THE BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICATION OF THE WORD “GOOD”
“... The majority attend to words rather than to things; and thus
very frequently assent to terms without attaching to them any
meaning, either because they think they once understood them, or
imagine they received them from others by whom they were correctly
understood.... Wherefore, if we would philosophize in earnest, and
give ourselves to the search after all truths we are capable of
knowing, we must, in the first place, lay aside our prejudices;
in other words, we must take care scrupulously to withhold our
assent from the opinions we have formerly admitted, until upon
new examination we discover that they are true.” DESCARTES, “The
Principles of Philosophy,” LXXIV, LXXV.
What do we mean by the word “good”? That is to say, how shall we
describe the action-pattern which the stimulus of this word arouses
in us? What does it mean when _we_ use it, and what does it mean to
us when _others_ employ it in their speech? Before we can answer
these questions, it is first essential to scan the list of things to
which this word is applied, for only by so doing can we identify the
term _good_ with some specific function of the human organism.[7]
Although such a task is a difficult one, the difficulty does not
appear to be insurmountable. In spite of the fact that nearly eighty
significations are possessed by this word, they will, nevertheless,
if pondered long enough, reveal some common core of meaning. And if
we now bear in mind that every such synonym implies a motor mechanism
that is developing a specific attitude toward the environment, we
shall hope to find a true solution to the problem of the meaning of
the concept “good”.
The term _good_ is used as an adjective, noun, and adverb, and
occasionally (Ex. 15) as a verb; in addition, it has sometimes an
idiomatic significance, in which case its exact status as a part of
speech is doubtful. These differences, however, need not concern
us here. _Good_ has originally an adjectival signification, and by
derivation implies _fitting_ or _suitable_. This is highly important,
for since _fitting_ and _suitable_ exclusively describe things which
help us realize our purposes, we may consider the relationship
between _good_ and human behavior to be inseparable. The type of
action-pattern implied by this word may also be faintly foreseen.
We have now the canvas stretched on which our picture of _good_ may
be delineated. Let us proceed to sketch in the first faint lines of
the picture. In the New Oxford Dictionary it is stated that _good_ is
the “most general adjective of _commendation_, implying the existence
in a high, or at least satisfactory degree of _characteristic_
qualities, which are either admirable in themselves [sic!] or
_useful for some purpose_.” This definition succeeds far better in
combining the theory of the Epicureans (good is what you like), of
the Platonists (the good is the typical), and of the Benthamites (the
good is the useful), than it succeeds in throwing a clear light upon
the question we are here attempting to answer, namely, what sort
of responses does the human organism make toward those objects and
persons which it calls “good”? From Palmer’s definition of _good_ as
“good _for_” (“The Nature of Goodness,” p. 13), we are able to derive
even less assistance, especially since it avoids the main issue in
containing the very word to be defined.
Let us now attack this problem by a new method. A survey of all
the things which this word _good_ indicates reveals not only that
it _denotes_ (or simply points out) a host of distinguishable
objects and properties, but that it also _connotes_ (or implies) an
exceedingly numerous array of human activities. And while the sum
total of all these denotations and connotations appears at first to
be an unwieldy mass, it can, I think, be suitably dealt with under
the following five classes:—
A. That which is useful, fit, serviceable, and the like, for any
purpose whatsoever. With such primitive use of the term, the purpose
involved is neither praised nor blamed. The burglar’s jimmy is as
“good” for his purpose as is an overcoat to keep out the cold. Some
ethical writers refer to this as _immediate_, as opposed to _remote_
or _mediate_ good, or as non-moral as opposed to moral good. It is
“good _for_,” without any limitations as to what the “_for_” implies.
William James might have called it “decerebrate good.”
B. That which is useful, fit, or serviceable in the sense of being
_continuously_ or _continually_ so. An extended time being here
introduced, _good_ now becomes almost synonymous with dependable.
Our concept here may refer to anything that sustains life, or
brings peace and contentment in society, and hence at one moment
it emphasizes intelligence and skill, while at another it points
directly to benevolent, spiritual, and esthetic agencies. Moreover,
it not only denotes property (Ex. 28, “goods”), but also frequently
connotes an emotional enthusiasm in the possessor of it.
