, with its own laws; for there is that

in him which delights in calling up new forms--which is the nearest,

perhaps, he can come to creation. When such forms are new embodiments of

old truths, we call them products of the Imagination; when they are mere

inventions, however lovely, I should call them the work of the Fancy: in

either case, Law has been diligently at work.

His world once invented, the highest law that comes next into play is,

that there shall be harmony between the laws by which the new world has

begun to exist; and in the process of his creation, the inventor must

hold by those laws. The moment he forgets one of them, he makes the

story, by its own postulates, incredible. To be able to live a moment in

an imagined world, we must see the laws of its existence obeyed. Those

broken, we fall out of it. The imagination in us, whose exercise is

essential to the most temporary submission to the imagination of

another, immediately, with the disappearance, of Law, ceases to act.

Suppose the gracious creatures of some childlike region of Fairyland

talking either cockney or Gascon! Would not the tale, however lovelily

begun, sink at once to the level of the Burlesque--of all forms of

literature the least worthy? A man’s inventions may be stupid or clever,

but if he do not hold by the laws of them, or if he make one law jar

with another, he contradicts himself as an inventor, he is no artist. He

does not rightly consort his instruments, or he tunes them in different

keys. The mind of man is the product of live Law; it thinks by law, it

dwells in the midst of law, it gathers from law its growth; with law,

therefore, can it alone work to any result. Inharmonious, unconsorting

ideas will come to a man, but if he try to use one of such, his work

will grow dull, and he will drop it from mere lack of interest. Law is

the soil in which alone beauty will grow; beauty is the only stuff in

which Truth can be clothed; and you may, if you will, call Imagination

the tailor that cuts her garments to fit her, and Fancy his journeyman

that puts the pieces of them together, or perhaps at most embroiders

their button-holes. Obeying law, the maker works like his creator; not

obeying law, he is such a fool as heaps a pile of stones and calls it a

church.

In the moral world it is different: there a man may clothe in new forms,

and for this employ his imagination freely, but he must invent nothing.

He may not, for any purpose, turn its laws upside down. He must not

meddle with the relations of live souls. The laws of the spirit of man

must hold, alike in this world and in any world he may invent. It were

no offence to suppose a world in which everything repelled instead of

attracted the things around it; it would be wicked to write a tale

representing a man it called good as always doing bad things, or a man

it called bad as always doing good things: the notion itself is

absolutely lawless. In physical things a man may invent; in moral things

he must obey--and take their laws with him into his invented world as

well.

“You write as if a fairytale were a thing of importance: must it have a

meaning?”

It cannot help having some meaning; if it have proportion and harmony it

has vitality, and vitality is truth. The beauty may be plainer in it

than the truth, but without the truth the beauty could not be, and the

fairytale would give no delight. Everyone, however, who feels the story,

will read its meaning after his own nature and development: one man will

read one meaning in it, another will read another.

“If so, how am I to assure myself that I am not reading my own meaning

into it, but yours out of it?”

Why should you be so assured? It may be better that you should read your

meaning into it. That may be a higher operation of your intellect than

the mere reading of mine out of it: your meaning may be superior to

mine.

“Suppose my child ask me what the fairytale means, what am I to say?”

If you do not know what it means, what is easier than to say so? If you

do see a meaning in it, there it is for you to give him. A genuine work

of art must mean many things; the truer its art, the more things it will

mean. If my drawing, on the other hand, is so far from being a work of

art that it needs THIS IS A HORSE written under it, what can it matter

that neither you nor your child should know what it means? It is there

not so much to convey a meaning as to wake a meaning. If it do not even

wake an interest, throw it aside. A meaning may be there, but it is not

for you. If, again, you do not know a horse when you see it, the name

written under it will not serve you much. At all events, the business of

the painter is not to teach zoology.

But indeed your children are not likely to trouble you about the

meaning. They find what they are capable of finding, and more would be

too much. For my part, I do not write for children, but for the

childlike, whether of five, or fifty, or seventy-five.

A fairytale is not an allegory. There may be allegory in it, but it is

not an allegory. He must be an artist indeed who can, in any mode,

produce a strict allegory that is not a weariness to the spirit. An

allegory must be Mastery or Moorditch.

A fairytale, like a butterfly or a bee, helps itself on all sides, sips

at every wholesome flower, and spoils not one. The true fairytale is, to

my mind, very like the sonata. We all know that a sonata means

something; and where there is the faculty of talking with suitable

vagueness, and choosing metaphor sufficiently loose, mind may approach

mind, in the interpretation of a sonata, with the result of a more or

less contenting consciousness of sympathy. But if two or three men sat

down to write each what the sonata meant to him, what approximation to

definite idea would be the result? Little enough--and that little more

than needful. We should find it had roused related, if not identical,

feelings, but probably not one common thought. Has the sonata therefore

failed? Had it undertaken to convey, or ought it to be expected to

impart anything defined, anything notionally recognizable?

