Once again we had successfully withstood one of the many threats against
the strength characterizing our policy. Russia had been obliged to give
way to us all along the line, as she never got an opportunity to advance
Serbian wishes. Albania was set up as an Austrian vassal State, and
Serbia was driven away from the sea. The conference was thus a fresh
humiliation for Russia.
As in 1878 and 1908, we had opposed the Russian program without German
interests being brought into play. Bismarck had to minimize the mistake
of the Congress by a secret treaty, and his attitude in the Battenberg
question--the downward incline being taken by us in the Bosnian
question--was followed up in London, and was not given up, with the
result that it led to the abyss.
The dissatisfaction then prevalent in Russia was given vent to during
the London Conference by an attack in the Russian press on my Russian
colleague and on Russian diplomacy.
His German origin and Catholic faith, his reputation as a friend of
Germany, and the accident that he was related both to Count Mensdorff
and to myself were all made use of by dissatisfied parties. Although not
a particularly important personality, Count Benckendorff possessed many
qualities of a good diplomat--tact, worldly knowledge, experience, an
agreeable personality, and a natural eye for men and things. He sought
always to avoid provocative attitudes, and was supported by the attitude
of England and France.
I once said: "The feeling in Russia is very anti-German." He replied:
"There are also many strong influential pro-German circles there. But
the people generally are anti-Austrian."
It only remains to be added that our exaggerated Austrophilism is not
exactly likely to break up the Entente and turn Russia's attention to
her Asiatic interests.