The fourth chapter of Mr. Bradley's _Appearance and Reality_ is a
chapter headed "Space and Time," and he begins the chapter as follows:--
"The object of this chapter is far from being an attempt to discuss
fully the nature of space or of time. It will content itself with
stating our main justification for regarding them as appearances. It
will explain why we deny that, _in the character which they exhibit_,
they either _have_ or _belong_ to reality."[1]
Here, it will be seen, Mr. Bradley states that, in his opinion, Time,
_in a certain character_, neither has nor belongs to reality; this is
the conclusion he wishes to maintain. And to say that Time _has not_
reality would seem to be plainly equivalent to saying that Time _is
not_ real. However, if anybody should doubt whether the two phrases
are meant to be equivalent, the doubt may be easily set at rest by
a reference to the concluding words of the same chapter, where Mr.
Bradley uses the following very emphatic expression: "Time," he says,
"like space, has most evidently proved _not to be real,_ but to be a
contradictory appearance" (p. 43). Mr. Bradley does, then, say here,
in so many words, that Time _is not_ real. But there is one other
difference between this statement at the end of the chapter, and the
statement at the beginning of it, which we must not forget to notice.
In the statement at the beginning he carefully qualifies the assertion
"Time neither has nor belongs to reality" by saying "Time, _in the
character which it exhibits,_ neither has nor belongs to reality,"
whereas in the final statement this qualification is not inserted;
here he says simply "Time is not real." This qualification, which is
inserted in the one place and omitted in the other, might, of course,
be meant to imply that, in some _other_ character--some character which
it does _not_ exhibit--Time _has_ reality and does belong to it. And I
shall presently have something to say about this distinction between
Time in one character and Time in another, because it might be thought
that this distinction is the explanation of the difficulty as to Mr.
Bradley's meaning, which I am going to point out.
However, so far it is clear that Mr. Bradley holds that _in some
sense,_ at all events, the whole proposition "Time is not real" can be
truly asserted. And, now, I want to quote a passage in which he says
things which, at first sight, seem difficult to reconcile with this
view. This new passage is a passage in which he is not talking of Time
in particular, but of "appearances" in general. But, as we have seen,
he does regard Time as one among appearances, and I think there is no
doubt that what he here declares to be true of all appearances is meant
to be true of Time, among the rest. This new passage is as follows:--
"For the present," he says,[2] "we may keep a fast hold upon this,
that appearances _exist._ That is absolutely certain, and to deny it
is nonsense. And whatever exists must _belong to reality._ This is
also quite certain, and its denial once more is self-contradictory.
Our appearances, no doubt, may be a beggarly show, and their nature to
an unknown extent may be something which, _as it is,_ is _not_ true
of reality. That is one thing, and it is quite another thing to speak
as if these facts had no actual existence, or as if there could be
anything but reality to which they might belong. And I must venture to
repeat that such an idea would be sheer nonsense. What appears, for
that sole reason, most indubitably _is;_ and there is no possibility of
conjuring its being away from it."
That is the passage which seems to me to raise a difficulty as to his
meaning when contrasted with the former passage. And the reason why it
seems to me to raise one is this. In the former passage Mr. Bradley
declared most emphatically that Time is not real; he said: "Time has
_most evidently_ proved not to be real." Whereas in this one he seems
to declare equally emphatically that Time _does_ exist, and _is._ And
his language here again is as strong as possible. He says it is sheer
nonsense to suppose that Time does _not_ exist, is _not_ a fact, does
_not_ belong to reality. It looks, therefore, as if he meant to make
a distinction between "being real" on the one hand, and "existing,"
"being a fact," and "being" on the other hand--as if he meant to say
that a thing may exist, and be, and be a fact, and yet _not_ be real.
