My main object in this paper is to try to define more precisely the
most important question, which, so far as I can see, is really at issue
when it is disputed with regard to any predicate of value, whether it
is or is not a "subjective" predicate. There are three chief cases in
which this controversy is apt to arise. It arises, first, with regard
to the conceptions of "right" and "wrong," and the closely allied
conception of "duty" or "what _ought_ to be done." It arises, secondly,
with regard to "good" and "evil," in some sense of those words in which
the conceptions for which they stand are certainly quite distinct from
the conceptions of "right" and "wrong," but in which nevertheless it is
undeniable that ethics has to deal with them. And it arises, lastly,
with regard to certain aesthetic conceptions, such as "beautiful" and
"ugly;" or "good" and "bad," in the sense in which these words are
applied to works of art, and in which, therefore, the question what is
good and bad is a question not for ethics but for aesthetics.
In all three cases there are people who maintain that the predicates
in question are purely "subjective," in a sense which can, I think,
be fairly easily defined. I am not here going to attempt a perfectly
accurate definition of the sense in question; but, as the term
"subjective" is so desperately ambiguous, I had better try to indicate
roughly the sense I am thinking of. Take the word "beautiful" for
example. There is a sense of the term "subjective," such that to say
that "beautiful" stands for a subjective predicate, means, roughly,
that any statement of the form "This is beautiful" merely expresses a
psychological assertion to the effect that some particular individual
or class of individuals either actually has, or would, under certain
circumstances, have, a certain kind of mental attitude towards the
thing in question. And what I mean by "having a mental attitude"
towards a thing, can be best explained by saying that to desire a thing
is to have one kind of mental attitude towards it, to be pleased with
it is to have another, to will it is to have another; and in short
that to have any kind of feeling or emotion _towards_ it is to have a
certain mental attitude towards it--a different one in each case. Thus
anyone who holds that when we say that a thing is beautiful, what we
_mean_ is merely that we ourselves or some particular class of people
actually do, or would under certain circumstances, have, or permanently
have, a certain feeling towards the thing in question, is taking a
"subjective" view of beauty.
But in all three cases there are also a good many people who hold that
the predicates in question are not, in this sense "subjective"; and I
think that those who hold this are apt to speak as if the view which
they wish to maintain in opposition to it consisted simply and solely
in holding its contradictory--in holding, that is, that the predicates
in question are "objective," where "objective" simply means the same as
"not subjective." But in fact I think this is hardly ever really the
case. In the case of goodness and beauty, what such people are really
anxious to maintain is by no means merely that these conceptions are
"objective," but that, besides being "objective," they are also, in
a sense which I shall try to explain, "intrinsic" kinds of value.
It is this conviction--the conviction that goodness and beauty are
_intrinsic_ kinds of value, which is, I think, the strongest ground of
their objection to any subjective view. And indeed, when they speak
of the "objectivity" of these conceptions, what they have in mind is,
I believe, always a conception which has no proper right to be called
"objectivity," since it includes as an essential part this other
characteristic which I propose to call that of being an "intrinsic"
kind of value.
The truth is, I believe, that though, from the proposition that a
particular kind of value is "intrinsic" it does follow that it must
be "objective," the converse implication by no means holds, but on
the contrary it is perfectly easy to conceive theories of _e.g._
"goodness," according to which goodness would, in the strictest sense,
be "objective," and yet would not be "intrinsic." There is, therefore,
a very important difference between the conception of "objectivity,"
and that which I will call "internality" but yet, if I am not mistaken,
when people talk about the "objectivity" of any kind of value, they
almost always confuse the two, owing to the fact that most of those
who deny the "internality" of a given kind of value, also assert its
"subjectivity." How great the difference is, and that it is a fact that
those who maintain the "objectivity" of goodness do, as a rule, mean by
this not mere "objectivity," but "internality," as well, can, I think,
be best brought out by considering an instance of a theory, according
to which goodness would be objective but would not be intrinsic.
Let us suppose it to be held, for instance, that what is meant by
saying that one type of human being A is "better" than another type B,
is merely that the course of evolution tends to increase the numbers of
type A and to decrease those of type B. Such a view has, in fact, been
often suggested, even if it has not been held in this exact form; it
amounts merely to the familiar suggestion that "better" means "better
fitted to survive." Obviously "better," on this interpretation of its
meaning, is in no sense a "subjective" conception: the conception of
belonging to a type which tends to be favoured by the struggle for
existence more than another is as "objective" as any conception can be.
