In the Netherlands the minds of all men were throughout the year
1618 preoccupied with the fierce political and religious discords
that had brought civil strife into the land. The sword of Maurice
had, in the name of the States-General of the Union, overthrown
the power of the provincial oligarchies, and despite the strenuous
opposition of the States of Holland under the leadership of
Oldenbarneveldt, had made good the claim of the States-General to
sovereign authority in the Republic. The aged Advocate of Holland,
so long supreme in the administration of public affairs, with his
chief adherents, lay in prison awaiting trial and condemnation.
Anxious, therefore, at such a crisis, to avoid a breach with King
James, or to provoke on his part measures of reprisal (especially
in view of the approaching meeting of the Synod of Dort, at which
James was to be officially represented), the States announced their
readiness (October 18) to accede to Carleton's request for the
speedy dispatch of a special embassy. But they wished to confine the
subjects of discussion to the East Indian and Greenland disputes. In
vain Carleton pressed upon the States the urgency of including the
Great (Herring) Fishery and dyed cloth questions in the instruction.
The reply was that it would be dangerous in the disturbed condition
of the country to touch matters of such great importance affecting
the interests of so large a portion of the population of the
maritime provinces. A clear indication was moreover given that on
these two points there was little possibility of concession.
The ambassadors arrived in England (December 7) accompanied by five
commissioners of the East India Company. The King received them with
expressions of friendliness (December 20), but the examination of
their instructions by the Privy Council at once revealed that the
subject of the Great Fisheries, which had most interest for the
English, was omitted. The Dutch envoys accordingly were informed
that the King was very astonished that the warnings of Carleton
had been without effect, and that their mission would be fruitless
unless this point, which concerned the King's sovereign rights,
were placed in the forefront of the negotiations. James, indeed,
refused to proceed unless the instructions were altered, and held
out the threat of an alliance with Spain if his wishes were not
complied with. Carleton, indeed, in a long and angry representation
made to the States-General, January 12, 1619, practically demanded,
not only that the ambassadors should be instructed to deal with the
Great Fishery question, but to admit that their rights under ancient
treaties and their contention as to the freedom of the sea were
claims that could not be sustained in face of the King's 'lawful
title and exclusive sovereign rights and property in the fisheries
upon the coasts of his three kingdoms'. In case of delay, England
would maintain her rights with the armed hand. The King was resolved
that the grievances of which his subjects complained must cease.
The States-General, however, dared not in the midst of the crisis
through which the country was passing, interfere with the fishery
question. Maurice, as Captain-General of the Union, had by military
force overpowered the resistance of the Province of Holland to the
will of the States-General. Its leaders had been incarcerated, and
the town magistracies throughout Holland changed. Feelings were very
embittered, and the position of the new magistrates would have been
seriously endangered had the dominant party consented to yield to
English threats the rights of free fishing, an industry on which
some 50,000 persons in Holland depended for their livelihood. Both
Maurice and his cousin and trusted adviser, William Lewis of Nassau,
Stadholder of Friesland, were agreed that such a course was at the
moment unwise, if not impracticable. These considerations were laid
before James, who had throughout the discussions in the Republic
strongly sympathized with the triumphant Contra-Remonstrant party.
The result was a modification in his unbending attitude. The King
agreed to defer the discussion of the 'Great Fishery' question until
the internal state of the Netherlands had become more settled, and
to proceed with the Greenland fishery and East Indian matters first,
on condition that the delay was to be as short as possible and
not to extend beyond the end of the year. Indeed, September 1 was
named as the actual limit of time. The States were quickly informed
(January 21) of the English concession, and now that the tension was
relieved, took more than three weeks in which to consider carefully
the terms of their answer to Carleton. They were in a difficult
position, and they finally (February 13) gave in general terms a
non-committal undertaking that 'so soon as the affairs of this land,
political and religious, shall be brought into a better state--if
possible within a year', they will send ambassadors to treat of the
Great Fishery, the cloth trade, and other points, as a preliminary
to the revision of the treaties of intercourse. Meanwhile they
trusted that all should go on as before, and that the English would
make no innovation in contravention of the ancient customs and
treaties. So the matter rested, the States being warned that the
King demanded that the placard of June 5, 1618, forbidding the Dutch
fishermen to commit further outrages and excesses 'on pain of severe
penalties', or to approach within sight (the English said within 14
miles, but to this the Dutch objected) of the Scottish coast, should
be rigidly enforced during the intermediate period of delay.
