"On the very day indicated to me by Helfferich the Austrian ultimatum to
Serbia appeared. At this time I was again in Berlin, and I told
Helfferich that I regarded the tone and contents of the ultimatum as
simply monstrous. Dr. Helfferich, however, said that the note only had
that ring in the German translation. He had seen the ultimatum in
French, and in French it really could not be regarded as overdone. On
this occasion Helfferich also said to me that the Kaiser had gone on his
northern cruise only as a 'blind'; he had not arranged the cruise on the
usual extensive scale, but was remaining close at hand and keeping in
constant touch. Now one must simply wait and see what would happen. The
Austrians, who, of course, did not expect the ultimatum to be accepted,
were really acting rapidly before the other powers could find time to
interfere. The Deutsche Bank had already made its arrangements, so as to
be prepared for all eventualities. For example, it was no longer paying
out the gold which came in. That could easily be done without attracting
notice, and the amount day by day reached considerable sums.
"Immediately after the Vienna ultimatum to Serbia the German Government
issued declarations to the effect that Austria-Hungary had acted all
alone, without Germany's previous knowledge. When one attempted to
reconcile these declarations with the events mentioned above, the only
possible explanation was that the Kaiser had tied himself down without
inviting the co-operation of his Government, and that, in the
conversations with the Austrians, the Germans took care not to agree
upon the text of the ultimatum. For I have already shown that the
contents of the ultimatum were pretty accurately known in Germany.
"Herr Krupp von Böhlen, with whom I spoke about these German
declarations--which, at any rate in their effect, were lies--was also by
no means edified. For, as he said, Germany ought not, in such a
tremendous affair, to have given a blank check to a State like Austria;
and it was the duty of the leading statesmen to demand, both of the
Kaiser and of our allies, that the Austrian claims and the ultimatum to
Serbia should be discussed in minute detail and definitely decided upon,
and also that we should decide upon the precise program of our further
proceedings. He said that, whatever point of view one took, we ought not
to give ourselves into the hands of the Austrians and expose ourselves
to eventualities which had not been reckoned out in advance. One ought
to have connected appropriate conditions with our obligations. In short,
Herr von Böhlen regarded the German denial of previous knowledge, if
there was any trace of truth in it, as an offense against the elementary
principles of diplomacy; and he told me that he intended to speak in
this sense to Herr von Jagow, then Foreign Secretary, who was a special
friend of his.