But yet, if I am not mistaken, all those who object to a subjective
view of "goodness," and insist upon its "objectivity," would object
just as strongly to this interpretation of its meaning as to any
"subjective" interpretation. Obviously, therefore, what they are really
anxious to contend for is not merely that goodness is "objective,"
since they are here objecting to a theory which is "objective;" but
something else. And this something else is, I think, certainly just
that it is "intrinsic"--a character which is just as incompatible
with this objective evolutionary interpretation as with any and every
subjective interpretation. For if you say that to call type A "better"
than type B means merely that it is more favoured in the struggle for
existence, it follows that the being "better" is a predicate which does
_not depend merely on the intrinsic nature of A and B respectively._
On the contrary, although here and now A may be more favoured than B,
it is obvious that under other circumstances or with different natural
laws the very same type B might be more favoured than A, so that the
very same type which, under one set of circumstances, is better than
B, would, under another set, be worse. Here, then, we have a case
where an interpretation of "goodness," which does make it "objective,"
is incompatible with its being "intrinsic." And it is just this same
fact--the fact that, on any "subjective" interpretation, the very same
kind of thing which, under some circumstances, is better than another,
would, under others, be worse--which constitutes, so far as I can
see, the fundamental objection to all "subjective" interpretations.
Obviously, therefore, to express this objection by saying that goodness
is "objective" is very incorrect; since goodness might quite well be
"objective" and yet _not_ possess the very characteristic which it is
mainly wished to assert that it has.
In the case, therefore, of ethical and aesthetic "goodness," I think
that what those who contend for the "objectivity" of these conceptions
really wish to contend for is not mere "objectivity" at all, but
principally and essentially that they are _intrinsic_ kinds of value.
But in the case of "right" and "wrong" and "duty," the same cannot
be said, because many of those who object to the view that these
conceptions are "subjective," nevertheless do not hold that they are
"intrinsic." We cannot, therefore, say that what those who contend for
the "objectivity" of right and wrong really mean is always chiefly
that those conceptions are intrinsic, but we can, I think, say that
what they do mean is certainly _not_ "objectivity" in this case any
more than the other; since here, just as there, it would be possible
to find certain views, which are in every sense "objective," to
which they would object just as strongly as to any subjective view.
And though what is meant by "objectivity" in this case, is not that
"right" and "wrong" are _themselves_ "intrinsic," what is, I think,
meant here too is that they have a fixed relation to a kind of value
which _is_ "intrinsic." It is this fixed relation to an intrinsic
kind of value, so far as I can see, which gives to right and wrong
that kind and degree of fixity and impartiality which they actually
are felt to possess, and which is what people are thinking of when
they talk of their "objectivity." Here, too, therefore, to talk of
the characteristic meant as "objectivity" is just as great a misnomer
as in the other cases; since though it is a characteristic which is
incompatible with any kind of "subjectivity," it is also incompatible,
for the same reason, with many kinds of "objectivity."
For these reasons I think that what those who contend for the
"objectivity" of certain kinds of value, or for the "objectivity" of
judgments of value, commonly have in mind is not really "objectivity"
at all, but either that the kinds of value in question are themselves
"intrinsic," or else that they have a fixed relation to some kind that
is so. The conception upon which they really wish to lay stress is not
that of "objective value," but that of "intrinsic value," though they
confuse the two. And I think this is the case to a considerable extent
not only with the defenders of so-called "objectivity," but also with
its opponents. Many of those who hold strongly (as many do) that _all_
kinds of value are "subjective" certainly object to the so-called
"objective" view, not so much because it is _objective_, as because it
is not _naturalistic ox positivistic_--a characteristic which does
naturally follow from the contention that value is "intrinsic," but
does not follow from the mere contention that it is "objective." To a
view which is at the same time both "naturalistic" or "positivistic"
and also "objective," such as the Evolutionary view which I sketched
just now, they do not feel at all the same kind or degree of objection
as to any so-called "objective" view. With regard to so-called
"objective" views they are apt to feel not only that they are false,
but that they involve a particularly poisonous kind of falsehood--the
erecting into a "metaphysical" entity of what is really susceptible of
a simple naturalistic explanation. They feel that to hold such a view
is not merely to make a mistake, but to make a superstitious mistake.
