The last two decades of the sixteenth century hold a place apart
in English History. The exploits of the great Elizabethan seamen
helped to shatter the supremacy of Spain upon the sea, but they did
more than this. They aroused in the English people the instinct of
their true destiny, as a maritime, trading, and colonizing power.
The granting of Charters to the Eastland (Baltic) Company (1579),
to the Levant Company (1581), to the Guinea Company (1588), the
foundation of the great East India Company (1600), the opening
out by the Muscovy Company of a new trade route to Persia by way
of Astrachan, the daring efforts to discover a North-West and a
North-East passage to Cathay and the Indies, the first attempts to
erect colonies in Virginia and Newfoundland, all testify to the
spirit of enterprise which animated the nation, a spirit whose
many-sided activity never failed to command the Queen's sympathy
and encouragement. In thus entering, however, upon that path of
colonial and commercial expansion which in later times was to become
world-wide, the Englishman found himself in the first half of the
seventeenth century confronted by a more formidable rival than the
Spaniard. The defeat of the Invincible Armada was followed[1] by the
rise of a new Sea-Power. At the opening of the seventeenth century
the Dutch Republic had not only succeeded in resisting all the
efforts made for its subjugation to Spanish rule, but, after more
than thirty years of continuous and desperate struggle, was thriving
in the midst of war. In the course of that struggle much help had
been given, both in money and men, by Elizabeth. But the English
Queen was not for many years whole-hearted in her support. She saw
in the revolt of the Netherlands a means for draining the resources
of a dangerous adversary. It was no small relief to her that the
coast lying opposite to the mouth of the Thames, with its many
ports and hardy sea-faring population, should no longer be at the
disposal of the master of the strongest navy in the world. She felt
a certain amount of sympathy with the Dutch on religious grounds,
but a sympathy tempered by political considerations, and strictly
subordinated to them. To support the rebellion of subjects against
their legitimate ruler was to the instincts of the Tudor Queen
a course which only necessity could justify. Hence her repeated
refusal of the proffered sovereignty, her niggardly aid, her
temporizing and apparently capricious attitude. As a matter of fact,
throughout this critical period of her reign the policy of Elizabeth
was not governed either by sentiment or by caprice. She always
kept steadily in view the welfare and the security of England,
with whose interests those of her own throne were identified, and
she held aloof from entanglements which might be dangerous to the
safety of her kingdom. Not until after the assassination of William
the Silent, followed by the success of Parma in capturing Antwerp,
August, 1585, did she make reply to the threatening attitude of
Spain by openly taking sides with the rebel provinces. Still
refusing the sovereignty, she sent Leicester at the head of a strong
body of English troops to act in her name, as Governor-General,
at the same time characteristically bargaining that the seaports
Flushing and Brill with the fort of Rammekens should be delivered
to her in pledge for the repayment of her costs. The mission of
Leicester was a failure, whether it be regarded from the military
or the political standpoint, but it gave the Dutch at a transition
period of disorganization and pressing peril a disciplined force to
assist in their defence, and a breathing space for recuperation.
[1] See the admirable monograph on the subject by the late Professor
Robert Fruin, _Tien Jaren uit de Tachtigjarigen Oorlog, 1588-98_.
The resignation of his post by Leicester (April, 1588) may be
taken as the date at which the history of the United Netherlands
as a self-governing State really begins. The treaty with England
still subsisted by the terms of which the Commander of the English
auxiliary troops with two colleagues had seats in the Council of
State, but the Council of State ceased ere long to have any but
executive functions. The conduct of affairs affecting the whole
Union was vested in the States-General as representing the States
of the seven sovereign provinces from which its authority was
derived. A more cumbrous system of government than that under which
the United Provinces were now to develop rapidly into a powerful
and flourishing State, probably never existed. That it was workable
was due to two facts. The voices of the provinces were nominally of
equal weight in the States-General, in reality that of Holland was
dominant. Holland contributed 60 per cent. of the general expenses
and contained about one-half of the entire population of the Union.