And I think there is, at all events, some superficial difficulty in
understanding this distinction. We might naturally think that to say
"Time exists, is a fact, and is," is equivalent to saying that it is
real. What more, we might ask, can a man who says that Time _is_ real
mean to maintain about it than that it exists, is a fact, and is? All
that most people would mean by saying that time is real could, it would
seem, be expressed by saying "There is such a thing as Time." And it
might, therefore, appear from this new passage as if Mr. Bradley fully
agreed with the view that most people would express by saying "Time is
real"--as if he did not at all mean to contradict anything that most
people believe about Time. But, if so, then what are we to make of his
former assertion that, nevertheless, Time is _not_ real? He evidently
thinks that, in asserting this, he is asserting something which is
_not_ mere nonsense; and he certainly would not have chosen this way of
expressing what he means, unless he had supposed that what he is here
asserting about Time is incompatible with what people _often_ mean when
they say "Time is real." Yet, we have seen that he thinks that what he
is asserting is _not_ incompatible with the assertions that Time is,
and is a fact, and exists. He must, therefore, think that when people
say "Time is real" they often, at least, mean something _more_ than
merely that there _is_ such a thing as Time, something therefore, which
may be denied, without denying this. All the same, there is, I think, a
real difficulty in seeing that they ever _do_ mean anything more, and,
_if_ they do, what more it is that they can mean.
The two expressions "There _is_ such a thing as so and so" and "So
and so is real" are certainly sometimes and quite naturally used as
equivalents, even if they are not always so used. And Mr. Bradley's own
language implies that this is so. For, as we have seen, in the first
passage, he seems to identify belonging to reality with being real.
The conclusion which he expresses in one place by saying that Time
does not belong to reality he expresses in another by saying that it
is not real; whereas in the second passage he seems to identify the
meaning of the same phrase "belonging to reality" with _existing;_
he says that whatever exists must belong to reality, and that it is
self-contradictory to deny this. But if both being real and existing
are identical with belonging to reality, it would seem they must be
identical with one another. And, indeed, in another passage in the
Appendix to the 2nd Edition (p. 555) we find Mr. Bradley actually using
the following words: "Anything," he says, "that in any sense _is,_
qualifies the absolute reality and so is real." Moreover, as we have
seen, he declares it to be nonsense to deny that Time _is_; he must,
therefore, allow that, _in a sense,_ at all events, it is nonsense to
deny that Time is real. And yet this denial is the very one he has
made. Mr. Bradley, therefore, does seem himself to allow that the word
"real" may, _sometimes_ at all events, be properly used as equivalent
to the words "exists," "is a fact," "is." And yet his two assertions
cannot both be true, unless there is _some_ sense in which the whole
proposition "Time is real" is _not_ equivalent to and cannot be
inferred from "Time is," or "Time exists," or "Time is a fact."
It seems, then, pretty clear that Mr. Bradley must be holding that the
statement "Time is real" is in _one_ sense, _not_ equivalent to "Time
exists"; though he admits that, in _another_ sense, it is. And I will
only quote one other passage which seems to make this plain.
"If," he says later on (p. 206) "Time is not unreal, I admit that our
Absolute is a delusion; but, on the other side, it will be urged that
time cannot be mere appearance. The change in the finite subject, we
are told, is a matter of direct experience; it is a fact, and hence it
cannot be explained away. And so much of course is indubitable. Change
is a fact and, further, _this fact, as such,_ is _not_ reconcilable
with the Absolute. And, if we could not in any way perceive how _the
fact_ can be _unreal,_ we should be placed, I admit, in a hopeless
dilemma.... But our real position is very different from this. For time
has been shown to contradict itself, and so to be appearance. With
this, its discord, we see at once, may pass as an element into a wider
harmony. And with this, the _appeal to fact_ at once becomes worthless."
"It is mere superstition to suppose that an appeal to experience can
prove _reality._ That I find something in existence in the world or in
my self, shows that this something _exists_, and it cannot show _more._
Any deliverance of consciousness--whether original or acquired--is
but a deliverance of consciousness. It is in no case an oracle and a
revelation which we have to accept as it is a fact, like other facts,
to be dealt with; and there is no presumption anywhere that any _fact_
is better than appearance."
Here Mr. Bradley seems plainly to imply that to be "real" is something
_more_ and other than to be a fact or to exist. This is the distinction
which I think he means to make, and which, I think, is the real
explanation of his puzzling language, and this is the distinction which
I am going presently to discuss. But I want first to say something
as to that other distinction, which I said might be supposed to be
the explanation of the whole difficulty--the distinction implied by
the qualification "Time, _in the character which it exhibits_"; the
suggestion that, when we talk of "Time," we may sometimes mean Time in
one character, sometimes in another, and that what is true of it in the
one character may not be true of it in the other. It might, I think, be
suggested that this is the explanation of the whole difficulty. And I
want briefly to point out why I think it cannot be the only explanation.