The efforts of the Dutch ambassadors to settle the two questions
which according to their instructions were the chief object of
their mission nevertheless encountered serious difficulties, and
it was soon apparent that the views of the two parties were almost
irreconcilable. The scheme for a working union of the two East
India Companies was speedily given up. For months, however, the
rights and wrongs of the two nations with regard to the Greenland
(Spitzbergen) fisheries were the subject of many conferences and
interchanges of notes. The English maintained that they, on the
ground of first discovery and of being the first to fish in the
Spitzbergen waters, had exclusive rights of sovereignty both on
the land and the seas that surrounded it. The Dutch set up the
counter-claim that they had not only first discovered, but first
occupied the land, and they held firmly that the sea was free to
all nations. For the damages suffered by the English fishing fleet
at the hands of the Netherlanders in 1618 an indemnity was demanded
by the English Government amounting to £43,800, and this did not
include the amounts due to private ship-owners for the loss of
their trade, and to the relatives of those who had been killed or
wounded. The Dutch replied by pointing to the repeated provocations
the Hollanders and Zeelanders had had year by year to endure, and to
the losses they on their side had suffered not only through being
hindered in their fishing, but through actual plundering of their
goods. The ambassadors promised to give reparation, if the English
would do the same. Tired at last of fruitless discussions, prolonged
month after month, the Dutch envoys sought a personal interview with
the King, July 10, at Greenwich, to see if any _modus vivendi_ could
be arrived at. All the old arguments on both sides were repeated,
and neither would yield on the point of their several 'rights'; the
utmost the King would concede was a suggestion that, as a favour,
he might connive at the Netherlanders fishing in his waters. This
did not satisfy the ambassadors, and they fell back on the familiar
device of asking that the question should be put off for later
settlement. To this finally James agreed, and it was arranged that
the matter should be deferred for further negotiations for a period
of three years, and that meanwhile the English and Dutch were to
fish peaceably together. The King insisted that restitution should
be made for the damage done by the armed attack on the English fleet
in 1618 within three months, and for all other losses inflicted
by the Dutch within the three years. As soon as the full English
claims were settled (such was the ultimatum), the question of the
satisfaction due to the Netherlanders should be considered. With
this decision, however unpalatable to them, the envoys had perforce
to be content. They sailed from Gravesend, on August 1, without
having really effected anything but a postponement of disputes,
which mere delay was more likely to aggravate than to appease.
The results then of the embassy of 1618 were disappointing to both
parties. The English resented the continued presence of the Dutch
fishermen both in the home waters and in the Northern Seas, for
they not only carried off the profits from what were regarded as
British industries, but behaved with overbearing arrogance as if
in their own domain. The Hollanders found themselves permitted, as
it were on sufferance, to continue an occupation which supplied a
large part of their population with sustenance and was the basis of
their prosperity. The States-General, though they were committed by
their envoys to send a fresh embassy to deal with the question of
the Great Fisheries, as soon as the internal troubles of the country
were settled, were in no hurry to move in the matter. It was in vain
that Carleton in the early months of 1620 reminded them of their
undertaking. The general opinion in Holland, and in this Prince
Maurice himself shared, was that there could be no surrender of the
treaty right to free fishing, even though it should be at the cost
of war.