With Zeeland she furnished almost the whole of the navy and was
already becoming one of the most thriving centres of commerce in
the world. At this time the influence of an exceptionally able
statesman, John van Oldenbarneveldt, who filled the office of
Advocate of Holland, was supreme in the States of that province, and
as their representative and spokesman he was able to exercise an
authority in the States-General which placed for thirty years in his
hands the general administration of the country and the control of
foreign affairs. By his side stood Maurice of Nassau, respected and
honoured as the son of William the Silent, wielding as Captain and
Admiral-General authority over all the armed forces of the Republic,
and exercising as Stadholder of five provinces large executive
powers. A consummate general but no politician, Maurice was content
to leave the business of administration and the conduct of diplomacy
in the hands of the statesman who had been his father's friend.
Thus by the efforts of these two men, each eminent in his separate
sphere, the youthful Republic, despite the inherent weaknesses of a
confederacy so loosely compacted as that of the United Provinces,
was able to carry out a wise and consistent foreign policy, to
defend its borders, and meanwhile to thrive and flourish.
The relations between England and the States required the most
careful handling during the whole of the period that intervened
between the return of Leicester and the death of Elizabeth. The
assistance given by the English Queen had not been without a
return: it had been fully repaid by the services rendered by the
Dutch fleet during the spring and summer of 1588 in blockading the
ports in which lay the transports collected by the Duke of Parma
for the invasion of England. When the Armada entered the Channel,
Parma with his splendid veteran army was thus compelled to remain a
helpless spectator of events, unable to take any part in promoting
the success of the great enterprise which Philip had been so
long preparing. But Elizabeth had been piqued by the opposition
that Leicester had encountered, and by the evident determination
of the States, under the leadership of Holland, not to permit any
interference on the part of the representative of a foreign power
with their provincial rights and privileges. She did not withdraw
her help, but it was given from motives of pure self-interest rather
than from any love for the cause she was supporting, and in a
huckstering spirit. With her it was a question of give and take, and
the military successes of Maurice, accompanied as they were by the
rapid growth of commercial prosperity in Holland and Zeeland, only
encouraged her to drive a harder bargain in her negotiations and to
press for repayment of the loans she had advanced.
In these circumstances friction in the relations between England
and the Republic was at times inevitable, but the community of
interests was so strong that friendly co-operation never ceased.
An English contingent took part in the campaigns of Maurice; a
powerful Dutch squadron sailed with the fleet of Essex to the sack
of Cadiz in 1595. The conclusion of peace between France and Spain
in May, 1598, brought about a fresh treaty between England and the
United Provinces, the terms of which point clearly to the great
change which had taken place in the relative position of the two
States since the time of Leicester's mission. The Dutch were now in
a position to promise the repayment of their debt to Elizabeth by
equal annual instalments[2] and to undertake in case of a Spanish
attack upon England to come to the assistance of their allies with
thirty ships of war and a force of 5,000 infantry and five cornets
of cavalry. On the other hand, only one Englishman henceforth was
to have a seat upon the Council of State, and the English auxiliary
troops in the Netherlands were transferred to the service of the
States as their paymasters and were required to take an oath of
allegiance to them. This English brigade in the Dutch service, now
first formed, was to have a long and honourable career. It was
speedily to prove its worth and gain immortal fame by the share that
it took in winning the great victory of Nieuwport (July 2, 1600),
and in the heroic defence of Ostend (1601-4).
[2] The towns of Flushing and Brill and the fort of Rammekens were
delivered into the hands of Elizabeth, as security for repayment.
Such was the state of things when James I ascended the English
throne. From him the Netherlands could hope for little active aid.