Stated very badly and crudely, the difficulty which requires
explanation is this: Mr. Bradley says, "It is sheer nonsense to say
Time is not real." But this thing which he says it is sheer nonsense
to say is the very thing which he himself had formerly said. He had
said, "Time has most evidently proved not to be real." Now, Mr. Bradley
certainly does not mean to say that this proposition of his own is
sheer nonsense; and yet he says, in words, that it _is_ sheer nonsense.
This is the difficulty. What is the explanation? Quite obviously,
the explanation can only take one possible form. Mr. Bradley must be
holding that the words "Time is real" may have two different _senses._
In one sense, the denial of them is sheer nonsense; in the other sense,
so far from being sheer nonsense, denial of them is, according to him,
evidently true. Now, what are these two different senses, between
which the difference is so enormous? It is here that the two different
explanations come in.
The first and, as I think, the wrong explanation (though I think Mr.
Bradley's words do give some colour to it) is this. It might be said:
"The whole business is perfectly easy to explain. When Mr. Bradley
says that Time is _not_ real, what he means is that Time, _in the
character which it exhibits,_ is not real. Whereas, when he says, Time
does exist, is a fact, and is, and that it is nonsense to deny this,
what he means is that Time does exist, _in some other character_--some
character _other_ than that which it exhibits. He does _not_ mean to
make any distinction, such as you suppose, between two meanings of
the word I real '--the one of them merely equivalent to 'exists,'
'is,' 'is a fact,' and the other meaning something very different from
this. The only distinction he means to make is a distinction between
_two_ meanings of 'Time' or of the whole sentence 'Time is real.' He
distinguishes between the meaning of this sentence, when it means,
'Time in the character which it exhibits, is real,' which meaning, he
says, is evidently false; and its meaning when it means, 'Time in _some
other_ character, is real,' and this meaning, he says, is evidently
true. This is the complete explanation of your supposed puzzle, which
is, in fact, therefore, very easy to solve."
This, I think, might be offered as an explanation of Mr. Bradley's
meaning. And it must be admitted that it _would_ furnish a complete
explanation of the particular puzzle I have just stated, it would
completely absolve Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency; and
would show that where he appears to contradict himself about the
reality of Time, the contradiction is verbal only and not real. We
might, indeed, object to this distinction between Time in one character
and Time in another; on the ground that anything which has not got the
character which Time exhibits, but only some _other_ character, ought
not to be called Time at all. We are, indeed, perfectly familiar with
the conception that one and the same thing may _at one time_ possess a
character which it does _not_ possess at another, so that what is true
of it at one time may not be true of it at another. We are, that is,
familiar with the idea of a thing _changing_ its character. But Time
itself as a whole obviously cannot change its character in this sense.
Mr. Bradley cannot mean to say that it possesses the character "which
it exhibits" and in which it is unreal _at one time,_ and possesses
some other character, in which it is real, at _some other time._ And
hence we might say it is certainly wrong to speak as if Time itself
could have two incompatible characters; since nothing can have two
incompatible characters, unless it has them _at different times._ And
this is an objection which does seem to apply to Mr. Bradley's doctrine
in any case, since he does in any case seem to imply this distinction
between Time in one character and Time in another, whether this
distinction is the complete explanation of our particular puzzle or
not. Yet this objection would not necessarily be more than an objection
to Mr. Bradley's words; it would not necessarily be an objection to
his meaning. Where he seems to imply that Time, in some character
other than that which it exhibits, may be fully real, he may only mean
that something completely different from Time, but which does in some
sense correspond to it, is fully real; and if he does mean this, our
objection would only amount to an objection to his giving the name of
"Time" to this supposed counterpart of Time; we might say, and I think
justly, that it is misleading to speak of this counterpart of Time as
if it were Time itself in some other character; but this would go no
way at all to show that there may not really be such a counterpart of
Time, which _is_ real, while Time itself is unreal. We might ask, too,
what this supposed counterpart of Time is like, or (to put it in Mr.
Bradley's way) what the precise character is, in which Time Areal? And
I think Mr. Bradley would admit that he cannot tell us. But this, you
see, would also be no objection to his actual doctrine. He might quite
well know, and be right in saying, that there is and must be a real
_counterpart_ of Time, completely different in character from Time, as
we know it, even though he has not the least idea what this counterpart
is like.