Their position was greatly strengthened by the momentous events that
had been occurring in Germany. The Elector Palatine, Frederick--King
James's son-in-law--had accepted the Crown of Bohemia (November,
1619) but a year later his forces were crushed by the Imperial army
at the White Hill near Prague (November 5). Meanwhile his hereditary
dominions had been invaded and conquered by a Spanish force under
Spinola. Frederick was head of the Protestant Union, but the
forces of the Union were disunited (indeed it was soon afterwards
dissolved), and although Sir Horace Vere, at the head of a fine
body of 2,000 English volunteers, escorted by a strong Dutch force,
made his way to the scene of conflict, he was unable to prevent the
Spanish conquest of the Lower Palatinate. The unfortunate King of
Bohemia, a homeless fugitive, was compelled with his wife, Elizabeth
of England, to seek refuge with his uncle, the Prince of Orange, at
the Hague. The Dutch were greatly disturbed, as the twelve years'
truce was drawing to an end, at the prospect of the Spaniards being
able through their alliance with the Emperor to march from their
post of vantage on the Rhine straight upon the Netherlands, and
were therefore anxious to secure the goodwill and help of England
in the serious struggle which they saw before them. They felt
confident that, despite his love of peace, James would be forced to
take active steps to defend his son-in-law's lands from conquest,
and the cause of Protestantism in Germany from ruin. The news of
the complete defeat of Frederick at the White Hill therefore,
together with the necessity of renewing the treaty between the
two countries, which expired in April, 1621, at the end of the
truce, had more effect than Carleton's remonstrances and threats
in hastening a renewal of negotiations. The English ambassador was
instructed to assure the States that James would lend assistance for
the recovery of the Palatinate, and it was resolved by them that a
special mission should be dispatched as soon as possible. It was
well known that the King was still on the most confidential terms
with Gondomar, and that the Spanish envoy continued to exercise a
strong influence upon the royal policy, and that the project of a
Spanish marriage had not been abandoned. It was felt therefore
that a strong effort should be made to counteract this secret
leaning of James to listen to the subtle counsels of the Spaniard,
and to persuade him to break with Spain and to take decisively the
Protestant side in the war against the allied forces of the House of
Habsburg.
The ambassadors set sail from Veere, January 28, 1621, and arrived
in London on February 1. They were six in number, representing
the three maritime provinces of Holland, Zeeland, and Friesland,
in itself a proof that though the affairs of the Palatinate were
the principal subject that filled their instructions, the fishery
questions, for the moment placed in the background, had in reality
lost none of their importance. The names of the special envoys were
Jonkheer Jacobus van Wijngaerden, Johan Camerling, Albert Sonck,
Albert Bruyninck, Jacobus Schotte, and Jonkheer Frederik van Vervou
tot Martenahuys, and with them was associated the resident in
London, Noel Caron. At their first audience with the King (February
7) the situation in Germany was almost exclusively referred to. They
laid stress upon the extent of the Spanish conquests on the Rhine,
and after pointing out that the States had been paying monthly
subsidies to certain of the Protestant princes and had collected a
great army on the frontier, expressed their gratification at the
information that had been received through Sir Dudley Carleton to
the effect that the King would, if diplomacy failed, restore his
children in the possessions by force. Should he indeed be prepared
to take steps for military intervention, they were commissioned to
assure him that the States would be ready to second his action and
to go to war.
The embassy had arrived at a critical moment in the reign of James
I, and after some words of friendly compliment their conference with
the Privy Council was deferred until February 15. In the interval
James's third Parliament had met (February 9). The King's financial
necessities had forced him to summon a Parliament, and the session
was to prove a very stormy one. The leaders of the Commons at once
demanded the redress of many grievances and proceeded to attack
those whom they charged with being the cause of the abuses they
denounced, more especially the omnipotent favourite, Buckingham
himself. The sojourn of the Dutch mission therefore coincided with
a period of political stress and anxiety. But the envoys had the
satisfaction of knowing that the English Parliament, which in this
was thoroughly representative of public opinion in the country, was
enthusiastically in favour of active support being given to the
King of Bohemia for the recovery of the Palatinate. Subsidies were
without delay voted for that purpose, and the vote was accompanied
by a petition urging the King to make war with Spain and to break
off the negotiations for the Spanish marriage.