The chief aim of James's policy from the first was to live on
friendly terms with Spain, and in 1604 he concluded a treaty of
peace with Philip III and with the Archdukes, as sovereigns of the
Netherlands. His attitude to the United Provinces was not indeed
unfriendly. He still retained the cautionary towns, as a pledge for
the debt, and his representative sat in the Council of State, but as
one of the conditions of peace he promised to lend no assistance to
the Dutch. The privilege of recruiting in England for the regiments
in their service was not withdrawn, but in return a like privilege
was extended to the Spaniards. Thus there were occasions on which
Englishmen were found fighting against one another on opposite
sides. The Court of Madrid on their part, exhausted by the long and
costly struggle, were already in 1606 making tentative proposals
to the rebel provinces for the conclusion of a peace or truce, and
meanwhile spared no efforts to prejudice the mind of James against a
people for whose cause as a stanch Protestant it was feared he might
have secret leanings, and at the same time to secure his benevolent
support in the coming negotiations. The arguments that were used
and their effect upon the King are well summed up in the words of
the keen-eyed Venetian Ambassador, Nicolò Molin, who in 1607 thus
reports:--
'The Spaniards are ceaselessly urging upon the King that for
his own interests he ought to use his utmost endeavours in this
negotiation in order to bring it to some conclusion, since by
continuance of the war the Dutch might come to make themselves
masters of those seas. Having their fleets ordinarily of a
hundred or more ships, and these widely scattered in different
places, they can thus say, and with truth, that they are masters
of those seas for the possession of which the ancient kings of
England have made very long and very costly wars against the
princes of Europe. The King knows all this to be true, but is
likewise of opinion that at a single nod of his the Dutch would
yield to him all that dominion that they have gained; which
without doubt would follow so long as the war with the Spaniards
lasted, since they are not able at one and the same time to
contend with two of the greatest princes of Christendom. But if
with time that ripens affairs peace should be effected between
them and the Crown of Spain, I do not know if they would be so
ready to yield as the King of England promises himself; since
just as this profession of the sea is manifestly more and more
on the wane in England, so more and more is it increasing and
acquiring force and vigour among the Dutch.'
The perspicacity of this review of the situation was completely
justified by the events. On April 9, 1609, after prolonged and
acrimonious negotiations, a treaty for a truce of twelve years
between the belligerents was signed, but on conditions imposed by
the Dutch. To the Spaniards the terrible drain on their resources
made a respite from war a matter not of choice, but of necessity. To
obtain it they had to treat with the United Provinces 'as if they
were an independent State', and, worst of all, they had by a secret
clause to concede liberty of trading in the Indies. From this moment
the relations of the States with England were sensibly changed. The
attitude of King James had hitherto been a mixture of condescension
and aloofness, and he had not troubled himself to consider seriously
the question of Dutch rivalry upon the seas and in commerce, which
had so profoundly impressed the Venetian envoy. Nicolò Molin was in
1607 undoubtedly correct in his supposition that at that date James
still looked upon the Dutch as dependents on his favour, who would
not venture to run counter to any expression of his will. The course
of the negotiations for the truce must have gradually undeceived
him, and their issue left him face to face with a power compelled to
maintain to the utmost the interests of the extensive commerce on
the proceeds of which its very existence as a State depended.
No sooner were the signatures appended to the treaty than James took
a step which exposed to a very severe strain his relations with the
people whose emancipation from Spanish rule he had, ostensibly at
least, worked hard to accomplish. Many indeed in Holland had been
suspicious of the real friendliness of his attitude during the
negotiations, but very few probably imagined that he was preparing,
as soon as they were ended, to put to the test their sense of the
value of his services and of his alliance by striking a deadly blow
at the most important of their industries. On May 16, 1609, the King
issued a proclamation, in which, after stating that though he had
hitherto tolerated the promiscuous liberty that had been granted
to foreigners to fish in the British seas, he has now determined,
seeing that this liberty
'hath not only given occasion of over great Encroachments upon
our Regalities, or rather questioning of our Right, but hath
been a means of daily Wrongs to our own People that exercise the
Trade of Fishing ... to give notice to all the World that our
express Pleasure is, that from the beginning of the Month of
August next coming, no Person of what Nation or Quality soever,
be permitted to fish upon any of our Coasts and Seas of Great
Britain, Ireland and the rest of the Isles adjacent, until they
have orderly demanded and obtain'd Licences from us....'