They feel the same kind of contempt for those who hold it, which we
are apt to feel towards those whom we regard as grossly superstitious,
and which is felt by certain persons for what they call "metaphysics."
Obviously, therefore, what they really object to is not simply the view
that these predicates are "objective," but something else--something
which does not at all follow from the contention that they are
"objective," but which does follow from the contention that they are
"intrinsic."
In disputes, therefore, as to whether particular kinds of value are
or are not "subjective," I think that the issue which is really felt
to be important, almost always by one side, and often by both, is not
really the issue between "subjective" and "non-subjective," but between
"intrinsic" and "non-intrinsic." And not only is this felt to be the
more important issue; I think it really is so. For the difference that
must be made to our view of the Universe, according as we hold that
some kinds of value are "intrinsic" or that none are, is much greater
than any which follows from a mere difference of opinion as to whether
some are "non-subjective," or all without exception "subjective." To
hold that any kinds of value are "intrinsic" entails the recognition of
a kind of predicate extremely different from any we should otherwise
have to recognise and perhaps unique; whereas it is in any case certain
that there are "objective" predicates as well as "subjective."
But now what is this "internality" of which I have been speaking?
What is meant by saying with regard to a kind of value that it is
"intrinsic?" To express roughly what is meant is, I think, simple
enough; and everybody will recognise it at once, as a notion which
is constantly in people's heads; but I want to dwell upon it at some
length, because I know of no place where it is expressly explained and
defined, and because, though it seems very simple and fundamental, the
task of defining it precisely is by no moans easy and involves some
difficulties which I must confess that I do not know how to solve.
I have already given incidentally the main idea in speaking of that
evolutionary interpretation of "goodness," according to which, as I
said, goodness would be "objective" but would not be "intrinsic."
I there used as equivalent to the assertion that 'better,' on
that definition, would not be 'intrinsic,' the assertion that the
question whether one type of being A was better than another B would
_not_ depend _solely on the intrinsic natures of A and B,_ but on
circumstances and the laws of nature. And I think that this phrase will
in fact suggest to everybody just what I do mean by "intrinsic" value.
We can, in fact, set up the following definition. _To say that a kind
of value is "intrinsic" means merely that the question whether a thing
possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the
intrinsic nature of the thing in question._
But though this definition does, I think, convey exactly what I mean,
I want to dwell upon its meaning, partly because the conception of
'differing in intrinsic nature which I believe to be of fundamental
importance, is liable to be confused with other conceptions, and partly
because the definition involves notions, which I do not know how to
define exactly.
When I say, with regard to any particular kind of value, that the
question whether and in what degree anything possesses it _depends
solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question_, I mean to say
two different things at the same time. I mean to say (1) that it is
_impossible_ for what is strictly _one and the same_ thing to possess
that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and
_not_ to possess it at another; and equally _impossible_ for it to
possess it in one degree at one time, or in one set of circumstances,
and to possess it in a different degree at another, or in a different
set. This, I think, is obviously part of what is naturally conveyed by
saying that the question whether and in what degree a thing possesses
the kind of value in question always depends _solely_ on the intrinsic
nature of the thing. For if _x_ and _y_ have different intrinsic
natures, it follows that _x_ cannot be quite strictly one and the same
thing as _y_; and hence if _x_ and _y_ can have a different intrinsic
value, only where their intrinsic natures are different, it follows
that one and the same thing must always have the same intrinsic value.
This, then, is part of what is meant; and about this part I think I
need say no more, except to call attention to the fact that it involves
a conception, which as we shall see is also involved in the other part,
and which involves the same difficulty in both cases--I mean, the
conception which is expressed by the word 'impossible.' (2) The second
part of what is meant is that if a given thing possesses any kind of
intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only must that same thing
possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also
anything _exactly like_ it, must, under all circumstances, possess it
in exactly the same degree. Or to put it in the corresponding negative
form: It is _impossible_ that of two exactly similar things one should
possess it and the other not, or that one should possess it in one
degree, and the other in a different one.