But Gondomar found no difficulty in trading upon James's habitual
preference for peaceful methods. According to the testimony of the
Venetian, Girolamo Lando, the Spanish ambassador 'had access to
the King at any hour, and found all doors open to him which were
accustomed to be shut to others', and he is described as 'with
ever-increasing boldness carrying on a campaign against these
kingdoms with unspeakable intrigues and corruption.' Through his
counsels the King entered upon a series of negotiations with the
Courts of Madrid and Vienna in the interests of Frederick, which
were perfectly futile and merely afforded the Catholic powers time
to strengthen their position upon the Rhine. At the same time James,
by opposing himself to the expressed wishes of his Parliament
and people in this matter of the Palatinate, only heightened the
determination of the House of Commons to assert their privileges
and insist upon their demand for a redress of grievances. In
foreign no less than in domestic affairs, the views of the King
and those of the representatives of his people proved to be
diametrically opposed. In December accordingly, no compromise being
possible, Parliament was dissolved, and James, left in desperate
financial straits, was unable to carry out any policy that involved
expenditure. In considering the course of the negotiations with
the Dutch, these facts must be borne in mind, for they are vitally
important for a right understanding of the situation.
The embassy, delayed by the opening of Parliament, had a conference
with the Privy Council on February 15. Once more they impressed
upon their audience the seriousness of the dangers which threatened
both the United Provinces and England from the war in Germany,
and urged, now that the truce with Spain was almost expired, the
renewal of the treaty of alliance between the two countries to
defend the Protestant cause against a common enemy. In the words
of the contemporary historian Aitzema, 'they laid strong emphasis
upon this last point as if it were the only object and aim of the
embassy.' But the Council had no desire, so immediately after the
meeting of Parliament, to commit themselves on the subject of
military intervention, for they were well aware of the King's
disinclination to break with Spain. The question was accordingly
put to the Dutchmen as to whether there were no other points in
their instructions, mention being specially made of the fisheries,
the cloth, and the East Indian disputes. The reply was that in the
present critical condition of European affairs the interest of both
States required that secondary questions should be allowed to rest
and continue on the same footing as before in the presence of the
grave danger (now the truce was drawing to an end) from a mighty
enemy. Some lesser differences which had arisen about the 'tare' in
the cloth trade, and the 'mint', they were ready to discuss, but
nothing more.
The matter was referred to the King, and on March 2 the envoys had
a second conference with the Council, when it was made clear to
them that the fisheries questions must be settled as a preliminary
to any treaty of alliance. The Dutch could only answer (March 10)
that they had received no powers to negotiate upon the fisheries,
but in accordance with their instructions they pointed out the
difficulty and the danger of trying to interfere with an industry
in which so large a part of the population were interested, while
civil discords were scarcely appeased and a renewal of the war with
Spain was on the point of breaking out. So much was this the case
that though the value of the fishing (so they said) was steadily
decreasing, the States were granting large subsidies for convoys
in order to provide the means of sustenance for so large a number
of their subjects. The smallest toll or charge, they argued, would
either cause 'their fishery to be entirely destroyed and ruined,
or possibly stir up this rude sea-faring population to fresh
commotions to the manifest peril of the repose of the Republic,
scarcely cured of the wounds of its late infirmity.' They begged
therefore that the consideration of the matter might be put off to
a more fitting time, and meanwhile that the old privileges should
continue in force. As to the Greenland fishery, it was pleaded that
the three years' delay that had been granted in 1619 was not yet
expired. Similarly in the East Indian disputes, which continued with
no less frequency and bitterness, although an accord between the
two companies had been agreed upon in June, 1619, the Netherlanders
met the complaints of the representatives of the English Company
with excuses and counter-protests. There was much talking, but
practically no progress made. After several interviews with the
Council and the King himself it was finally arranged that things
should remain as they were for a short time longer, but the King
insisted (April 8) that 'the fishery questions concerned his right
and his honour and that he could not allow them to be any longer in
debate and suspense', and that a special Commission must be sent by
the States to deal with these disputes, and further, that he would
not wait longer than May 31. He also demanded a settlement of the
quarrels in the East Indies, and a withdrawal of the 'tare' edict,
which was declared to be the ruin of the cloth industry in England.
So soon as these matters were satisfactorily arranged, he promised
that he would conclude an alliance with the States. The Dutch envoys
left London on their return journey on April 26.