We must, therefore, admit that this proposed explanation of our puzzle
would be a complete explanation of it. It would completely vindicate
Mr. Bradley from the charge of inconsistency, and would give us, as
his doctrine, a doctrine to which we have hitherto found no objection
except verbal ones.
But, nevertheless, I think it is a wrong explanation, and I want to
explain why. If we were to suppose that this distinction between Time
in one character and Time in another were the only one on which Mr.
Bradley meant to rely, we should have as his doctrine this: We should
have to suppose him to affirm most emphatically that Time, in the
character which it exhibits, neither is real, _nor_ exists, _nor_ is
a fact, _nor_ is. We should have to suppose him to be using all these
four expressions always as strict equivalents, and to mean that it
is _only_ in its other character that Time either exists, or is a
fact, or is. And if he did mean this, there would, of course, be no
doubt whatever that he does mean to contradict the common view with
regard to Time; since, of course, what most people mean by "Time" is
what he chooses to call "Time in the character which it exhibits."
Yet, his language, even in the passages that I quoted, seems to me
to indicate that he does not mean this. I think, on the contrary,
he means to affirm emphatically that Time _even_ in the character
which it exhibits, does exist, _is_ a fact, and indubitably _is,_
though it is _not_ real in that character. In the second passage, for
instance, where he insists so emphatically that appearances do exist,
are facts, and indubitably _are,_ he is, I think, plainly talking of
appearances, in the character which they exhibit--or, as he there puts
it, their nature, _as it is_--he does, I think, mean that appearances,
even in this character, are facts, exist, and are, though, in this
character, they are not "true of reality." And, so again in the third
passage, where he says, Change _is_ a fact, and this fact, _as such,_
is not reconcilable with the Absolute; this language is surely quite
inexcusable, unless he means that Change, as such--change, in the
_character which it exhibits_--change, _as it is, is_ a fact: though,
of course, he holds that _in_ this character it certainly is not real.
I think, therefore, we have to assume that Mr. Bradley means to make
a distinction not merely between Time, in one character, and Time in
another, but also between "real," in one sense, and "real" in another.
His meaning is not so simple as it would be, if he were merely making
a distinction between Time in one character and Time in another, and
it is not, after all, at all plain whether he means to contradict what
ordinary people hold about Time or not. He does not mean to assert that
Time, _as such, neither_ is real, _nor_ exists, _nor_ is a fact, _nor_
is; but, on the contrary, that Time, even _as such,_ does exist, _is_
a fact, and _is_; _but,_ nevertheless, is not real. This, at least,
is what I am going to assume him to mean. And on this assumption, we
are brought face to face with the question as to the meaning of the
word "real," and also as to the meaning of these other words "exists,"
"is a fact," and "is." Mr. Bradley seems to admit, we have seen, that
"real" may _sometimes_ be properly used as _merely_ equivalent to
these other phrases. We are, however, now supposing that he also holds
that in another sense they are not equivalent, but that "real" means
something more than the others, so that it is quite consistent to
maintain that Time is _not_ "real," and yet _does_ exist, is a fact,
and is. In holding this I think he is mistaken; and what I want to do
is to explain, as clearly as I can, what sort of a mistake I take him
to be making, and what seems to me to be the source of this mistake. I
may, perhaps, be quite wrong in thinking that Mr Bradley has made this
mistake, and that it is in any degree the source of the distinction he
seems to draw between "reality" and "existence." To maintain that it is
so is no part of my main object. My main object is simply to make clear
the nature of this particular mistake, whether committed by Mr. Bradley
or not, and that it is a mistake; because it seems to me that it is a
mistake which it is very easy to make, and very important to avoid. I
am, of course, not concerned at all to discuss the question whether
Time _is_ real or not, but only to discuss the question what sort of
things would have to be true, if it were unreal, and whether if those
things were true it could still be true that Time either exists, or is,
or is a fact.
Now, to begin with, I think I know pretty well, in part at least, what
Mr. Bradley means when he says that it is unreal. I think that part
at least of what he means is just what he _ought_ to mean--just what
anyone else would mean if he said that Time was unreal, and what any
ordinary person would understand to be meant, if he heard those words.