The news of the publication of this edict caused in Holland no
small surprise, not unmingled with indignation. On June 12 the
matter was discussed in the States of that Province, and it was
resolved[3] that the States-General be requested to adopt measures
for the vigorous defence of the land's rights as based upon the
treaties. The States-General on their part resolved[4] that a full
inquiry should be made into the question of treaty rights and a
special embassy be sent to London, and as early as July 6, King
James agreed[5] to receive such a deputation, and to appoint
commissioners to enter into conference with it on the subject of
the privileges and immunities for freedom of commerce claimed in
virtue of ancient treaties. Meanwhile the States-General promised
the fishermen their protection, at the same time bidding them to be
very careful not to give any cause for new complaints on the part
of the King. So far indeed were the Dutch from yielding immediate
submission to the demand of James, or from admitting its justice,
that Sir Ralph Winwood (the resident English ambassador at the
Hague), reporting to the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, the
results of an interview he had had with Oldenbarneveldt September
16, 1609, informs him:--
'the States do write expressly to their ambassador [Noel Caron]
urging him to advertise his Majesty their purpose to send to
beseech him upon the necessity of this affair [i.e. liberty of
fishing] in the meantime to have patience with their people
trading upon his coast that without impeachment they may use
_their accustomed Liberty and antient Privelidges_; which he
[Oldenbarneveldt] said they were so far from fear that his
Majesty upon due consideration will abridge, as that they hope
he will be pleased to inlarge and increase into new ones.'[6]
[3] Res. Holl. June 12, 1609.
[4] Res. St.-Gen. June 12, 1609.
[5] Art. 6 of the Treaty between James and the States, July 6 (June
25, 1609, o.s.).
[6] Winwood, _Memorials_, vol. iii.
For a right understanding of the importance of the fisheries
question and of the reasons which led King James at this particular
time to issue his proclamation, a short retrospect is necessary.
Special rights of free fishing in English waters had been granted
to the Hollanders and Zeelanders, as early as 1295, by King Edward
I, and afterwards renewed by several of his successors. Finally
a treaty was concluded, dated February 24, 1496, known as the
_Magnus Intercursus_, between Henry VII and Philip the Fair, Duke
of Burgundy, which was destined to regulate the commercial relations
between England and the Netherlands during the whole of the Tudor
period, and was still in force in 1609. Article XIV of this treaty
ran as follows:--
'Conventum, concordatum et conclusum est quod Piscatores
utriusque Partis Partium praedictarum (cujuscunque conditionis
existant) poterunt ubique Ire, Navigare per Mare, secure Piscari
absque aliquo Impedimento, Licentia, seu Salvo Conductu.'
Nothing could be more explicit or complete, and it was to this
clause of the _Magnus Intercursus_ and the rights it had so long
recognized that Oldenbarneveldt referred when he spoke to Winwood of
the Dutch fishermen's 'accustomed Liberty and antient Privelidges.'
The rights of the Netherlanders to trade and navigate in Scottish
waters, 'sine aliquo salvo conductu aut licentia generali aut
speciali', were guaranteed by the Treaty of Binche, dated December
15, 1550, which had been confirmed by James himself, as King of
Scotland, in 1594. But neither in this treaty of 1550, nor in
an earlier treaty of 1541 to which it expressly refers, '_circa
Piscationem et liberum usum Maris, ea quae per Tractatum anno 1541_
... inita, conclusa ac conventa fuerint debite ac sincere observari
debebunt', is there any definite statement that the free use of
the sea carried with it the right to fish without payment, though
undoubtedly that right seems to be implied, and was certainly
exercised without let or hindrance before 1609.