I think this second proposition also is naturally conveyed by saying
that the kind of value in question depends solely on the intrinsic
nature of what possesses it. For we should naturally say of two
things which were _exactly alike_ intrinsically, in spite of their
being _two,_ that they possessed the _same_ intrinsic nature. But
it is important to call attention expressly to the fact that what
I mean by the expression 'having a different intrinsic nature' is
equivalent to 'not exactly alike' because here there is real risk of
confusion between this conception and a different one. This comes
about as follows. It is natural to suppose that the phrase 'having a
different intrinsic nature' is equivalent to the phrase 'intrinsically
different' or 'having different intrinsic properties.' But, if we do
make this identification, there is a risk of confusion. For it is
obvious that there is a sense in which, when things are exactly like,
they must be 'intrinsically different' and have different intrinsic
properties, merely because they are two. For instance, two patches of
colour may be exactly alike, in spite of the fact that each possesses a
constituent which the other does not possess, provided only that their
two constituents are exactly alike. And yet, in a certain sense, it
is obvious that the fact that each has a constituent, which the other
has not got, does constitute an intrinsic difference between them, and
implies that each has an intrinsic property which the other has not
got. And even where the two things are simple the mere fact that they
are _numerically_ different does in a sense constitute an intrinsic
difference between them, and each will have at least one intrinsic
property which the other has not got--namely that of being identical
with itself. It is obvious therefore that the phrases 'intrinsically
different' and 'having different intrinsic properties' are ambiguous.
They may be used in such a sense that to say of two things that they
are intrinsically different or have different intrinsic properties does
_not_ imply that they are not exactly alike, but only that they are
_numerically_ different. Or they may be used in a sense in which two
things can be said to be intrinsically different, and to have different
intrinsic properties _only_ when they are not exactly alike. It is,
therefore, extremely important to insist that when I say: Two things
can differ in intrinsic value, only when they have different intrinsic
natures, I am using the expression 'having different intrinsic natures'
in the latter sense and not the former:--in a sense in which the mere
fact that two things are two, or differ numerically, does _not_ imply
that they have different intrinsic natures, but in which they can
be said to have different intrinsic natures, _only_ where, besides
differing numerically, they are also _not_ exactly alike.
But as soon as this is explained, another risk of confusion arises
owing to the fact that when people contrast mere numerical difference
with a kind of intrinsic difference, which is _not_ merely numerical,
they are apt to identify the latter with _qualitative_ difference. It
might, therefore, easily be thought that by 'difference in intrinsic
nature' I mean 'difference in quality.' But this identification of
difference in quality with difference in intrinsic nature would also
be a mistake. It is true that what is commonly meant by difference
of quality, in the strict sense, always is a difference of intrinsic
nature: two things cannot differ in quality without differing in
intrinsic nature; and that fact is one of the most important facts
about qualitative difference. But the converse is by no means also
true: although two things cannot differ in quality without differing in
intrinsic nature, they can differ in intrinsic nature without differing
in quality; or, in other words, difference in quality is only _one_
species of difference in intrinsic nature. That this is so follows
from the fact that, as I explained, I am using the phrase 'different
in intrinsic nature' as equivalent to 'not exactly like for it is
quite plain that two things may not be exactly alike, in spite of the
fact that they don't differ in quality, _e.g._ if the only difference
between them were in respect of the _degree_ in which they possess
some quality they do possess. Nobody would say that a very loud sound
was exactly like a very soft one, even if they were exactly like in
quality; and yet it is plain there is a sense in which their intrinsic
nature is different For this reason alone qualitative difference cannot
be identified with difference in intrinsic nature. And there are still
other reasons. Difference in size, for instance may be a difference
in intrinsic nature, in the sense I mean, but it can hardly be called
a difference in quality. Or take such a difference as the difference
between two patterns consisting in the fact that the one is a yellow
circle with a red spot in the middle, and the other a yellow circle
with a blue spot in the middle. This difference would perhaps be
loosely called a difference of quality; but obviously it would be more
accurate to call it a difference which consists in the fact that the
one pattern has a _constituent_ which is qualitatively different from
any which the other has; and the difference between being qualitatively
different and having qualitatively different constituents is important
both because the latter can only be defined in terms of the former, and
because it is possible for simple things to differ from one another
in the former way, whereas it is only possible for complex things to
differ in the latter.