But I can conceive that, when I have explained as well as I can what
this is that he _ought_ to mean, some people may be inclined to dispute
whether he means any such thing at all. They may say that he is using
the word "real" exclusively in some highly unusual and special sense,
so that in asserting that "Time is unreal" he is by no means denying
any part of what ordinary people would mean by saying that "Time is
real." And that some special sense may _come in_ to his meaning I
am prepared to admit. I do think it is possible that _part_ of what
Mr. Bradley is asserting may be something which no unsophisticated
person would think of expressing in the same way, and I will admit,
therefore, that he does not, very likely, mean by "Time is unreal"
_merely_ what other people would mean by this phrase, but something
else _as well._ What, however, I cannot help thinking is that, even
if he means something more, he _does_ mean what ordinary people would
mean _as well_: that what they would mean is at least a _part_ of his
meaning. And if even this is disputed, if it is maintained that he is
using the words _exclusively_ in some special sense, I own I do not
know how to argue the question. If anybody really does take the view
that, when he says "Time is unreal," absolutely all that he means is
something which is in no way incompatible with what most people would
mean by saying "Time is real," I do not know how to show that this view
is wrong. I can only say that if this _had_ been all that he meant,
I cannot believe that he would have expressed his view in the form
"Time is unreal." The only further argument I shall bring in favour
of my view that he does mean what he ought to mean will take the form
of an answer to one possible argument which might be brought against
it. When I nave explained what he _ought_ to mean by saying that "Time
is unreal," it will be quite clear that this is something which is in
fact incompatible with the truth of the propositions that Time _is,_
or _exists,_ or _is a fact._ And it might be urged that the fact that
it is thus incompatible is a strong argument against the view that
Mr. Bradley does mean what he _ought_ to mean, since, if he had meant
it, he could hardly have failed to perceive that what he meant _was_
inconsistent with these propositions, whereas, as we have seen, he
certainly does not perceive this. I have an answer to that argument,
which consists in giving an explanation, which I think a plausible
one, as to how he could come to think that the propositions are _not_
inconsistent, when in fact they are.
What, then, _ought_ Mr. Bradley to mean by "Time is unreal"? What
would most people mean by this proposition? I do not think there is
much difficulty in discovering what sort of thing they would mean by
it. Of course, Time, with a big T, seems to be a highly abstract kind
of entity, and to define _exactly_ what can be meant by saying of an
entity of that sort that it is unreal does seem to offer difficulties.
But if you try to translate the proposition into the concrete, and to
ask what it _implies,_ there is, I think, very little doubt as to the
sort of thing it implies. The moment you try to do this, and think what
it really comes to, you at once begin thinking of a number of different
_kinds_ of propositions, all of which plainly must be untrue, if Time
is unreal. If Time is unreal, then plainly nothing ever happens before
or after anything else; nothing is ever simultaneous with anything
else; it is never true that anything is past; never true that anything
will happen in the future; never true that anything is happening now;
and so on. You can at once think of a considerable number of kinds of
propositions (and you could easily add to the list), the falsehood of
all of which is plainly implied by saying that Time is unreal. And it
is clear, also, that to say that the falsehood of all propositions of
these kinds is implied is equivalent to saying that there are no facts
of certain corresponding kinds--no facts which consist in one event
happening before another; none which consist in an event being past or
future, and so on. That is to say, what "Time is unreal" implies is
that, in the case of a large number of different _properties_ which
are such that, if they _did_ belong to anything, what they belonged
to would be facts having some common characteristic, which we might
express by calling them "temporal facts," the properties in question
do, in fact, belong to nothing. It implies that the property of being a
fact which consists in one event following another belongs to nothing;
that that of being a past event belongs to nothing, and so on. And
why it implies that all those different special properties belong to
nothing is, I think we may say, because what it _means_ is that the
general property which I have called that of being a "temporal fact"
belongs to nothing. To say that the property of being a temporal fact
belongs to nothing _does imply_ that such special properties as that
of being a fact which consists in one event following another, or that
of being a fact which consists in something being past, also belong to
nothing; in exactly the same way as to say that the property of being
"coloured" belongs to nothing _implies_ with regard to the special
properties "being red," "being blue," etc., that they also belong to
nothing. We may, then, I think, say that what "Time is unreal" _means_
is simply "The property of being a temporal fact belongs to nothing,"
or, to express this in the way in which it would be expressed in
ordinary life, "There _are_ no temporal facts." And this being so, we
have explained the usage of "unreal," where it is predicated of Time
with a capital T, by reference to a much more common and perfectly
familiar usage of the term. The use of "is unreal" in the phrase "Time
is unreal" has been defined by reference to its use in the phrase
"Temporal facts are unreal." And its use in this phrase is, so far as
I can see, exactly the same as in hosts of phrases with which we are
perfectly familiar; it is, I think, _the_ commonest and by far the most
important use of the term "unreal." The use is that in which we use it
when we say, "Unicorns are unreal," "Griffins are unreal," "Chimæras
are unreal," and so on. It is the usage in which unreal is equivalent
to "imaginary"; and in which to say "Unicorns are unreal" means the
same as "There are no unicorns" or "Unicorns do not exist." In just
the same way the proposition "Temporal facts are unreal," into which
we have translated "Time is unreal," means the same as "There are no
temporal facts," or "Temporal facts do not exist," or "Temporal facts
are imaginary."