The question at issue was of vital consequence to the Dutch. It
may be asserted without any exaggeration that the commerce and
prosperity of Holland and Zeeland had been built upon the herring
fishery, and rested upon it. The discovering of the art of curing
the herring by Willem Beukelsz at the close of the fourteenth
century had transformed a perishable article of local consumption
into a commodity for traffic and exchange. Soon the 'great fishery',
as it was called, afforded, directly or indirectly, occupation and
a means of livelihood to a large part of the entire population
of the Province of Holland.[7] Not only did many thousands of
Hollanders put out to sea to follow the track of the herring shoals
along the British coasts, but thousands more found employment on
shore in building the busses, pinks, and other boats engaged in the
lucrative industry, and in providing them with ropes, nets, and
other necessaries. The profit from the fishery alone before the
outbreak of the revolt was estimated by Guicciardini at 500,000
Flemish pounds. But such an estimate was far from representing the
real value of what was styled by the States-General in an official
document 'one of the chiefest mines of the United Netherlands'.[8]
Salt was required for the curing. It was brought in Dutch bottoms
in its rough state from French and Spanish ports, or direct from
Punta del Rey on the coast of Venezuela, and salt-refineries quickly
sprang up at Enkhuysen, Hoorn, and other fishing centres. In a land
which had no natural products, the cured herrings and the refined
salt which were not required for home use served as articles of
commerce, and freights were dispatched to the neighbouring lands
but specially to the Baltic to be exchanged for corn, timber, hemp,
and other 'Eastland' commodities. The enterprising Hollanders and
Zeelanders, at first competed with the Hanse towns in the Baltic
ports, but long before the opening of the seventeenth century had
practically driven their rivals from the field, and at the time
with which we are dealing it has been computed that no less than
3,000 Dutch vessels were engaged in the 'Eastland' traffic through
the Sound. The corn in its turn brought by so vast a fleet far more
than sufficed even for the needs of a country where no corn was
grown. Some thousands of other ships laden with grain voyaged along
the coast of France, the Peninsula and the Western Mediterranean,
discharging their cargoes and returning with freights of wine, silk,
olive oil, and other staple products of the South. The Spaniards
and Portuguese were in fact largely dependent upon the Hollanders
for their necessary food supplies, and these keen traders had no
scruples in enriching themselves at the cost of their foes. An
abundance of timber and hemp also came from the Baltic and furnished
the raw material for flourishing shipbuilding and ropemaking
industries. Sawmills sprang up on the banks of the Zaan, and before
long Zaandam became the chief centre of the timber trade of Europe.
It will thus be seen at once how many Dutch interests were involved
in the full maintenance of the rights to free fishing on the British
coasts guaranteed by treaty, and why it was that the States-General
under pressure from the States of Holland should have determined
to send a special embassy to protest strongly and firmly against
the edict of King James, and should have meantime promised the
fishermen their protection in case of any attempt being made to
compel them by armed force to pay the licences.
[7] The Zeelanders in the seventeenth century, though they sent out
many fishermen to the Dogger Bank, to Greenland and Spitzbergen, did
not take much part in the herring fishery. See note.
[8] Groot Placaet-Boek (July 19, 1606).
The step taken by King James had, however, from the English point
of view much to recommend it. The English people saw the growing
maritime strength and rapidly increasing commercial prosperity of
the Dutch with jealous eyes. Their practical monopoly of the British
fisheries was deeply resented. Pamphlets were written lamenting the
decadence of English shipping and trade.[9] It was felt that the
ancient claim of England to the sovereignty and dominion of the
narrow seas was being challenged, and that its maintenance depended
upon the numbers and the experience of the sea-faring population,
for whom the fisheries were the best and most practical school.
A petition is extant from the fishermen of the Cinque Ports to
the King, showing that the Netherlanders drive them from their
fishing, and sell fresh fish contrary to the laws, and beseeching
His Majesty to impose on them a tax of fifteen shillings upon
every last of fish, the same as they imposed on the English.[10]
James was far from indisposed to listen to their complaints. Early
in his reign, in 1604, an attempt had been made to enforce the
eating of fish in England on fast-days, and the motive of it was
plainly stated. It had little to do with religious observances. It
was 'for the better increase of Seamen, to be readie at all times
to serve in the Kings Majesties Navie, of which the fishermen of
England have euer been the chiefest Seminarie and Nurserie.'[11]
The suggestion that licences should be required for which a tax or
toll should be paid naturally presented itself to the King, at this
time in sore straits for money and at his wit's end how to obtain
it, as a welcome expedient. It also afforded a means by which the
sovereignty and jurisdiction of the British King in the British seas
could be asserted and his regalities safeguarded.[12] The large
revenue derived by Christian IV of Denmark from the tolls in the
Sound had no doubt often made the impecunious James envious of his
brother-in-law, whose right to levy such an import in Danish waters
differed in no way from the right, which as King of Great Britain
and Ireland he was now asserting, to demand a licence from all