C. That which fulfils expectation. This signification is sometimes
equivalent to “normal” or “typical,” which terms are also frequently
included in the connotation of “useful” and “dependable.” But here a
distinctly new factor enters into the use of this concept, namely,
the tone of voice by which the word “good” is uttered, for all
colors and shades of emotion and sentiment may be registered by this
means. Hence the concept “good” may be used to imply that which just
passably fulfils expectation, or—
D. It may be used to indicate that expectation has been greatly
and even suddenly exceeded, in which case it sometimes denotes
the presence of something which is rated far above the normal, the
immediately useful, or the mildly beneficent (thereby identifying
itself with some of the significations exhibited in Class B), or—
E. It may be merely expletive. Here the use of the term “good”
rapidly becomes exotic. It signifies only surprise, shock, or spasm.
“Good” as an expletive also becomes closely allied with “good” as an
adverb, in which case its significance as a term by which to express
a judgment of value rapidly evaporates.
_The Results of an Experiment to Determine Which of These Five
Classes Are Implied by the Seventy-Nine Significations of the Word
“Good”_
The choice of these five classes was the result of a test carried
out over a period of several years. Each one of the seventy-nine
significations was printed on a separate slip of paper, and then,
first choosing one of them at random, and employing it as a tentative
standard, the points of similarity and difference between it and the
remaining significations were determined and recorded. From this
procedure there gradually arose, by differentiation and condensation,
the five classes we have just indicated, which, as may be observed,
are defined so as to include as many and to exclude as few of the
uses of “good” as possible. Had our classes been defined with too
great emphasis upon the meaning of any single term of our array, the
whole idea of a classification would have had to be abandoned.
Having thus determined upon these five classes as representative and
significant, one hundred college students were asked to ponder these
classes in connection with the subjoined array of the common uses
of the word “good,” to choose one of the classes as the one most
appropriate in each case, and then to choose as many other of these
classes as seemed to be involved, and to rank them in order of their
importance. For example, they were shown the first two terms of the
array,—(1) “Good food; fit to eat, untainted,” and (2) “Good food;
nutritious, palatable,” and were asked whether they belonged in Class
A, B, C, D, or E. It was at once seen that membership in more than
one class was implied in both cases, but it was also admitted that
nutritious and palatable food (No. 2) was a more dependable “good”
than was the food specified by example No. 1. First choices were
consequently indicated on this basis. After that, second, third, and
succeeding choices were made for Nos. 1 and 2; following which, the
remainder of the array was treated in the same manner.
The average of the results derived from this experiment indicates
that Class B (dependable “good”) has a majority of votes, it being
given first place 49 times, and a subsidiary place 75 times. Class C
was given first place 20 times, and a secondary
[Illustration:
_CHART_
_Showing the distribution of the 79 significations of the word
“Good.”_
(_Explanation in text._)
_Key_
= _First Choice._
= _Second Choice._
= _Third Choice._
= _Fourth Choice._
= _Not Chosen._
_Classes A B C D E_] place 65 times. Class A was the first to be
implicated in 5 uses of the word “good,” and was mentioned as a
later choice 26 other times. Class D was voted to be the one most
obviously implied only 2 times, but was mentioned in an associative
relationship 59 times, while Class E, which received only one
vote, got that for first place. The importance of Class B is thus
clearly apparent. However, an almost equally significant fact seems
to be that there were only five cases in which one class alone
was implicated, whereas two classes were used in 18 cases, three
classes were used in 34 cases, and four classes were simultaneously
implicated by 20 terms of this array. The appended chart renders this
distribution and overlapping more obvious. From all this, moreover,
we seem to be warranted in inferring that, with all the unlikeness
there is between these various synonyms for “good” when taken one
at a time, when taken all together (_sub specie aeternitatis_, as
Spinoza would say) there is more of a common core of meaning in them
than one might naïvely expect. Consequently, we may safely presume
that if we can satisfactorily define any one of the preceding five
classes of “good” in physiological terms, we shall at the same time
have hinted the definitions of all the remaining classes.
In this connection one important thing must be borne in mind. Which
is, that in attempting to reach our final definition of “good” we
need only to abstract the common characteristic,—in mathematical
parlance,—the greatest common divisor of all the particular uses
for which this word is employed. Consequently the definition we are
searching for cannot be expected to have any bias toward private or
provincial conceptions of the term “good.” It must be catholic and
unpartisan.