I hope this is sufficient to make clear exactly what the conception is
which I am expressing by the phrase "different in intrinsic nature."
The important points are (1) that it is a kind of difference which
does _not_ hold between two things, when they are _merely_ numerically
different, but only when, besides being numerically different, they
are also _not_ exactly alike and (2) that it is _not_ identical
with qualitative difference; although qualitative difference is one
particular species of it. The conception seems to me to be an extremely
important and fundamental one, although, so far as I can see, it has no
quite simple and unambiguous name: and this is the reason why I have
dwelt on it at such length. "Not exactly like" is the least ambiguous
way of expressing it; but this has the disadvantage that it looks as
if the idea of exact likeness were the fundamental one from which this
was derived, whereas I believe the contrary to be the case. For this
reason it is perhaps better to stick to the cumbrous phrase "different
in intrinsic nature."
So much for the question what is meant by saying of two things that
they "differ in intrinsic nature." We have now to turn to the more
difficult question as to what is meant by the words "impossible" and
"necessary" in the statement: A kind of value is intrinsic if and only
if, it is _impossible_ that _x_ and _y_ should have different values of
the kind, unless they differ in intrinsic nature; and in the equivalent
statement: A kind of value is intrinsic if and only if, when anything
possesses it, that same thing or anything exactly like it would
_necessarily_ or _must_ always, under all circumstances, possess it in
exactly the same degree.
As regards the meaning of this necessity and impossibility, we may
begin by making two points clear.
(1) It is sometimes contended, and with some plausibility, that what
we mean by saying that it is _possible_ for a thing which possesses
one predicate F to possess another G, is, sometimes at least, merely
that some things which possess F do in fact also possess G. And if
we give this meaning to "possible," the corresponding meaning of the
statement it is _impossible_ for a thing which possesses F to possess
G will be merely: Things which possess F never do in fact possess G.
If, then, we understood "impossible" in this sense, the condition for
the "internality" of a kind of value, which I have stated by saying
that if a kind of value is to be "intrinsic" it must be _impossible_
for two things to possess it in different degrees, if they are exactly
like one another, will amount merely to saying that no two things
which are exactly like one another ever do, in fact, possess it in
different degrees. It follows, that, if this were all that were meant,
this condition would be satisfied, if only it were true (as for all
I know it may be) that, in the case of all things which possess any
particular kind of intrinsic value, there happens to be nothing else
in the Universe exactly like any one of them; for if this were so, it
would, of course, follow that no two things which are exactly alike did
in fact possess the kind of value in question in different degrees,
for the simple reason that everything which possessed it at all would
be unique in the sense that there was nothing else exactly like it. If
this were all that were meant, therefore, we could prove any particular
kind of value to satisfy this condition, by merely proving that there
never has in fact and never will be anything exactly like any one of
the things which possess it: and our assertion that it satisfied this
condition would merely be an empirical generalisation. Moreover if
this were all that was meant it would obviously be by no means certain
that purely subjective predicates could not satisfy the condition in
question; since it would be satisfied by any subjective predicate of
which it happened to be true that everything which possessed it was,
in fact, unique--that there was nothing exactly like it; and for all
I know there may be many subjective predicates of which this is true.
It is, therefore, scarcely necessary to say that I am not using
"impossible" in this sense. When I say that a kind of value, to be
intrinsic, must satisfy the condition that it must be _impossible_ for
two things exactly alike to possess it in different degrees, I do not
mean by this condition anything which a kind of value could be proved
to satisfy, by the mere empirical fact that there was nothing else
exactly like any of the things which possessed it. It is, of course,
an essential part of my meaning that we must be able to say not merely
that no two exactly similar things do _in fact_ possess it in different
degrees, but that, _if_ there had been or were going to be anything
exactly similar to a thing which does possess it, even though, in
fact, there has not and won't be any such thing, that thing would have
possessed or would possess the kind of value in question in exactly the
same degree. It is essential to this meaning of "impossibility" that
it should entitle us to assert what _would_ have been the case, under
conditions which never have been and never will be realised; and it
seems obvious that no mere empirical generalisation can entitle us to
do this.