I think, then, that what Mr. Bradley _ought_ to mean by "Time is
unreal" can be defined by reference to one particular usage of the word
"real" --or, if you like to put it that way, to one particular one
among the conceptions for which the term "reality" may stand. And this
particular conception seems to me to be by far the commonest and most
important of those for which the term does stand. I want, therefore,
before going on, to dwell a little upon its nature; although I daresay
that all that I have to say is perfectly familiar and perfectly well
understood by every one here. Of course, it has often been said before,
but I think it is still very far from being generally understood.
I think, perhaps, the point I want to insist on can be brought out in
this way. I have just said that we have pointed out one particular
one, and that the most important, among the conceptions for which the
term "reality" may stand; and that is an excusable way of saying what
we have done. But it would, I think, be more correct to say that we
have pointed out one particular, and that the most important, usage
of the terms "real" and "unreal," and that one of the peculiarities
of this usage is that it is such that the terms "real" and "unreal"
cannot, when used in this way, be properly said to stand for any
conception whatever. I will try to explain what I mean. We have said
that what "Lions are real" _means_ is that some particular property or
other--I will say, for the sake of brevity, _the_ property of being
a lion, though that is not strictly accurate, does In fact _belong
to_ some-thing--that there are things which have it, or, to put it
in another way, that the conception of being a lion is a conception
which does apply to some things--that there are things which _fall
under_ it. And similarly what "Unicorns are _unreal"_ means is that the
property of being a unicorn belongs to _nothing_. Now, if this is so,
then it seems to me, in a very important sense, "real" and "unreal"
do _not_ in this usage stand for any conceptions at all. The only
_conceptions_ which occur in the proposition "Lions are real" are, on
this interpretation, plainly, (1) the conception of being a lion, and
(2) the conception of belonging to something, and perfectly obviously
"real" does not stand for either of these. In the case of the first
that is obvious; but it is worth while pointing out that it is also
true of the second.
For if "is real" did stand for "belongs to something," then the
proposition "Lions are real" would stand, not for the assertion
that the property of "being a lion" belongs to something, but for
the assertion that lions themselves _are properties which belong to
something_; and it is quite obvious that what we mean to assert is
not any such nonsense as this. "Real," therefore, does not, in this
proposition, stand for the conception of "belonging to something" nor
yet, quite plainly, does it stand for the conception of "being a lion."
And hence, since these are the only two conceptions which do occur in
the proposition, we may, I think, say that "real," in this usage, does
not stand for any conception at all. To say that it did would be to
imply that it stood for some property of which we are asserting that
everything which has the property of "being a lion" _also_ has this
other property. But we are not, in fact, asserting any such thing. We
are not asserting of any property called "reality" that it belongs to
lions, as in the proposition "Lions are mammalian" we _are_ asserting
of the property of "being a mammal" that _it_ belongs to lions. The
two propositions "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian," though
grammatically similar, are in reality of wholly different forms; and
one difference between them may be expressed by saying that whereas
"mammalian" does stand for a property or conception, the very point of
this usage of "real" is that it does not.