_The Action-Patterns Implied by the Use of the Word “Good”_
We are now prepared to answer the question propounded at the opening
of this chapter: “What do we mean by the word ‘good’? That is to say,
how shall we describe the action-pattern which the stimulus of this
word arouses in us?” For if we can find out “what the organism is
doing” when its vocal organs are uttering this concept, we shall be
able to discover what the word “good” means.
It does not appear especially difficult to find what we are now
seeking. We have just given the total array of uses to which this
word is put, and we have also reduced that array to some measure of
coherence by means of our five classes. Is it not, indeed, a matter
of the commonest observation just what conduct human beings manifest
when they use the term “good” and signify thereby what is included in
Class A? It will be recalled that this class includes “that which is
useful, fit, serviceable, and the like, for any purpose whatsoever.”
Keeping our eye upon the specific behavior patterns implied by this
class of “good,” we may now venture the following mechanistic
interpretation: _When a man is ready to perform any action, he
calls anything_ GOOD _which assists or furthers that particular
action-tendency_. Or, the same thing may be conveyed in the following
words: _Any stimulus that evokes a response we are ready to make we
are wont to call good_.
Any picture of the human race that one may draw furnishes evidence
of the cogency of this definition. The child calls candy “good,”
not because he knows that sugar is muscle food, but simply because
he craves it, and sucks it in his mouth with avidity. This mode of
speech he got long ago from his parents. His wanting the candy makes
it “good” to him when he gets it, because the candy is a stimulus
that evokes a response he was ready to make. The boy of ten wants
a top that will spin like those which the other boys have, and he
calls his a “good” top, when it satisfies the action-pattern which
he has been developing. The rough youth of seventeen gives his
bullying chum a “good” punch in the eye, by which he again means
that the action-tendency he was covertly developing toward him has
been provided a chance to expand into a full excitation. The college
man of twenty-two calls a dance tune a “good” one, when, by its
rhythmic effects it induces him to caper and relax, and satisfy his
semi-sexual tendencies in public. And the old man of sixty-five
often speaks of his wife as a “good” woman, because she has always
had his dinner ready for him piping hot when, upon coming home,
his whole alimentary system was keyed up to perform elaborate acts
of chewing and swallowing. These and countless other cases, taken
from every hour of the day and night, fully support the mechanistic
interpretation which we have just given. But mark, that no question
is in place here as to whether all such persons _ought_ to use the
word “good” in such connections. The fact that they _do_ use it is,
for the present, the only essential item to be considered in an
empirical science of human conduct.
Just as when we enquired into the basic nature of antonyms, we
carried our investigation a little below the surface of the organism,
so may we here carry on a similar study to advantage. It is obvious
that the readiness with which we respond to the objects called “good”
is necessarily dependent upon the integrity of certain internal
mechanisms, which, though never observed in their uninterrupted
working, have nevertheless been deduced from a multitude of
scientific investigations. Moreover, it has been discovered that
every response we make is chiefly a function of the muscular and
nervous systems of the body. How, indeed, would a child reach out
for candy unless his arm were an extensible hinge, and how could it
be extended unless something, namely, his triceps muscle, pulled
on the radial bone, and how also could the muscle contract, unless
a motor nerve from the spinal cord were stimulated to perform this
specific activity? We do not, of course, specify that the definition
of “good” be restricted to imply only this particular set of facts,
but on the other hand we stipulate that this significant mechanism be
not lost sight of by him who seeks without prejudice to understand
how ethical concepts originate. Even more specific information than
this is now available. Any muscle that is ready to contract (or, as
the vitalist would say, to do Psyche’s bidding in attaining Homo’s
_good_) is said to be in a condition of tonus or elastic tension.
So far, then, as the muscles are concerned, the “good” of Class
A implies a normal muscular tonus, which can, under the proper
conditions, be developed into a full contraction. Physicians know
that in both of the abnormal conditions of tetanus and contractured
tonus, the organism cannot obtain some of the things which are
essential for its adaptation of the world about it. The possession of
a normal muscular tonus is, then, an ethical desideratum of no mean
importance.