As a proof of the very close relations subsisting at this time
between England and the United Provinces, it may be mentioned
that in the very same months that the Wijngaerden embassy was thus
holding ineffectual conferences in London with the King of England
and his Privy Council, the Fellowship of the Merchant Adventurers
were transferring their Court to the Prinsenhof at Delft.
Driven from Antwerp in 1582 the Adventurers had, as already related,
set up their Great Court first at Emden, then at Hamburg and Stade.
But in 1598 the enmity of the Hanse towns compelled them to leave
Stade, and to establish themselves at Middelburg in Zeeland. Until
the suppression of the Adventurers' Charter in 1615, this town was
the staple for English cloth and wool in the Netherlands, though
the 'interlopers' as they were called, succeeded in carrying on
an active smuggling trade through Amsterdam and Flushing. After
the renewal of the Charter in 1617 the Adventurers returned to
Middelburg, but on account of the unhealthiness of the place, and
other reasons, they determined to remove to Delft. To effect this
involved elaborate negotiations with the Town Corporation, with
the States of Holland, and with the States-General. Moreover,
the consent of the King was necessary as a preliminary step. Sir
Dudley Carleton was largely instrumental in bringing the matter to
a successful issue. James gave his consent that the Court should
move from Zeeland within the borders of Holland, 'to show his
Majesty's great affection for that Province'. On April 21, 1621,
the contract with Delft was signed, just as the Dutch envoys were
leaving England. But Amsterdam, with whose cloth merchants the
'interlopers' had been engaged in a profitable trade, sent in to
the States of Holland a very strongly worded remonstrance. They
objected to the privileges which the Delft Corporation had granted
to the Adventurers as injurious to themselves and the interests of
the province. The States of Holland on receiving this remonstrance
resolved that the contract made by Delft and the monopoly of the
Adventurers should be examined by a commission. Against this Delft
and a number of other towns sent in a counter-remonstrance, but
the influence of Amsterdam outweighed theirs in the provincial
States, who by a majority of votes persisted in their determination.
The Merchant Adventurers, however, appealed from the provincial
authorities to the States-General, who had always been their
protectors. And now began one of those curious struggles so common
in Dutch history between the town of Delft, the States of Holland,
and the States-General, all of them claiming independent authority
to deal with the matter. The Corporation of Delft refused to hand
over their contract with the Merchant Adventurers to be examined
by the Commission of the States of Holland. At last, however, it
was agreed by both parties that it should be placed in the hands of
Prince Maurice and some impartial persons, who should then confer
with the States, and draw 'a good regulation for the preserving of
the common industries'. Maurice appointed a commission on which the
ten towns interested in the cloth trade (of which naturally Delft
was one) were represented, to take the matter in hand, and on June
19, 1621, the 'Regulation' was drawn up which defined the privileges
and conditions under which the Adventurers henceforth for many years
carried on their trade in Holland. Its terms therefore deserve
to be briefly indicated. The old privileges giving freedom from
import and export duties, harbour and market tolls, &c., originally
granted in 1598, were not revoked, but defined afresh and modified.
Art. i gave the Fellowship permission to have their Court at Delft,
but only with the licences 'which we [the States of Holland] and
the States-General shall be pleased to accord, in trust that the
Netherlanders shall enjoy their old privileges in England.' This
last clause clearly referred to the fishing rights, with which at
that very moment the English Government were proposing to interfere.
Art. ii reminded the Adventurers that when residing in Holland 'they
would be subject to all our edicts and enactments made or still to
make.' Art. iii dealt with the excise recently imposed on foreign
woollen cloth. On this no concession was made; it must be promptly
paid. Art. iv insisted on the strict carrying out of the edict of
1614 forbidding the importation of dyed or prepared cloth, and also
of the edict on the 'tare', which had been renewed in 1617. Both
these edicts were regarded as grievances by the English, and had in
1618 and in 1621 been among the subjects on which negotiations had
proved fruitless.