foreigners who desired to fish on the British coasts. His decision
to issue the proclamation was confirmed by the appearance in March,
1609, of the famous treatise of Hugo Grotius, entitled _Mare
Liberum_. The argument in this work seemed to be directed against
the principle of a _dominium maris_ such as the English Kings had
claimed for centuries in the 'narrow seas', and its publication
at this time aroused the resentment of James, always tenaciously
jealous of any infringement of his sovereign prerogatives. As a
matter of fact, as has been shown by the late Professor Robert
Fruin[13], the _Mare Liberum_ was originally a chapter of a larger
unpublished work of Grotius, written to prove that the Portuguese
had no exclusive rights in the Indian Ocean but that the Eastern
seas and all others were open to the traders of every nation. The
most burning question in the negotiations for the twelve years'
truce, then just drawing to a close, had been that of the liberty to
trade in the Indies, demanded with insistence by the Dutch, refused
up to the very last peremptorily by the Spanish King, and conceded
by him finally not directly but by a kind of subterfuge. The _Mare
Liberum_ of Grotius saw the light at a time when it was hoped that
his learned arguments might tend to allay the acuteness of the
dispute by showing the reasonableness and legality of the position
taken up by the Dutch. It is clear now that these arguments, though
their application was general, had their special reference to
Portuguese and not to British pretensions. Curiously enough, as
will be seen later, it was in the long succession of Anglo-Dutch
negotiations over the fisheries in the seas over which the Crown
of England claimed paramount sovereignty and jurisdiction that the
thesis put forward by the author of the _Mare Liberum_ was destined
to be the source of embittered controversy. The acute mind of King
James was quick in grasping its importance.
[9] _A Pollitique Platt_, by Robert Hitchcock, 1580.
_Observations made upon the Dutch fishery about the year 1601_, by
John Keymer. Ralegh, _Works_, i. 144.
Sir Thomas Overbury's observations in his travels in 1609: _Harleian
Misc._ viii. 349.
Discourse addressed to the King by Sir Nicholas Hales, on the
benefit derived by the Dutch from English fisheries. Terms suggested
for granting them a licence to fish for twenty-one years. _Calendar
of State Papers, Dom. Ser., 1603-10_, p. 509.
[10] _Cal. State Papers, Dom. Ser., 1603-10_, p. 509.
[11] _Statutes of the Realm_, iv. 2, p. 1058.
[12] Letter of Salisbury to Cornwallis, June 8, 1609. Winwood's
_State Papers_, iii. 44-50.
[13] Fruin's _Verspreide Geschriften_, vol. iii, pp. 408-45.
Delayed by various causes, it was not till April 16, 1610, that
the embassy from the States set sail from Brill for England. The
object of the mission was ostensibly a complimentary one--to thank
the King for the active part he had taken, as a mediator, in
bringing the truce negotiations to a favourable issue. The two
matters which called for serious discussion were: (1) the critical
situation which had arisen in the Jülich-Cleves Duchies owing to
a disputed succession; (2) the proclamation about the fisheries.
The importance of the last question was revealed by the fact that
all the five envoys originally selected were representatives of
the two maritime provinces. One of the five died at Brill just
before starting. The four who actually sailed (April 16) were:
Johan Berck, pensionary of Dort; Albert de Veer, pensionary of
Amsterdam; Elias van Oldenbarneveldt, pensionary of Rotterdam; and a
Zeelander, Albert Joachimi, who was later to show himself a skilful
diplomatist during the twenty-five years that he was resident Dutch
ambassador in London. Elias van Oldenbarneveldt was the brother
of the Advocate of Holland. According to a letter from Sir Ralph
Winwood[14] to Lord Salisbury he had special charge of the fishery
question, a proof of the peculiar interest felt by the Advocate in
the issue raised. With them was joined the resident ambassador, Noel
Caron. Their instructions required them to seek from His Majesty an
explanation of his intentions in the proclamation, 'since their High
Mightinesses the States-General could not believe that he meant to
include the inhabitants of the United Netherlands among those who
were bidden to pay for a licence to fish, since this was contrary
to the ancient treaties subsisting between them and the Crowns of
England and Scotland. After audiences with the King (April 27) and
with the Privy Council (May 8), it was arranged that a Conference
on the fisheries question should be held, with a Committee of the
Council, two of whose members were Sir Julius Caesar, Chancellor
of the Exchequer, and Sir Thomas Parry, Chancellor of the Duchy
of Lancaster. The Conference opened on May 16, and the points in
dispute were argued at length. The Dutch case was presented in a
memorandum drawn up with much skill, probably by the hand of Hugo
Grotius himself. The freedom of fishing was claimed on two grounds:
(1) that of the privileges granted by ancient treaties still in
force; (2) that of abstract right, because the sea, like the air,
is for the common use of all and cannot be private property. The
weak point of the case lay in the fact that these two grounds,
that of treaty right and that of the _Mare Liberum_, seemed to
be in a certain sense contradictory. The English, however, would
not admit that the question of the immemorial claim of the Kings
of England to sovereignty and jurisdiction in the seas adjoining
the British coasts was open to discussion, and seizing upon the
argument placed in their hands by the Dutch memorandum itself,
pleaded with great force that the granting of privileges implied
the power to take them away or modify them, should the King deem
such a step necessary to protect the interests of his own subjects.