Every such muscular contraction as we have just described is brought
about by means of a nervous impulse, originating at a receptor
organ, either external or internal, which impulse proceeds toward
a muscle or a group of muscles. However, this impulse (which in a
sense may be thought of as a desire on its way to fulfilment), is
often subject to a rather eventful history of interruptions before
it finally produces muscular action. Between the individual nervous
strands along the pathway of its motion the impulse may encounter
blockades, unless electrically charged particles (called _ions_)
are present at the various gaps in considerable numbers. Here again,
then, we reach a further refinement in our understanding of what one
class of “good” means. The “permeability of the synapses” (to use
a phrase descriptive of the above situation), thus becomes a large
determinant in human action. And if one of the classes of our concept
is definable in terms of actions that are facilitated, the light
which neurology throws upon ethics is not to be despised.
Our next adventure is the search for the various implications of
the term “good” as employed with respect to Class B. This class, as
previously stated, involves the general notion of _dependability_.
Things of this class are nominally useful, fit, or serviceable, not
merely with reference to the desire of the moment, but also and more
particularly they are useful for the future also. Nevertheless, this
phrase, “useful for the future,” must be taken to mean “imagined as
continuously or continually useful,” for although we commonly regard
tomorrow as a sort of package that is coming to us in the mail, it is
strictly something not yet existing and consequently unreal. Just as
William James said, “The feeling of past time is a present feeling,”
so is the feeling of dependability here to be interpreted not as a
property of objects, but as a condition of the organism. And, while
no incontrovertible evidence of the nature of such a condition has
yet been brought to light, it is directly in line with the facts as
we know them to assert that the “good” included in Class B implies
both a maintenance of muscular tone and a steady permeability of
the synaptic membranes involved in the action-patterns aroused by
the things we keep calling “good.” To which we might also safely
add, that the receptor organ requisite for initiating such an energy
transformation has also become so attuned to receiving the stimulus
as to show what the psychologists call a lowered threshold. Suppose
we now condense this whole account, and state it more pointedly
by saying that Class B refers to those objects that produce the
responses for which the organism has mobilized its maximum available
energies. Some of these dependable “goods” may thus imply habitual
responses, while others may simply imply a craving long denied its
overt satisfaction. And I doubt not that between these two extremes
every man can find his own “highest _good_.”
In passing, it might be pertinent to remark that the “good” implied
by Class B is always _life-enhancing_, were it not for the fact that
this obtrudes a standard not warranted by all users of this term. For
the snap judgment (or even the pondered conclusion) of an exceedingly
great number of people makes money the chief dependable “good,” that
of others puts friends and companions in this category, while with
fewer still knowledge is so regarded. Some of these things do not
always turn out to be life-enhancing,—time, place, circumstance, and
the ductless glands alter the assumed value of any such hypothesis.
Hence “good” has been here defined simply in terms of what the
organism is doing, and not in terms of any spurious teleological
principle. Empirical science has no books to balance. He who watches
a little closely will see that as far as conduct reveals it (which
is, indeed, very far), all sorts of things that are not particularly
life-enhancing are chosen hourly as the “highest goods” in the
sense of being greedily and furiously pursued. Sexual excitement,
drug-taking, gourmandizing, idling, and the latest styles in clothing
vie with any and all of these soberer values for first place in the
attention of numberless people. And while many a man may choose for
himself, yet none can choose for all.
Class B includes skilful and kind persons as objects to which the
term “good” is customarily applied. No new difficulties confront
our attempt to pronounce the physiological implications of our
concept as thus employed, even if we are obliged to alter to some
slight extent our previous point of view. The skilful man is
called “good” simply because he does or can mobilize his energy to
produce something which is regarded as useful, fit, or serviceable.
Likewise, the skilful or kind person is one who may be counted on
to assist in maintaining, restoring, or increasing any state of
things that is regarded as desirable. And we who employ the concept
“good” to praise or encourage such a man insinuate that the same
mobilization of energy is going on within us. Indeed, as could be
readily shown, all perceptions of persons involve an imitative or
empathic response. That is why skill and virtuosity of all sorts are
agreeable to behold. They furnish numerous outlets for subconscious
action-tendencies.
As regards Class C, the concept “good” points to “that which
fulfils expectation,” that is, the _normal_ or _typical_ thing.
These words “normal” and “typical” (“implying the existence of
characteristic qualities”) are related to the word “good” by means
of the conditioned reflex. Our experience with all such things as
motor-cars, for example, involves not only cognition, but eventually
discrimination and comparison as well. Thereafter, when we hear of a
_good_ motor-car, we think of such a one as we have been trained to
regard as capable of a certain kind of performance. The same thing
holds with respect to all other objects and persons concerning whom
we have become discriminative. “Good,” thus employed, seems to imply
that energy is being mobilized to perform selective activity, and
also that the sense organs have become specially attuned to receive
a specific stimulus. The “good” cat is not any old beast of the back
alley, but a mouser with a certain number of catches to her credit.
