On my return journey from Silesia I only remained a few hours in Berlin,
but I heard there that Austria intended to take steps against Serbia to
put an end to this intolerable situation. Unfortunately I undervalued
the importance of the information. I thought nothing would come of it,
and that it would be easy to settle the matter if Russia threatened. I
now regret that I did not stop in Berlin, and at once declare that I
could not agree to such a policy.
I have since learned that the inquiries and appeals from Vienna won
unconditional assent from all the influential men at a decisive
consultation at Potsdam on July 5, with the addition that it would not
matter if war with Russia resulted. This is what was stated, anyhow, in
the Austrian protocol which Count Mensdorff received in London. Shortly
afterward Herr von Jagow arrived in Vienna to discuss the whole question
with Count Berchtold.
Subsequently, I received instructions to work to obtain a friendly
attitude on the part of the English press, if Austria dealt Serbia a
deathblow, and by my influence to prevent so far as possible public
opinion from becoming opposed to Austria. Remembering England's attitude
during the annexation crisis, when public opinion sympathized with
Serbian rights to Bosnia and her kindly favoring of national movements
in the time of Lord Byron and that of Garibaldi, one thing and another
indicated so strongly the improbability of British support of the
proposed punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers, that I
felt bound to issue a serious warning. I also sent a warning against the
whole project, which I characterized as adventurous and dangerous, and
advised moderation being urged on the Austrians, as I did not believe in
the localization of the conflict.