But (2) to say that I am not using 'necessity' in this first sense,
is by no means sufficient to explain what I do mean. For it certainly
seems as if causal laws (though this is disputed) do entitle us to make
assertions of the very kind that mere empirical generalisations do not
entitle us to make. In virtue of a causal law we do seem to be entitled
to assert such things as that, if a given thing had had a property
or were to have a property F which it didn't have or won't have, it
_would_ have had or _would_ have some other property G. And it might,
therefore, be thought that the kind of 'necessity' and 'impossibility'
I am talking of is this kind of causal 'necessity' and 'impossibility.'
It is, therefore, important to insist that I do _not_ mean this kind
either. If this were all I meant, it would again be by no means
obvious, that purely subjective predicates might not satisfy our second
condition. It may, for instance, for all I know, be true that there
are causal laws which insure that in the case of everything that is
'beautiful,' anything exactly like any of these things would, in this
Universe, excite a particular kind of feeling in everybody to whom it
were presented in a particular way: and if that were so, we should have
a subjective predicate which satisfied the condition that, when a given
thing possesses that predicate, it is impossible (in the causal sense)
that any exactly similar thing should not also possess it. The kind
of necessity I am talking of is not, therefore, mere causal necessity
either. When I say that if a given thing possesses a certain degree of
intrinsic value, anything precisely similar to it _would_ necessarily
_have_ possessed that value in exactly the same degree, I mean that it
_would_ have done so, even if it had existed in a Universe in which
the causal laws were quite different from what they are in this one. I
mean, in short, that it is _impossible_ for any precisely similar thing
to possess a different value, in precisely such a sense as that, in
which it is, I think, generally admitted that it is _not_ impossible
that causal laws should have been different from what they are--a sense
of impossibility, therefore, which certainly does not depend merely on
causal laws.
That there is such a sense of necessity--a sense which entitles us to
say that what has F _would have_ G, even if causal laws were quite
different from what they are--is, I think, quite clear from such
instances as the following. Suppose you take a particular patch of
colour, which is yellow. We can, I think, say with certainty that any
patch exactly like that one, _would_ be yellow, even if it existed in
a Universe in which causal laws were quite different from what they
are in this one. We can say that any such patch _must_ be yellow,
quite unconditionally, whatever the circumstances, and whatever
the causal laws. And it is in a sense similar to this, in respect
of the fact that it is neither empirical nor causal, that I mean
the 'must' to be understood, when I say that if a kind of value is
to be 'intrinsic,' then, supposing a given-thing possesses it in a
certain degree, anything exactly like that thing _must_ possess it in
exactly the same degree. To say, of 'beauty' or 'goodness' that they
are 'intrinsic' is only, therefore, to say that this thing which is
obviously true of 'yellowness' and 'blueness' and 'redness' is true
of them. And if we give this sense to 'must' in our definition, then
I think it is obvious that to say of a given kind of value that it is
intrinsic _is_ inconsistent with its being 'subjective.' For there
is, I think, pretty clearly no subjective predicate of which we can
say thus unconditionally, that, _if_ a given thing possesses it, then
anything exactly like that thing, _would,_ under any circumstances, and
under any causal laws, also possess it. For instance, whatever kind of
feeling you take, it is plainly not true that supposing I have that
feeling towards a given thing A, then _I_ should necessarily under any
circumstances have that feeling towards anything precisely similar to
A: for the simple reason that a thing precisely similar to A _might_
exist in a Universe in which I did not exist at all. And similarly
it is not true of any feeling whatever, that if _somebody_ has that
feeling towards a given thing A, then, in arty Universe, in which
a thing precisely similar to A existed, _somebody_ would have that
feeling towards it. Nor finally is it even true, that if it is true of
a given thing A, that, under actual causal laws, any one to whom A were
presented in a certain way _would_ have a certain feeling towards it,
then the same hypothetical predicate would, in any Universe, belong to
anything precisely similar to A: in every case it seems to be possible
that there _might_ be a Universe, in which the causal laws were such
that the proposition would not be true.
