The rage of certain gentlemen over my success in London and the position
I had achieved was indescribable. Schemes were set on foot to impede my
carrying out my duties, I was left in complete ignorance of most
important things, and had to confine myself to sending in unimportant
and dull reports. Secret reports from agents about things of which I
could know nothing without spies and necessary funds were never
available for me, and it was only in the last days of July, 1914, that I
heard accidentally from the Naval Attaché of the secret Anglo-French
agreement for joint action of the two fleets in case of war. Soon after
my arrival I became convinced that in no circumstances need we fear a
British attack or British support of a foreign attack, but that under
all conditions England would protect France. I advanced this opinion in
repeated reports with detailed reasoning and insistence, but without
gaining credence, although Lord Haldane's refusing of the formula of
neutrality and England's attitude during the Morocco crisis were clear
indications. In addition, the above-mentioned secret agreements were
known to the department. I repeatedly urged that England, as a
commercial State, would suffer greatly in any war between the European
great powers, and would therefore prevent such a war by all available
means; but, on the other hand, in the interest of the European balance
of power, and to prevent Germany's overlordship, would never tolerate
the weakening or destruction of France. Lord Haldane told me this
shortly after my arrival. All influential people spoke in the same way.