8. During the last days of November increased registration of hostile
artillery, the movements of troops and transport observed behind the
German lines, together with other indications of a like nature, pointed
to further efforts by the enemy to regain the positions we had wrested
from him.
The front affected by this increased activity included that of our
advance, as well as the ground to Vendhuille and beyond. The massing of
the enemy's infantry, however, his obvious anxiety concerning the
security of his defenses south of the Sensée River, the tactical
importance of the high ground about Bourlon, and the fact that we were
still only in partial possession of it, all pointed to the principal
attack being delivered in the Bourlon sector.
9. Measures were accordingly taken, both by the 3d Army and by the lower
formations concerned, to prepare for eventualities. Arrangements had
been made after our last attack to relieve the troops holding the
Bourlon positions by such fresh divisions as were available, and when
these reliefs had been satisfactorily completed I felt confident that
the defense of this sector could be considered secure.
Covering our right flank from Cantaing to the Banteux Ravine, a distance
of about 16,000 yards, five British divisions were disposed, and, though
these had been fighting for several days and were consequently tired, I
felt confident that they would prove equal to stopping any attack the
enemy could make on them.
From the Banteux Ravine southward the divisions in line were weak and
held very extended fronts. On the other hand, the line held by us in
this southern sector had been in our possession for some months. Its
defenses were for this reason more complete and better organized than
those of the ground gained by us in our attack. Moreover, the capture of
the Bonavis Ridge had added to the security of our position further
south.
The reserve divisions immediately available in the area consisted of the
Guards and 2d Cavalry Divisions, both of which had been engaged in the
recent fighting at Fontaine and Bourlon Wood. These were located behind
the La Vacquerie-Villers Guislain front, while another division, the
62d, which had also been recently engaged, was placed further to the
northwest in the direction of the Bapaume-Cambrai road. A fresh South
Midland Division was assembling further back, two other cavalry
divisions were within from two to three hours' march of the battle area,
and another cavalry division but a little further distant.
In view of the symptoms of activity observed on the enemy's front,
special precautions were taken by local commanders, especially from
Villers Guislain to the south. Troops were warned to expect attack,
additional machine guns were placed to secure supporting points, and
divisional reserves were closed up. Special patrols were also sent out
to watch for signs of any hostile advance.