The Conference therefore effected nothing more than the bringing
out in relief of the differences of view of the two parties. But
reflection brought wisdom. There was no wish on either side to
press matters to extremities. Already on May 10 the States-General,
unwilling to run the risk of making James an enemy, at a time when
they were very anxious to secure his help in the settlement of
the Jülich-Cleves succession question[15], had sent instructions
to their ambassadors not to make difficulties or unpleasantness
about the fisheries, but rather to propose that the execution of
the proclamation should be postponed for two years, in order that
the question might be thoroughly investigated. There were several
claimants to the Jülich-Cleves inheritance, Protestant and Catholic,
and it was of vital importance to the States, and also to a lesser
extent to all Protestant princes in Germany and to James, that this
frontier territory on the Rhine should not fall under the rule of a
Catholic sovereign. But the Archduke Leopold had seized the fortress
of Jülich, and Henry IV of France, jealous of the power of the House
of Habsburg in Europe, had put himself at the head of a coalition to
secure the succession to the Elector of Brandenburg, and William,
Count Palatine of Neuburg, as joint possessors. There was a general
desire to avoid hostilities, but Henry IV had pushed forward his
preparations for a great campaign, and war seemed inevitable. At
this moment the assassination of the French king at the very time
the Conference was being held in London changed the whole aspect
of affairs. The new French Government was favourably disposed to
Spain. The Dutch therefore were left face to face with the task of
expelling the Archduke from Jülich, and they felt that all other
matters were for the moment of secondary importance to that of
having the friendly co-operation of James in case of the outbreak
of war. Their attitude to the fisheries question was therefore
considerably modified. It became much more conciliatory, and for
precisely similar reasons a like change took place in the attitude
of the English King. He too felt that the friendship of the Dutch
was essential to him at such a critical juncture, and at a meeting
with the Earls of Salisbury and Northampton, May 24, the Dutch
envoys were agreeably surprised to find that the King, while not
formally abating one jot of his sovereign rights in the matter of
issuing licences for fishing, was willing to postpone the execution
of his edict for two years. The ambassadors took leave of the King
the same day and started on their return journey. Of this audience
the Lords of the Council, in a letter to Winwood, dated May 18, 1610
(o.s.), write:
'For the States Ambassadors, His Majesty is now dismissing them
with sufficient assurance of his inward affections towards them
and the preservation of their State, which next to his own he
holdeth most dear above all other respects in the world. And
as for the matter of fishing and Reglement of commerce, His
Majesty thinketh not fit now to spend any more time in it, but
to refer the one and the other to some better season; and in
the meanwhile that things may remain in the same state as now
they are. So as we conceive these Deputies will return with good
contentment, having no other cause either for the public or for
the private; and His Majesty having also been careful to give
them the rights that appertain to their title, and all other
external courtesy and honour in their reception.'
[14] Winwood's _Memorials_, March 16, (o.s.), 1610. See also letter
of April 6 (o.s.).
[15] See Note C.
This good understanding was to bear good fruit. The army, which
Maurice of Nassau led into the duchy in June, contained a fine
body of English troops under the command of Sir Edward Cecil.
Jülich was besieged and surrendered to the Dutch on September 1,
and the Archduke Leopold was compelled to leave the territory.