Before this 'Regulation' of June 19, 1621, had come into force
the time fixed by King James for the dispatch of another embassy
to settle all outstanding disputes had passed by. Through the
representations of Carleton at the Hague, and the letters of their
own ambassador Caron from London, it was made clear, however, to the
States that a temporizing policy was no longer possible. Indefinite
delay would not be brooked. Steps were accordingly taken to approach
certain of those who claimed damages against the Greenland Company
with an offer to compound with them by a cash payment. Nor did
the States confine themselves to words, but gave practical proof
of their desire for peace, for when the Greenland Company applied
for a convoy of warships to accompany the whale-fishing fleet to
Spitzbergen, the States-General, after consultation with the States
of Holland, declined to grant the request, April 28. The determined
attitude of Carleton, who threatened reprisals in the Channel upon
the ships returning from the East Indies had its effect, and the
slow-moving Netherlanders were at last stirred to action. The new
envoys were appointed early in October, and though even after their
nomination there was further delay while the instructions were being
drawn up, within two months all preliminaries were completed, and
the embassy finally arrived in London, December 8, 1621.
Its arrival coincided with the final rupture between James and
his Parliament, and the situation was far from favourable to a
really friendly settlement. The King was in bad health, worried
and embittered in temper by the affronts which he had just been
enduring from what he regarded as the insolent demands of a House
of Commons which neither by threats nor by persuasion had he been
able to bend to his will. Both Philip III of Spain and the Archduke
Albert of the Netherlands had recently died. A young king reigned
in Madrid, but his favourite, the Count of Olivares, held the reins
of power, a man filled with the ambition of raising Spain once
again to her old position of ascendancy in Europe. His policy,
as stated in the Cortes of Castile, was to assist the Emperor to
crush the Protestant cause in Bohemia and in Germany, to attack
the Dutch rebels now that the truce was expired, and to defend with
all the power of the monarchy 'the sacred Catholic faith and the
authority of the Holy See'. Yet in spite of so clear a declaration
James fell more and more under the spell exercised over him by
Gondomar, who had Buckingham and other English councillors in his
pay, and who continued to dangle before the eyes of the infatuated
King, still dreaming of a Spanish match for his son, the hope that
by the friendly intervention of Philip IV at Vienna, he might be
able to secure without hostilities good terms for his son-in-law,
and a settlement of the Dutch and other questions in a manner
satisfactory to all parties. It was, of course, a purely visionary
project, nevertheless it is probable that James was sincere in his
aims, and thought that he was acting nobly in playing the part of
arbiter of peace and war. But he was really a puppet in the hands
of those who were far more astute than himself, and who, while he
was negotiating, were grimly preparing for the prosecution in real
earnest of the longest and most cruel war Europe has ever seen. It
was well known moreover to the statesmen, who treated him as their
dupe, that the breach between James and his Parliament effectually
prevented him, even if he wished it, from serious intervention.
The Dutch Embassy, which was accompanied by three Commissioners
on behalf of the East India Company, had at its head Francis van
Aerssen, Lord of Sommelsdijk. Aerssen, already distinguished as a
diplomatist and noted for the prominent part he had taken in the
recent overthrow of Oldenbarneveldt, was for many years to be the
trusted councillor of the Stadholders Maurice and Frederick Henry.
Richelieu, at a later time, spoke of him as one of the three ablest
statesmen of his time. He had now before him a long and difficult
task. Aitzema lays special emphasis on the duration and the expense
of this special mission. It lasted, he tells us, 454 days, and cost
80,850 guilders. 'In the course of it', he further remarks, 'King
James at the audiences made very particular and most remarkable
discourses, which were replied to by the Lord of Sommelsdijk with
exceptional prudence, he being a man of great sharp-sightedness,
eloquence, and experience.'
The skill of Aerssen is shown in the instructions for the embassy,
which, once more according to Aitzema, were drawn up by himself.