To return to Mr. Bradley. "Time is unreal" _ought_ to mean, according
to me, "Temporal facts are unreal," in the sense I have tried to
explain. And I cannot help thinking that this which he _ought_ to mean
is, in part at least, what Mr. Bradley _does_ mean when he says "Time
is unreal," though possibly be also means something else as well. But
if so, it is quite clear, I think, that what he means is inconsistent
with its being true that Time exists or that there is such a thing as
Time. To say that Time exists or that there is such a thing, is to
assert at least, that there are some temporal facts: it may assert more
than this, but it does assert this, at least. And this, we have seen,
is exactly what is denied when it is said that Time is unreal. "Time
is unreal" just means "Temporal facts are unreal," _or_ "there are no
temporal facts," _or_ "Temporal facts do not exist." And just this is
also what is meant by "Time does not exist" or "There is no such thing
as Time." There is, in fact, nothing, else for these expressions to
mean. What, therefore, Mr. Bradley _ought_ to mean and (according to
me) does mean by "Time is unreal" is, in fact, inconsistent with what
he ought to mean by "Time exists" or by "Time is." And yet plainly he
does not think that it is so. Is it possible to explain why he should
have failed to perceive the inconsistency?
I think his failure can be explained as follows. It may have been
noticed that, in the passages I quoted from him, he insists in one
place, that to deny that appearances exist is not merely false but
_self-contradictory,_ and in another appeals to the principle that "any
deliverance of consciousness is but a deliverance of consciousness" in
support of his contention that what _is_ a fact need, nevertheless,
_not_ be real. And the fact that he does these two things does, I
think, give colour to the suggestion that the reason why he thinks that
what is unreal may yet exist, and be a fact, and be, is the following.
It is undoubtedly the case that, even if temporal facts are unreal,
_i.e.,_ there _are_ no such things, we can and do _think of them,_ just
as it is undoubtedly the case that, though unicorns are unreal, we can
and do imagine them. In other words, "temporal facts" and "unicorns"
are both quite certainly "deliverances of consciousness," at least
in the sense that they are "objects of thought"; being "objects of
thought" they are, in a wide sense, "appearances" also, and I cannot
help thinking that Mr. Bradley supposes that, merely because they are
so, they _must_ at least BE. "How" (I imagine he would ask) "can a
thing 'appear' or even 'be thought of' unless it is there to appear and
to be thought of? To say that it appears or is thought of, and that yet
there is no such thing, is plainly self-contradictory. A thing cannot
have a property, unless it is there to have it, and, since unicorns
and temporal facts _do_ have the property of being thought of, there
certainly must be such things. When I think of a unicorn, what I am
thinking of is certainly not nothing; if it were nothing, then, when
I think of a griffin, I should also be thinking of nothing, and there
would be no difference between thinking of a griffin and thinking
of a unicorn. But there certainly is a difference; and what can the
difference be except that in the one case what I am thinking of is a
unicorn, and in the other a griffin? And if the unicorn is what I am
thinking of, then there certainly must _be_ a unicorn, in spite of the
fact that unicorns are unreal. In other words, though in one sense of
the words there certainly _are_ no unicorns--that sense, namely, in
which to assert that there are would be equivalent to asserting that
unicorns are real--yet there _must_ be _some_ other sense in which
there _are_ such things; since, _if_ there were not, we could not think
of them."
Perhaps, it may be thought that the fallacy involved in this argument
is too gross for it to be possible that Mr. Bradley should have
been guilty of it. But there are other passages in _Appearance and
Reality_--particularly what he says about Error --which look to me as
if he certainly was guilty of it. I suppose it will be quite obvious to
everyone here that it is a fallacy; that the fact that we can think of
unicorns is not sufficient to prove that, in any sense at all, there
_are_ any unicorns. Yet, I am not sure that I know myself what is _the_
mistake involved in thinking that it _is_ sufficient, and I am going,
therefore, to try to put as clearly as I can, what I think it is, in
the hope that somebody may be able, if I am wrong, to correct me.
