Most difficult of all, there remained the question of the fleet. It was
never quite rightly judged. The creation of a mighty fleet on the other
shore of the North Sea and the simultaneous development of the
Continent's most important military power into its most important naval
power had at least to be recognized by England as uncomfortable. This
presumably cannot be doubted. To maintain the necessary lead and not to
become dependent, to preserve the supremacy of the sea, which Britain
must have in order not to go down, she had to undertake preparations
and expenses which weighed heavily on the taxpayer. A threat against the
British world position was made in that our policy allowed the
possibility of warlike development to appear. This possibility was
obviously near during the Morocco crisis and the Bosnian question.
People had become reconciled to our fleet in its definite strength.
Obviously it was not welcome to the British and constituted one of the
motives, but neither the only nor the most important motive, for
England's joining hands with Russia and France. On account of our fleet
alone, however, England would have drawn the sword as little as on
account of our trade, which it is pretended called forth her jealousy
and ultimately brought about war.
From the beginning I adopted the standpoint that in spite of the fleet
it would be possible to come to a friendly understanding and
reapprochement if we did not propose new votes of credit, and, above
all, if we carried out an indisputable peace policy. I also avoided all
mention of the fleet, and between me and Sir Edward Grey the word was
never uttered. Sir Edward Grey declared on one occasion at a Cabinet
meeting: "The present German Ambassador has never mentioned the fleet to
me."