The following are the important points. Art. vii deals with the
'questions which have arisen on the whale fishery between the
English nation and the Greenland Company of their lands and
their differences concerning the pretended losses suffered on
either side.' The envoys are instructed, if possible, to come to
a friendly understanding, 'if not, by authoritative decision to
draw up for the future a Regulation of the aforesaid fishery' on
the lines of the previous negotiations, but 'not so as to cause
any disadvantage to the land's service or to the rights of the
privileged company,' Above all, nothing is to be concluded on this
matter without awaiting the orders of the States-General, should
time and opportunity permit. The next five articles treat of the
affairs of the two East India Companies, which were, in fact, the
main object of the mission. The cloth trade disputes are next
dealt with. If complaints should be made about the raising by the
States of Holland of the duty on foreign woollen goods, the lines
of defence are laid down in Arts. xiv and xv. In Art. xvi the
envoys are bidden to avoid any reopening of the 'tare' question,
but should the placard enforcing an examination of the goods by the
tare-masters be denounced, it must be shown to be necessary in the
interests of the cloth trade, and for the prevention of fraud. If
English subjects pretend to suffer any injury through the 'tare',
let them bring their grievances before their High Mightinesses,
who will see that justice is done. Likewise on the subject of the
'interlopers' (Art. xvii) silence is enjoined. The reply, however,
to any complaint is that his Majesty has the remedy in his own hands
by forbidding the 'interlopers' to trade. It would be far easier to
prevent their egress from England than their ingress into the United
Provinces. Art. xviii deals with the question of the Mint. Last of
all, the instructions arrive at the Great Fisheries difficulty.
The envoys are carefully to avoid any reference to this matter. If
compelled to speak about it, they are to say that they have received
no instructions thereon,
'as their High Mightinesses had hoped that the King would
leave this matter untouched, as His Majesty had thought good
to delay this whole question for a further period still and a
more fitting season. In any case this industry is necessary for
the subsistence of many thousands of the sea-faring folk of
their Lands, and to consent to a course that would ruin them is
_impossible_, and there is no hope that such consent would be
given either now or hereafter.'
Conferences were held with the Privy Council on January 15, February
17, and March 14, the Dutch trying to concentrate attention on the
East Indian differences, about which public opinion in England as
well as in Holland had been much stirred, and about the renewal of
the treaty of alliance, urging that the King should take sides with
his old allies against the Spaniards and active steps to recover
the Palatinate for his son-in-law. Buckingham's efforts to discuss
the alleged acts of violence by the Dutch fishermen to the King's
Scottish subjects only led to the reply that the States had issued a
strong edict against such acts and would punish them if proved. As
no progress to any agreement was being reached, the envoys suggested
a personal audience with the King. This was granted on April 27.
James was far from well, and in a very irritable humour. He received
them alone, and, contrary to his habit, sat in his chair during the
interview with his hat on, while the ambassadors stood the whole
time with uncovered heads. Aerssen, after the usual compliments,
spoke at considerable length, in accordance with the terms of his
instructions, upon the East Indian and other matters on which the
States desired to treat. The effect of this speech is best told in
the words of the original report of the proceedings:--
'They [the envoys] noted that His Majesty was entirely
prejudiced and prepared by his Council to set his heart against
them. To their compliments he gave no reply, letting them pass
unnoticed. When they (through their spokesman Aerssen) were
entering into the business, he said, "Make an end of your long
harangue. I will give a short and good answer. You are a good
orator, I know it well; when I was younger, so was I also; now
my memory fails me." Six times with great discourtesy did he
interrupt them.'
The violence of the 'short and good answer' in which he finally
poured forth the pent-up vials of his wrath upon the Dutchmen is at
least a proof that James, despite his age and infirmities, still
possessed considerable powers of invective. Speaking of the East
Indian disputes, he exclaimed:--
'You have taken away the goods of my subjects, have made war on,
murdered and mishandled them, without once thinking of what you
have enjoyed from this Crown, which has made you and maintained
you. You must give them satisfaction.... I hold that you ought
to show respect to my nation. You are speaking of the accord (of
1619), I decline to treat with you on equal terms. You have in
the Indies a Man[33] who well deserves to be hanged. Your people
over there represent everywhere your Prince of Orange as a great
King and Lord, and hold me up as a little kinglet, as if I stood
under him, thus misleading the barbarian kings.