The “good” grocer (that is, supposedly _normal_) is one who gives
full weight and makes prompt deliveries. Moreover, there is implicit
in all such uses of this value predicate some reference to that
dependability which was discussed in connection with Class B. Here,
then, we may state that Class C implies _the mobilization of energy
for the performance of such action as will maintain our physical
or mental equilibrium_. And this, physiologically speaking, is
ultimately a matter of the progressive coordination of reflexes and
the maintenance of muscular tone.
The objects referred to by class D are those which greatly or even
suddenly exceed expectation, whence, as has been hinted before,
the signification of our concept frequently approaches that of an
expletive. Let us see what physiological mechanisms provide this
shade of meaning. It is generally realized that not only do our
successes and failures, our disappointments and satisfactions attune
our neuro-muscular mechanism to respond to the typical or normal
thing by calling it “good,” but these same successes and failures may
also whet our appetite for things which, by exceeding the average,
shall make up for those experiences which have been especially
disappointing. All normal protoplasm is insatiable for the maximum
success. And hunger of any sort, physiologically speaking, may be
described as a condition in which the motor mechanism is activated
to greater efforts than usual in order to relieve the condition of
want. Consequently, the physiological implications of the concept
“good” may be made as precise with respect to Class D as with any of
the preceding classes. The action-patterns implied by this class are
those which are exhibited by anyone when, after long privation, the
tensions he has accumulated are suddenly relieved by the appearance
of the desired stimulus. Indeed, such action-patterns may sometimes
be described as rapacity, as is illustrated in the case of our crying
out “Good!” when some misfortune has befallen a particularly annoying
prig.
The physiological implications of the term “good” as regards Class
E have already been sufficiently hinted in our delineation of that
class. Moreover, the surprise, shock, and spasm which it connotes
prevent its having an important rôle to play in our judgments of
value.
Let us now sum up and condense these several points. From the
foregoing it appears that he who uses the word “good” is at the
same time exhibiting a certain specific motor attitude toward the
environment which gives this word its meaning. As we have already
shown, the action-pattern involves the following physiological
conditions:—(1) the presence, maintenance, or even heightening of
muscular tone, (2) the permeability of the synaptic membranes,
especially of those along the motor pathways, (3) selective activity
and selective excitability, and (4) normally, the nice coordination
of the motor responses involved in overt action. This positively
responsive condition of the organism may now be expressed in simpler
words by saying that the word “good” is the sign of an _outgoing
reaction_. That is to say, in the first place, the things we call
“good” release the energy that is ready to be discharged; in the
second place, we participate more fully in that environment which
contains a “good” than in one that does not; and in the third place,
the effect of the presence of continuously “good” stimuli is to
render us more and more responsive, and to provide a wide margin of
resiliency for our organic interior.
Our definition of good in physiological terms has now been achieved.
FOOTNOTES:
[7] The following list of uses of the word “good” has been taken
from Murray’s New Oxford Dictionary, The Century Dictionary and
Encyclopedia, Webster’s, and the Standard Dictionary. From the same
sources also were derived the lists given in the following five
chapters. It should, however, be well noted that the lexicographer
rarely attempts such an analytical definition of words as we are
in search of here. He confines himself chiefly to the etymology of
a word and its synonyms, and to citing quotations which illustrate
the accepted usage of words. As a result, the man who looks into
a dictionary will increase his range of associations long before
he will be stimulated to perform that most fruitful of all mental
activities,—critical analysis.
THE USES OF THE WORD “GOOD”
1. Good food; fit to eat, untainted.
2. Good food; nutritious, palatable.
3. Good medicine; useful as a remedy.
4. Good soil; fertile, arable.
5. Good ice; easy to skate on.
6. Good ice; fit to dissolve in drinking water.
7. Good ship; capable, or under sail, or expressing pride in the
owner, or as an expression of well-wishing.
8. Good cat; able mouser, house-broken, etc.
9. Good child; quiet, obedient, not troublesome.
10. Good person _for_: capable, thorough, skilful, competent,
clever at, in concord with.
11. “To can no good,” (colloq.); to be untrained.