It is, then, because in my definition of 'intrinsic' value the 'must'
is to be understood in this unconditional sense, that I think that the
proposition that a kind of value is 'intrinsic' is inconsistent with
its being subjective. But it should be observed that in holding that
there is this inconsistency, I am contradicting a doctrine which seems
to be held by many philosophers. There are, as you probably know, some
philosophers who insist strongly on a doctrine which they express by
saying that no relations are purely external. And so far as I can make
out one thing which they mean by this is just that, whenever r has any
relation whatever which _y_ has not got, _x_ and _y cannot_ be exactly
alike: That any difference in relation necessarily entails a difference
in intrinsic nature. There is, I think, no doubt that when these
philosophers say this, they mean by their 'cannot' and 'necessarily'
an unconditional 'cannot' and 'must.' And hence it follows they are
holding that, if, for instance, a thing A pleases me now, then any
other thing, B, precisely similar to A, must, under any circumstances,
and in any Universe, please me also: since, if B did not please me, it
would _not_ possess a relation which A does possess, and therefore, by
their principle, _could_ not be precisely similar to A_--must_ differ
from it in intrinsic nature. But it seems to me to be obvious that this
principle is false. If it were true, it would follow that I can know _a
priori_ such things as that no patch of colour which is seen by you and
is not seen by me is ever exactly like any patch which is seen by me
and is not seen by you; or that no patch of colour which is surrounded
by a red ring is ever exactly like one which is not so surrounded. But
it is surely obvious, that, whether these things are true or not they
are things which I cannot know _a priori._ It is simply _not_ evident
_a priori_ that no patch of colour which is seen by A and not by B is
ever exactly like one which is seen by B and not by A, and that no
patch of colour which is surrounded by a red ring is ever exactly like
one which is not. And this illustration serves to bring out very well
both what is meant by saying of such a predicate as 'beautiful 'that
it is intrinsic,' and why, if it is, it cannot be subjective. What is
meant is just that if A is beautiful and B is not, you could know _a
priori_ that A and B are _not_ exactly alike; whereas, with any such
subjective predicate, as that of exciting a particular feeling in me,
or that of being a thing which would excite such a feeling in any
spectator, you cannot tell _a priori_ that a thing A which did possess
such a predicate and a thing B which did not, could not be exactly
alike.
It seems to me, therefore, quite certain, in spite of the dogma that no
relations are purely external, that there are many predicates, such for
instance as most (if not all) subjective predicates or the objective
one of being surrounded by a red ring, which do _not_ depend solely
on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them: or, in other words,
of which it is _not_ true that if _x_ possesses them and _y_ does
not, _x_ and _y must_ differ in intrinsic nature. But what precisely
is meant by this unconditional 'must,' I must confess I don't know.
The obvious thing to suggest is that it is the logical 'must,' which
certainly is unconditional in just this sense: the kind of necessity,
which we assert to hold, for instance, when we say that whatever is a
right-angled triangle _must_ be a triangle, or that whatever is yellow
_must_ be either yellow or blue. But I must say I cannot see that
all unconditional necessity is of this nature. I do not see how it
can be deduced from any logical law that, if a given patch of colour
be yellow, then any patch which were exactly like the first would be
yellow too. And similarly in our case of 'intrinsic' value, though I
think it is true that beauty, for instance, is 'intrinsic,' I do not
see how it can be deduced from any logical law, that if A is beautiful,
anything that were exactly like A would be beautiful too, in exactly
the same degree.
Moreover, though I do believe that both "yellow" (in the sense in
which it applies to sense-data) and "beautiful" are predicates which,
in this unconditional sense, depend only on the intrinsic nature of
what possesses them, there seems to me to be an extremely important
difference between them which constitutes a further difficulty in the
way of getting quite clear as to what this unconditional sense of
"must" is. The difference I mean is one which I am inclined to express
by saying that though both yellowness and beauty are predicates which
_depend_ only on the intrinsic nature of what possesses them, yet
while yellowness is itself an _intrinsic_ predicate, _beauty_ is not.