The main mistake, I suppose, is the mistake of thinking that the
proposition "Unicorns are thought of" is a proposition of the same form
as "Lions are hunted"; or the proposition "I am thinking of a unicorn"
of the same form as "I am hunting a lion"; or the proposition "Unicorns
are objects of thought" of the same form as "Lions are objects of the
chase." Of the second proposition in each of these three pairs, it is
in fact the case that it could not be true unless there were lions--at
least one. Each of them does, in fact, assert both with regard to a
certain property--which we will call that of "being a lion"--that there
_are_ things which possess it, and also with regard to another--that of
being hunted--that some of the things which possess the former possess
this property too. But it is obvious enough to common sense that the
same is by no means true of the _first_ proposition in each pair, in
spite of the fact that their grammatical expression shows no trace of
the difference. It is perfectly obvious that if I say "I am thinking of
a unicorn,"
I am not saying both that there is a unicorn and that I am thinking of
it, although, if I say "I am hunting a lion," I am saying both that
there is a lion, and that I am hunting it. In the former case,
I am _not_ asserting that the two properties of being a unicorn and of
being thought of by me both belong to one and the same thing; whereas,
in the latter case, I am asserting that the two properties of being a
lion and of being hunted by me _do_ belong to one and the same thing.
It is quite clear that there is _in fact_, this difference between
the two propositions; although no trace of it appears in their verbal
expression. And why we should use the same form of verbal expression
to convey such different meanings is more than I can say. It seems to
me very curious that language, in this, as in the other instance which
we have just considered of "Lions are real" and "Lions are mammalian,"
should have grown up just as if it were expressly designed to mislead
philosophers; and I do not know why it should have. Yet, it seems to
me there is no doubt that in ever so many instances it has. Moreover,
_exactly_ what _is_ meant by saying "I am thinking of a unicorn" is
not by any means clear to me. I think we can assert at least this:
In order that this proposition should be true, it is necessary (1)
that I should be conceiving, with regard to a certain property, the
hypothesis that there Is something which possesses it, and (2) that the
property in question should be such that, if anything did possess it
there would be a unicorn. Although this is plainly true, it does not
give us completely what is _meant_ by the statement, "I am thinking
of a unicorn"; and I do not know what the complete meaning is. It is
certainly _not_ that I am conceiving with regard to the property of
"being a unicorn," that there is something which possesses it; since
I may be thinking of a unicorn, without ever having conceived the
property of "being a unicorn" at all. Whatever it does mean, the point
which concerns us is that it is certainly _not_ necessary for its
truth, that the property of being a unicorn should, in fact, belong
to anything whatever, or, therefore, that there should in any sense
whatever _be_ a unicorn. And the fallacy I am attributing to Mr.
Bradley is that of supposing that, _in some sense,_ it must imply this
latter.
This, then, is what I imagine to be at least one of the reasons
which have led Mr. Bradley to suppose that the proposition "Time is
unreal," _must_ be consistent with the proposition "There _is_ such
a thing as Time." Put shortly, it is that he sees (what is perfectly
true) that "Time is unreal" _must_ be consistent with "We do think of
Time;" he thinks (falsely) that "We _do_ think of Time" must imply,
in some sense, "There _is_ such a thing as Time;" and finally, infers
(correctly) from this true and this false premiss, that there _must_ be
some sense of the proposition "There is such a thing as Time" which is
consistent with "Time is unreal."
It follows, then, that if Mr. Bradley means what he ought mean _both_
by "Time is unreal" _and_ by "Time exists," he is contradicting himself
when he combines these two propositions. And I have said I feel
convinced that he _does_ mean what he ought to mean by the former.
But I feel a good deal of doubt as to whether, all the same, he is
contradicting himself, because it does seem to me doubtful whether he
means what he ought to mean by the latter. The kind of thing which I
imagine may be happening to him when he insists so strongly that Time
_does_ exist, _is a fact,_ and _is,_ is that, properly speaking, he is
not attaching to these phrases any meaning whatever--_not,_ therefore,
that which they properly bear. It seems to me very possible that he
has so strongly convinced himself of the false proposition that there
_must_ be _some_ sense in which, if I think of a unicorn, there must
_be_ a unicorn, that wherever he knows the former proposition holds,
he allows himself to use the latter _form of words,_ without attaching
any meaning to them. What he is really asserting so emphatically may,
I think, be not anything which his words stand for, but simply this
verbal proposition that there _must_ be _some_ sense in which they are
true.
[1] _Appearance and Reality_ (2nd edn.), p. 35. The Italics are mine.
[2] _Op. cit._ pp. 131-2.