* * * * *
Tell me what you are thinking of doing, whether you will take
action and give me satisfaction or not? Will you do it, then
do it the sooner the better; it will be best for you; when
will you begin? Surely you are like leeches, bloodsuckers of
my realm, you draw the blood from my subjects and seek to ruin
me; there are six points that show it clearly; take _the great
fishery_--you come here to land against the will of my subjects,
you do them damage, you injure them, you desecrate the Churches,
doing filthy acts in them, you hinder them from fishing; the
Greenland whale fishery you wish to dispute with me, without
making good the loss; France and Spain have ceded it to me,
with Denmark I have come to an agreement, you alone wish to
maintain it against me. I would not endure it either from France
or from Spain, do you think I either can or will bear it from
you? In the Cloths you are playing at _passe-passe_, as if you
were laying a burden on your inhabitants, and yet this is the
cause; these (the Cloths) are no more carried, therefrom as you
may have heard a mutiny and wellnigh a rebellion exists in my
Realm.'
[33] The Governor-General, Jan Pietersz Coen.
Having mentioned these three points, the other three appear to have
escaped his Majesty's memory. After this outburst the negotiations
were renewed, the East Indian questions being taken first. This
admirably suited the Dutch, who knew they had the upper hand in
the Indies and were anxious to shelve the fishery dispute as long
as possible. For months the weary negotiations proceeded, until in
August there was once more a deadlock. The King again granted an
audience (August 16), was again angry, and with small result. An
event now occurred which gave rise to fresh complaint. The Dutch
fishermen off the Scottish coast had encountered an Ostend vessel
with some Dutch prisoners on board. The Ostender was attacked and an
attempt made to set the captives free. A conference was held on the
matter in the King's presence, September 25, and the Hollanders were
accused of a breach of neutrality. The envoys rejoined that it was
the Ostender which had committed a breach of neutrality by bringing
prisoners into Scottish waters, and pointed out 'that no one had
so great an interest as his Majesty to prevent Spain from sharing
the sovereignty of the sea on which his Majesty was so mighty and
whereon his chief security lay'. This reference to James's relations
with Spain was more than the testy King could brook.
'It is you', he said, 'who are masters of the sea, far and wide,
you do just what you like, you hinder my own subjects from
fishing on my coasts, who at any rate according to all Rights
ought to enjoy the first benefit, but when I raise the question,
and urge you to observe my rights, to listen to what I have to
say, you will not agree to a single word being spoken about it;
yes, my ambassador writes to me that he might just as well
speak to you of the rights of my fishery, as of a declaration of
war with you. When you are at war, you say that your Government
has not yet been granted time for your community to get on its
legs. In peace, you have other excuses. The long and the short
is, you don't want to enter into it.'
The ambassadors were, however, not to be entrapped into a discussion
of the Great Fisheries; remarking that his Majesty had agreed to
defer speaking about this question, they skilfully turned his
attention to other subjects. One result of this conference was the
resolve of the Privy Council to make a serious effort to accommodate
the Greenland fishery dispute. A formal statement of the English
grievances was set forth in a letter to the ambassadors, and they
were requested, now that far more than the three months' delay which
the King had conceded was past, to pay up the indemnity of £22,000
for the losses that had been suffered. The Netherlanders at once
replied that they were ready to consider the Greenland differences
as soon as the East Indian were settled, but not before. Unless the
East Indian negotiations were pushed on, they threatened to return
home (October 3). For some two months accordingly the Indies held
the field. When, however, the middle of December had arrived the
Council once more repeated their demand that the indemnity, which
had been promised in 1619, should now be handed over. The envoys
denied having any knowledge of such a promise. They would make
inquiries about it, meanwhile their instructions only allowed them
to discuss the Greenland question as a whole and without prejudice.
They asked for proofs of the alleged promise. None were forthcoming.
So by raising this side-issue the Dutch achieved their object of
gaining time. An accord at last having been reached on East Indian
affairs, the envoys announced that after fourteen months' sojourn
in London they were unable to remain longer. Caron, they said,
would have full powers to carry on negotiations about the Greenland
matter. So far as any real settlement of disputes was concerned, the
embassy was again a complete failure. Even the accord in the East
was a sham. The English Company had obtained a nominal position of
equality with its Dutch rival in the Indies, and a definite share
of the coveted trade in the Spice islands. But all the power was in
the hands of the Dutch, and such an artificial arrangement was more
likely, as events were speedily to show, to breed fresh discords
than to allay the old ones.