Indeed it seems to me to be one of the most important truths about
predicates of value, that though many of them _are_ intrinsic kinds of
value, in the sense I have defined, yet _none_ of them are intrinsic
properties, in the sense in which such properties as "yellow" or the
property of "being a state of pleasure" or "being a state of things
which contains a balance of pleasure" are intrinsic properties. It is
obvious, for instance, that, if we are to reject _all_ naturalistic
theories of value, we must not only reject those theories, according to
which no kind of value would be intrinsic, but must also reject such
theories as those which assert, for instance, that to say that a state
of mind is good is to say that it is a state of being pleased; or
that to say that a state of things is good is to say that it contains
a balance of pleasure over pain. There are, in short, two entirely
different types of naturalistic theory, the difference between which
may be illustrated by the difference between the assertion, "A is good"
_means_ "A is pleasant" and the assertion "A is good" _means_ "A is a
state of pleasure." Theories of the former type imply that goodness is
_not_ an intrinsic kind of value, whereas theories of the latter type
imply equally emphatically that it is: since obviously such predicates
as that "of being a state of pleasure," or "containing a balance of
pleasure," _are_ predicates like "yellow" in respect of the fact that
if a given thing possesses them, anything exactly like the thing in
question must possess them. It seems to me equally obvious that _both_
types of theory are false: but I do not know how to exclude them both
except by saying that two different propositions are both true of
_goodness_, namely: (1) that it does depend _only_ on the intrinsic
nature of what possesses it--which excludes theories of the first type
and (2) that, _though_ this is so, it is yet not itself an intrinsic
property--which excludes those of the second. It was for this reason
that I said above that, if there are any intrinsic kinds of value,
they would constitute a class of predicates which is, perhaps, unique;
for I cannot think of any other predicate which resembles them in
respect of the fact, that though _not_ itself intrinsic, it yet shares
with intrinsic properties the characteristics of depending solely on
the intrinsic nature of what possesses it. So far as I know, certain
predicates of value are the only non-intrinsic properties which share
with intrinsic properties this characteristic of depending only on the
intrinsic nature of what possesses them.
If, however, we are thus to say that predicates of value, though
_dependent_ solely on intrinsic properties, are not themselves
intrinsic properties, there must be some characteristic belonging to
intrinsic properties which predicates of value never possess. And
it seems to me quite obvious that there is; only I can't see _what_
it is. It seems to me quite obvious that if you assert of a given
state of things that it contains a balance of pleasure over pain, you
are asserting of it not only a _different_ predicate, from what you
would be asserting of it if you said it was "good"--but a predicate
which is of quite a different _kind_; and in the same way that when
you assert of a patch of colour that it is "yellow," the predicate
you assert is not only _different_ from "beautiful," but of quite a
different _kind,_ in the same way as before. And of course the mere
fact that many people have thought that goodness and beauty were
subjective is evidence that there is _some_ great difference of kind
between them and such predicates as being yellow or containing a
balance of pleasure. But _what_ the difference is, if we suppose, as I
suppose, that goodness and beauty are _not_ subjective, and that they
do share with "yellowness" and "containing pleasure," the property
of depending _solely_ on the intrinsic nature of what possesses
them, I confess I cannot say. I can only vaguely express the kind of
difference I feel there to be by saying that intrinsic properties seem
to _describe_ the intrinsic nature of what possesses them in a sense
in which predicates of value never do. If you could enumerate _all_
the intrinsic properties a given thing possessed, you would have given
a _complete_ description of it, and would not need to mention any
predicates of value it possessed; whereas no description of a given
thing could be _complete_ which omitted any intrinsic property. But,
in any case, owing to the fact that predicates of intrinsic value are
not themselves intrinsic properties, you cannot define "intrinsic
property," in the way which at first sight seems obviously the right
one. You cannot say that an intrinsic property is a property such that,
if one thing possesses it and another does not, the intrinsic nature of
the two things _must_ be different. For this is the very thing which we
are maintaining to be true of predicates of intrinsic value, while at
the same time we say that they are _not_ intrinsic properties. Such a
definition of "intrinsic property" would therefore only be possible if,
we could say that the necessity there is that, if _x_ and _y_ possess
different intrinsic properties, their nature must be different, is a
necessity of a _different kind_ from the necessity there is that, if
_x_ and _y_ are of different intrinsic values, their nature must be
different, although both necessities are unconditional. And it seems to
me possible that this is the true explanation. But, if so, it obviously
adds to the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the unconditional
"must," since, in this case, there would be two different meanings of
"must," both unconditional, and yet neither, apparently, identical with
the logical "must."