“But words are not music; words at least are meant and fitted to carry a

precise meaning!”

It is very seldom indeed that they carry the exact meaning of any user

of them! And if they can be so used as to convey definite meaning, it

does not follow that they ought never to carry anything else. Words are

live things that may be variously employed to various ends. They can

convey a scientific fact, or throw a shadow of her child’s dream on the

heart of a mother. They are things to put together like the pieces of a

dissected map, or to arrange like the notes on a stave. Is the music in

them to go for nothing? It can hardly help the definiteness of a

meaning: is it therefore to be disregarded? They have length, and

breadth, and outline: have they nothing to do with depth? Have they only

to describe, never to impress? Has nothing any claim to their use but

the definite? The cause of a child’s tears may be altogether

undefinable: has the mother therefore no antidote for his vague misery?

That may be strong in colour which has no evident outline. A fairytale,

a sonata, a gathering storm, a limitless night, seizes you and sweeps

you away: do you begin at once to wrestle with it and ask whence its

power over you, whither it is carrying you? The law of each is in the

mind of its composer; that law makes one man feel this way, another man

feel that way. To one the sonata is a world of odour and beauty, to

another of soothing only and sweetness. To one, the cloudy rendezvous is

a wild dance, with a terror at its heart; to another, a majestic march

of heavenly hosts, with Truth in their centre pointing their course, but

as yet restraining her voice. The greatest forces lie in the region of

the uncomprehended.

I will go farther.--The best thing you can do for your fellow, next to

rousing his conscience, is--not to give him things to think about, but

to wake things up that are in him; or say, to make him think things for

himself. The best Nature does for us is to work in us such moods in

which thoughts of high import arise. Does any aspect of Nature wake but

one thought? Does she ever suggest only one definite thing? Does she

make any two men in the same place at the same moment think the same

thing? Is she therefore a failure, because she is not definite? Is it

nothing that she rouses the something deeper than the understanding--the

power that underlies thoughts? Does she not set feeling, and so thinking

at work? Would it be better that she did this after one fashion and not

after many fashions? Nature is mood-engendering, thought-provoking: such

ought the sonata, such ought the fairytale to be.

“But a man may then imagine in your work what he pleases, what you never

meant!”

Not what he pleases, but what he can. If he be not a true man, he will

draw evil out of the best; we need not mind how he treats any work of

art! If he be a true man, he will imagine true things; what matter

whether I meant them or not? They are there none the less that I cannot

claim putting them there! One difference between God’s work and man’s

is, that, while God’s work cannot mean more than he meant, man’s must

mean more than he meant. For in everything that God has made, there is

layer upon layer of ascending significance; also he expresses the same

thought in higher and higher kinds of that thought: it is God’s things,

his embodied thoughts, which alone a man has to use, modified and

adapted to his own purposes, for the expression of his thoughts;

therefore he cannot help his words and figures falling into such

combinations in the mind of another as he had himself not foreseen, so

many are the thoughts allied to every other thought, so many are the

relations involved in every figure, so many the facts hinted in every

symbol. A man may well himself discover truth in what he wrote; for he

was dealing all the time with things that came from thoughts beyond his

own.

“But surely you would explain your idea to one who asked you?”

I say again, if I cannot draw a horse, I will not write THIS IS A HORSE

under what I foolishly meant for one. Any key to a work of imagination

would be nearly, if not quite, as absurd. The tale is there, not to

hide, but to show: if it show nothing at your window, do not open your

door to it; leave it out in the cold. To ask me to explain, is to say,

“Roses! Boil them, or we won’t have them!” My tales may not be roses,

but I will not boil them.

So long as I think my dog can bark, I will not sit up to bark for him.

If a writer’s aim be logical conviction, he must spare no logical pains,

not merely to be understood, but to escape being misunderstood; where

his object is to move by suggestion, to cause to imagine, then let him

assail the soul of his reader as the wind assails an aeolian harp. If

there be music in my reader, I would gladly wake it. Let fairytale of

mine go for a firefly that now flashes, now is dark, but may flash

again. Caught in a hand which does not love its kind, it will turn to an

insignificant, ugly thing, that can neither flash nor fly.

The best way with music, I imagine, is not to bring the forces of our

intellect to bear upon it, but to be still and let it work on that part

of us for whose sake it exists. We spoil countless precious things by

intellectual greed. He who will be a man, and will not be a child,

must--he cannot help himself--become a little man, that is, a dwarf. He

will, however, need no consolation, for he is sure to think himself a

very large creature indeed.

If any strain of my “broken music” make a child’s eyes flash, or his

mother’s grow for a moment dim, my labour will not have been in vain.

A Dish of Orts : Chiefly Papers on the Imagination, and on Shakespeare · 第 44 / 44 题