12. Good for a period of time; well able to accomplish.
13. In good earnest; vigorously and effectively.
14. Good king; one who fulfils his function, or is beloved by his
subjects.
15. To good; to improve land by manuring it.
16. Good space or time for; available for the purpose.
17. Good opinion; favorable or approving, laudatory.
18. Good cry; beneficent, profitable, salutary, wholesome.
19. Good spirits; not depressed or dejected, indicative of
resilience or ambition.
20. Good offices; friendly use of power.
21. Good man; kind, benevolent, gentle, gracious, friendly,
favorably disposed, virtuous, skilful, commendable, pious, devout,
or religiously approved.
22. Good season; holy days.
23. The good book; “tending to spiritual edification.”
24. The good God; “connoting perfection or benevolence.”
25. Highest good; conventional phrase of philosophers.
26. “Antonio is a good man”; reliable, safe, able to fulfil his
engagements, financially sound.
27. “A man of good”; of property, standing, rank.
28. Goods; property, merchandise, wares, live-stock, cattle, etc.
29. “A great good”; a large sum of money.
30. To yield a good product or result; to turn to a person’s
advantage.
31. To the good; balance on the credit side, excess of assets over
liabilities.
32. “Good fors”; colloquial in South Africa for promissory notes,
drafts, “I.O.U.’s,” etc.
33. Good wind; favorable, not too weak or too strong.
34. Good health; conducive to peace of mind and longevity.
35. Good order; stable, satisfying.
36. Good complexion; gratifying, favorable, advantageous, etc.
37. Good face; fair or smooth, or indicating intellectual ability
or trustworthiness of character.
38. Good play; agreeable, amusing, skilful.
39. Good fame; honorable, not sullied.
40. To have a good night of it; to sleep undisturbedly and to be
refreshed by so doing.
41. To have a good time of it; period of enjoyment.
42. Good will; benevolence.
43. “Good morning”; elliptical for well wishing.
44. “Good bye”; elliptical for well wishing at departure.
45. To take in good part; to be somewhat pleased, or at least not
displeased.
46. “Good to overcome”; easy to overcome.
47. To appear or seem good; implying various degrees of
commendation, depending, however, upon the accent of the speaker.
48. A good deal; an amount greater than expected.
49. A good deal; adequate, abundant, ample, sufficient.
50. As good as; practically or to all intents and purposes the same.
51. To be as good as one’s word; to act up to the full sense of the
letter or the meaning.
52. To make good; to succeed, fulfil, or perform, carry out or
succeed in performing.
53. To make good; to fill up even or level.
54. To make good; to repair or restore, to compensate for, to
supply a deficiency, to pay a debt.
55. To make good; to secure prisoners for the night.
56. To make good; to prove to be true or valid, to demonstrate or
substantiate a statement.
57. Good for a certain amount; spoken of a person expected to pay
or contribute.
58. Good debts; those which are expected to be paid in full.
59. To make one’s part good; to make a successful resistance.
60. To become good for; to fulfil expectation.
61. To come to good; spoken of a dream that comes true.
62. Good birth; average or above the average, not humble or mean.
63. Good coin; genuine, not counterfeit.
64. Good purpose or conduct; commendable, acceptable, up to
standard, not causing trouble.
65. Good jest; smart, witty, typical, or even exceptional.
66. Good right, claim, reason, plea, proposition; valid, sound.
67. Good legal decision, or contract; valid, effectual, not
vitiated by any flaw.
68. To have a good mind to; to be ready to act, to have a matured
intention.
69. “Our good wishes go with you”; expectation of happiness or
prosperity.
70. For good and all; valid conclusion, finally.
71. “Good my lord”; courteous address, deferential attitude,
expectation of favor or esteem.
72. Good life insurance risk; likely to live a long time.
73. “Good men and true”; spoken of a jury that is expected to
render a fair verdict.
74. Good old; possibly a term of praise, or merely meaning very old.
75. “Good words!”; equivalent to “do not speak so fiercely,” or “I
expected kind words from you.”
76. “The good people”; palliatory with reference to the fairies or
witches.
77. Good gracious! good Peter! good God!; exclamatory, possibly
signifying the presence of something that is unexpected, which may
be either welcome or otherwise.
78. Good folk; used in a jocular or depreciatory sense.
79. Goody good; mildly depreciatory of trustful simplicity.