Of this achievement Sir Ralph Winwood, writing to Lord Salisbury
from Dusseldorf, August 22 (o.s.), says: 'The honor of the conduct
of this seige no man will detract from the Count Maurice, who is
the _Maistre-ouvrier_ in that _Mestier_. But that this Seige hath
had so happy an end, himself will and doth attribute it to the
Diligence and Judgement of Sir Edward Cecil.' The capture of Jülich
did not indeed end this thorny little dispute. Anglo-Dutch and
Spanish-Imperial armies, under Maurice and Spinola respectively,
manoeuvred within a short distance of one another. But the quarrel
was localized, no further hostilities took place, and finally by the
Treaty of Xanten, November 12, 1614, an arrangement was arrived at.
During all this time the relations between James and the States were
friendly. The King, however, had quarrelled with his Parliament,
and even had he wished to take a stronger line in foreign politics,
lack of funds compelled him to temporize. The English contingent in
Maurice's army was recruited indeed in England, but the troops were
in the pay of the States. Moreover, James was all the time hankering
after a Spanish marriage for the Prince of Wales, from mixed motives
doubtless, but chiefly from a misguided notion that such an alliance
between the leading Catholic and the leading Protestant State would
enable him to play the part of arbiter in the religious differences
which were dividing Europe into two hostile camps, and by his
influence to prevent an actual breach of the peace. This was the
underlying motive which prompted all the apparent fluctuations of
his policy. Hence the persistence with which for so many years he
pursued the _chimaera_ of a Spanish match, while at the same time he
allowed his only daughter to marry the Elector Palatine, the head of
the Protestant Union in Germany, and endeavoured to maintain good
relations with the United Provinces, notwithstanding the continual
friction between his subjects and the Dutch regarding the increasing
monopoly by the latter of the fisheries and of sea-borne trade. The
situation in 1611 is thus described by the Venetian, Marcantonio
Correr[16]:--
'With the lords of the United Provinces of the Low Countries,
there exists at present perfect friendship and union; formerly
he [James] used to despise them, as rebels, but now he loves
and esteems them, as princes of valour and quality, an effect
of the truce made with the Catholic king.... Now H.M. desires
and procures the preservation of the Dutch, but not a further
increase of their greatness, since their forces on sea are not
inferior to those of any potentate whatsoever, because that in
time of war necessity has been their best mistress. Of these
forces the English are not without some jealousy, seeing their
own diminished, and the dominion of the sea, that they have
been accustomed to hold in that part of the ocean transferred
to others.... In the herring fishery alone they [the Dutch]
send out every year to the east coast of the Kingdom of England
1,700 vessels, in which perhaps 30,000 men are employed.[17]
After the truce the King made a proclamation, that no one was
allowed to fish in those parts without licence, perhaps incited
by the great sums of money, that formerly the Spaniards offered
Queen Elizabeth to have the user of it; but just as at that time
that scheming did not succeed in despoiling the Dutch, so now
these with two special ambassadors have not obtained any promise
of an alteration, as he [the King] is always intent upon the
conservation of his jurisdiction and the increase of the royal
incomings. The King at present regards the possession of such
great sea power as being in itself of great moment for the needs
of England, and united with his own it could with difficulty
be resisted. He holds further that these same provinces are a
barrier rampart of his kingdoms, and he is interested in them
through the debt of a million and a half of gold that remains to
him of the sum of more than two millions already lent by Queen
Elizabeth, the repayment of which is at present spread over a
number of years, a portion every year. Meanwhile three principal
places are pledges in the hands of his Majesty....'
[16] _Relazioni venete_, _Inghilterra_, serie iv, p. 128.
[17] See Note A.
The possession of these fortresses was indeed at this time placing
King James in a position of no small advantage in his dealings with
the States, and he was well aware of it. On the other hand, it was
galling to the Dutch, now that they had compelled the Spaniard to
treat with the United Provinces as if it were an independent State,
to feel that two chief doors of entrance into their land were in the
hands of foreign garrisons. James professed to be their good friend,
and it appeared to be his interest to cultivate their alliance, but
it was inevitable that his assiduous advances to gain the goodwill
of Spain and to obtain the hand of an Infanta for his son should
render him suspect.